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 This dissertation explores the role of the Upper Creek Indian town of Little 
Tallassee in Creek History, beginning with the town’s origins during the 1740s and 1750s 
and ending with its decline in the late 1780s and early 1790s. Little Tallassee is a unique 
place as it was a product of a colonial encounter and originated as a center of Euro-
exchange and Atlantic trade. Yet under the leadership of headman and warrior 
Emistisiguo, Little Tallassee evolved into a prominent Creek town that saw the creation 
of a formal town structure as well as a ceremonial space in which to conduct international 
diplomacy and manage trade. 
 The vast majority of American Indian histories of the Native South have attached 
Little Tallassee’s identity to its most notable resident, Alexander McGillivray, a mixed-
ancestry Creek and arguably one of the most notable historical figures to emerge out of 
the American Southeast. Contrary to existing historiography, I argue that Alexander 
McGillivray was first and foremost a trader who held little political authority within 
Creek society. An examination of the town’s history reveals Emistisiguo to have been the 
individual most responsible for Little Tallassee’s prominence as a Creek town within 
Creek society. McGillivray’s activities actually contributed to the town’s subsequent 
decline. Placing Little Tallassee at the forefront of Creek and colonial American 
historiography challenges the current scholarship on Alexander McGillivray’s power and 
authority and restores agency to Creek Indians at the local level in their own domestic 
and foreign affairs. 
 
 Scholars have cast their gaze far too long at western-educated mestizos and 
cultural brokers like Alexander McGillivray, and as a result have obscured other Native 
architects of diplomacy and trade who dominated the economic and social realms of 
Indian societies throughout the eighteenth century. By restoring credit to Emistisiguo as 
the engineer behind the transformation of Little Tallassee from a mere trading post to a 
leading Upper Creek town and center of diplomacy, this dissertation addresses this 
significant oversight in Creek and Southeastern Indian historiography. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Upper Creek town of Little Tallassee is a familiar place to historians of 
Southeastern Indian and Colonial history. It is best known as the home of Alexander 
McGillivray, a mixed ancestry Creek and arguably one of the most notable historical 
figures to emerge out of the American Southeast. McGillivray was a powerful and 
influential man who at different points in his life served as a champion of Creek national 
independence after the American Revolution, a diplomatic liaison between Spain and the 
United States, and a partner of one of the region’s most successful trading houses, 
Panton, Leslie and Company. He also negotiated The Treaty of New York, one of the 
largest Creek land cessions in history to the American government. The details and 
motivation behind the treaty are subject to interpretation, and have left McGillivray with 
a debatable, but memorable legacy.1 
  Little Tallassee was also the home of Emistisiguo, one of the most prominent 
traditional headmen of the Creek Nation from 1763 to his death in 1782. Emistisiguo’s 
role in the region was not limited to local Creek politics, and within his relatively short 
                                                 
1 There is an overwhelming amount of literature available on the career of Alexander McGillivray. For an 
introduction, see Kathleen DuVal’s Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution 
(New York, NY: Random House Press, 2015), 24-34; John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 
ed. William J. Bauer, Jr. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938, reprinted Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 3-57, and Linda Langely, “The Tribal Identity of Alexander 
McGillivray: A Review of the Historic and Ethnographic Data,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the 
Louisiana Historical Association 46:2 (Spring 2005): 231-9. 
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life he came to be a respected war hero, politician, diplomat, and Beloved Man of Little 
Tallassee. Furthermore, he was an invaluable ally to the British during the American 
Revolution, and mentor to the young Alexander McGillivray.2 Emistisiguo’s strong and 
crucial role in the development of Little Tallassee has long been overshadowed by his 
successor, Alexander McGillivray and the later years of Little Tallassee during the birth 
of the American Republic. Looking back on the origins of the town offers a fresh 
perspective on Emistisiguo and the evolution of Creek towns that resulted from the 
development of new intercultural trade routes to distant markets during the eighteenth 
century. Focusing on this early period provides invaluable insight into the relationship 
between two important Creek leaders, Emistisiguo, Alexander McGillivray, and restores 
Emistisiguo to his prominent role in late eighteenth-century Creek history.  
 This dissertation explores the contributions of the Upper Creek Indian town of 
Little Tallassee to Creek History beginning with the town’s origins during the 1740s and 
1750s to its decline in the late 1780s and early 1790s. Unlike other Creek towns, Little 
Tallassee is unique as it was a product of a colonial encounter and originated purely as a 
center of Euro-exchange and Atlantic trade. I argue that despite these unique origins, 
under the leadership of Emistisiguo during the 1760s Little Tallassee evolved into a 
prominent Creek town that responded to all the needs of Native culture with the creation 
                                                 
2 There is no one book on the career of Emistisiguo. The paper trail of Emistisiguo exists in almost every 
modern book on Creek history, but is scattered and quite muddied at times. The most detailed and recent 
account of Emistisiguo can be found in Kathleen DuVal’s Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the 
American Revolution (New York, NY: Random House Press, 2015), 19, 77-78, 82-83, 85, 177-78, 228-29, 
240, 246, 248. Another valuable work that one can look to for accurate information on Emistisiguo is John 
T. Juricek’s Endgame for Empire: British-Creek Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776 
(Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2015). 
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of formal town political structure as well as a ceremonial space in which to conduct 
international diplomacy. Emistisiguo based his authority on traditional markers such as 
success as a warrior, and innovative diplomacy that expanded Little Tallassee’s 
importance within Creek Country. As a result, he transformed Little Tallassee into a 
sacred space where decisions of war and peace were made during the Creek-Choctaw 
War (1766-1776) and the American Revolutionary War (1776-1783). Under his 
leadership, by the mid-to-late eighteenth century, Little Tallassee had emerged as a center 
of diplomacy and Anglo-Creek trade not only for the Upper Creeks, but the majority of 
Creek towns. 
 Emistisiguo’s death in 1781 marked an end of an era for Little Tallassee as a 
traditional Creek town. Alexander McGillivray, whom most scholars view essentially as 
Emistisiguo’s political successor resided at Little Tallassee throughout the 1780s. He was 
one quarter Creek, one quarter French, as well as half Scottish, and is usually envisioned 
as a bicultural, adept Indian who thus made a highly successful leader.3 McGillivray was 
not a Creek headman, warrior, or even as a savvy politician and memorable leader of the 
Creek ‘Nation’ as current historiography has depicted him to be. I contend that Alexander 
McGillivray was first and foremost a Creek trader. McGillivray did serve Little Tallassee 
                                                 
3 McGillivray was only one quarter Creek, his mother Sehoy being the daughter of a French Captain named 
Marchland. Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Shaping of the Southern Colonial 
Frontier (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 72-73; “Lachlan and Sehoy,” in John Walter 
Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, ed. William J. Bauer, Jr. (University of Oklahoma Press, 1938, 
reprinted Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 9-13.(hereafter cited as Caughey, 
McGillivray of the Creeks, page number(s). See also, Albert James Pickett, History of Alabama and 
Incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi from the Earliest Period. 1851. (Repr. Birmingham, AL: 
Birmingham Book and Magazine Co., 1962), 343-33; Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives Lost on 
the Edge of the American Revolution (New York, NY: Random House Press, 2016), 28. 
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and the Upper Creeks in an advisory capacity as well as an active spokesperson, but 
unlike Emistisiguo, he held little political authority within Creek society. McGillivray 
was the sole facilitator of Euro-Creek trade throughout the 1780s, but a Creek town 
cannot exist on trade alone. No traditional headman ever replaced Emistisiguo, and 
because of this by the middle of the 1780s Little Tallassee quickly lost its place as the 
center of Creek diplomacy and prestige as a leading Upper Creek town. By the time of 
McGillivray’s death in 1793, Little Tallassee was nothing more than a trade depot. Thus, 
even Little Tallassee’s decline was unusual, as the town itself dissolved decades before 
Indian Removal. 
 There is no known documentary evidence of what Little Tallassee looked like 
spatially, but given the fact that Little Tallassee served as a center of international 
diplomacy throughout the mid-1760s to 1770s one can assume it looked similar to other 
important Creek towns such as the Okfuskee or Tuckabatchee. Located at the very center 
would be a large town square that served as an accessible public and ritual space, along 
with a large plaza and public buildings. The plaza was a place for Creeks to socialize, 
perform ceremonial dances and festivities, play ball games, debate personal affairs, and 
conduct business with resident traders. Outside of the plaza were agricultural fields, 
where Creek women during the spring and summer seasons would tend to their crops. 
Once a year, both men and women would gather together to celebrate the Creek Corn 
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Busk, a ceremony of both physical and spiritual renewal for the town and their 
neighbors.4 
Creek towns were independent social and political units within Creek society that 
served as diplomatic and spiritual centers. Headmen and warriors gathered around the 
sacred square and held a town council to discuss domestic and foreign affairs. The 
council was composed of a selection of men, all of whom held a merit-based rank and 
title. While each Creek town was different, their councils were composed of similar 
members, including the leading headman (mico), the second man (heniha) who advised 
the principal headman and assumed political control in extreme circumstances, as well as 
a number of other political officials and secondary advisors. Elders referred to as Beloved 
Men (isti atcacagi) also served on the council and provided wisdom and experience to 
guide all discussions. The town meetings lasted anywhere from a few hours to several 
days, and ended when a consensus had been reached amongst all councilmen. A spiral 
cane would be lit at the start of each town meeting as a symbolic reminder that the 
council was “of one fire” based upon kinship and all councilmen had an equal voice 
while deliberating town affairs.5  
There is ample evidence that throughout Emistisiguo’s residency at Little 
Tallassee he was accompanied by a Second Man known as Neothlucco.6 In addition, 
                                                 
4 Robbie Ethridge’s Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel Hill, NC, University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003) provides one of the most detailed descriptions of the spatial layout, social 
organization, and sacred elements of Creek towns. See Chapter 4, “The Heart of Creek Country” of this 
book in particular. Another excellent account can be found in Steven C. Hahn’s The Invention of the Creek 
Nation 1670-1763 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), pp. 20-26. 
5 Robbie Ethridge’s Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003), 101-108; Steven C. Hahn’s The Invention of the Creek Nation, 20. 
6 Several historians have noted the presence of the Second Man at Little Tallassee. For examples, see John 
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there is one account in the documentary record that confirms the presence of an actual 
town square at Little Tallassee during a diplomatic meeting hosted by Emistisiguo in 
February of 1774. During the meeting, Emistisiguo presented the British Superintendent 
David Taitt with gifts of white beads, tobacco, both symbolic peace offerings on behalf of 
the Upper Creeks. During the exchange, Emistisiguo remarked the clay to have been 
“white” and “the same as our Square.”7 The presence of a town square and a Second Man 
at Little Tallassee supports my argument that a formal Creek town and political structure 
was in place by 1774 at the latest, while the number of diplomatic meetings that took 
place before 1774 indicates Little Tallassee could have been a traditional Creek town as 
early as the 1760s. 
 All town meetings were accompanied by a series of rituals in order to create a 
sacred atmosphere that fostered honest discussion. A trained spiritual specialist or master 
of ceremonies prepared and served Acee, also known as “the black drink,” that was 
consumed by all council participants at the beginning of the meeting. Acee was a high 
caffeine plant that in most cases caused one to regurgitate minutes later and served as a 
means to “purify” one’s mind and body before entering discussion of any important town 
                                                 
T. Juricek, Endgame for Empire: British Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776 (Gainesville, FL: 
University of Florida Press, 2015), pp. 47, 113, 145, 192-94, 218-20, 227; Kathryn E. Holland Braund, 
Deerskin and Duffels: Creek Indian Trade with Anglo America, 1685-1815 (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1993), 151; David H. Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 1540-1783 (Norman, OK: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 255. 
7 Emistisiguo references the town square in the following talk: Upper Creek “Great Talk” to Superintendent 
Stuart, Seeking Georgia-Lower Creek Reconciliation, 2/4/1774, Little Tallassee, in Georgia Treaties, 1733-
1763, ed. John T. Juricek, in vol. 11 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, 
ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002). Historian David 
Corkran does also report that on on April 20th of 1766 that “Upper Creek headmen assembled in 
Emistisiguo’s square at Little Tallassee.” David H. Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 258. 
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affairs.8 At the close of the meeting, the spiritual specialist would circulate a calumet that 
when smoked would sanctify agreements between all council members. These two 
particular rituals were required especially if the meeting was cross cultural in scope. In 
order to guarantee success of all diplomatic agreements between outsiders, whether they 
be European, Indian, or American, a sacred atmosphere sealed by the smoking of the 
calumet was of utmost importance.9 
Emistisiguo’s status and expertise as a traditional headman enabled Little 
Tallassee’s transition from a trade post to a Creek town. Emistisiguo gained authority 
amongst his fellow Creeks through his accomplishments as a military official as well as 
someone who controlled access to vital European manufactured goods. Furthermore, he 
was a war prophet, a type of spiritual specialist who possessed the power to predict the 
outcome of battles from afar with the assistance of a sacred medicinal bundle. As a 
successful diplomat, warrior, and a man of inherent spiritual power, Emistisiguo served 
multiple needs of Creek culture as a traditional headman. Emistisiguo participated in 
town councils where he gained the support of his townspeople, created the necessary 
sacred ceremonial setting for diplomatic meetings between other Indian groups or Euro-
Americans, as well as supplying Creeks with trade goods through many of his diplomatic 
negotiations.  
                                                 
8 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 104-105; Steven Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 24-25. 
9 For further discussion on ceremonial and spiritual components of Southeastern Indian diplomacy, see 
Greg O’Brien, “The Conquered Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-
Revolutionary Southern Frontier”, in Pre-Removal Choctaw History: Exploring New Paths, ed. Greg 
O’Brien (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 148-183. 
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Relying on trade as a source of authority was dangerous due to the fact that war 
with neighboring Indian groups or Euro-Americans could easily disrupt it and being in 
debt to traders threatened the long-term stability of Indian societies. If the headman lost 
access these important trade routes then their prestige and influence would wane. By the 
middle of the eighteenth century, control over access to trade goods became a new way to 
exert authority over others.10 Emistisiguo’s ability to maintain Creek access to European 
trade through various diplomatic meetings throughout the 1760s and 1770s bolstered his 
authority amongst the Creeks. He was a traditional headman who demonstrated his 
authority through traditional and non-traditional definitions of power. 
*** 
While combing through the sources on Creeks during the Revolutionary period, 
Emistisiguo’s name kept appearing and reappearing. I recalled seeing his name in Creek 
and Native South historiography, but his identity remained quite a mystery to me. Little 
Tallassee appeared in the same historiography just as frequently as Emistisiguo, but all 
sources indicated it to be a place of trade and the birth place of Alexander McGillivray. 
Based on current scholarship and primary source readings, it became clear to me that 
Little Tallassee was an important place. Exactly why it was significant became and 
remained the question, as well as Emistisiguo’s connection to the bustling trade center. 
Within only a period of approximately twenty years, Little Tallassee transformed 
from a trading center to a true Indian town. In fact, it is the only known Upper Creek 
                                                 
10 For a more in-depth analysis of traditional and non-traditional sources of Southeastern Indian sources of 
power during the Eighteenth Century, see Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age 1750-1830 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), Chapters 3 and 4 in particular. 
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town (and possibly Lower) to be a product of eighteenth-century Euro-American trade. 
Little Tallassee lacked ancient origins and before the arrival of Emistisiguo had no 
traditional town square. It also appeared to contain no significant cultural and ceremonial 
features of what constitutes a Creek town by Native standards. Little Tallassee’s 
evolution, from trade post to Creek town and subsequent decline, provides historians rare 
and unique insight into the colonial encounter in the American Southeast during the 
eighteenth-century. 
Further study of Little Tallassee’s origins transforms Alexander McGillivray’s 
legacy regarding the success of his home town and Creek national politics. A close 
examination of the town’s history revealed Emistisiguo to be the architect and force of 
leadership behind Little Tallassee’s prominence as a Creek town within Southeastern 
Indian and Creek society. McGillivray’s later presence only led to the town’s subsequent 
decline. Placing the history of Little Tallassee in its entirety at the forefront of Creek and 
American historiography challenges current scholarship on Alexander McGillivray’s 
power and authority as well as restores Creek Indians’ agency in their own domestic and 
foreign affairs at the local level. 
Trade was not enough to sustain a traditional Creek town. Under the leadership of 
Emistisiguo during the 1760s and 1770s, Little Tallassee was a place where significant 
diplomacy took place between Creeks and both their Indian and non-Indian neighbors. As 
a traditional headman, Emistisiguo created a space at Little Tallassee that was vibrant in 
Creek culture, whether that be participation in town councils or conducting ritual 
ceremonies before trade negotiation. Little Tallassee provides historians a closer look at 
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what constitutes a Creek town during the eighteenth-century. The strength of Indian 
institutions and traditional Indian leadership is thus the most vital component of a Creek 
town. 
It is not the case that Little Tallassee was so obscure a place that historians have 
not noticed it. The problem is that past and current scholars have misunderstood Little 
Tallassee’s role in Creek society and therefore have not recognized it was, for a brief 
period, an actual Creek town. Creek scholars have reduced Little Tallassee to be a small 
trade community or a mere trade outpost and depot. The oversight, I argue, is due to the 
fact that historians have focused too long on the subject of Alexander McGillivray. The 
majority of historians who have examined Little Tallassee utilized the abundance of 
evidence that McGillivray himself left behind, and an even wider literature examines the 
McGillivray family and their notable trade companies. As a result, scholars have 
associated Little Tallassee as a place of European trade, rather than examining the role 
that Creeks, and in particular Emistisiguo, played in Little Tallassee’s emergence as a 
Euro-American trade center as well as prominent Upper Creek town. 
Alexander McGillivray and the extensive scholarship surrounding him has 
hindered development of a more realistic and nuanced understanding of Creek history. 
The reason scholars have magnified McGillivray’s power and influence within Creek 
society was due to the large quantity of correspondence between Spanish, American, 
Scottish and English trade partners, letters that he penned himself and subsequently 
archived. Alexander McGillivray’s writings are filled with self-aggrandizement, desire 
for wealth, and a yearning for authority within Creek society that he never achieved. A 
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closer reading of these documents along with Spanish and lesser known English sources 
exposes the bias and inaccuracies of the bulk of his writings. When these documents are 
placed within a larger historical context as well as read through an ethnographic lens, 
McGillivray’s identity more closely resembles that of a white landed planter and a 
business man who prioritized his own private investments in trade over the interests of 
Creek society. Alexander McGillivray was the sole facilitator of Creek trade during the 
1780s but held very little authority within Creek society outside of the trade monopoly he 
and his firm, Panton, Leslie, and Company created. 
The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate and restore power to the Creek 
actors that were responsible for Little Tallassee’s evolution from a center of Indian trade 
to a prominent Creek town. All decisions, whether they were for peace or war, were 
conducted in the square grounds of Creek towns. Even the famous Alexander 
McGillivray was reliant on the headmen and warriors of other Creek towns throughout 
the duration of his life in Indian country. Too much credit has been given to Alexander 
McGillivray and to educated mestizos, cultural brokers, and intermediaries, in general, 
and not enough attention has been paid to traditional aspects of Creek culture in the 
town’s history. A close study of Little Tallassee as a trade community and Creek town 
exposes this problem. 
This dissertation is part of the wave of New Indian history, which places Indians 
at the center of the narrative. By looking at Little Tallassee’s entire history, and focusing 
on Emistisiguo’s importance, recasts and limits the role of McGillivray within this 
history. Little Tallassee’s emergence within Creek society depended upon the ambitions 
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of the key Native personalities that inhabited it. This study is therefore not only written as 
a town history, but also as a biographical study of the two individuals that created and 
shaped Little Tallassee: Emistisiguo and Alexander McGillivray. 
There is no scholarly study dedicated solely to Little Tallassee, despite its unique 
place to Creek and European worlds during the middle of the eighteenth-century.11 In 
addition, Emistisiguo, Little Tallassee’s prominent headman, has garnered very little 
attention by scholars of Creek history and the Native South.12 One of the first historians 
to discuss Emistisiguo, and highlight the importance of his presence was Colin G. 
Calloway. Calloway proclaims, in his pioneering work The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and 
the Transformation of North America (2006), that Emistisiguo’s first “debut on a major 
stage” occurred at the Treaty of Augusta in 1763.13 At that conference, he and his fellow 
Creeks gathered to discuss the idea of conducting trade only with the British, not any 
other European power, in the aftermath of the Seven Years War. Calloway’s emphasis 
                                                 
11 The most substantial research that has been conducted on Little Tallassee has been that of the 
archaeologists Gregory Waselkov and Craig Shelton but their scope has been limited due to the fact that 
most of the former town is restricted and off limits for excavation. The fact that Little Tallassee declined in 
both population and significance during the late 1780s and 1790s partly explains their limited findings. 
Gregory A. Waselkov, “Coosa River Valley Archaeology Volume I: Auburn University Monograph 2” 
(Auburn, GA: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Auburn University, 1980), 20-37, sites 1EE5, 
1EE150, and 1EE211. The largest geographical site, 1EE3, Waselkov suspects to be the largest location of 
Little Tallassee, but the site has not been revisited since 1955 and there are no available descriptions of the 
types of artifacts that were found there.  
12 For examples of important Creek scholarship that discuss Emistisiguo briefly but lack analysis, see the 
following: Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation: 1670-1763 (Lincoln, NE, University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004), 274; Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity 
in Early America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 157, 163; Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A 
Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 146, 189-191; 
Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskin and Duffels: Creek Indian Trade with Anglo America, 1685-1815 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), pp. 141, 151, 161-162, 166-170; Claudio Saunt, A New 
Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-1816 (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 19-21, 39, 47-49, 81, 96, 151. 
13 Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103. 
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was not Emistisiguo’s role in the Treaty of Augusta, but the importance of the treaty 
itself. However, it was the first book to acknowledge the role that Indians across the 
Eastern seaboard played important roles negotiating new trade alliances after the French 
and Indian War. He places the Creeks at the center of the discussions of politics and trade 
that occurred at Augusta. 
 John T. Juricek’s Endgame for Empire: British-Creek Relations in Georgia and 
Vicinity, 1763-1778, builds on Calloway’s acknowledgement of the significance of the 
year 1763, by providing a detailed account of Anglo-Creek trade and politics from 1763 
to 1776.14 Juricek argues that the Treaty of Augusta was the first of many significant 
public appearances Emistisiguo made representing Little Tallassee. These appearances 
followed his emergence as a significant Upper Creek headman and strong advocate for 
the preservation of Anglo-Creek trade. For example, Juricek verifies that Emistisiguo was 
present at the Congress with the British at Pensacola in 1765, which demonstrated the 
headman’s support for trade based out of the Gulf Coast. His presence at this meeting has 
gone largely unnoticed as few historians have focused on the conference. This 
dissertation is indebted to Juricek’s work as he was the first historian to provide a 
                                                 
14 Juricek’s collection of primary source documents: Georgia Treaties and Georgia-Florida Treaties also 
provided a steady paper trail for me to follow while I searched for the beginnings of Emistisiguo’s career as 
a headman, warrior, and diplomat. Chapter 4 as well Chapter 7 of Endgame for Empire in particular discuss 
Emistisiguo’s defining actions in matters of Anglo-Creek trade. See, John T. Juricek, Endgame for Empire: 
British Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2015); 
Georgia Treaties, 1733-1763, ed. John T. Juricek, in vol. 11 of Early American Indian Documents: 
Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 
2002); Georgia and Florida Treaties, 1763-1776, ed. John T. Juricek, in vol. 12 of Early American Indian 
Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications 
of America, 2002). 
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detailed paper trail of Emistisiguo and his involvement in Anglo-Creek trade during the 
Colonial Era. 
My dissertation both adds to and revises John T. Juricek’s work. First and 
foremost, I argue that the Treaty of Augusta in 1763 was not the first public appearance 
of Emistisiguo as Little Tallassee’s headman and warrior. Emistisiguo appeared in major 
diplomatic meetings in 1759 and again in 1761.15 The 1759 congress was held by the 
British to convince the Upper Creeks to enter the fold before the end of the Seven Years 
War, and the 1761 assembly was held at Little Tallassee by leading headmen of the 
Upper Creek towns to discuss that idea.16 Second, I contend that Emistisiguo championed 
forging an alliance with the British to open trade out of the Gulf Coast region as far back 
as 1763 and continued to do so throughout the 1760s and 1770s. Last, my most 
significant revision is one that builds off of Juricek’s study of Emistisiguo organizing a 
campaign to abandon clan revenge momentarily in order to preserve Anglo-Creek trade 
in lieu of escalating frontier violence with the colony of Georgia in the mid-1760s. 
Clan or “blood” revenge was a Creek cultural practice that stipulated a Creek 
warrior had the right to kill any person or relative that was responsible for the murder of a 
member of their own clan. Creek clans were ancient kinship groups, related by blood, 
                                                 
15 In 1759, Emistisiguo appeared but under the name Eenyhathlucko. Linguistic evidence as well as 
historical context strongly supports Eenyhathlucko and Emistisiguo to be the same person. See pages 47-48 
of Chapter One of this dissertation for more details.  
16 For Emistisiguo’s appearance in 1759, see No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabutchee 
and afterwards in that square to the headmen of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in William 
Henry Lyttelton papers, William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 
(hereafter cited as WHLP). On Emistisiguo’s 1761 appearance, see also William Struthers to Governors 
Wright and Bull, 5/17/1761, Little Tallassee, in Allen D. Candler, Kenneth Coleman, and Milton Ready, 
The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, 28 vols. (Atlanta and Athens, GA: 1904-16, 1974-6) vol. 8, 
545-546 (hereafter CRSGA). 
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which Creeks believed could be traced through matrilineal lineage and a common 
mythical ancestor. If a clan member was murdered and revenge was not performed, then 
the soul of the deceased Creek kinsman would be stuck on an earthly plane and according 
to Creek tradition unable to rest and enter the spirit world. The practice of clan revenge 
was centuries old and an integral cultural custom tied to life and death in Creek society.17 
Small skirmishes between Creeks and frontier settlers were increasing in number and in 
intensity throughout the 1760s and clan revenge fueled this violence. 
Although Juricek credited Emistisiguo for engineering the campaign, he believed 
the initial negotiations between Upper and Lower Creek towns to end this practice 
occurred at the town of Great Tallassee. These discussions were successful and headmen 
agreed to “drop the hatchet” in order prevent a trade embargo.18 However, this 
dissertation makes a case that the meeting took place at Little Tallassee, and Emistisiguo 
was the individual responsible for organizing it. I argue the first meeting occurred in May 
of 1774, in Little Tallassee, where Creek headmen from all towns were present and 
voluntarily agreed to forego clan revenge momentarily in order to protect access to 
European manufactured goods. In my interpretation, this assembly was significant 
because it demonstrates that Creek headmen and warriors were willing to put aside a 
cultural tradition that was centuries old to maintain Anglo-Creek trade. As the architect of 
both the assembly and controversial yet progressive campaign, Emistisiguo established 
                                                 
17 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 109. Steven C. Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 25-26. 
18 Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 197. 
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himself to be an innovative and persuasive diplomat as well as respectable headman and 
spokesman. I explain this topic further in Chapter III of this study. 
Understanding Little Tallassee’s evolution at first appeared to be an impossible 
task. The archaeological record provided very little information and in fact, much of the 
site has been off limits to archeologists. To trace Little Tallassee’s transformation from 
trade community to official Creek town, I utilized the biographical knowledge I acquired 
of Emistisiguo and placed him within the historical contexts that surrounded him. In 
addition, I applied ethnohistorical insights to interpret what culturally constituted an 
eighteenth-century Creek town and to understand the central role communities and 
Native institutions at the local level served within eighteenth-century Creek society. By 
placing Little Tallassee within a series of cultural and historical contexts, I was able to 
recognize what allowed Little Tallassee to be a place of trade as well as an important 
Upper Creek town. 
Several seminal works in Creek and Native South scholarship shaped my 
understanding of the role Indians played in the eighteenth-century deerskin trade and 
demonstrate Little Tallassee was a thriving center of Euro-Indian and Atlantic exchange. 
Although written in the early 1990s, Kathleen Holland E. Braund’s Deerskins and Duffels 
remains the most comprehensive and accurate analysis of the eighteenth-century Euro-
Creek deerskin trade to date.19 Braund’s book not only carefully explains both Indian and 
non-Indian interests in the Southeastern deerskin trade. It continues to remind scholars 
                                                 
19 Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 
(Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska Press, 1993). 
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that trade is first and foremost “a mutual affair.”20 Based on her extensive research, I 
pieced together how a select few Upper Creek headmen worked with Scottish and 
English trade representatives of large companies such as Brown and Rae to mold Little 
Tallassee into a place where inter-cultural trade took place for the benefit of all parties 
involved. 
In 2010 Kathleen DuVal published, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in 
the heart of the Continent, an in-depth study of relations between Indians and Europeans 
in the Arkansas Valley from the sixteenth to early nineteenth century. Although her focus 
was not on the Creeks, her argument that “in the heart of the North American continent, 
far from centers of European population and power, Indians were more often able to 
determine the form and content of inter cultural relations than were their European would 
be colonizers,” was crucial to me.21 DuVal’s study guided my approach to examining the 
relationships between Creek and resident Indian traders at Little Tallassee, as well as 
served as a model to a certain degree for understanding places of exchange that were on 
the outskirts of heavy European populations during the early- to mid-eighteenth century. 
DuVal contends, “This story of one contingent place contributes to a reorientation in 
thinking about colonialism itself” and that “Early American history is too rich for the old 
narrative that presumes the inevitability of European colonial success.”22 My study of 
Little Tallassee strengthens DuVal’s argument but redirects it to a single, small, trade 
community in Upper Creek country. I depart from DuVal because my research 
                                                 
20 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, xiii. 
21 Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the heart of the Continent (Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 4. 
22 DuVal, The Native Ground, 10. 
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demonstrates that power changed hands on a rapid basis at Little Tallassee. More 
specifically, I argue that during the 1740s and 1750s traders and Creek headmen had 
equal control over the Indian trade based out of Little Tallassee, but by the mid-1760s the 
Creeks at Little Tallassee had complete control and Emistisiguo, the town’s headman, 
facilitated that shift. 
 Joshua Piker’s book Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (2004), 
inspired this dissertation as it outlined the importance of Creek towns. Piker argued in 
Okfuskee that through “peculiar connections” the history of Okfuskee, and many other 
Creek Native towns and centers, were “histories that are at once Native and American.” 
Furthermore, his book “traces the history of a Native community that was also in many 
ways, an American town.”23 Piker draws this conclusion by exploring the intricate 
dynamics and importance of European-Creek trade networks and as a result is able to 
draw the conclusion that as neighbors the two people’s histories are subsequently 
intertwined. He argues scholars need to stop putting Native history into a separate 
category. Piker demonstrated “Native histories” and “American histories” cannot exist 
without the other and his book is a significant contribution to the study of Creek History 
but also Colonial history as well. My dissertation builds on Piker’s study as it is evident 
that Little Tallassee as a trade center and eventual Creek town, could not have existed 
without Euro-Creek trade. Little Tallassee was a product of a colonial encounter and a 
world made through Atlantic exchange. 
                                                 
23 Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: The University of 
Harvard Press, 2004), 2.  
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 Steven C. Hahn’s The Invention of the Creek Nation (2001) also guided the 
framework of this study. There are a multitude of benefits of writing a “town” history. 
Creek towns are the center of political, spiritual, economic, and social and cultural life for 
individual Indians. Hahn highlighted how many Creek historians had tended to gloss over 
the dynamics and diversity of towns even though their nation was made up of a multitude 
of individual, loosely tied together communities. As Hahn points out in Invention of the 
Creek Nation, it was not until the early eighteenth century that individual Creeks even 
began to use the term “Creek Nation” or identify with other Creek towns as a larger 
whole.24 Therefore, one needs to privilege the town as the location where Creek culture 
was maintained and reinvented throughout the colonial period. Likewise, Piker 
poignantly reminded scholars that Creek history is community history. “Without histories 
of Indian communities, scholars will have a stunted understanding of American history 
and cannot hope to understand Indian history.”25  
I desired to conduct a town study, since this location was the heart of Creek 
society. By doing so, I show that without a proper understanding of Little Tallassee, as an 
official Creek town, one cannot properly understand Creek history at that time nor 
perhaps any community that emerged out of trade. Sociopolitical categories such as 
nation, state, and colony have often obscured what is going on at the local level. My 
study of Little Tallassee’s evolution from center of Euro-trade to official Creek town and 
                                                 
24 Steven Hahn suggests that it was in 1718 at the “Coweta Resolution” that the Creeks first referred to 
themselves as being part of a larger “nation” when treaty making with the British. See: Hahn, The Invention 
of the Creek Nation, 3-8 and 227-270. 
25 Piker, Okfuskee, 7.  
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its subsequent decline is a contribution to historiography on Native towns and 
communities alike. 
 In addition, this dissertation follows the recent biographical and narrative turns in 
Creek historiography like Joshua Piker’s The Four Deaths of Acorn Whistler: Telling 
Stories in Colonial America. Published in 2013, it used a multi-perspective study of the 
execution of one Creek warrior to offer invaluable insight into how historians must avoid 
taking the documentary record at face value. Piker presented his readers with the 
biographies of four different “storytellers” and examined how each party had their own 
agenda in Acorn Whistler’s execution. Piker suggests that the story tellers “knew that no 
hard and fast line separated winners from losers in colonial British America, and they 
likewise knew that, in times of flux and chaos, telling the right story was more important 
than getting the story right.”26 Furthermore, Four Deaths of an Acorn Whistler reminded 
historians of all fields of study not to read sources at face value and to continue to 
question facts we have long held to be true. 
 Steven C. Hahn’s ground-breaking study, The Life and Times of Mary Musgrove 
(2012), is another example of how a biographical approach written utilizing 
ethnohistorical insights can provide invaluable insight into Creek history and the much 
larger historiography on the Colonial Southeast and Native South. Life and Times is the 
first complete and accurate analysis of the woman Mary Musgrove whom historians 
thought they knew but in actuality greatly misunderstood. Hahn explores Mary 
                                                 
26 Joshua Piker, The Four Deaths of Acorn Whistler: Telling Stories in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: 
University of Harvard Press, 2013), 11.  
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Musgrove’s identity as both a “Creek” and “English woman,” considering questions that 
historians have been perplexed by in regards to “mixed blooded” and “mestizos” within 
Native societies for years. Hahn contends that Mary Musgrove’s identity was not that of a 
“Creek-Englishwoman” but rather “situational.” He asserts that “she wore different 
masks depending upon the company she kept at various times in her life.”27 Hahn also 
makes a bold but necessary point: “I don’t think Mary can be fully understood unless we 
come to grips with the fact that self-interest governed most of her decisions and 
actions.”28 After conducting my research on Little Tallassee, Emistisiguo, and Alexander 
McGillivray, I cannot agree more with Steven C. Hahn. American Indians followed their 
cultural traditions, but they also recognized their own self-interests. 
 This study builds off of Piker and Hahn’s recent works as I use a biographical 
approach to understand individuals’ relationships to the Creek towns they belonged to. I 
demonstrate that Emistisiguo was largely responsible for the creation of Little Tallassee, 
and Alexander McGillivray to be associated with accelerating its decline. Emistisiguo 
derived his power as a Creek headman and warrior through traditional and nontraditional 
means. He was an accomplished warrior and war leader, a great orator, master of Creek 
persuasion, manipulator of spiritual power, savvy diplomat, and had developed strong ties 
to Anglo-Creek trade. Alexander McGillivray was Creek by matrilineal law, but he 
dedicated his life to preserving and expanding his Scottish father’s Indian trade company; 
however, a fully functioning Creek town is not a town based solely on trade. 
                                                 
27 Steven C. Hahn, The Life and Times of Mary Musgrove (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida press, 
2012), 234.  
28 Steven C. Hahn, The Life and Times, 235.  
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McGillivray’s sole focus on trade and his misuse of his role as an advisor within Creek 
society contributed to the downfall of Little Tallassee. My dissertation not only explores 
the relationship between these two prominent figures of Creek history, but it analyzes 
McGillivray’s relationship to his birth place of Little Tallassee with fresh eyes. 
 McGillivray’s identity as a Creek of mixed ancestry has impressed historians as 
far back as the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.29 McGillivray has been 
consistently praised for being a “masterful diplomat,” or known as the “Talleyrand of 
Alabama,” and despite both his Creek and European ancestry was not only “loyal to the 
Creeks” but “definitely of the Creeks.”30 Other historians of this era referred to him as a 
dictator who “displayed the greed of the Scotch, the diplomacy of the French, and the 
craft of an Indian.” McGillivray’s life has caught the attention of various scholars for 
centuries. They all agreed that he was an individual who held incredible power among the 
Creeks.31 
 In recent years, scholars have continued to depict Alexander McGillivray as an 
individual of power and varying authority amongst the Creeks. Historians praised him for 
also being a clever politician and diplomatic liaison on behalf of the Creeks in regards to 
trade and land negotiations with the Spanish and Americans throughout the 1780s. For 
                                                 
29 Alfred J. Pickett wrote of McGillivray, “We doubt if Alabama has ever produced a man of greater 
ability,” and President Theodore Roosevelt praised McGillivray to be a “master of diplomacy.” Quotes 
cited in John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 57, 34. In 1938, William Caughey’s McGillivray 
of the Creeks emerged as the most comprehensive and accurate biography to have been written about the 
famous ‘mixed-blooded Creek.’ Caughey described McGillivray as a masterful diplomat and laudable 
Indian leader. Caughey utilized the extensive amount of research and collection of correspondence between 
McGillivray and both Spanish and American diplomats in his bibliography, which appeared hard to refute. 
The majority of scholars accepted Caughey’s book to be groundbreaking. For more on the reception of 
Caughey’s book, see William J. Bauer, Jr.’s introduction to McGillivray of the Creeks.  
30 Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks,56-57. 
31 Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, xvii.  
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example, in Deerskin and Duffels, Braund argued that McGillivray’s identity as a “mixed 
blood” enabled him not only to be Emistisiguo’s successor, but an individual of 
tremendous authority within Creek country. According to Braund, “McGillivray’s 
literacy, experience, natural ability, and clan connection made him the most successful 
man in the upper Nation,” and by 1783 “McGillivray took control of the meetings of 
Upper Creek [Abeika, Tallapoose, and Alabama] headmen . . .”32 Theda Perdue’s seminal 
work, Mixed Blood Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South (2003) bolstered 
Braund’s claims. According to Perdue, “Among the Creeks, Alexander McGillivray was 
the most powerful chief in the nation in the late eighteenth century.”33 Similarly, Linda 
Langley’s 2005 publication, “The Tribal Identity of Alexander McGillivray,” described 
McGillivray be “one of the best-known American Indian leaders of eighteenth century,” 
and “highly influential in Southeastern politics in general and early United States-Spanish 
Relations in particular.”34  
                                                 
32 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 170-171.  
33 Theda Perdue, Mixed Blood Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 2003), 46-47, quote on 46. 
34 Linda Langely, “The Tribal Identity of Alexander McGillivray: A Review of the Historical and 
Ethnographic Date,” The Journal of Louisiana Historical Association 46:2 (Spring 2005), 231. Similar 
portrayals of Alexander McGillivray are as follows: Michael D. Green, “Alexander McGillivray,” in 
American Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity, ed. David Edmunds (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 
1980). Edward Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Shaping of the Southern Colonial 
Frontier (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992). An exception to this scholarship is Claudio 
Saunt’s, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-
1816 (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Saunt’s work points out that “McGillivray exploited his power 
among the Creeks” and is to blame for overturning traditional based Creek government of consensus for 
coercion. Saunt generated a much-needed discussion among scholars in regards to McGillivray’s use of 
violence to protect trade as well as his attempts to unify the Creeks as a method of control, not a selfless act 
to protect the sovereignty of the Creek ‘Nation.’ Saunt leads his readers astray by the amount of power he 
gives to McGillivray in making this argument. Alexander McGillivray did not lead town meetings or large 
Creek assemblies; nor did Creek traditional consensus collapse in the presence of the “famous” mestizo. A 
close reading of McGillivray’s own letters demonstrates that he was powerless to make any decisions 
without the consultation of leading Upper Creek headman and warriors. Quote on 78. See also, Chapters 
Three and Four of Saunt’s A New Order on this topic. 
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 This dissertation challenges the current historiographical portrayal of Alexander 
McGillivray by placing him within the context of his (Creek) home community: Little 
Tallassee. By doing so, Alexander McGillivray’s identity is revealed to be that of an 
Indian trader guided by self-interest, his authority limited to an advisory capacity only. 
No other scholar has attempted this approach. As a result, I reveal that the Creek leader 
most responsible for the prominence of Little Tallassee is Emistisiguo, not Alexander 
McGillivray. 
 In addition, by examining Little Tallassee’s position within Creek society based 
upon the individuals that resided there, I draw attention to an area of historiography that 
American Indians have largely been left out of: The American Revolution. Studies on the 
role American Indians played in the American Revolution, in particular the deep south, 
are extremely limited. The first scholar to explore the role of Southeastern Indians during 
American’s war for independence was James O’Donnell, in Southern Indians in the 
American Revolution (1975). O’Donnell’s account is rich in archival material and is a 
pioneering work in its exploration of Spain’s multiple Gulf Coast military campaigns 
against the British and their Southeastern Indian allies. Particular attention is given to the 
battle of Pensacola. O’Donnell’s book is not a work of ethnohistory and little analysis is 
given to Indian culture or insight into the varied cultural encounters between British, 
Spanish, American, and Southeastern Indians in the Revolution’s southernmost theatre of 
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war. O’Donnell’s work, however, is the first of its kind and eye opening to any scholar 
who seeks to understand the American Revolution to full capacity.35 
Colin C. Calloway’s publication of The American Revolution in Indian Country in 
1995 renewed historical attention to the role of American Indians in the American 
Revolution after decades of silence. Calloway’s book argues that “the Indians’ ‘War of 
Independence’ was well underway before 1775 and waged on many economic, cultural, 
political, and military fronts and continued long after 1783.”36 Calloway’s study looks at 
a number of groups, such as the Cherokee, Iroquois, Abnaki, etc., and attempts to 
understand how and why these Native groups were drawn into a war that was not their 
own as well as exploring the life altering effects the war had on their communities. 
Calloway does not give a detailed account of the Creek experience nor does he expand 
his study to include the Gulf Coast, but it is a book every scholar interested in Native 
History, Revolutionary History, and American History should have on their bookshelf. 
 Kathleen DuVal’s Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American 
Revolution (2016) is the most recent contribution to the existing scholarship on Native 
Americans in the American Revolution, and in particular, the Gulf coast region. 
According to DuVal, America’s war for independence in the deep South was not just a 
war between Great Britain and its colonies, but “another imperial war, another war fought 
for territories and treasure.” Spain and American Indians fought their battles parallel to 
the more common story that generally limits the War of Independence to just England 
                                                 
35 James H. O’Donnell, Southern Indians in the American Revolution (Knoxville, TN: The University of 
Tennessee Press, 1975).  
36 Colin C. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American 
Communities (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995), xiii. 
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and northeastern colonial America. DuVal’s study mirrors Hahn and Piker’s 
bibliographical approach to studying history by centering her analysis around eight 
individuals all of whom experienced the impact of the American Revolution on the Gulf 
Coast from Florida to Louisiana in various ways.37 My chapter on the American 
Revolution joins Duval in expanding scholar’s attention to the Indian experience on the 
Gulf Coast, except that I place Emistisiguo at the center of the Creek story. 
 The Choctaw-Creek War (1765-1776) is another area of history that has been 
neglected by scholars of both Native and Southern History. Kathryn E. Holland Braund 
was the first scholar to tackle the subject and argues in Deerskins and Duffels that 
competition over British trade during the post-Seven Years War period was the root of 
the war between the two Indian groups. In 2002 and 2008 Greg O’Brien emerged as the 
leading scholar on the Choctaw-Creek War after publishing Choctaws in a Revolutionary 
Age, 1750-1830 (2002) as well as “Protecting Trade through War: Choctaw Elites and 
British Occupation of the Floridas” (2008). Greg O’Brien complicates Braund’s thesis by 
conducting a much more detailed analysis of Choctaw society during the eighteenth 
century, and as a result concludes that the war erupted as a result of a number of 
economic and social/cultural reasons. In order to control young warriors and restore 
power to Choctaw elites, O’Brien contends that the Choctaws encouraged war with the 
Creeks. Intertribal warfare served as a means by which the Choctaws were able to 
                                                 
37 Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution (New York, NY: 
Random House Press, 2016), Introduction, xv and xvi. DuVal does conduct a significant study of 
Alexander McGillivray’s role in the American Revolution and provides long overdue analysis of the Creek 
experience during the war.  
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redirect escalating violence away from nearby white settlers. By doing this, O’Brien 
argues the Choctaws were able to uphold and renew British trade alliances.38 
 My dissertation expands on O’Brien’s and Braund’s discoveries. By focusing on 
Emistisiguo and Little Tallassee, I discovered that war was being conducted on two fronts 
for the Creeks during the 1760s. The first was an escalation of frontier violence, and the 
other was the war that erupted to minimize this chaos: the Choctaw-Creek War. To 
maintain Creek strength during these wars, Emistisiguo innovated a unique form of Creek 
diplomacy that asked Creeks from both Upper and Lower towns to abandon the tradition 
of clan revenge in order to ensure that trade with the British would not be disrupted. 
Inter-tribal warfare, as O’Brien points out, was one way in which this policy could be 
carried out and Emistisiguo’s actions as well as those of the majority of the Creeks, 
exemplify that trade could be protected through warfare or another front. My research 
also demonstrates that Emistisiguo during the mid-1760s to 1770s emerged as an 
accomplished and respected headman and warrior, and his innovative diplomacy 
exemplifies that he also gained prestige as a spokesperson and diplomat. O’Brien 
contends that the Choctaw-Creek war was another means to restore power to elites, and 
Emistisiguo’s power at this time, as not only lead headman of Little Tallassee, but also 
broker in both war and peace, resulted in a bolstering of Emistisiguo’s authority amongst 
the Creek Confederacy. 
                                                 
38 Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age: 1750-1830 (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 
2002); Greg O’Brien, “The Conquered Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the 
Post-Revolutionary Southern Frontier,” in Pre-Removal Choctaw History: Exploring New Paths, ed. Greg 
O’Brien (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 148-183. 
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Since Creeks and other non-literate Native groups did not leave a paper trail of 
their own to follow, this study draws on eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century 
archival evidence and written sources produced by colonists. I analyze British, American, 
and translated Spanish correspondences, private journals and letters, travel accounts, 
treaty documents, transcriptions of Creek headmen’s speeches in diplomatic meetings. 
The task of uncovering Native institutions and conceptions of power and authority, as 
well as Creek definitions of towns and communities require reliance on these eighteenth-
century written sources. Although such documentary records do allow historians to 
investigate people and places that lack a written history, they are problematic due to 
inherent biases and misinterpretations by European and American authors. 
 Like other ethnohistorians of the Native South, I address these problematic 
sources through close reading and detailed analysis of multiple accounts and competing 
perspectives, as well as placing each document within its proper historical context.39 I 
also consult later anthropological sources such as nineteenth century ethnographic data, 
and archeological reports, and I utilize historical linguistics to bring Creek culture to the 
forefront of my investigation.  
 In order to prove Little Tallassee to be an important Creek town by the mid 
eighteenth-century, I combine linguistic and ethnohistorical insights to interpret Creek 
diplomacy and politics. This method allows me to fill in the gaps in the historical record 
surrounding the origins of Little Tallassee as well as piece together Emistisiguo’s identity 
                                                 
39 Examples include the following works: Joshua Piker, Okfuskee; Steven C. Hahn, The Life and Times of 
Mary Musgrove; Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age; Kathleen DuVal, On Native Ground, 
Joshua Piker, Four Deaths of Acorn Whistler. 
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and source of power before his arrival at the bustling trade center. I also revisit past 
historiography regarding Little Tallassee and Alexander McGillivray and through 
scholar’s new awareness of Creek culture, and the enduring power of Native institutions, 
I am able to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of past interpretations of Alexander 
McGillivray as well as Little Tallassee. 
* * * 
  Little Tallassee was a unique place in Colonial America and during the early 
years of the American Republic. Born out of inter-cultural trade, Little Tallassee offers 
invaluable insight into the eighteenth-century deerskin trade, the Indian and European 
inhabitants who depended on it, and how their exchanges connected them to a much 
larger Atlantic World. The transformation from trade center to Creek town is a mystery 
that scholars have left unanswered. Ignoring the fact that Little Tallassee was viewed by 
Creek society as a sacred space and official town under Emistisiguo’s leadership obscures 
scholars’ understandings of what actually constitutes an actual Creek town. 
 Little Tallassee, like any other place, was shaped by those who inhabited it, and 
they were mostly Indians. Emistisiguo, the town’s lead headman and warrior, has been 
left out of the spotlight of Creek historiography and his innovative trade policies, skill in 
diplomatic affairs, and fierce protection of Creek trade throughout the Choctaw-Creek 
War and the American Revolution deserve deeper analysis. Little Tallassee’s rise to 
prominence within Creek society paralleled the success of its lead headman and warrior. 
This study provides a historical context and an ethnohistorical lens for scholars to 
examine Emistisiguo’s role in eighteenth-century Anglo-Creek affairs, and recasts him to 
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be an important Creek leader, worthy of significant discussion by historians of Creek 
History and the Native South.  
 Last, it is my hope that the scholarship on Alexander McGillivray can be set aside 
to make room for new studies on his identity as a trader and Creek advisor, not a leader 
or figure of authority in regards to Creek affairs. I conducted a town-based history and 
contextual study that led me to see the between Emistisiguo, Alexander McGillivray, and 
the place they both claimed to represent: Little Tallassee. It was only after examining 
these relationships, and improving my understanding of what constitutes a Creek town 
and the hand each individual had in Little Tallassee’s rise and fall that I formulated my 
arguments. The goal of this dissertation is to make an argument for Little Tallassee to 
earn a place as an Indian space within Creek, Colonial, and American historiography. 
 My research traces the evolution of Little Tallassee from its origins in the 1740s 
and 1750s and to its decline in the late 1780s and early 1790s. I begin by exploring the 
European traders who resided at Little Tallassee in the 1740s and their interactions with 
neighboring Creek headmen. Lachlan McGillivray, Alexander McGillivray’s father was a 
key figure in this process, as well as headmen such as Mortar of Okchai, Wolf of 
Muccolossus, and Handsome Fellow of Okfuskee. The firm Brown and Rae was also 
integral in the startup of Little Tallassee’s thriving trade community. Therefore, much of 
Chapter III examines the interaction of the notable trade company with the Creek 
population who made trade possible for the company on the banks of the Tallapoosa and 
Coosa rivers of Upper Creek country. Inter-cultural trade and Euro-Indian exchange are 
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the themes of Chapter II as well as the basic cultural components of what constitutes a 
Creek town verses a trade community. 
 Chapter III is dedicated to trade and highlights Emistisiguo’s interest and pursuit 
of an Anglo-Creek trade alliance based out of Pensacola and Mobile. This chapter 
navigates Creek politics as well as economics, as Emistisiguo rose as a great orator 
amongst the Creeks, and eventually convinced stubborn Creek towns to embrace a new 
trade path out of the Gulf Coast. Little Tallassee, I argue, at this time became the center 
of Anglo-Creek trade within Upper Creek Country and Atlantic exchange. 
 Chapters IV and V examine how Emistisiguo utilized the context of a war-torn 
society to not only amplify the importance of Little Tallassee within the Native South but 
also bolstered his own authority within Creek and Anglo societies. During the Choctaw-
Creek War as well as the Revolutionary War, Little Tallassee evolved into a sacred space 
where diplomacy was conducted. Town headmen and warriors assembled in the square 
grounds of Little Tallassee between the mid-1760s to the late 1770s and discussed both 
domestic and foreign affairs. Emistisiguo organized a Creek conference that was national 
in scope in 1774, where he was able to unite all Creeks at Little Tallassee in order to 
protect Anglo-Creek trade. This is a task Alexander McGillivray later set out to 
accomplish but never achieved. Likewise, Chapter V explores McGillivray’s entrance 
into Creek country during the American Revolution as well as what type of relationship 
Emistisiguo and McGillivray shared. 
 Chapter VI of this dissertation provides an in-depth analysis of Little Tallassee 
during the 1780s and early 1790s, and recounts the town’s rapid decline as a sacred space 
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and official Creek town. It is in this section of the dissertation that I investigate the 
identity of Alexander McGillivray, as well as the roles he played in Little Tallassee and 
Creek Country. Topics of discussion include McGillivray’s monopoly over Creek trade, 
his compulsory enforcement of that trade over neighboring Creek towns, as well as his 
partnership in the famous trade firm Panton, Leslie, and Company. I also contend that 
McGillivray embodied the identity of what might be called a war profiteer, where he 
encouraged violence against the state of Georgia and promoted Creek unification during 
the early years of the American Republic. Previous scholars argued that McGillivray’s 
interest in Creek sovereignty was due to his allegiance to the Creeks whereas I argue 
Creek sovereignty and warfare protected McGillivray’s trade monopoly. The Treaty of 
New York is also discussed in Chapter Five and it is within the so-called secret articles 
that I think McGillivray’s true nature is revealed. 
 This dissertation concludes with Chapter VII, a short synopsis of Little Tallassee 
in the aftermath of Alexander McGillivray’s death in 1793 and an examination of the 
transfer of power and diplomacy to the Upper Creek town of Tuckabatchee away from 
Little Tallassee. I briefly discuss the several conferences that were conducted and led by 
the elected speaker and head warrior, Mad Dog, at Tuckabatchee in 1793. It was during 
these assemblies that representatives of both Upper and Lower Creek towns united for the 
first time since Emistisiguo’s conference at Little Tallassee in 1774 and decided to make 
peace with the growing American republic. This decision, however, I contend was based 
on Creek consensus, and not just the needs of trade. Town politics and interest still ruled 
Creek domestic and foreign affairs, just as Emistisiguo had understood they always 
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would. In fact, this study concludes with a brief glance at the importance of towns and 
local politics within Creek government in the twenty-first century.40 
  
                                                 
40 A discussion of the persistence of Creek towns and Creek politics can be found in Duane Champagne, 
Social Change and Cultural Continuity among Native Nations (Lanham, NY: Altamira Press, 2007), 
Chapters 4 and 5, and especially 71-74, 90, 98-101. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
PEOPLE AND PLACES 
 
Lachlan McGillivray, Alexander McGillivray’s father, took up residency at Little 
Tallassee shortly after his arrival to North America from Scotland in 1741.1 From his 
home at Little Tallassee, strategically located just a few miles North of the French Fort 
Toulouse, Lachlan McGillivray played two major roles. He served as a “spy” on French 
activities to South Carolina’s Governor Glen, and he managed established trade routes 
along the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers. His distant relatives, William and John 
McGillivray had first developed these trade routes in conjunction with the local Creek 
Indians as early as 1725.2 By 1755, Lachlan had expanded his family’s operations and 
owned two of his own trading firms, Clark & McGillivray and the more well-known, 
Brown, Rae, and Company. The two firms maintained a monopoly over the region’s 
Creek-Indian deerskin trade throughout the eighteenth century.3 Little Tallassee served as 
the center of a trade between the Creeks and the McGillivray family that lasted 
approximately one hundred years.4 
The town’s importance continued into the American Revolution as David Taitt, 
the British Superintendent of Southern Indian affairs, made Little Tallassee his 
                                                 
1 Amos J. Wright, Jr., The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders of the Old Southwest Frontier, 1716-1815 
(Montgomery, AL: New South Books, 2007),48.  
2 Amos J. Wright, Jr., The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders, 30.  
3 Amos J. Wright, Jr., The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders, 50-21. 
4 Amos J. Wright, Jr., The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders, 30.  
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headquarters. From the town, he oversaw the British campaign against the Americans 
throughout the war and did his best to maintain an alliance with the Creeks. After the 
death of Alexander McGillivray in 1793 and Taitt’s retirement in the wake of the 
emergence of the American Republic, the emerging nation appointed a new agent to 
supervise Southeastern Indian affairs, Benjamin Hawkins. Hawkins, like David Taitt, 
chose to spend most of his life amongst the Southeastern Indians at a place called 
“Hickory Ground,” only four and half miles from Little Tallassee.5 Hawkins is a familiar 
name to most historians of the Southeast, since he first implemented the U.S. 
government’s “civilization plan,” a program to designed to “Americanize” Indians by 
attempting to transform them from hunters and gatherers to pastoral farmers with the 
underlining goal of acquiring Creek Land for the United States.6 The plan brought social, 
cultural, political, and economic changes to all respects of Creek life, and ultimately, by 
the dawn of the nineteenth century, civil war.7 
 In short, between the early 1700s and the early 1800s Little Tallassee emerged as 
a significant Upper Creek Town and a center of exchange, both culturally and 
economically, in the Colonial Southeast. Although Little Tallassee became a Creek town, 
according to Creek standards and indigenous perspectives, its transformation was not 
expected and continues to leave historians with a mystery in need of explanation. Lacking 
                                                 
5 Octipofa is another name for Hickory Ground. John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and 
Their Neighbors (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1922) (as part of the Smithsonian 
Institution’s Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 73), 242.  
6 Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 
1733-1816 (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 139. 
7 For more information on the the Creek Civil War that broke out in 1812 (also known as the Red Stick 
War) see Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things, 249-272. 
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ancient origins or even a traditional town square, at the time, it seems to have been the 
only Upper Creek town that arose purely as a product of Euro-American trade interaction. 
Thus, the uniqueness of Little Tallassee to the Creek world makes it a vital space to 
interrogate Creek and European relationships and observe the impact of colonialism and 
shifting Indian politics. 
Little Tallassee’s importance rests with the key personalities of the individuals 
that resided there. It is necessary to revisit the origins of Little Tallassee to understand the 
amount of power and influence the Creeks, and Emistisiguo in particular, held over their 
European counterparts in the creation of the town, rather than continue to over extend 
credit to the newly arrived Scots family as past and current historians have tended to do. 
Emistisiguo, master of diplomacy and savvy politician among his Creek neighbors, 
possessed incredible foresight that not only allowed him to make Little Tallassee the 
center of Creek trade during the colonial period, but also enabled it to emerge into a new 
Creek town. For Creeks, the center of political, spiritual, economic, and social life rested 
within their towns during the eighteenth century. Emistisiguo and his neighboring Creek 
headmen’s ability to transform Little Tallassee into a sacred and integral part of the Creek 
world is a testament not only to the town’s unique location, but also a vivid illustration of 
how Creek towns were created from colonial encounters. 
Past historians have misunderstood the significance of Little Tallassee. As a 
result, there are few studies that discusses Little Tallassee’s place in Creek life. The bulk 
of this scholarship has largely utilized the massive documentary evidence left behind by 
Alexander McGillivray. Much of the literature surrounding the McGillivray family and 
37 
 
subsequently Little Tallassee as a place of European trade has obscured the Creek actors 
that played an equal if not larger role in Little Tallassee’s emergence as a Trans-Atlantic 
trade center as well as official Creek town. Repositioning the Creeks at the center of the 
origins of Little Tallassee allows one to reexamine the evolution of Little Tallassee 
through an ethnohistorical vantage point that places the Creek people of Little Tallassee 
at the forefront of a forgotten narrative. The evolution of Little Tallassee will be the 
subject of this chapter. This will allow one to see how a select few individual Upper 
Creek headmen together with some Scots-Irish, English, and French traders, worked to 
create a space of opportunity, wealth, and survival, contributing to an already drastically 
transformed Southeastern frontier economy during the mid to late eighteenth century.  
The Nature of Creek Towns 
Between 900 CE and 1700 CE, the American Southeast was populated by a 
people historians now refer to as the Mississippians, which was composed of a series of 
individual chiefdoms built along the Mississippi River. Each chiefdom shared a similar 
sociopolitical structure that included civil and priestly classes, and fixed hierarchies 
between elites and non-elites. These chiefdoms were known for their earthen mound 
temples and flat-topped pyramids, Cahokia being the largest.8 During the colonial period 
these chiefdoms destabilized and eventually collapsed under the weight of disease and 
continued raids by other Indigenous groups that sought slaves to be sold in markets 
throughout the Southeast.9 
                                                 
8 Robbie Ethridge, “Introduction,” in Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone, eds. Robbie Ethridge and 
Sheri M. Shuck-Hall (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 5-6.  
9 Robbie Ethridge, “Introduction,” Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone, 12-13; Steven J. Peach, “The 
Three Rivers Have Talked”: The Creek Indians and Community Politics in the Native South, 1753-1821 
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The archaeological record suggests that refugees from these fallen chiefdoms 
relocated and banded together to form three main provinces that evolved over time to 
form the modern Creek Nation. The first of these provinces was Abhika, which was 
located along the middle Coosa River (northern Alabama). According to archaeologists, 
Abihka were descendants of the former chiefdom of Coosa, where these refugees left the 
Etowah River Valley (present day northeastern Georgia) after Coosa collapsed, and over 
the course of 200 years traveled along the Coosa river to form the province of Abhika.10 
The second of theses provinces was Apalachicola, located on the lower Chattahoochee 
River (western Georgia). The refugees of Apalachicola spoke mainly Hitichi, which is an 
offshoot of Muskogean, the “mother tongue” and more popularly spoken language of the 
Creeks.11 Apalachicola, home of the Lower Creeks, was composed of two prominent 
towns, Apalachee (northern Florida) and Coweta, as well as several other towns located 
along the convergence of the Towaliga and Ocmulgee rivers (near present day Macon, 
Georgia).12 
The third province, which is the focus of this dissertation, was Tallapoosa, its 
name originating from the Tallapoosa river (located within present central Alabama). 
Whether or not the Tallapoosa people were descendants of any of the fallen Mississippian 
chiefdoms remains an archeological mystery.13 By the early eighteenth century , large 
populations of peoples of diverse ethnicities and backgrounds sharing a common 
                                                 
(PhD. Dissertation: The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2016), 43-44. 
10 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel Hill: NC, The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2003), 26-27.  
11 For a good discussion on language, see Steven J. Peach, “The Three Rivers Have Talked,”48. 
12 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 28.  
13 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 27. 
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language, converged together along the Alabama River near or at the junction of the 
Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers.14 These people collectively became known as the 
Alabamas, particularly those who lived at or around the area that would become the 
French Fort Toulouse. Over time, the Alabamas made alliances with neighboring 
populations, most significantly the Cussetas, who left their homelands in Tennessee to 
join the Alabamas, though they retained their own identity. Together, these groups 
established their own towns and villages, which later were collectively referred to as the 
Upper Creeks.15 
By the late eighteenth century, Upper Creek Country consisted of approximately 
48 towns that varied in size and population. The largest of these might consist of as many 
as 200 individual families, and the smallest only 10 to 20 families.16 During the time of 
Little Tallassee’s founding, the leading Upper Creek town was Okfuskee, followed by 
Okchai, and Tuckabatchee. The smaller towns of Muccolossus and Puckantallahasee 
were also important to the development of Little Tallassee.17 Three headmen of 
importance from this cluster of towns were The Gun Merchant (Enactanatchee) and The 
Mortar (Yahatustunagee) from Okchai and Duvall’s Landlord (Hoithlepoya Hadjo) of 
                                                 
14 Ned J. Jenkins, “Tracing the Origins of the Early Creeks, 1050-1700 CE,” in Mapping the Mississippian 
Shatter Zone, eds. Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
2009), 227. 
15 Sheri M. Shuck-Hall, “Alabama and Coushatta Diaspora and Coalescence in the Mississippian Shatter 
Zone,” in Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone, eds. Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 259-261.  
16 There were approximately 25 Lower Creek towns at the time. See also, Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 
31.  
17 See Figure 5, Map of Creek Towns during the eighteenth century.  
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Puckantallahasee. All of these headmen would later play varying, but significant, roles in 
the history of Little Tallassee.18 
Recent historians have observed that general sociopolitical categories such as 
“nation,” “state,” and “colony,” etc., have often obscured what is going on at local levels 
of societies. In the case of the Creeks, traditional scholarship that focused on the Creek 
“Nation” or “Confederacy” ignored the importance of Creek towns all together. 
Eighteenth century records, however, indicated the centrality of Creek towns to their 
society and to the larger definition of ‘Nation.’ These records, whether they be a 
documented conference or talk, always listed the towns present. In addition, the 
documents attested that Creek headmen often identified themselves to Euro-American 
officials by the town they were from, and in many cases, referenced neighboring or 
competing towns to cement their town claims. Creek history continues to be a history 
derived from the community, and the base of it is their town.19 
 It is debatable to what extent individual Creek towns saw themselves as part of a 
much larger, cohesive Nation. Early British traders were the first to group the Creeks into 
two categories: Upper and Lower due to geographical location of their towns and the 
“relative position of the two main paths that linked the Creeks with South Carolina.” 
Historical documents by Spanish officials also added a “Middle” category when they 
                                                 
18 Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2004), 201 and 250.  
19 Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 3.  
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spoke of the Creeks, although the current consensus amongst historians is that there were 
no definitive “middle towns.”20 [See Figure 1 below.] 
 
 
Figure 1. Creek Country during the Eighteenth Century. Source: Map from Kathryn E. 
Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 
1685-1815 (1993; repr., Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 10. 
 
Whether or not Creeks identified as being part of a Nation, “the basic political 
unit of the Creek Confederacy was the township or talwa.”21 More specifically, Creek 
                                                 
20 For an example of the use of “middle towns” see Alexander McGillivray to O’Neil, 8/12/1786, Little 
Tallassee, in John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 127-128.  
21 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 95. 
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towns were important autonomous governing bodies that tied themselves loosely with 
neighboring Muskogean townships, but put their own town’s needs over the Nation. 
These “needs” encompassed cultural, political, or economic desires. Towns served as 
focal point of Creek life and all regional, local, and national concerns were secondary to 
them.22 
 Many Creek towns also included talofas, which were smaller towns or villages 
that broke away from their mother town geographically, but still remained politically and 
culturally tied to that town. Talofas still participated in larger town ball games, town 
councils, public ceremonies, and the annual Green Corn Busk. Some of these satellite 
towns were located as close as the other side of the river, but others would settle as far as 
several miles away. The number of talofas could be in constant flux, ranging anywhere 
from one to seven. Creek towns splintered over time for several reasons: population 
growth, internal factionalism and or politics, agricultural field exhaustion, and better 
trade options.23 
Little Tallassee was never a talofa. It had no affinity with the Upper Creek town 
called Tallassee, which was located on the left bank of the Tallapoosa, opposite the town 
of Tuckabatchee. Little Tallassee was never documented to be a satellite of Tallassee, nor 
was it located within the geographical vicinity that would make sense for it to be a talofa, 
for it was separated from Tallasseenot only rivers, but other renowned Creek Towns.24 
                                                 
22 Joshua Piker, Okfuskee, 10. 
23 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 96.  
24 John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 244-245. See also Bernard Romans, “A Draught of 
the Upper Creek Nation,” May 1757 (small maps), William L. Clements library, The University of Ann 
Arbor, MI.  
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Linguistically, both towns have similar translations. Tal-e-see stems from Talofau [town] 
and ahasi which translates to “old.”25 Little Tallassee was also often referred to by 
Lachlan McGillivray as the “Old Town on the Coosa River” or simply “Old Town,” a 
term never used to describe Tallassee.26 Present day Creek linguistic place names for both 
towns also indicate the two towns to be separate. According to Jack B. Martin’s A 
Dictionary of Creek/Muskogee, the people of Tvlvhassee or Tallahassee are now located 
in McIntosh County, Oklahoma, and the inhabitants of Tvlvhassuce or Little Tallassee 
are in Seminole Country, Oklahoma. The populations of each town were separate in the 
eighteenth century and remain so today.27 
The Creek town or talwa was their political, economic, spiritual, and cultural 
center. Guiding the town in these affairs, was the council or “body politic.” This group 
was composed of a combination of headmen, warriors, and ‘beloved men’ (isti atcagagi) 
who made decisions and carried out the wishes of the community to the best of their 
abilities.28 Some Creek men were born into these positions, based upon one’s clan’s 
                                                 
25 John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 244.  
26 Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Reshaping of the Southern Colonial 
Frontier (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 59. French traveler and later Creek resident 
Louis Milford referred to Little Tallassee as “village of the Hickory Trees” in his memoir of his travels 
through Creek Country in 1775 to 1776, which suggests that the one commonality the two towns shared 
was that hickory trees were nearby. For more information on this possibility, see also Louis LeClere de 
Milford, Memoir or, a Quick Glance at my Various Travels and my Sojourn in the Creek Nation (Chicago, 
IL: The Lakeside Press, 1956) 17-18. Milford was a Brigadier General for the French Republic under 
Napoleon Bonaparte. His journey to the Creek Nation was in the interest of the French, but he did have 
close ties to the McGillivrays, since he married Lachlan’s daughter and Alexander’s sister, Jeannette. 
27 Jack B. Martin and Margaret McKane Mauldin, A Dictionary of Creek/Muskogee: with notes on the 
Florida and Oklahoma Seminole dialects of Creeks (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000) 
165-167. For exploration on this topic, see Amos J. Wright, Jr., The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders, 30; 
See also, Bienville to Maurepas, 4/14/1735, New Orleans, in Dunbar Rowland and A.G. Sanders, eds., 
Mississippi Provincial Archives: French Dominion, 1729-1748, vol. 1, 258. (Hereafter cited as MPAFD, 
vol. number, page number(s)).  
28 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 102. 
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animal affinity or family ties. For example, in the Upper Creek town of Okchai, the Bear 
clan held the most prestige, but in Tuckabatchee it was the Eagle.29 Even though lineage 
within Creek society was matrilineal, women were not given seats on the town council; 
instead, clan authority was passed down from uncles to maternal nephews. Despite the 
weight given to affinity and lineage, council positions and other leadership opportunities 
had to be earned. Hawkins wrote, “If one is not equal to his office, they elect another.”30  
There were two means by which positions of prominence were achieved in Creek 
society by the mid-eighteenth century, and both required the mastery of spiritual power 
that accompanied offices of authority. The first of these was through the demonstration of 
one’s manhood. Creek men received considerable prestige in the town for successfully 
providing food through hunting. Titles could be awarded for killing the largest game 
animals, especially since hunting was the primary source of protein for families. In 
addition, when the clan went to war, Creek men gained stature through leading their 
fellow warriors, victories against other important enemy headmen, and collecting a 
significant number of scalps or prisoners. Participating in these undertakings marked the 
transition to adulthood for young men who were awarded new names or “titles” that 
reflected this transition.31  
The second way Creek men earned leadership roles and respect from their fellow 
townspeople was through the demonstration of respected skills. The ability to trade and 
                                                 
29 Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-American, 
1685-1815 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 20. 
30 Quote cited in Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 20. 
31 Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1759-1830 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
2002), 52. 
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negotiate favorable terms of that trade with Europeans was increasingly important as 
Creeks became dependent on Euro-American trade goods. More specifically, Creeks that 
possessed knowledge of the rapidly changing political landscape outside of the village 
and could cement an important trade alliance, avoid war, or preserve native lands, were 
increasingly relied upon to protect the town’s interests. Diplomats, orators, and other 
‘politicians’ experienced a quick rise in stature that made them the equals of warriors or 
good huntsmen. “We are very sensible that neither us nor the Choctaws can live without 
assistance of the English,” head warrior and beloved man Emistisiguo remarked in 1770 
at Little Tallassee. He and his townspeople knew the importance of the trade goods the 
English could provide, and the choice to relocate to take advantage of that center of that 
trade was sign of effective leadership.32 
The Earliest Formation of Little Tallassee 
 All things considered, little is known about the origins of the Upper Creek town 
of Little Tallassee. The town does not enter historical records at all until the mid-1750s, 
and those primary sources are scarce, at best. The archeological record prior to this 
timeframe is even less clear since no excavation of the four major sites that composed the 
original town have ever been conducted.33 
 The first map to document the existence of the town of Little Tallassee appears in 
1757, which positions the town in close proximity to Fort Toulouse, but also the 
                                                 
32 ‘A Talk from the headmen and warriors of the Creek Nation delivered at Little Tallassee’, 10/1/1777, 
Records of the British Colonial Office, Class Five Files, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, The Board of 
Trade, The French and Indian War, ed. Randolph Boehm (Frederick, MD: University Publications of 
America, 1983) vol. 72 (Hereafter cited as CO5/vol. number). 
33 Email conversation with Gregory A. Waselkov (February 9, 2015 at 12:12PM.) 
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neighboring Upper Creek towns such as Puckana, Okchai, Okfuskee, and Muccolossus.34 
Within the same year, a second and more detailed map of the Upper Creek Nations was 
drafted by William Bonar, its illustration of the location of Little Tallassee strikingly 
similar to the first map.35 [See Figures 2 and 3.] 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Bernard Romans, “A Draught of the Upper Creek Nation,” May 1757 (Small 
Maps), William L. Clements Library, The University of Ann Arbor, MI. 
                                                 
34 Bernard Romans, “A Draught of the Upper Creek Nation,” May 1757 (small maps), William L. Clements 
Library, The University of Ann Arbor, MI. This map is assumed to have been drawn by Bernard Romans, a 
Dutch born cartographer and principal deputy surveyor of the Southern British colonies, although his name 
being absent from the draught does draw into question the actual author of the map. 
35 William Bonar, “A draught of the Creek nation by William Bonar, May 1757” (manuscript maps), 
William L. Clements Library, the University of Ann Arbor, MI.  
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Figure 3. William Bonar, “A Draught of the Upper Creek Nation,” May 1757 
(Manuscript Maps) William L. Clements Library, The University of Ann Arbor, MI. 
Photostat Original in British Colonial Office, C.O., Carolina, 21. Shows Upper Creek 
Villages Near Fort Toulouse, Particularly Along the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers. 
 
Archaeology, however, does provide evidence for the establishment of a trade 
outpost during the 1730s that later evolved into the Creek town of Little Tallassee during 
the late 1750s. In 1979, Gregory Waselkov and Craig T. Shelton led an archaeological 
reconnaissance of the entire Coosa River Valley, documenting four major archaeological 
sites located “on or near the east bank of the Coosa River, north of Wetumpka in Elmore 
County” (present-day Alabama) that are conjectured to be the location of the former 
Creek Town of Little Tallassee. Due to historical preservation and Creek privacy laws, 
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Shelton and Waselkov were only able to take surface collections, rather than excavate the 
archaeological site. As a result, limited archaeological discoveries have been made.36 
Despite the fact that archaeology does not offer substantial insight in regards to 
the origins of Little Tallassee, it does offer an explanation for the town’s peculiar absence 
from the historical record prior to 1753. Compared to other historic Creek towns in the 
Coosa River Valley, there was a significant absence of midden as well as artifacts. The 
lack of depth in the archaeological record indicates that Little Tallassee had only existed 
for a “fairly short length of time- several decades at most,” not centuries. The town itself 
was also “situated in an odd location, without much adjacent river bottomland for 
agricultural fields.”37 
 Accounts of early travelers confirm Waselkov and Shelton’s conjectures that the 
geographic placement of Little Tallassee was not suitable for traditional Creek 
agriculture. According to the first American Superintendent of Southeastern Indian 
Affairs, Benjamin Hawkins, the town of Little Tallassee was “located on the east bank of 
the Coosa River 3 miles above the falls,” and even though the falls could be “easily 
passed in canoes, either up or down; the rock is very different from that of Tallapoosa; 
here it is ragged and very coarse granite.” Hawkins added that the land along these 
                                                 
36 Gregory A. Waselkov, “Coosa River Valley Archaeology Volume I: Auburn University Monograph 2” 
(Auburn, GA: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Auburn University, 1980), 20-37, sites 1EE5, 
1EE150, and 1EE211. The largest geographical site, 1EE3, Waselkov suspects to be the largest location of 
Little Tallassee, but the site has not been revisited since 1955 and there are no available descriptions of the 
types of artifacts that were found there. Craig T. Shelton also participated in the archaeological 
reconnaissance of the Coosa River Valley in 1979 along with Waselkov, although I did not have any direct 
correspondence with Shelton, only Waselkov. Information also taken from an email conversation between 
myself and Waselkov on February 9, 2015 at 12:12PM. 
37 Email conversation with Waselkov (February 9, 2015 at 12:12PM.) 
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numerous waterfalls appeared to be “broken or waving, gravelly, not rich” and therefore 
not conducive for the cultivation of any type of fruitful agriculture.38 
 In 1755, British Superintendent Edmond Atkin indirectly pointed out the unique 
placement of the Creek town of Little Tallassee when he described the cumbersome 
nature of the numerous waterfalls surrounding Fort Toulouse, which happened to be only 
about nine miles at most from Little Tallassee. According to Atkin, “in the dry season, 
the boats on account of Sand bars in the River, cannot go up so far as the Fort, without 
having small Boats sent down to lighten them,” and “no boat can at any time go more 
than two miles above the fort, upon the Coosa River, nor more than two miles above 
Tuckabatchee, on the Tallapoosa River, on account of water falls in each.”39 Two 
Augusta traders confirmed Hawkins’ and Atkin’s descriptions of Little Tallassee’s odd 
placement by adding that the terrain was also “a great deal of hilly ground and bad rivers 
ever full and rapid in the winter, in so much that in our trading way we have great 
hardships in crossing them with out big leather canoes.”40 British Indian Agent Daniel 
Pepper in 1756 also noted in a letter concerning trade with the Upper Creeks, that the 
area was indeed “stoney and hilly.”41 Thus, Little Tallassee was not ideal for farming but 
                                                 
38 John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors, 242. 
39 Edmond Atkin, “The Report and Plan of Edmond Atkin 1755,” in ed. Wilbur R. Jacobs’, The 
Appalachian Indian Frontier (Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska Press, 1954), 60-63 (Hereafter 
cited as Edmond Atkin, “The Report of Edmond Atkin 1755’). 
40 Extract of a Letter from Two Traders at Augusta in Georgia to Governor William Henry Lyttelton dated 
07/17/1758, CO5/18. 
41 Daniel Pepper to Governor Lyttelton, 11/18/1756, Okchai, in Colonial Records of South Carolina: 
Documents relating to Indian Affairs, 1754-1765, ed. William L. McDowell, Jr. (1970, repre., Columbia, 
SC: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1992), 255-256. (Hereafter cited as CRSCIA, 
1754-1765, page number(s). 
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the perfect spot for a trade outpost, due to the fact that it served as a portage by carrying 
boats and or cargo quickly and efficiently alongside the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers. 
Little Tallassee may have lacked the soil and land for traditional Creek 
agricultural fields, but records suggest that by 1750 prominent Scots-Irish Trader Lachlan 
McGillivray, the father of Alexander, had chosen to make it one of his permanent 
residencies.42 Referred to by Lachlan McGillivray as the “Old Town on the Coosaw 
River” as well as “Weetomkee Old Town,” the location of McGillivray’s plantation was 
the original site of the Creek town Little Tallassee, a few miles above the modern town of 
Wetumpka Alabama.43 In the 1770s, French traveler Le Clerc Milford visited the home of 
Alexander McGillivray, the son of Lachlan McGillivray. Milford stated that he and 
McGillivray “set out and after four days march arrived at a village called Little Tallassie, 
or Village of the Hickory Trees.” Alexander McGillivray’s house, Milford continued, “is 
near this village on the banks of the Coosa River, half a league from Fort Toulouse, 
which formerly belonged to the French and is now the site of the village of Taskigi 
[Tuskegee].”44 In 1799, during his stay at Hickory Ground, United States Indian Agent 
Benjamin Hawkins added explicitly: “three and a half miles above the town [Hickory 
Ground] are ten apples trees, planted by the late General McGillivray; half a mile up 
further up are the remains of Old Talesee, formerly the residence of Mr. Lachlan, and his 
son, the general.” Hawkins reported the area also to still be abundant with apple trees, 
                                                 
42 Traders had multiple residencies. 
43 Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Reshaping of the Southern Colonial 
Frontier (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 59 
44Louis Milford, Memoirs or, a Quick Glance at my Various Travels and my Sojourn in the Creek Nation 
(Chicago, IL: The Lakeside Classics, 1956), 18. 
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orange groves, hogs and cattle.45 In fact, the Wetumpka Chamber of Commence in 
Elmore County erected a monument in memory of Lachlan McGillivray’s plantation 
called “McGillivray Plantation known as Little Tallassee and ‘The Apple Grove’ 1740-
1793.”46 It is apparent that the location of Little Tallassee and Lachlan McGillivray’s 
residence were one and the same. [See Figure 4.] 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Caleb Swan’s Sketch of the Junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers from 
His Visit in 1791 Highlights the Details of Alexander McGillivray’s Plantation. It is 
Important to Note, However, That Little Tallassee and Hickory Ground Were Not the 
Same Place, as I Describe in My Text. The Title is Swan’s Error, But the Map is Still 
Useful. Charles Weatherford Was a Scotsman Who Married One of McGillivray’s 
Sisters. Melford is a Variation of Milford. Primary Source, “Caleb Swan, Position and 
State of Manners and Arts in the Creek or Muscogee Nation in 1791”, in Information 
Respecting the History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Trade of the United 
States, ed. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft (New York, NY: Paladin Press, 1855), 5: 244. Also 
Found in Claudio Saunt’s New Order of Things, 74. 
                                                 
45 John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 242. 
46 John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 242. 
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The exact date of Lachlan McGillivray’s arrival at Little Tallassee is not known. 
The oldest documents regarding his activities date back to 1741. It was in January of that 
year that Indian Agent and respected Carolina Trader James Bullock of the Creek Nation 
employed Lachlan McGillivray to investigate French influence amongst the Indians 
around Fort Toulouse. Afterward, Lachlan McGillivray filed a claim of 244 pounds as 
payment for his services.47 In 1744, Lachlan was asked to carry out a second mission, this 
time upon the request of Governor Glen of South Carolina. Lachlan was to serve as an 
interpreter as well as negotiate trade and peace with the Choctaw Nation.48 
Lachlan McGillivray’s ability to speak fluent Muskogean (Creek) and serve as a 
translator for two British officials by 1744 indicates that he had been in Creek territory 
for quite some time. Being a member of the Scottish McGillivray clan meant Lachlan had 
family connections, and after he arrived in Savannah or Charles Town he likely joined 
one of Archibald McGillivray’s trade caravans, Fort Toulouse.49 In fact, Little Tallassee 
just might have been Lachlan McGillivray’s destination from the start, due to the fact that 
by the time he was granted his official license to trade in 1744, he quickly obtained 
additional licenses to trade in the Upper Towns of Pucknatallhassee, Weoka (Wewoka), 
as well as Wetumpka old Town, better known as Little Tallassee.50 Archibald 
                                                 
47 Amos J. Wright, Jr., The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders, 41; Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan 
McGillivray, Indian Trader, 36-37. McGillivray’s claim can be found in The Journal of of the Commons 
House of Assembly, ed. J.H. Easterby (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Historical Commission, 1951), 355. 
48 Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 46. 
49 Amos J. Wright, Jr., The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders, 43. Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillvray, 
Indian Trader, 42–43. 
50 Thomas Deval, trader to Pucknatallhassee disappears from the written record in the 1750s, which is most 
likely why Lachlan McGillivray obtained a license for Pucknatallhassee. See Kathyrn E. Holland Braund, 
Deerskins and Duffels, 44-46. For when Lachlan obtained his licenses, see also “Petition of Lachlan 
McGillivray,” in Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents relating to Indian Affairs, May 21, 1750-
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McGillivray applied to retire from that province that same year and relocated to attend his 
businesses in Charlestown, and left the trade at Little Tallassee in his younger cousin’s 
hands.51 
Why was McGillivray interested in establishing a home or a trade post near Little 
Tallassee? Archaeological studies suggest that the original inhabitants of the place later 
known as Little Tallassee might have belonged to the stray town of “Wiwohka,” a 
settlement formed by fugitive Creeks from multiple towns and villages. John Swanton, 
one of the foremost anthropologists to study the Southeastern Indians, was told by an 
informant that the name Wiwohka was often used interchangeably with Witumpka as 
both meant “roaring and tumbling water.”52 Both of these towns do appear on early 
European maps, but are inconsistent in these appearances. For example, Romans 
illustrates a town called “Weetumkee” in 1757, but it is nowhere to be found on Bonar’s 
map draught of the Upper Creeks in May of 1757. [See Figures 2 and 3]. Neither 
Wetumpka nor Wiwohka are found on any modern maps of the Creek Nation, which only 
complicates the matter. [See Figure 1.] 
Weetumkee (Witumpka) was a refugee Creek settlement during the early 
eighteenth century, but it ceased to exist by the time the first modern map of the Creek 
Nation was designed. It makes the most sense to conclude that Weetumkee’s Indian 
inhabitants relocated elsewhere over time, being that they were an informal town by 
                                                 
August 7, 1754, ed. William L. McDowell, Jr. (1958; repr., Columbia, SC: South Carolina Department of 
Archives and History, 1992), 518. (Hereafter, cited as CRSCIA, 1750-1754, page number(s). 
51Archibald McGillivray announced that he intended to depart the province in November of 1744. See 
Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader, 42- 43.  
52 John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creeks, 271. 
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definition, and odds are the place only became an interesting place to settle in large 
numbers due to the European trade brought by the McGillivrays. Wewocau, on the other 
hand, by 1759 was a recognized Creek town.53 Given the intimate geographic proximity 
to Little Tallassee and Weetumkee and the fluid nature of eighteenth-century Creek 
towns, it is very likely that Wewocau inhabitants intermarried with peoples from Little 
Tallassee. Others may have even chosen Little Tallassee as their permeant place of 
residence, slowly aiding in the evolution from trade outpost to Creek town. The existence 
of Wewocau and Weetumkee demonstrate two things. First, early Little Tallassee was not 
just a place of trade in the eighteenth century, but a settlement made up of several 
dislocated Creek villages. Secondly, Little Tallassee was a unique product of eighteenth-
century colonial exchange. Little Tallassee can thus be seen as a microcosm of the origins 
of the loosely tied together Creek Confederacy, a place where people of like mind and 
language gathered to survive in the chaotic new world of the eighteenth century. Little 
Tallassee during the 1740s and 1750s was an upstart trade hub and potential Creek town, 
and therefore Creeks and Europeans had good reason to relocate to what was becoming a 
significant place within Creek society and the Colonial Southeast. 
Populating Little Tallassee: War, Change, and Migration 
The archaeological and documentary evidence suggests that unlike traditional 
Creek towns, Little Tallassee was a product of a long series of Trans-Atlantic exchanges 
and European-Indian encounters that combined with eighteenth century culture created 
the foundation for a new town. It had been a period of great change for the Creeks, 
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especially related to trade and its impacts. As early as 1565, ancestors of the Creeks had 
been introduced to European trade goods, after the Spanish had founded St. Augustine. 
Although Spain was more interested in converting local Indians to Christianity and 
maintaining a permanent, physical presence in America, many individual Spanish 
colonists and officials did engage in trade on their own with several Indian groups, 
including the Creeks. Most of the trade was centered around Pensacola and smaller 
mission sites along the Gulf coast, often between Spanish soldiers and the Apalachee 
Indians of northern Florida. When the Creeks became involved, they mostly sold 
deerskins and foodstuffs in exchange for manufactured goods such as textiles, metal 
tools, bead ornamentations, and rum. Guns were highly sought after, but due to trade 
restrictions enacted by Spanish authorities, they were in short supply.54 Almost a century 
later, in 1685, the Creeks entered into their first British trade agreement working with 
Henry Woodward and two hundred and fifty Englishmen. Woodward and Indigenous 
leaders cemented a Creek-Carolina alliance at the preeminent Lower Creek town of 
Coweta, located along the Chattahoochee River. 
In addition to this agreement, Creeks continued to trade with the Spanish who had 
lessened their restrictions and now welcomed the trade of firearms. The increased number 
of firearms exacerbated the taking of captives for sale as slaves to the British. For Creeks 
and other Indians, slavery was not a new concept and had existed in the region long 
before the arrival of Europeans. Archaeological studies demonstrate that during the pre-
contact era, Indians usually took captives for alliance building, laborers, ritual killing, and 
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in many cases, captives were adopted to replace lives lost in war or from disease. It was 
only after Europeans arrived on the continent that trade in captives became a commercial 
interest, and Indian captives started to be sold into slavery largely in exchange for 
European guns and ammunition. The desire among European colonists for slaves created 
an organized and systematic system to seize captives. It drove stronger Native groups to 
conquer their weaker neighbors and perpetuated European hunger for more slaves.55 As a 
result of this new militaristic form of enslavement, Indian groups throughout the 
Southeast and the Eastern seaboard found themselves competing for power and control of 
the trade. Firearms became necessary trade item as groups sought to protect themselves 
or capture new slaves. Repercussions of this revolutionary shift in how Indians treated 
slavery transformed the region. If one was not sold into slavery, they most likely 
participated in the acquisition of slaves. As the number of slave raids increased, the 
amount of lives lost soared and produced a considerable population loss that threatened to 
destabilize the region. 
The increase in violence during this period was not motivated solely by economic 
factors. The loss of life was intensified through the cultural practice of “blood 
vengeance,” a practice by which individuals sought to avenge the death of a relative by 
taking the life of the party responsible for that death. Relatives of the individual who 
committed the murder were also often killed, for if the perpetrator was not found justice 
was not served until the blood of a family member was shed.56 Blood revenge was clan 
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based, not personally motivated, and held a spiritual component. Traditionally, Creek 
clans had a form of shared kinship amongst individual Creeks that shared ancestral links 
that Creeks held to the equivalent of blood relatives. Each clan member could trace their 
origins matrilineally back to a mythical ancestor, which was symbolized by an animal or 
natural phenomenon. The four most common clans among the Creek were Wind, Bear, 
Deer, and Tiger (Panther).57 Clans were matrilineal based, which meant that individuals 
only traced their ancestry through their mothers. At birth individual Creeks inherited their 
clan identity through their mothers, and their family consisted only of their maternal 
relatives. A Creek child’s maternal uncle, not their father, was the one who raised them in 
Creek society. The biological father played little to no role at all in their upbringing, 
except as a provider.58 
Blood or clan revenge was personal and motivated them to seek revenge. The 
death of a clan member was not just loss of life, but the death of a loved one. For Creeks 
and many other Indian groups, clan members could not enter the spirit world until blood 
was shed of the individual or family responsible for their death. Through such blood 
revenge, Indian warriors captured part of the spiritual energy or soul of the victim, which 
would therefore assist in enabling their family to cross over to the spirit world. Improper 
burials also prevented the soul from entering the afterlife, which made it even more 
pressing for clan members to seek blood revenge. Their spiritual obligation to retaliate 
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often led to an endless cycle of killing and increased warfare amongst Southeastern 
Indians beyond what was necessary to acquire slaves to trade.59 
To make up for a massive population loss caused by European disease and slave 
raids, Southeastern Indians sometimes adopted their captives, rather than sell them into 
slavery. Between the years 1711 and 1715, more and more Indians sought to transform 
strangers into kinsman in order to replace lost family members to raiders.60 As Indian 
populations dwindled, so did the commodity of the Indian slave, and therefore groups 
such as the Yamasee found themselves in a tremendous amount of debt to their British 
trade partners. As potential captive populations continued to dwindle, the Yamasee soon 
found themselves presented with the reality that they might become the target of British 
slave raider’s themselves.61 All things considered, a revolt by the Yamasee and their 
fellow Indian trade partners against the British seemed inevitable. The Yamasee War of 
1715-1717 caused disruptions throughout the Southeast. 
The Upper Creeks played a much more limited role than the Lower Towns in the 
Yamasee War, given the simple fact that the Upper Creeks were approximately 480 miles 
away from Charles Town; the “backwater” or “backcountry” of the Creek Nation so to 
speak. 62 Unlike the Lower Towns, the Upper Creeks also had the opportunity to build 
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substantial trading ties with the French, where Sieur de Bienville (later Governor of 
Louisiana) built a fort in 1702 at the current site of Mobile, Alabama.63 
Whereas the role of the Upper Creeks in the Yamasee War is debatable, the 
impact of the war’s aftermath contributed greatly to the growth of Little Tallassee during 
the 1750s to 1760s. According to historian William Ramsey, by 1718, “over four hundred 
colonists and untold number of Native American warriors had perished” as result of the 
conflict, and these deaths had spurred “extensive tribal migrations and alliance 
realignments that changed the diplomatic and cultural landscape of the region for the 
remainder of the eighteenth century, and it led to the collapse of South Carolina’s 
proprietary government in 1719.”64 Indian groups such as the Ochese, Yamassee, 
Apalachee, Apalachicola, and several others took “great pains to find new homes further 
away from their enemies and closer to potential allies,” altering the “physical and human 
geography of the Southeast.”65 The French capitalized on Indian animosity towards the 
British and the temporary collapse of the South Carolina Indian trade by erecting Fort 
Toulouse in 1717, later referred to by the British as the ‘Alabama Fort.’ Situated on the 
Coosa river “near the junction of that stream and the Tallapoosa,” the French fort was 
only “four miles south of present day Wetumpka Alabama,” and within only seven miles 
of the neighboring Upper Creek Towns including Okchai, Muccolossus, 
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Pucknatallahassee, and what would later be the town of Little Tallassee.66 [See Figure 4.] 
Founding Little Tallassee in the shadow of the French fort made sense as the population 
was mostly comprised of migrants that fled during the Yamasee war. The Natives now 
living in the region saw the economic opportunity to trade with the forts occupants to 
generate wealth and survive. 
The Eighteenth Century Anglo-Creek Deerskin Trade 
 
 By the mid-eighteenth century, the bartering of deerskins for European 
manufactured goods became an integral component in the daily lives of Creek men and 
women as well as their partners in trade. European traders were mostly of English, 
Scottish, or Irish descent, and were based out of South Carolina and Augusta, the former 
becoming the more favorable conduit of trade due to its significant location at the head of 
a major Southeastern Indian trade path. Anyone granted a license by the Governor of 
Georgia or South Carolina at the time was allowed to conduct trade, but over time larger 
firms such as Brown, Rae, and Company monopolized the Southeastern deerskin trade. 
Individual traders within the company would then be assigned a specific Creek town and 
often took up residency within those towns on a permanent basis.67 
 Creek headmen defined the terms they wished to trade and that included whom 
they traded with. Leading headmen restricted residential traders to those they trusted and 
accepted as a friend and ally. Upon arrival, European traders were introduced to the niece 
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of a female relative of the town’s leading headmen and marriage alliances were often 
proposed. Since Creek societies were matrilineal, marriage to a Creek woman turned 
traders into extended kin or family. Over time, the children of these marriages often 
became traders themselves. Town headmen developed strong, lasting friendships with 
their resident traders and consequently believed them to act within the town’s best 
interest.68 
 Commercial hunting was an economic venture shared by both men and women. 
Men hunted and provided skins that the women cleaned, cured, and dressed until the raw 
hides transformed into a polished, supple leather commodity. Creek men were often 
accompanied by their wives and children on long hunting trips, which occurred during 
the Fall and Winter seasons. Creek towns often appeared abandoned during these months, 
with the exception of the elderly or those unfit for travel. Spring and Summer towns were 
bustling and were reserved for planting and harvesting.69 
 The standard medium of exchange between Creeks and their Scotch-English trade 
partners was the skin of the white-tailed deer. During the eighteenth-century 
leatherworking was one of the largest industries in England, London in particular. 
Buckskins were transformed into a variety of useful items to English men and women. 
The most popular of these items were clothing, in particular breeches, as well as gloves, 
footwear, and hats. Other common manufactured goods made from the deerskins 
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included saddles, harnesses, as well as bookbinders. Indian peltry or furs of beaver, bear, 
fox, and raccoon were also sought after by British markets and crafted to the latest 
London fashions, but on a much smaller scale compared to the skin of the white-tailed 
deer.70 
In exchange for skins and peltry, Creek headmen would receive a number of 
useful European trade goods that benefited men and women of their villages. Guns, 
ammunition, and cloth were the most prized items, but metal tools as well were also 
priority items. By the eighteenth century bows and arrows had been replaced by English 
firearms and were necessary for Creek hunting and warfare. Iron goods such as hoes, 
axes, knives, and hatchets quickly replaced stone tools, which allowed women to perform 
daily tasks at a much easier and quicker pace. Copper kettles were also exchanged during 
the winter months. 
The highly valued cloth came in a variety of colors, weights, and designs, which 
women fashioned into clothing with newly acquired scissors and needles. One of the 
most popular cloth forms for women were duffels, a coarse woolen cloth that could be 
used as a blanket or overcoat in the winter. Stroud, a cheaper cloth was also quite 
popular, as Creeks worn them annually in the form of men’s leggings and women’s 
skirts. Strouds were available in red (scarlet) or blue (indigo), and duffels were available 
in the same colors but also in white or striped patterns. Originally, Creeks wore little 
clothing in the summer months and during winter covered themselves with tanned 
deerskins and furs. The introduction of European textiles, however, revolutionized Creek 
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clothing. It was also facilitated by the practice of British awarding prominent and allied 
headmen European style suits and trousers, which was quickly seen as a symbol of status 
and or rank. By the late eighteenth century, boots, belts, hats, overcoats, and petticoats 
were commonplace in every Creek town and culture. 
A variety of European beads were also exchanged for skins and pelts. Most of 
these beads were worn used as necklaces or to decorate pouches, sashes, and belts. 
Traditional deerskin moccasins were popular amongst Creek men and women, but they 
were often adorned with beads as decoration. Beads, for the most part, were in demand 
largely for traditional ceremonial and spiritual practices. For example, wampum belts still 
used to communicate diplomatic messages to other Indian groups as well as Europeans. 
The medium of the belt had changed, but the colors remained the same and so did their 
significance. For example, red, black, and blue symbolized war or a call to war, and a belt 
adorned with white beads served as a peace offering.71 
By the mid-to-late eighteenth century men and women had abandoned traditional 
Native handicrafts for European manufactured goods, and were therefore dependent on 
the Anglo-Creek deerskin trade. Guns and ammunition were prioritized over bows and 
arrows and improved metal tools were superior to those of bone, shell, and stone. Debt 
from rising prices in trade goods, over extended credit, and waning deer populations from 
over hunting played similar roles that facilitated Creek dependency on the deerskin trade. 
Ultimately, Creek men and women consumed European manufactured goods that were 
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worth, commercially, much more than those they produced. Creek economic self-
sufficiency was traded away one deer skin at a time.72 
Little Tallassee’s Traders: Creek and European 
Although evidence indicates that the McGillivray family and their Indian and 
European trade partners had set up a trade outpost at Little Tallassee as early as 1725, it 
was not until Lachlan McGillivray joined Brown & Rae & Company that Little Tallassee 
evolved from a mere trade depot to a prominent center of Euro-Creek and Atlantic 
trade.73 Brown & Rae, founded by Archibald McGillivray in the late 1740s, was the most 
successful trading firm to develop and be sustained by the McGillivray family. It was the 
newest addition to the McGillivray family companies based out of Augusta, Georgia, and 
the key to its success was the number of traders that Archibald McGillivray employed, as 
well as the vast territory they could cover. The most notable of the firm’s members 
included Patrick Brown, John Rae, William Sludders, Issac Barksdale, Thomas Deval, 
William Struthers (nephew of William Sludders), and George Galphin. Although 
Archibald McGillivray retired in 1744, all his employees, both old and new, had worked 
with him at some point in time, and had excellent relationships with individual Creek 
towns throughout Georgia and Alabama.74 Patrick Brown replaced Archibald 
McGillivray as director of the Brown, Rae, & Company after his return to Scotland, but 
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this position was more of an abstract title then a position of power. The secret to the 
firm’s success was the collective efforts of all Brown’s trading partners, the number of 
individual Creek towns they traded with, but more important, the friendships that were 
formed between the firm’s traders and prominent Creek headmen.75 
Almost all of the trade alliances that Brown & Rae formed were with prominent 
Upper Creek towns and subsequently, neighbors of Little Tallassee. For example, Patrick 
Brown held a license to trade in Muccolossus, the closest town to Little Tallassee besides 
Pucknatallhassee, which held an alliance with Thomas Deval, another associate of the 
firm.76 Issac Barksdale and William Sludders were also licensed to trade in several Upper 
Creek towns, the most notable being the towns of Okfuskee and Okchai. George Galphin 
was an exception, who already had a thriving trade store in the most powerful Lower 
Creek town of Coweta, which added to the successful growth of Brown, Rae, and 
Company. Lastly, there was Lachlan McGillivray, who was the primary trader for 
Weetomkee Old Town, alias Little Tallassee. As early as 1743 Lachlan had utilized his 
family connections to establish himself as a respected trader at Wacocoys, a nearby Creek 
village situated on a stream that flowed into the Coosa River near where Little Tallassee 
would be founded.77 It was not surprising that by 1754, Lachlan McGillivray was made 
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an official partner of Brown & Rae, and for the first time Little Tallassee is documented 
not as a trading post, but a culturally defined and formal Creek town.78 
Reports by Edmond Atkin to William Lyttelton in November 1759 demonstrated 
Little Tallassee’s evolution from trade depot to town by documenting the long trade 
history that the McGillivray family shared with the area, and also the vast network of 
important Upper Creek headmen that participated in that trade. Edmond Atkin was a 
former member of the South Carolina Council and the British Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs in 1759. The Crown had appointed him to recruit Creek warriors during the 
French and Indian War and assist in attacking the nearby French Fort Toulouse. The 
“Alabama Fort,” another name for Fort Toulouse, was a frequent meeting place for 
French diplomats and their Indian allies throughout the French and Indian War. Given 
Little Tallassee’s proximity to the fort and elaborate trade ties, Atkin was suspicious of 
Little Tallassee’s purpose as a trade hub from the beginning of his appointment as British 
Superintendent. Atkin’s goal was to curb any allegiances, trade, or alliances with the 
French during the war and the growing population and trade economy of Little Tallassee 
threatened Atkin’s mission. William Lyttleton, the Royal Governor of South Carolina, 
planned to assist Atkin. Lyttleton predicted Atkin’s mission to be a failure from the start. 
Lytteton noted that the Creeks were not “ill disposed to us [British],” but “it is a fixed 
principle with them to observe a strict neutrality between us and the French.” Govenor 
Lytteton turned out to be correct. The Creeks, Upper and Lower, remained neutral 
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throughout the course of this war, and Atkin’s goal to turn the Creeks against the French 
as well as discontinue with the French at Little Tallassee was a complete failure.79 
Atkin’s journey to Little Tallassee therefore provides valuable insight into the 
trading community at Little Tallassee. According to Atkin, Lachlan McGillivray’s trade 
at Little Tallassee is “infamous” and a place where “his family had been getting estates in 
succession already above 30 years.”80 The same year, Atkin also informed Lyttelton that, 
“Thomas Perriman being duly sworn, saith that he has been employed in the Indian Trade 
in the Creek Nation, 21 years last June.” Throughout that time, Perriman bought and sold 
goods for several different traders, most notably James McQueen, Thomas Morgan, and 
John Spencer. All three of these men were licensed to trade at “Little Talsey,” with the 
exception of Spencer who had another store “nearly about midway between Muccolossus 
and Little Okchai, one of the Alabama Towns” that “stands alone in the woods, with 
other convenient buildings.”81 The store, Atkin added, “was a mile and a half further 
[from Muccolossus], alone in the woods, and nearer to the French Fort.”82 If Atkin was 
correct, both McGillivray’s family estates and the trading career of Thomas Perriman 
suggest that Upper Creeks had been engaged in a fairly rich and profitable trade for at 
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least a decade before Lachlan McGillivray set up his plantation at Little Tallassee during 
the early 1750s.83 
Lachlan McGillivray was not unique in making Little Tallassee his permanent 
residence. Most eighteenth-century traders lived among their trade partners. The most 
successful traders were those who immersed themselves in Indian culture. They learned 
their language, customs, and created strong alliances with prominent headmen and their 
corresponding towns. An alliance, in Creek culture, was a formation of a new friend or 
family member, not just a business partner. All new trading agreements were 
accompanied by a traditional Creek ceremony, where traders like Lachlan McGillivray 
would be invited to sit amongst the headmen, smoke the calumet, sip the black drink, and 
participate in gift exchange. These traders afterward were considered by the Creeks to be 
“brothers” or “friends,” not strangers or mere business partners.84 Almost all of Brown, 
Rae, and Company lived among the Creeks and took part in these highly symbolic and 
powerful ceremonies. They not only earned the trust of the Creeks, but their friendship, 
which led to lucrative trade partnerships. 
 One of the most common ways a European trader was able to secure an alliance 
with a powerful Creek headmen was through marriage. Since Creek society was 
matrilineal, when a European trader took an Indian wife, he not only became a friend or 
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brother, he was granted access to many of the privileges of his wife’s clan. These 
privileges included both protection and support of the town or towns where the Creek 
woman’s clan held influence. Creek wives often tutored their husbands in Muskogean or 
served as interpreters, and also familiarized European traders in Creek customs at an 
accelerated rate.85 
 Marriage to a European trader provided benefits to Creek women. Through their 
white husbands, Creek women had the opportunity to learn English as well as insight into 
the political and economic dynamics of the European deerskin trade. Indian wives of 
traders became privy to new household skills that revolved around animal husbandry, 
which was a concept foreign to Indians of the Southeast during the early to mid-
eighteenth century. These skills included how to milk cows and produce Butter and 
cheese (European women’s work). In addition, they learned how to slaughter the cattle 
for beef.86 All in all, these Creek women transformed into “cultural brokers,” or 
mediators between two worlds. The eighteenth-century Euro-Creek trade required both 
parties to change for it to be successful, and women provided the foundation for the 
Creeks. 
One of the most notable marriage alliances between the Creeks and Augusta 
traders was Lachlan McGillivray’s marriage to Sehoy Marchland. Sehoy’s mother was a 
Creek and her brother was an Upper Creek headman named Red Shoes. Her father’s 
identity, was most likely Captain Marchland de Courtel, who was a commander at Fort 
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Toulouse until 1729.87 The date of marriage is not known, but in 1750 Sehoy gave birth 
to Alexander McGillivray at Little Tallassee, placing their marriage alliance somewhere 
between 1744 and 1750.88 Lachlan McGillivray’s marriage, which straddled both the 
Creek and French world undoubtedly earned him the trust of many important Creek 
headmen at the site of Little Tallassee and the neighboring towns. 
The French and Indian War 
The Seven Years War (1754-1763) also known as the French and Indian War 
complicated the role and place of trading spaces such as Little Tallassee, which served as 
a site of espionage during the French and Indian War. Between the years 1755 and 1758 
Lachlan McGillivray sent several letters to Governor Glen of South Carolina. In these 
letters, he reported the activities of the French and their Indian allies at Fort Toulouse, 
only a few miles from McGillivray’s plantation at Little Tallassee.89 Lachlan McGillivray 
wrote to Glen on the first of February of 1755 that “I have had no opportunity to converse 
with the Headmen therefore can have no material to communicate, but it is most certain 
that the Governor of Orleans made a vigorous Push last Summer at Mobile, to set on the 
Creek Indians to break out with the English.” Lachlan elaborated that the French even 
used “all the little, mean, insinuating, malicious lies that the French Policy could 
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suggest,” but “several of them came away not well satisfied” and that he would give his 
excellency a “full account” of what transpired when he was next in Charles Town.90 In 
the same letter, Lachlan added that he also had the “honor to convey a letter” that was 
given to him by the commander of French Fort from the Governor of New Orleans to 
Governor Glen.91 Only a few months later, Lachlan McGillivray would report to Glen 
that a “French Captain with some other officers and soldiers arrived at the Alabama Fort” 
and soon after his arrival the Captain “called a general meeting of both Creek Nations,” 
where he told the Creeks that “the French would sell goods as cheap as the English and 
something cheaper.”92 
A few years later, in 1758, another series of correspondences occurred between 
Lachlan McGillivray and William Henry Lyttelton, who replaced Glen as Governor of 
South Carolina in 1756.93 Within these correspondences, Lachlan McGillivray continued 
to report the business of the French from Little Tallassee, and suggested that it would be 
a “great advantage” to the British if they possessed Mobile and New Orleans, both ports 
at the time occupied by the French. Lachlan’s letters to Lyttelton also discussed military 
strategies, including an estimate that it would take about six thousand men to capture Fort 
Toulouse and Mobile.94 Although the French and Indian War was fought mostly in the 
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northern colonies, the English could not afford to lose the Creeks or Choctaws, two large 
and potential Indian allies. Lachlan McGillivray’s information in regards to the French 
activity at Fort Toulouse was no doubt crucial to both Governors of South Carolina and 
Britain. Little Tallassee was not just an evolving Creek town, but a contested and coveted 
space by two European powers during the French and Indian War. Little Tallassee, 
however, was never a theatre of war and no combat took place there. 
  Lachlan McGillivray’s allegiance to Britain was dubious at best. While some 
evidence indicates that Lachlan did spy on the French for Governor Glen and Lyttelton, 
the documentary record provides ample support that Lachlan McGillivray put the 
interests of his trading firms and partners above all else. In 1755, McGillivray asked 
Governor Glen why 
 
the gentleman of the assembly should have so mean an opinion of me; I don’t 
know what part of my conduct could give them any room to think so, except it 
was my over eficiousness to do anything that lay in my power to serve the pulick 
upon all occasions [even to the neglect of my own private business].95 
 
It is clear from Lachlan McGillivray’s inquiry to Glen that by 1755 the men of the South 
Carolina assembly and other gentleman of the colony not only gossiped about Little 
Tallassee being a place of “infamous” trade, but Lachlan himself. What is perhaps more 
insightful from this piece of gossip, however, is that McGillivray appeared to be more 
concerned that he often neglected his “own private business” in order to serve the King’s 
colony. McGillivray was a trader first and foremost and espionage for the British 
                                                 
95 Lachlan McGillivray to Governor Glen, 10/15/1755, New Windsor, in CRSCIA, 1754-1755, 82. 
73 
 
threatened to compromise Brown and Rae’s daily business activities and alliances during 
the formative years of Little Tallassee. This threat was due to the fact that Brown and 
Rae’s traders depended on trade with the Alabama Indians and were supposed allies of 
the French. 
Creeks at Little Tallassee 
 Besides being a place to spy on the French, Little Tallassee was the site of one of 
the busiest trading hubs in the American Southeast during the late eighteenth century and 
a place of “illicit” exchange, according to the Royal Governors and British Indian agents. 
Although the British conducted several conferences with both the Indians and traders in 
attempt to regulate trade after the disaster of the Yamasee War, royal governors and 
Indian agents had little power over where traders conducted business. The trading career 
of John Spencer, a member of Brown, Rae, and Company, and friend of Lachlan 
McGillivray, offers insight into why Little Tallassee was a place of interest to Royal 
Authorities. Little Tallassee’s location, only a few miles from Fort Toulouse, allowed 
Spencer to frequently trade with the local Creeks and Alabama Indians but also the 
Choctaws, Chickasaws, French at Fort Toulouse, as well as British traders out of Charles 
Town and Augusta. In a deposition by one of Spencer’s employees, Thomas Perriman, 
dated November 11, 1759 Perriman reported his duties were “to deal not only with the 
Indians of any town named in his license for trading, but with any of the French Indians 
of the Alabama Towns, and with the French themselves.” Perriman also attested that, “the 
Frenchmen belonging to the French Fort, did every year in the time he served Mr. 
Spencer as aforesaid, bring deerskins to him and sometimes to Spencer himself” along 
74 
 
with other items such as “duffel blankets, striped flannel and calico.” Lastly, Perriman 
admitted in his report to Atkins, “that the foresaid Spencer, did sometimes go to the 
French Fort, and French men and women belonging to that Fort came often to Mr. 
Spencer’s House to see him and his Indian woman.”96 
The Alabama Indians, simply known as the Alabama, were a separate group of 
Southeastern Indians that historians and archeologists believe to have been descendants 
of the historic chiefdom known as Moundville that dominated western Alabama and 
eastern Mississippi for almost 500 years before European contact. Moundville and other 
similar chiefdoms of the Southeast collapsed around 1300 and by the time Spanish 
Conquistador Hernando de Soto plundered the remains of these chiefdoms in 1540, the 
Alabama became refugee Indians. Escaping warfare, disease, and possible enslavement, 
the Alabama moved north and eventually settled near the confluence of the Coosa and 
Tallapoosa rivers, just north of present-day Montgomery. A trade agreement was 
coordinated by the Alabama, the French, and neighboring Creeks as early as 1715. The 
Alabama asked French officials in Mobile to establish a trading post within the area. By 
1717, Fort Toulouse was constructed and the Alabama resided in about seven small 
towns within close proximity to the French Fort.97 
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The Alabama were a unique group because they resided on Tallapoosa land, but 
they were not Creeks themselves, despite being historically close in language and 
culture.98 The Alabama traded deerskins in exchange for guns and other necessary 
European trade items with the French at the fort. Over time, they therefore gained the 
reputation as being “French Indians” and enemies of the British whom coveted all Indian 
trade by the mid-eighteenth century. Spencer’s trade with the Alabama appeared to be an 
act of treason to British officials during the Seven Years War, but caused few problems 
locally as the group had become a significant portion of the Little Tallassee’s population 
by the 1750s. As French trade dwindled at Fort Toulouse and was relatively nonexistent 
by the time of the Seven Years War, it was not surprising that many Alabama Indians 
chose to trade with or relocate to the emerging Creek town of Little Tallassee. Perhaps 
Emistisiguo, eager to expand Little Tallassee in trade and population, invited the 
Alabama to join him. The success of the Alabama in procuring the construction of Fort 
Toulouse and their ability to utilize their geographic position to establish a successful 
trade that capitalized on the competing Indian Nations and Europeans in the area may 
have given Emistisiguo the idea that he could do the same.99 
 British Indian Agent, Edmond Atkin appeared to be more suspicious of Lachlan 
McGillivray’s activities at Little Tallassee than John Spencer’s. Less than a week after 
Perriman accused Spencer of illegal activity, Adkin reported McGillivray to have been 
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“engrossing the whole trade of 450 Alabhma [Alabama] Indians & dealing with them & 
others his Majesty’s Enemies” and “Lachlan McGillivray’s store at Little Talsey” to be 
the center of that trade.100 In addition, Atkin reported McGillivray to have “promoted a 
private trade with the Choctaws independent of the Company” which Atkin attested, 
“nothing could be more prejudicial to the King’s service,” because at the time the British 
considered the Choctaws to be French allies.101 Besides the fact that England was at war 
with France, Atkin had issued an injunction in September of that year to all Upper Creek 
traders that forbid trade with the Alabama Indians.102 During a time of war, the French 
and their Indian trade partners were one and the same to both the Superintendent of 
Southern Indian Affairs and the British Crown. 
Edmond Atkin may have been the Superintendent for Southern Indian Affairs, but 
he did not have control over the region’s traders. He spent most of his career arguing with 
London officials in hopes of strengthening his commission to reform Indian trade in the 
South, but his efforts were fruitless. Without greater authority from London, he could not 
prevent Lachlan McGillivray’s Brown, Rae, and Company from monopolizing the 
Southeastern Indian trade markets by the mid-1750s. Atkin and McGillivray maintained a 
healthy dislike for each other throughout the rest of his commission.103 
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 Atkin was not incorrect in sensing the importance of regulating the trade around 
Little Tallassee. As the Seven Years War continued, the town became an important and 
coveted trading space by both the French and the British. Both countries not only wanted 
to win a war but secure a monopoly over the lucrative deerskin trade in the region. 
Individuals like Lachlan McGillivray, John Spencer, and other members of Brown, Rae, 
and Company that resided and traded at Little Tallassee complicated this process. Brown 
and Rae may have been made up of British subjects, but they were an independent trade 
company. McGillivray and his men traded with whomever allowed them to make the 
most profit. Similarly, the Creeks attempted to make the best deals for their clans. While 
the Creeks at Little Tallassee publicly abided by the doctrine of neutrality, they leveraged 
the European powers against each other for profit and never cemented a permanent trade 
alliance with just one potential trade partner.104 
Much of the trade conducted out of Little Tallassee by Lachlan McGillivray and 
John Spencer was frowned upon by the British and Superintendent Atkin, but the Crown 
had no system in place to regulate trade conducted by independent outfits.105 Local 
traders prioritized their friendships and business arraignments with the local Natives, 
especially the Upper Creek, before their British and French allegiances. For the town, it 
was largely business as usual at Little Tallassee despite the larger and bitter war being 
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carried out on American soil. A Carolina trader commented on this behavior in 1752, 
having stated that Brown, Rae, and Company “was a monstrous set of rogues for the 
major part of whom the gallows groans.”106 Governor Wright of Georgia described the 
Augusta Company in similar terms, describing the traders to be “not the honstest [honest] 
or soberest of people,” and the “very worst and abandoned set of men.”107 The success 
and general disdain that traders at Little Tallassee had for authority while the war raged 
on outside the town left an unsavory taste in the mouths of British officials. 
Little Tallassee was a community that was formed by Brown, Rae, and Company. 
By the 1750s, the trading company was more interested in earning a profit than abiding 
by rules and regulations enacted by colonial officials. These regulations threatened the 
autonomy of almost every Augusta trader that had built a life for himself in the Carolina-
Georgia backcountry. Traders, like Lachlan McGillivray, William Struthers, and John 
Spencer had stores, cattle plantations, and families at Little Tallassee. Brown, Rae, & 
Company had created more than a trading out post at Little Tallassee. By the 1750s, it 
was a thriving Euro-Indian community, based on the eighteenth century trans-Atlantic 
deerskin trade. 
The Emergence of Emistisiguo 
  By them middle of the eighteenth century access to a steady supply of European 
trade goods was crucial to the survival of any Creek community, but a Creek town was 
not based on trade alone. Towns were sacred spaces where diplomacy was conducted and 
                                                 
106 CRSCIA, 1750- 1754, 263. 
107 Wright to the Board of Trade, 8/27/1767, in Allen D. Candler, Kenneth Coleman, and Milton Ready, 
The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, 28 vols. (Atlanta and Athens, GA: 1904-16, 1974-6) vol. 28 
(part 2), 51-52. (Hereafter cited as CRSGA, vol. number, page number(s).) 
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decisions on both war and peace were discussed and deliberated. Little Tallassee 
remained merely a trade depot until the arrival of an individual who was able to envision 
and engineer Little Tallassee, the Creek town. In the mid-1750s, the prominent Creek 
Emistisiguo became the town’s first leading headman, renowned warrior, and future 
spokesperson and diplomatic liaison. 
In June of 1753, Little Tallassee was documented as a Creek town for the first 
time in British records during a conference in Charles Town where both Lower and 
Upper Creeks gathered to parlay with the British to lower the price of trade goods. 
Several prominent headmen were also noted to be in attendance such as the Red Coat 
King of Okfuskee, The Wolf of Muccolossus, Duvall’s Landlord of Pucknatallhassee, as 
well as approximately ninety-nine Creeks in total.108 Joining these leaders was the first 
“Indian representative” from Little Tallassee.109 Unnamed in the records, I argue this 
representative was Emistisiguo, who used this opportunity to make his debut in regional 
politics. The meeting was important since war had broken out between the Creeks and 
Cherokees during the previous month in a dispute over British trade rights.110 Throughout 
                                                 
108 The Wolf of Muccolossus was a Tallapoosa Indian, like Emistisiguo, and long-standing friend of the 
British. His presence during these meetings bolsters the possibility that the representative was, indeed, 
Emistisiguo as he and the headman Tallipoosas were pro-British. For information on the Wolf king’s 
support for Governor Glen during the Cherokee-Creek War, see Proceedings of the Council Concerning 
Indian Affairs, Thursday, A.M., 5/31/1753, in Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents relating to 
Indian Affairs, May 21, 1750- August 7, 1754, ed. William L. McDowell, Jr. (1958, repr., Columbia, SC: 
South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1992), 397. Hereafter cited as CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 
page number(s). 
For information concerning the ninety-nine chiefs present at Charles Town, see Proceedings of the Council 
Concerning Indian Affairs, 5/28/1753, in MPAFD, 1: 406. 
109 Proceedings of the Council Concerning Indian Affairs, 5/28/1753, in MPAFD, 1: 406. 
110 The origins of the Creek-Cherokee war stem from a number of factors related to British expansion, a 
longstanding Anglo-Cherokee alliance, and the dependence on trade by all Southeastern Creeks. By May of 
1754, most Upper Creek towns ceased war with the Cherokees. For more on the causes of the war, see 
William Ramsey, The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 151-152; Steven Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 
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July of that same year, several Upper Creek towns had met with South Carolina Governor 
Glen to aid in the war’s escalation in exchange for the British to lower trade prices and 
maintain friendly relations.111 A representative from Little Tallassee was not documented 
at any of the July meetings, but in 1754 Mortar of Okchai traveled to Cherokee country in 
an attempt to make peace with the headmen there.112 Given the fact that Emistisiguo was 
pro-British trade throughout his entire life, and a kinsman of Mortar, and that the town of 
Okchai was an important ally for Little Tallassee during the 1750s and 1760s, this 
historical context leads me to suggest the true identity of Little Tallassee’s 
“representative” in 1753 to be Emistisiguo. A war over trade was the perfect debut for the 
ambitious headman, warrior, and leader of a town whose creation was based on the 
foundation of European trade itself. 
Only a few years later, in July 1757, representatives from Little Tallassee attended 
a conference at the Upper Creek town of Tuckabatchee, where headman Wolf of 
Muccolossus along with several other headmen from both the Upper and Lower Creek 
Nations agreed to a new treaty of friendship with the British. The identity of Little 
Tallassee’s representatives remained unspecified. A few months later, on the third of 
November, a new alliance between the British and select Upper and Lower Creeks was 
fashioned during what was known as the Treaty of Savannah. A total of twenty-one 
                                                 
250. On the Upper Creek-Cherokee peace, see Malatchi to Glen, 5/12/1754, Coweta, in CRSCIA, 1750-
1754, 500. 
111 “Proceedings of the Council Concerning Indian Affairs,” 5/30/1753-6/4/1753, CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 
387-414. For a specific list of headmen present, see p. 410 of the “Proceedings.” 
112 Lachlan McIntosh to Glen, 4/3/1754, Kialijee (Caileges), in CRSCIA, 1750-1754, 504. Morar was 
rumored to be an embassy to the Cherokee town of Chota due to the fact that he had kinship ties to the 
Beloved town. See, Steven Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 250. 
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Creek towns signed the treaty, including Little Tallassee.113 The Tallapoosa headman 
Wolf was the chosen spokesperson for pro-British Upper Creek towns during the treaty. 
The identities of Little Tallassee’s representatives during the November conference are a 
mystery, but speculation can be made that Emistisiguo was there and of like mind with 
his Tallapoosa neighbor because in later years they often worked together on diplomatic 
and trade issues. 
In July of 1759 British sources revealed that the identity of Little Tallassee’s 
headman to be a warrior titled “Eenyhaththlucko.”114 Although Eenyhahthlucko 
disappeared from the historical record the same month that he appeared, linguistics 
provides great insight into the mysterious individual’s identity. The root word thlucko in 
Creek and or Muskogee dialect translated roughly to “big” or “head great warrior” of a 
town when combined with a war name or title.115 E-na-he-tv reflected the first part of 
Eenyhaththlucko’s name and referred to a type of warrior that in Creek society “recited a 
war formula” often to “increase one’s determination to win” and “only uttered in time of 
immediate and extreme danger.”116 Titles such as “great warrior” were rarely bestowed 
                                                 
113 Treaty Minute, Ellis to Lyttelton, 11/13/1757, Savannah, Box 6, WHLP. Creek towns besides Little 
Tallassee and Muccolossus that were present consisted of the following Upper and Lower towns: Coweta, 
Cussita, Hillabee, Sauwoogelo, Tallassee, White Ground, Upper Eufaula, Wewoka, “Tamuchassee,” 
Hatchechubbau, Fusihatchee, Autoseee, Pucantallahassee, Oconee, Tuskegee, Yuchi Town, Chewhaw, 
Okfuskee, and Tuckabatchee. For more on the Treaty of Savannah, see Steven Hahn, Invention of the Creek 
Nation, 261-262. 
114 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
115 Thlucko or thlacco is the eighteenth-century phonetic spelling of the word rakko, which is pronounced 
“thlucko.” The world warrior in Creek/Muskogee is tstnvke, but when paired with thlucko/rakko equates to 
big or great warrior. See, Jack B. Martin and Margret McKane Mauldin, A Dictionary of Creek/Muskogee: 
with notes on the Florida and Oklahoma Seminole dialects of Creek (Lincoln: NE, University of Nebraska 
Press, 200), 344. (Hereafter, Martin, A Dictionary, page(s). 
116 Martin, A Dictionary, 27. It is noted that e-na-he-tv is an archaic term and now obsolete in the Creek 
language, “with the advent of peaceable occupation.”  
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on Creek men unless they proved themselves to be highly successful in war over a period 
of years.117 That said, although little else is known about the identity Eenyhahthlucko, his 
name does prove he held a position of importance within Creek society and Little 
Tallassee by the summer of 1759. 
There is a strong possibility that Eenyhahthlucko was an earlier title for 
Emistisiguo. “Emissee” or “imis” in Muskogee translates to “one responsible for carrying 
the battle-charm or war physic.”118 Linguistics suggests that Emistisiguo was a war leader 
who employed the spiritual power held in the war physic to achieve success in battle. By 
the late 1770s, Emistisiguo was bestowed with several other honorary war names/titles, 
these names including: Big Fellow, Big Man, Big King Mr. Sego, and the most notable: 
Opaya Mico Thucko.119 In addition to his collective war titles, Opaya is another spelling 
for Hopaii. Hopaii referred to a war prophet and an individual who can predict the 
outcome of a battle and would often lead war parties into battle.120 Given 
Eenyhahthlucko’s disappearance from the historical record and the linguistic similarities 
                                                 
117 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 103. 
118 See Martin, A Dictionary, 25. The contents of the battle charm were bones of snakes and lions. Oral 
tradition states that that long ago a lion “devoured” several Creeks. As a result, they ‘dug a pit and caught 
hi in it” (the lion) and “covered him with lightwood knots, burnt him” and saved the bones. A snake 
happened to be in the water at the time, and when the old people sung, the snake appeared and “showed his 
horns”, which are also supposed to be in the bundle. See, Benjamin Hawkins, “A Sketch of the Creek 
Country in the years 1798 and 1799,” in Letters, Journals, and Writings, of Benjamin Hawkins, ed. C.L. 
Grant (Savannah, GA: Beehive Press, 1980) 79-80. 
119 For a summary of the many names and alias’ of Emistisiguo, see Georgia and Florida Treaties, 1763-
1776, ed. John T. Juricek, in vol. 12 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, 
ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002), “Notes to Chapter One”, 
507. (Hereafter cited as GFT, vol. number, page number(s.) See also, Joshua Piker, “White & Clean & 
Contested: Creek Towns and Trading Paths in the Aftermath of the Seven Years’ War,” Ethnohistory 50:2 
(Spring 2003), 341. 
120 For a discussion on Hopaii, see Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 28-29. 
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between his and Emistisiguo’s war titles, it is possible that the two names in the archival 
records refer to the same person. 
Although the exact date of Emistisiguo’s arrival at Little Tallassee is unknown, 
the simultaneous appearance of Little Tallassee as a new town and the documentation of 
a headman and other town representatives suggest he became part of the town between 
1753 and 1759.121 In fact, a closer analysis of Emistisiguo’s personal background offers 
significant insight into what might have motivated him to invest himself in the future of 
Little Tallassee and represent the former trade depot turned town. While references 
regarding Emistisiguo’s biographical identity are sparse, snippets of information can be 
gleaned from his own words transcribed by British officials during speeches and town 
meetings. Emistisiguo was from the Tyger (or Panther) clan, which he claimed to signify 
that he was of “royal descent,” but according to John Stuart, “unfortunately his mother 
was a slave so that he has no pretension to Family.” Most likely Emistisiguo’s mother 
was therefore a captive that was adopted into the Panther clan which passed down to her 
offspring. Emistisiguo’s father (or more likely his maternal uncle) must have had some 
stature, due to the fact that he received a commission from South Carolina and presented 
it to Emistisiguo sometime before his death.122 This select piece of information allows 
one to conclude that Emistisiguo’s “father” was a trusted facilitator of Creek-Anglo trade 
                                                 
121 In front of ‘Little Talsey’ is a note saying “a new town.” See, No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going 
into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 
13, in WHLP. 
122 Emistisiguo’s father was probably his Uncle since Creek society was matrilineal. Stuart to Gage, 
05/23/1777, in Thomas Gage Papers vol. 11 (hereafter cited as TGP), William L. Clements Library, Ann 
Arbor, MI. The only other record of Emistisiguo’s family is that his mother was a slave. See, Juricek, GFT, 
Vol. 12, “Notes to Chapter One,” 507. 
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during Little Tallassee’s formative years, and most likely responsible for Emistisiguo’s 
early trade connections at Little Tallassee.123 
Creek societies were matrilineal and children are considered to only be “blood” 
descendants of their mother. Creek children know their fathers, but they are not 
considered blood relations and therefore play a limited role in the upbringing of the child. 
Instrumental in the child’s upbringing then, was the mother’s brother. Matrilineal blood 
ties were the strongest emotional, social, and obligational ties within Creek societies. 
Kinship within Creek culture was tied to a series of social and reciprocal relationships, 
which tied terms such as “brother” or “father” to carry deep connotations of 
responsibility and and authority. The strongest kinship relationship within Creek society 
was therefore believed to be that of blood, and the reason why Emistisiguo’s “father” was 
his mother’s brother. Emistisiguo’s paternal father was a relative through marriage but 
this carried no kinship responsibility within Creek culture.124 
Evidence indicates that Emistisiguo was trading with Brown, Rae, and Company 
during the mid-1750s. By June of that year, William Struthers was asked by his trade 
partner Lachlan McGillivray to “tend to his interests in Little Tallassee” while he was 
away conducting business at his other stores in Augusta, Georgia. The British often 
referred to Emistisiguo as “Struthers landlord,” which indicates that the two had formed a 
business relationship that began upon Struther’s arrival in 1755 or soon after.125 
Emistisiguo’s alias the “landlord” also implied that Struthers was Emistisiguo’s tenant, 
                                                 
123 A Meeting in Augusta, 6/6/1767, in GFT, Vol.12, 35. 
124 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country, 74-75, 110. 
125 Struthers Landlord or Struthers Friend was once of Emistisiguo’s early nicknames or alias. Robert 
McIntosh to John Stuart, 2/8/1768, in GFT, Vol. 12, Document 24. 
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which allows one to assume that Emistisiguo might have been one of the first Creeks to 
live at Little Tallassee and be able to provide protection to traders. Emistisiguo’s 
relationship to Lachlan McGillivray remains ambiguous, but Lachlan was the designated 
trader to Little Tallassee’s neighboring village of Wacocoys as far back as 1743, and and 
later Little Tallassee, the Creek town, in 1754. This evidence indicates the two were most 
likely closely acquainted through trade and their mutual interest in growth and prosperity 
of Little Tallassee. Emistisiguo referred to himself as a “king warrior of the Little 
Tallassies,” in 1764 and all evidence from that point forward document him as 
identifiable with no other town besides Little Tallassee.126  
 Significant in the formation of Little Tallassee as a new town and in Emistisiguo’s 
debut as its primary headman, was the fact that by the mid-eighteenth century many 
successful Southeastern Indian warriors had transcended the limits of their powers in the 
realm of war and evolved into chief diplomats and leading town headmen. Success in war 
not only elevated the status of Creek men within their towns, but their reputation among 
their Native neighbors as well. Creek warriors earned the respect of their kin, whether it 
be for obtaining clan revenge or the restoration of peace after months to years of 
bloodshed. Some warriors, like Emistisiguo, earned additional respect for their abilities to 
use war medicine to protect war parties via the use of the war physic as well bear the 
responsibility of the battle’s outcome. War became so integral to Creek life that warriors 
garnered the approval of their town’s entire community. Festivities were carried out in 
the town square for returning war parties, where women performed dances, decided the 
                                                 
126 Upper Creek “Great Talk” to Superintendent Stuart and Governor Wright, in GFT, Vol.12, 212. 
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fate of war captives, and both men and women feasted for days. Elite warriors over time 
not only bolstered their own authority through war, but they often established an elite 
status that transcended that of a warrior. More specifically, war leaders by the mid-
eighteenth century were often elected by their communities to become chief diplomats 
and leading town headmen. Emistisiguo’s emergence as the leading town headmen and 
warrior of Little Tallassee during the late 1750s and 1760s makes logical sense within the 
cultural logic of the eighteenth-century American Southeast.127 
Edmond Atkin’s Mission and The Anglo-Cherokee War 
The same year Little Tallassee emerged as a new Creek town in 1759, a war 
erupted between the Cherokee and the British. The Cherokees had long been at odds with 
the colony of South Carolina and the heavy encroachment of settlers and squatters on 
their land. Cherokee headmen were also displeased that a growing number of traders had 
taken up residency within Cherokee country, as well as excessive rum trade. Increased 
frontier violence between the Cherokee warriors and their European neighbors 
exacerbated the situation. Rumors that the Cherokee were aligning themselves with the 
French at Fort Toulouse, and possibly also the Creeks, circulated widely. In August 1759, 
the British cut off ammunition to the Cherokee and despite a delegation of approximately 
                                                 
127 Greg O’Brien has long argued that war leaders often became chief diplomats based on their use of 
spiritual power and ability to lead and gain the respect of men within their town. For more information, see 
“Warriors, Warfare, and Male Power,” in Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 27-49, 38 -47 
in particular. 
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fifty-five Cherokee who traveled to Charleston to make amends with the British, South 
Carolina Governor Henry Lyttelton declared war against the Cherokee that Fall.128 
The outbreak of the Anglo-Cherokee War exacerbated England’s need for Indian 
allies and momentarily shifted the focus of the French and Indian War to the Southeast. 
Under order to secure Native allies, Superintendent Edmond Atkin worked to procure 
reconciliation with the Cherokee, and secure an alliance with the Upper and Lower 
Creeks. Atkin’s new mission was thus to journey into Creek territory and hope that a 
steady supply of European trade goods would cement the alliance. The alliance was 
difficult to forge, as many Creek towns still preferred to adhere to the doctrine of 
neutrality and refused to tie themselves to one European power despite Governor Glen’s 
success in obtaining a trade agreement with Little Tallassee, Muccolossus, and several 
other Tallapoosa towns during the Treaty of Savannah in 1757.129 Upper Creek headmen 
wanted to hold onto their politics of neutrality and more reliable access to European trade 
goods. 
One conversation, between Superintendent Atkin and head warrior 
Yahahtustunnogy of Tuckabatchee, during one of the first of several meetings at 
Tuckabatchee held between the Creeks and Atkin throughout the months of July and 
October of 1759, opens a crucial window into understanding why Upper Creek towns 
                                                 
128 The Cherokee War spanned from 1759 to 1761. Thomas Hatley, The Dividing Path: Cherokees and 
South Carolinians through the Revolutionary Era (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, 105-115 and 
Chapter 9 for more details on the events of the war. 
129 Juricek, Colonial Georgia and the Creeks, 232-236. The Creek town of Okchai and its leading warrior 
the Mortar, in particular, held strong ties to the French. For more on the Mortar and his contact with the 
Cherokees throughout the Anglo-Cherokee war, see Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, Okfuskee, box 13, 
WHLP. 
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tried to remain friends with each side of the conflict.130 The conversation occurred in July 
of 1759 and Atkin informed Yahahtustunnogy that he was “not a little surprised” that so 
few headmen had left their towns to discuss a treaty of friendship with him. The 
commissioner further commented, “I have heard a great deal of French talks in my 
coming up here and you have a French Fort in your Country.”131 Atkin’s hearsay proved 
to be true, as Mortar was holding a meeting at his home town of Okchai, where many 
Upper Creeks, Cherokees, and Frenchmen were said to be in attendance.132 
The British official misunderstood the absence of Creek Headmen from his 
meeting. “If the Creeks chose to go at such a time to that meeting, rather than come to 
receive me, I suppose it is because they love the French better,” the Superintendent told 
Yahahtustunnogy. The Upper Creeks did not prefer the French over the British. Instead, 
they were buying time. They had only “five days’ notice” of Atkin’s arrival, and the 
Upper Creeks could only send some of their head warriors, including Talsey Mico, whom 
Yahahtustunnogy informed Atkin to be the “mouth [speaker] of one of the greatest micos 
in our nation,” to placate Atkin while the rest of the Creeks finished treating with the 
French and their allies at Okchai.133 “We thought it our duty upon this occasion to come 
                                                 
130Yahahtustunnogy is also noted to be a commissioned warrior and the appointed speaker at this meeting. 
See, No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the 
headmen of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
131 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. For more information on the Cherokee war, see 
Steven J. Oatis, “Chapter 7, Inchoate Resistance: Indians and Imperialists in the Creek-Cherokee War, in 
Oatis, A Colonial Complex, 223-263, 235 especially. 
132 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
133 Note here that the Talsey Mico is from the town of Tallassee, not Little Tallassee. The two towns, are 
independent. Tallassee is NOT the mother town of Little Tallassee. No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going 
into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 
13, in WHLP. 
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out to meet you,” Yahahtustunnogy apprised Atkin, when he met him ten miles from 
Tuckabatchee. The Headman was not alone, having managed to bring with him several 
other warriors who held commissions, which alluded to the fact that these men retained 
some importance to both the Creek and British Nations.134 Yahahtustunnogy had 
admitted to knowing that “before we came out, that it was wrong for so few of us to come 
to meet you, whom we look on as our Mother. But if none at all had come, it would have 
been worse.”135 
Yahahtustunnogy’s decision to meet Atkin, despite former loyalties to the French 
is significant. Though many people might have preferred remaining neutral, Fort 
Toulouse had become dependent on trade with Brown, Rae, and Company to survive. 
Their reliance on British trade demonstrated to the Creeks that France could not be relied 
upon as a stable and profitable trade ally.136 Thus, for the duration of Creek-Anglo 
negotiations, Tuckabatchee hosted Atkin’s visit. 
Testing Neutrality: The 1759 Conferences 
In early July, Tuckabatchee was joined by five hundred Upper Creek towns eager 
to renew the alliance previously made two years earlier in Savannah, including the 
Tallapoosa town of Little Tallassee.137 Several prominent Indian traders from Little 
                                                 
134 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
135 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
136 Joshua A. Piker, The Four Deaths of Acorn Whistler, 136. 
137 Atkin to Lyttelton, 7/8/1759, Tuckabatchee Square, box 13, WHLP. Other notable towns and 
corresponding headmen of note to attend the Atkin conference besides Little Tallassee that were present 
included but were not limited to: Ten Abeika headmen (Upper Eufaula Captain, the Okfuskee Captain, Dog 
King of Woccoccocie, two Hillibee “Captains,” Deval’s Landlord of Pucantallahassee, Wewoka’s Second 
Man, “an Upper Creek town,” and “a few” Alabamas. All were present to renew Anglo-Choctaw trade 
made previously at Savannah. It is extremely rare that diplomatic conferences had such a large number of 
90 
 
Tallassee had gathered in Tuckabatchee Square that day to renegotiate trade with the 
British. Included in this group were several “missing” headmen from the meeting two 
days prior. The meeting was composed of the town’s most prominent figures: Lachlan 
McGillivray, John Spencer, and William Struthers of Brown, Rae, and Company, as well 
as the Wolf of Muccolossus (Tustunnogy Eemathla) and the Gun Merchant of Okchai 
(Enastunnogy).138 In addition, there were twenty-one Upper Creek towns present, 
evidence that the majority of Upper Creeks were open to the idea an alliance with the 
British in hopes of retaining their trade agreements.139 Mortar of Okchai was not in 
attendance and was noted to have been conducting business at the “French Fort” as 
proceedings began in his absence at Tuckabatchee.140 
The conference opened with a formal greeting given to Atkin in the Tuckabatchee 
Square where “a fresh party of Indians came singing and dancing with Eagle tails, with 
which they stroked the Superintendent,” as well as “a great number of beloved men, 
micos & others, advanced from behind with a cup of black drink headed by the Wolf and 
the Gun Merchant.”141 The Wolf informed Atkin that he had “just come off his journey” 
                                                 
participants. Atkin most likely exaggerated the turnout of “500 persons” but for certain there was a large 
number of towns. See, Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. For a detailed scholarly account on 
renewing this trade alliance, see Greg O’Brien, “Quieting the Ghosts: How the Chickasaws and the 
Choctaws Stopped Fighting,” in The Native South: New Histories and Enduring Legacies, eds. Tim Alan 
Garrison and Greg O’Brien (Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska Press, 2017), 47-69. 
138 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/9/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. Other notable headmen in attendance were 
Tallassee Mico, The Long Lieutenant of Tallassee, Tuckatchee Mico Great Setter, and Hoithlewaulee 
Mico. 
139 Document No. 1, 7/8/1759, Tuckabatchee Square in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP.  
140 Document No. 1, 7/9/1759, Tuckabatchee Square in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. The 
Gun Merchant was the brother in law of The Mortar and both were from Okchai. See, Hahn, Invention, 
255. 
141 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/9/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
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and “no doubt wanted rest,” which led to him to have “sat there a great while,” until the 
“Superintendent rose up and taking him by the hand [but not Enastunnogy sitting next to 
him] took leave and went out of the square.”142 Atkin’s choice to not take the Gun 
Merchant by the hand offers valuable insight concerning larger Creek politics. The Gun 
Merchant’s arrival at Tuckabatchee was delayed because he had been meeting with the 
French and purportedly “forbid” several headmen from “going to meet the 
Superintendent.”143 Atkin believed and told others that the Gun Merchant had also “sent 
messengers to others for the same purpose,” which “was the reason why only 14 men 
from 6 towns came to me at camp within 10 miles of Talsey or Tuckabatchee.” It was not 
until Mortar of Okchai, Gun Merchant’s brother in law, advised him and several other 
headmen to meet Atkin, while Mortar remained, leaving Gun Merchant with instructions 
“to send for him at the French fort” if his presence was absolutely necessary.144 
Atkin’s account of Gun Merchant Mortar’s actions would lead one to believe that 
two of the Upper Creek leading headmen preferred their preexisting French trade alliance 
above the possibility of renewing ties with the British. The two warriors from Okchai 
were just adhering to the old Creek politics of neutrality. They knew trade was essential 
for survival and refused to limit themselves when they chose political or trade alliances. 
In the same account, Atkin revealed both the Mortar and his brother in law to have also 
                                                 
142 I added the italics. In the document there was an X and the line about Atkin not taking the Gun 
Merchant by the hand was in parenthesis. No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and 
afterwards in that square to the headmen of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/9/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
143 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/9/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
144 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
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engaged in peaceful talks with the British. “My two greatest opponents [Mortar and 
Gun]” have “contributed most themselves, without design, to raise my reputation 
amongst the Creeks, the first speaking of me as a man, the other of my abilities,” Atkin 
declared.145 
Even though Superintendent Atkin and the British had secured an alliance in July 
of 1759, by September of that same year Upper Creek unity fell apart and leading Creek 
headmen such as Gun Merchant, Mortar, and even Wolf of Muccolossus retracted their 
previous commitments to only trade with the British. When Atkin summoned the Creeks 
to what he proclaimed to be a “Great Meeting” in Tuckabatchee Square on September 28, 
the majority of the Upper Creeks, including Tuckabatchee’s leading headmen, did not 
attend.146 Both Gun Merchant and Mortar were also absent, and evidence indicates that 
the two purposely held a meeting in their home town of Okchai on the same day in order 
to draw Creeks away from Atkin’s “Great Meeting” and renew Creek faith in their 
politics of neutrality.147 Wolf, whom up until this point had been one of the British’s most 
faithful allies, was present but informed Atkin at the end of the meeting that he “had no 
Answer to make” in response to Atkin’s trade and alliance proposals.148 Little Tallassee 
and the town’s headman Emistisiguo was also conspicuously absent.149 
                                                 
145 No 1. Speeches, July 1759 before going into Tuckabatchee and afterwards in that square to the headmen 
of the Upper Creek Towns, 7/13/1759, Box 13, in WHLP. 
146 Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
147 Document No. 10, 9/28/1759, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
148 Document No. 10, 9/29/1759, in Atkin to Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. 
149 Emistisiguo was referred to by the title Hoboytusnnogy in the document. Tustanuggee in Muskogee 
means warrior, Martin, 344. The prefix hoboy a title similar to Hopaii, which meant “prophet, priest, war 
chief, war prophet, seer,” O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 29. For Little Tallassee, Emistisiguo, 
and a list of other absent headmen and towns, see “minutes” in Document No. 10, 9/29/1759, in Atkin to 
Lyttelton, 11/30/1759, box 13, WHLP. The document suggests the reason for Emistisiguo’s absence to be 
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Although Emistisiguo did not attend Atkin’s meeting in July 1759, the fact that he 
is mentioned by the British Superintendent in his letters and documents as a headman is 
quite significant. Atkin’s mission was to incorporate not just the Creeks, but the 
Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokee into a formal British trade alliance. That he noted 
Emistisiguo to have been a headman and absent demonstrates that the Superintendent 
regarded him to be an individual of importance by 1759. Perhaps even more significant 
was Atkin’s recognition of Emistisiguo as Little Tallassee’s headman; this demonstrates 
that by 1759, even British Superintendent Edmond Atkin, regarded Little Tallassee was 
no longer merely a place of trade, but an actual Creek Indian town. Emistisiguo, a 
traditional headman, was crucial in Little Tallassee’s transition from trade post to town. 
Wolf of Muccolossus silence and the absence of the leading headmen of the 
seemingly pro-English towns that attended the July conferences reveal the general 
attitude of most Creeks towards the British by the end of 1759. Henry Ellis, Governor of 
Savannah, months later commented on Wolf’s silence. Ellis wrote to Lyttelton that the 
Creek leaders were “surprised” and were so “daunted and confounded” at the 
Tuckabatchee that they “could make no answer” to Atkin’s requests.150 Despite what the 
British believed, the Creeks were not confused. They desired a steady flow of European 
goods, but they were not ready to put their trust in a single European power. The Creeks 
were not against British trade; they simply did not see the need to abandon a century of 
                                                 
due to illness. A list of “sick” headmen is given which included three others: Uflegey of Coweta, 
Talhalegey of Cussita, Enyhahmico (Halfbred), and a Beloved man of Hitchiti. All notable headmen. 
150 Ellis to Lyttelton, 10/16/1759, Savannah, box 12, WHLP. 
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Creek neutrality politics that still in the year 1759 appeared to serve the interest of the 
Creeks well. 
Superintendent Atkin’s mission to cajole the Creeks into a trade alliance with the 
British was not a complete failure despite the collapse of the trade agreements. Before the 
British agent left Creek Country, Atkin did successfully ratify a “treaty of friendship” in 
October of 1759 with the Alabama Indians.151 The treaty agreed to end the trade embargo 
placed on the Alabama that had prevented them from receiving any British trade goods. 
According to Atkin, “the Alabama towns” did “humbly request to be looked upon and 
treated as well as the Creeks by having the Trade allowed to them, professing equal 
friendship and promising to live in perfect peace with his majesty’s subjects.”152 The 
trade the Alabama town requested in return for their allegiance to the British was to 
“purchase Goods from British Licensed traders at the same rates as the Creeks now, 
either at the Town of Moocolussah on the Tallapoosa River, or in the Town of Little 
Talsey on the Coosa River.”153 In exchange, the Alabama towns’ agreed to relinquish all 
trade, talks, and “not take part with the French in anything whatever, against or to the 
prejudice of his British Majesty or any of his subjects.”154 Atkin agreed to the Alabama’ 
demands and the treaty was signed. By December, he left Creek country and never 
returned. 
                                                 
151 Treaty of Friendship & Commerce, 10/9/1759, Tuckabatchee, in CO5/64. 
152 The Alabamas were Creeks and close neighbors to Little Tallassee. Atkin looked upon them differently 
than the majority of the Creeks for they lived within the closest proximity of Fort Toulouse and had been 
trading with the French since the construction of the fort in 1717. Treaty of Friendship & Commerce, 
10/9/1759, Tuckabatchee, in CO5/64. 
153 Treaty with the Alabama Indians, 10/9/1759, Tuckabatchee, in Mr. Atkin’s of 10/24/1760, p.3, CO5/64. 
The italics are not my own, but those of Atkin. 
154 Treaty with the Alabama Indians, 10/9/1759, Tuckabatchee, in Mr. Atkin’s of 10/24/1760, p.3, CO5/64. 
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The conferences between Atkin and the Creeks between the summer and winter of 
1759 offer valuable insight in Little Tallassee’s evolution from trade space to origins as a 
traditional Creek town, as well as Emistisiguo, its headman. Little Tallassee and 
Emistisiguo were both present and absent during the conferences at Tuckabatchee, a clear 
sign that Little Tallassee’s attendance as a Creek town was worthy of noting by British 
officials, specifically the Superintendent of Southeastern Indian Affairs Edmond Atkin. 
In addition, the fact that Little Tallassee supported its fellow Upper Creek towns in their 
decision to remain neutral despite waning French support is evidence that Little Tallassee 
was no longer a space to merely conduct trade. Emistisiguo, the town’s leading headmen, 
attended the Tuckabatchee conferences with leading headmen such as the Wolf, the 
Mortar, and Gun Merchant, but remained at home when these headmen chose not to 
attend or to simply remain silent. Although Emistisiguo had championed British trade his 
entire career as lead headman of Little Tallassee, before 1763 he respected that he was 
not in a position of authority to challenge the principal warriors and diplomats of his 
neighboring towns. Little Tallassee’s participation in adhering to the century old Creek 
custom of neutrality illustrates that by 1759 Creek politics dominated the town of Little 
Tallassee, and exemplifies that trade was no longer the only subject of discussion at Little 
Tallassee. Atkin’s documentation of “the town of Little Talsey” in his Treaty of 
Friendship with the Alabama in October of 1759 only cemented this fact. 
Within only a window of approximately twenty years, Little Tallassee’s identity 
was no longer confined to that of a place of Euro-Indian exchange, but an important place 
within Creek society. The arrival of a traditional headman, second man, and Little 
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Tallassee’s participation in Creek politics of neutrality all demonstrate crucial 
components that compose a traditional Creek town. Emistisiguo’s arrival at Little 
Tallassee was central to this transformation. A warrior, traditional headmen, and 
emerging orator and diplomat, Emistisiguo brought Creek culture and tradition to Little 
Tallassee. By 1759, the foundation was set for one of Creek society’s most prominent 
Creek towns to emerge during the mid-eighteenth century. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TRADE AND DIPLOMACY 
1761-1765 
 
 The story of Little Tallassee, in many ways, encapsulated a unique era in Creek 
History and Colonial America. A product of a colonial encounter, Little Tallassee 
between the mid-1740s to early 1750s was a center of Euro-Creek exchange and Atlantic 
trade. In 1759, under the leadership of warrior and traditional headman Emistisiguo, 
Little Tallassee evolved into a formal Creek town and by 1761 even hosted its first 
diplomatic meeting. Between 1763 and 1765 Emistisiguo championed a new southern 
trade path with the British out of the Gulf Coast, which bolstered Emistisiguo’s authority 
within Upper Creek society and confirmed Little Tallassee to be a sacred space by Creek 
standards. Euro-Indian trade dominated the American Southeast throughout the 
eighteenth century, and Little Tallassee took full advantage of its benefits. 
Waning Neutrality 
Two years after British Superintendent Edmond Atkin’s departure, several Upper 
Creek towns reconsidered their position of neutrality. In April of 1761, Wolf of 
Muccolossus spearheaded a request to align with the British in friendship and trade, 
which Emistisiguo formally facilitated during the conference of Augusta in 1763.1 By the 
                                                 
1 Several other towns were present during the first of many meetings between the Upper Creeks and 
Govenor Wright in the spring of 1761. These towns and their corresponding headmen were as follows: 
“Oakchoy’s” and the Gun Merchant, “Hillaby’s” and Mad Bear and Big Chatter, “Oakfuskees” and High-
Atka-lega and the half breed, “Wacakoy” and the Dog King, “Euphala” and the Captain, “Fushatchee” and 
the town’s second man, “Great Talissee” and the beaver Tooth King, “Weoka” and long second man, 
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end of April of 1761, Wolf of Muccolossus informed the Governors of South Carolina 
that “we [Creeks present] hold fast by the English and they to hold fast by us.” He 
continued, “We have not thrown away the Govenours Talk and we shake hands with 
them, and all the Towns hold fast by the English.”2 Even though Wolf may have wavered 
during the Tuckabatchee councils of 1759, the Creeks knew that their days of neutrality 
were limited as the French and Indian War came closer to a British victory.3 
Gun Merchant of Okchai seconded Wolf’s desire for peace during the same 
conference in late April. “We are now renewing out Peace with you. Our head Warriors 
and Young people want nothing but Peace and Goods, and white People amongst them,” 
Gun Merchant apprised the British officials. Gun Merchant was well-known as a pro-
French supporter, as his kin Mortar of Okchai, and his presence and speech on April 30 
demonstrated the serious intentions of the Upper Creeks in offering their allegiance in 
exchange for British trade. Gun Merchant’s closing remarks during the conference spoke 
only to the protection of that trade. He listed nine headmen who had “staid [stayed] at 
Home last Winter to protect the Traders” within each of their towns, Little Tallassee 
                                                 
“Cusadees” and Tom-matha-King, “Tuskegee” and Tuskegee King, and “Cialegees” and the town’s head 
warrior. The town names are in quotes due to the British spelling. See, Upper Creek Headmen to Governor 
Wright, 4/30/1761, in Georgia Treaties, 1733-1763, ed. John T. Juricek, vol. 11 of Early American Indian 
Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Frederick, MD: University Publications 
of America, 1989), 342. (Hereafter cited as GT, Vol. 11, page(s).) On Emistisiguo and the conference of 
Augusta, see David H. Corkran, The Creek Frontier 1540-1783 (Norman, OK: The University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1967), 240; John T. Juricek, Endgame for Empire: British, 53. Emistisiguo’s role in the 
conference at Augusta in 1763 will be addressed in greater detail later in this chapter of my dissertation. 
2 Upper Creek Headmen to Governor Wright, 4/30/1761, in GT, Vol. 11, 342-343. 
3 Quebec fell to the British after the battle of the Plains of Abraham on September of 1759, and the French 
ceded “French Canada shortly after. In 1761, France made an alliance with Spain to defend sugar islands in 
the Caribbean, but by January of 1762 England had captured Spanish Cuba and French Martinique. The 
Treaty of Paris in 1763 brought an end to the Seven Years War, and thus, the French and Indian War. See, 
Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), 
431-432. 
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being one of the nine.4 Gun Merchant remarked that there had been “Disturbances in the 
upper Towns” due to the nearby Anglo-Cherokee War and feared if “any Cherokee 
should run here for shelter” it would not be “taken amiss.” In exchange for trade, Gun 
Merchant made it clear: “No head or Common Warrior will take up the Hatchet against 
the English to help the Cherokees.”5 
The next month, several prominent Upper Creek headmen met to confirm their 
commitment to a British trade alliance. Instead of gathering at Tuckabatchee, the primary 
Upper Creek town for diplomatic negotiations, the headmen assembled at Little Tallassee 
to carry out their talks. The speaker at this talk was identified only as “second Indian,” 
but his words echoed that of Wolf and Gun Merchant the month before: “we intend to 
hold by the English fast,” as “the French we know it is not in their power to supply us 
with anything but Ammunition, and was we to throw away the English we should soon 
come to want.” A complete list of towns and headmen that met at Little Tallassee was not 
provided by Struthers, but evidence suggests that the May assembly was an extension of 
the prior conversations between the Upper Creek towns and Governor Wright conducted 
and that the identity of the ‘second Indian’ speaker was that of Emistisiguo.6 
                                                 
4 Mad Wind is listed as the “persons” in charge of protecting trade at Little Tallassee. For a list of the other 
eight town and persons, see Upper Creek Headmen to Governor Wright, 4/30/1761, GT, Vol. 11, 342-343. 
William Struthers, friend of Emistisiguo, long time trade partner of Brown, Rae, and Company, and 
resident trader of Little Tallassee recorded the Creek’s talk on the 30th and signed the document. See also, 
“Talks from Upper Creek Country,” 4/30/1761, in Allen D. Candler, Kenneth Coleman, and Milton Ready, 
The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, 28 vols. (Atlanta and Athens, GA: 1904-16, 1974-6) Vol. 8, 
542-544. (hereafter citer as CRSGA). 
5 “Talks from Upper Creek Country,” 4/30/1761, in CRSGA, Vol. 8, 542-544; Upper Creek Headmen to 
Governor Wright, 4/30/1761, GT, Vol. 11, 342-343.  
6 William Struthers to Governors Wright and Bull, 5/17/1761, Little Tallassee, in CRSGA, Vol. 8, 545-546. 
Struthers stated that he delivered the talks “at Little Tallassee” in the opening of the document. The identity 
of the speaker is not known. John T. Juricek speculates that it was the Okfuskee Captain, see John T. 
Juricek, Colonial Georgia and the Creeks: Anglo- Indian Diplomacy, 1733-1763 (Gainesville, FL: 
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The Upper Creek towns decision to reach out to the British in 1761 demonstrated 
their ability to understand the global shifts in diplomacy and trade that were about to 
occur as a result of the French and Indian War ending in 1763 with the Treaty of Paris. 
Britain gained control over all of France and Spain’s former territories, and consequently 
monopolized control over Southeastern Indian trade except for the Spanish stronghold in 
New Orleans. The aftermath of the war ushered in a period of great change for the Creek 
Indians and their neighbors. Little Tallassee, along with its headmen and key traders, 
would be at the center of this change and geopolitical situation. 
Creek Diplomacy at Little Tallassee 
 The decision to conduct a meeting diplomatic in nature at Little Tallassee in May 
1761 was a turning point in the former trading post’s evolution to traditional Creek town. 
Creek diplomacy required an elaborate set of rituals and ceremonies to create a sacred 
atmosphere for those meeting to maintain control and achieve success in the negotiation 
at hand. The objective of the May meeting at Little Tallassee was to forge an alliance 
with the British to secure access to European trade as the French and Indian War came to 
a close. For Creeks, individuals were grouped into two single categories: relatives and 
enemies. Outsiders, such as the British, were viewed by the Creeks and Southeastern 
Indians as foreigners and categorized as enemies. Unlike the McGillivray family that had 
traded with Little Tallassee and took Creek women as their wives, the colonies of South 
Carolina and Georgia and the British officials attached to those colonies were complete 
                                                 
University of Florida Press, 2010), 294. Historical context leads me to argue it was Emistisiguo. See also, 
“Talks from Upper Creek Country,” 4/30/1761, in CRSGA, Vol. 8, 542-544; William Struthers to 
Governors Wright and Bull, 5/17/1761, Little Tallassee, in CRSGA, Vol. 8, 545-546. 
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strangers. To take advantage of this trade and transform potential enemies into kinfolk 
diplomacy was necessary, but only a spiritual specialist, an individual with a proven 
ability to manipulate supernatural forces, possessed the skills to carry out such an 
elaborate process.7 Emistisiguo was one of these spiritual specialists. 
  Creeks conceptualized power to be connected to anything that originated outside 
one’s daily experience, which could be highly unpredictable and dangerous. The 
unknown could take the form of a geographically distant place, a foreigner, or a mystical 
force that resided in within the supernatural realm. Since diplomacy required Creek 
headmen to engage with strangers or travel to distance places, spiritual specialists were 
valuable and necessary thanks to their abilities to predict and influence distant events. 
The presence of someone capable of these abilities was needed in order to ensure success 
of all Native diplomatic negotiations as well as the safety of those participating in 
diplomatic missions. Spiritual specialists were also needed during travel to create a 
sacred atmosphere through a variety of ritual practices and ceremonies that fostered an 
environment that allowed Creeks to convert strangers into relatives and friends on foreign 
soil. These rituals included but were not limited to the smoking of a calumet (pipe) and 
consumption of the black drink in order to foster an open and honest discussion by all 
involved. The bestowment of white eagle feathers to the chosen partner in diplomacy was 
                                                 
7 Greg O’Brien discusses the role of spiritual specialists, political spiritual specialists and spiritual leaders 
in great length in Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age: 1750-1830 (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 
2002), especially Chapters 3 and 4. For an example of a Choctaw spiritual specialist, see his discussion of 
Taboca within these chapters as well pages 38-39, 55-56, 71 in particular. 
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also supervised by a proven spiritual leader in order to promote peaceful relations and 
negotiations.8 
 Although the meeting in May 1761 at Little Tallassee did not require the Creeks 
to journey outside of their familiar territory, it did require the employment of a spiritual 
specialist that could establish a sacred atmosphere necessary for incorporating strangers 
into the system of Creek kinship. Emistisiguo was more than Little Tallassee’s first 
known leading headmen and warrior, but a spiritual specialist. Not only did Emistisiguo’s 
name literally translate to war psychic, but within a decade he received the title Opaya 
Mico Thucko, which confirmed his abilities as a great war prophet. The decision by Gun 
Merchant and Wolf, two prominent Upper Creek headman to continue their peace 
overtures to the British at Little Tallassee, rather than Muccolossus, suggests that the two 
were in search of a spiritual specialist and Emistisiguo by that time had proven himself to 
be quite capable of creating the sacred atmosphere needed to complete their peace 
overtures.9 
Creek diplomacy was only conducted in sacred spaces, by well-respected 
headmen, warriors, and under the direction of spiritual specialists. The meeting at Little 
Tallassee was evidence that Creek society no longer considered Little Tallassee to be a 
                                                 
8 For a discussion on American Indian concepts of power, see O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 
“Introduction” and xxvi-xxvii in particular. In regards to diplomacy as a sacred act, see Greg O’Brien, “The 
Conquered Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-Revolutionary Southern 
Frontier,” in Pre-Removal Choctaw History: Exploring New Paths, ed. Greg O’Brien (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 148-183, 155-156 in particular on the role of spiritual specialists, 
such as Taboca (war prophet). 
9 John T. Juricek still refers to Little Tallassee as a village at this point. However, he does note the 
significance of the community’s rise as an “extremely influential and common meeting site for the Upper 
Creek leaders for the remainder of the colonial era.” See, Juricek, Colonial Georgia of the Creeks, 294. 
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place of Euro-Creek exchange, but a Creek town. Documentary evidence only serves to 
bolster this fact by mentioning that a town square by Creek standards was intact at Little 
Tallassee by this time.10 Emistisiguo’s arrival at Little Tallassee was crucial to this 
transformation. His identity as a traditional headman, warrior, spiritual specialist, and 
aspiring diplomat propelled Little Tallassee’s position within Creek society as an 
important and sacred space. The peace overtures for an Anglo-Creek trade alliance during 
the spring 1761 were the first of many to be conducted out of Little Tallassee and under 
the direction of Emistisiguo. 
Aftermath of the French and Indian War (1763-1765) 
The aftermath of the French and Indian War brought great change to Little 
Tallassee. Within three years, Little Tallassee surpassed its neighboring towns in power 
and prominence, and emerged as the lead town of the Upper Creek Nation in matters of 
trade and diplomacy. During the same period, Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee, 
transformed himself from a little-known warrior into a leading headman, head warrior, 
and an elected spokesperson and diplomatic liaison on behalf of all Upper Creeks. The 
British victory in 1763 removed the element of European competition from Creek trade, 
which ushered in a new era of trade and diplomacy for everyone in the region. Under the 
leadership of Emistisiguo, Little Tallassee seized upon this opportunity and became the 
first town and headman to openly accept and promote trade with the British at Mobile 
and Pensacola. It was, therefore, during the aftermath of the French and Indian War that 
                                                 
10 Upper Creek “Great Talk” to Superintendent Stuart, Seeking Georgia-Lower Creek Reconciliation, 
2/4/1774, Little Tallassee, GT, Vol. 11, 136. 
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the town of Little Tallassee, via trade and the leadership of its headman, became a much 
more important place not only within the Creek Nation, but also the Colonial Southeast. 
There is no scholarly study to date that analyzes the growth of Little Tallassee or 
that puts the town at the center of eighteenth-century Gulf Coast trade. In addition, there 
is no substantial study on the town’s headman, Emistisiguo, who facilitated that trade and 
established Little Tallassee’s status as the key link in the relationship between the Upper 
Creeks and the British.11 Current historiography has glossed over Emistisiguo’s 
significant presence at the conference of Augusta in 1763, which was the first attempt by 
the British and the Creek Nation to negotiate new trade alliances in the aftermath of Great 
Britain’s acquisition of Pensacola and Mobile in the new colonies of East and West 
Florida following the defeat of France. 
The most significant factor in this scholarly oversight, is because few historians 
have identified Emistisiguo as the only Upper Creek headman to speak at Augusta in 
1763. The first historian to address this possibility was David Corkran, in his seminal 
work, The Creek Frontier. Corkran did not account for Emistisiguo having spoken at the 
conference, but he did state the headman was “on record as attending under the name 
‘Mistisequa.’” Corkran believed this was an alias possibly used to protect his identity as a 
                                                 
11 The closest historical study on this topic can be found in Joshua A. Piker’s article, “White & Clean & 
Contested: Creek Towns and Trading Paths in the Aftermath of the Seven Years’ War,” Ethnohistory 50:2 
(Spring). Piker’s primary focus is not Little Tallassee or Emistisiguo, but I am indebted to him for his 
thorough research on Trade Paths in the aftermath of the Seven Years War. See also, John T. Juricek’s 
Endgame for Empire: British-Creek Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776 (Gainesville, FL: 
University of Florida Press, 2015). Juricek also does not center his story on Little Tallassee or Emistisiguo, 
but he brings new details to the significance of the Treaty of Augusta in 1763. 
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“discreet agent” of the Upper Creek headman who was not in attendance.12 Edward 
Cashin, in his book, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader, was the second to make the 
connection between Mustisikah and Emistisiguo, but he leaves this connection only to a 
footnote, with no further explanation than what Corkran provided.13 The most recent and 
comprehensive study on the Creeks at the Treaty of Augusta is John T. Juricek’s 
Endgame for Empire. Juricek, not only states that Emistisiguo was in fact Mustisikah, but 
that he was indeed, the only Upper Creek to speak at the conference, his words being “a 
small but pregnant comment.”14 That said, Mustisikah is merely an alternative spelling 
for Emistisiguo, but has largely gone unnoticed by previous scholars. Emistisiguo’s 
emergence as Little Tallassee’s first official headman and most influential representative 
until his death in 1780 also indicated that he played a significant role in shaping the 
town’s identity. As Emistisiguo rose to power, so did Little Tallassee. 
The need to hold a conference at Augusta in 1763 was a necessary due to the 
results of the French and Indian War. France had lost all of its territory east of the 
Mississippi River to Great Britain. French land claims west of the Mississippi were given 
to Spain and included New Orleans, which France had ceded to Spain a year earlier. 
Although many Frenchmen remained in New Orleans, their holdings in the Americas 
paled in comparison to Great Britain’s empire, which encompassed all of North America 
                                                 
12 David H. Corkran, The Creek Frontier 1540-1783 (Norman, OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 
1967), 240. 
13 Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Reshaping of the Southern Colonial 
Frontier (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 356. 
14 John T. Juricek, Endgame for Empire: British, 53. 
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east of the Mississippi River and included the former Spanish and French trade 
strongholds of Montreal, Quebec, Mobile and Pensacola.15 
Although Florida now belonged to Great Britain, Indians continued to dominate 
the region and any changes in European claims to the area had to be explained to them. 
East Florida was occupied by the Lower Creeks, and West Florida to the Upper Creeks 
and Choctaws. If the British wanted to occupy the region, they needed to negotiate with 
the Southeastern Indian Nations first.16 Establishing a successful and profitable trade with 
the Southeastern Indians at Pensacola and Mobile remained vital to British and Indian 
interests. The Board of Trade outlined specific a clause in the Proclamation of 1763 that 
proclaimed “trade with the said Indians shall be free and open to all our subjects” as long 
as two conditions were met. First, traders needed to secure a license from a colonial 
governor. Second, each trader was required to post a bond that pledged their allegiance to 
observe any regulations that the Board or Commissioners of Trade saw fit.17 Trade with 
the Southeastern Indians was of the utmost importance to the British. [See Figure 5.] 
                                                 
15 Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 5. 
16 Juricek, Endgame for empire, 28. 
17 Juricek, Endgame for empire, 27. 
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Figure 5. Formal Boundaries of Georgia and Adjacent British Colonies, 1764-1776. From 
Bernard Romans, A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida, ed. Kathryn 
Braund, University of Alabama Press, 1999. Found in Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 31. 
 
Creek Concerns and Town Opposition 
It took a series of conferences after the transfer of colonial claims from France 
and Spain to Britain to negotiate boundary lines and trade alliances between the 
Southeastern Indians and the British colonies. The first of these conferences took place 
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during the Fall and Winter of 1763. John Stuart replaced Edmond Atkin as the British 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern District in 1763. He was advised by 
Henry Ellis, Royal Governor of South Carolina, and ordered by the King to conduct a 
conference with all Southeastern Indian groups to address these issues no later than 
November of 1763. All four of the southern district’s governors were instructed to be 
present: Thomas Boone of South Carolina, Arthur Dobbs of North Carolina, James 
Wright of Georgia, Lieutenant-Governor Francis Fauquier of Virginia, along with 
Superintendent Stuart.18 Stuart choose James Colbert, a Scottish trader who had resided 
amongst the Chickasaws for an extended period of time, as one of the lead interpreters. 
Augusta Georgia, was selected by British consensus to be the location for these 
conferences, and a peace and trade alliance with the Southeastern Indians remained the 
goal.19 
Out of all the Southeastern Indian groups, the Upper Creeks were the most 
hesitant to meet with Stuart and the British. Their initial concern was the meeting 
location and the time of year it would occur. On October 4, 1763, Governor Thomas 
Boone informed James Wright in a letter that “none of the Creeks will be there, at the 
congress,” Augusta simply being too far from their towns along the north-western portion 
of the Coosa and Tallapoosa River Valleys.20 The Second man of Tuckabatchee met with 
                                                 
18 “Journal of the Proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta," 10/1/1763- 11/8-1763, Augusta, 
Records of the British Colonial Office, Class Five Files, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, The Board of 
Trade, The French and Indian War, ed. Randolph Boehm (Frederick, MD: University Publications of 
America, 1983) vol. 65 (Hereafter cited as CO5/vol. number). 
19 Juricek, Endgame for empire, 44. 
20 Letter from Governor James Wright, 10/11/1763, Savannah, in “Journal of the Proceedings of the 
Southern Congress,” in CO5/65. 
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John Stuart at Fort Augusta later that week, along with a number of Choctaws, 
Chickasaws, and a few other Creeks. At that meeting, they informed Stuart that they 
could not make the conference in Augusta because “it was their hunting season,” and 
“during this time they should be in the woods providing for their families.” The Second 
Man of Tuckabatchee asked Stuart if he could, instead, “deliver the king’s talk to them, 
and dispatch them immediately,” or change the location of the conference.21 In addition, 
Upper Creeks were worried about land seizure. In May 1763, only a few months before 
the desired conference date, Mortar (Yahahtustunnogy) and Gun Merchant 
(Enastunnogy) of Okchai met with Governor Wright of Georgia. During this meeting 
Mortar gave a talk where he stated, “that formerly lands that the white people now live 
upon were theirs, but now he believes white people have forgot or think they have no 
lands belonging to them, as he hears we are going to take all the lands which they lent the 
French and Spaniards.” To the governor, Mortar expressed his surprise, “in how people 
can give away land that does not belong to them,” which is why he and his townsmen 
were puzzled as to why there was a need to draw a boundary line in the first place. The 
Creeks had lent the contested land to the Spanish and French, but still claimed it as their 
own. The British arrival did not change this fact.22 
                                                 
21 Letter from Governor James Wright, 10/11/1763, Savannah, “Journal of the Proceedings of the Southern 
Congress,” in CO5/65. 
22 Mortar and Gun Merchant to Governor Wright, 5/8/1763, Okchai, in Georgia Treaties, 1733-1763, ed. 
John T. Juricek, in vol. 11 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden 
T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002), 252 (hereafter cited as Juricek, 
GT, vol. 11, page number). Juricek states in a footnote that Gun Merchant was indeed present at this talk, 
but he spoke with Wright privately and was more concerned with the fact that the Cherokees were able to 
buy goods more cheaply than the Creeks. 
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Mortar continued to express his distrust towards the British at a second meeting 
with Governor Wright before the conference at Augusta. In that meeting, he reminded 
Wright that “their agreement was that this Side of Savannah River above Augusta should 
belong to them [the Creeks],” but 
 
now find it settled all over the woods with People Cattle and Horses, which has 
prevented them for some time from being able to supply women and children with 
provisions as they could do formerly, their buffalo, deer, and bear being drove off 
the lands and killed.23  
 
Handsome Fellow, a headman from the Upper Creek town of Okfuskee, confirmed 
Mortar ’s concerns. “His Talk is the same as Mortar’s,” Handsome Fellow told Wright, 
and “he sees the Virginia People settled upon a great Part of their Lands which they never 
granted, such as Satilla to the South of Georgia, Ogeechee, Conutchee, and Savannah 
River up high,” where he was “certain no red People ever granted any lands in those 
parts.”24 For Creeks, these “contested” lands were not mere pieces of property that could 
be simply be given away or replaced by a monetary value. Land to Indians in general was 
tied to practical and spiritual realms. Hunting grounds and agricultural farmlands were 
necessary to Creek society, whether it be the meat of a deer or trade goods procured from 
dressing and trading its skin. The same land was also used to bury the dead or “the bones 
of our people,” as Stump-finger of Coweta informed Henry Ellis, Governor of South 
                                                 
23 Upper Creek Protest to Governor Wright Over Encroachments, 4/5/1763, Okchai, in Juricek, GT, vol. 11, 
351. 
24 Upper Creek Protest to Governor Wright Over Encroachments, 4/5/1763, Okchai, in Juricek, GT, vol. 11, 
351. According to Juricek, Secretary of State William Pitt on June, 10, 1758 ordered the evacuation of 
white settlers or “Virginians” in New Hanover, on the Satilla River. However, by April of 1759 “nearly all 
the settlers had returned,” proving Handsome Fellow’s concerns to be correct. 
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Carolina, three years before Augusta conference.25 Mortar attempted to express these 
concerns to Wright, saying, “when the King sees this talk he may think we are cross and 
love our lands a great deal, and so we do, the wood is our fire and the grass is our bed.”26 
British officials did not make the connection to the Creeks spiritual connection to 
their land and remained dumbfounded to their resistance to make a deal. As negotiations 
for the meeting bogged down, Stuart remarked, “It is certainly within the interest of the 
Creek Nation that they should be supplied with Goods from as many places as possible 
and from the nearest places.” Why continue to trade only with Augusta, Stuart continued, 
when presented with the opportunity to “always depend on having a surer supply” of 
trade goods, as well as a “better market” for all their skins?27 Stuart and other officials 
believed the financial benefits being discussed at the conference regarding the possibility 
of having three trading centers were a win-win situation for the Creek Nation, and should 
be the most important factor for the Indians. 
When making this observation, however, Stuart grossly underestimated the 
complexity of Upper Creek Town politics. Okchai and Okfuskee were “northern” Upper 
Creek Towns, located further up the Tallapoosa River than Little Tallassee, as well as a 
greater distance east, in the direction of Augusta. Trade with Pensacola and Mobile 
would center around the southern towns such as Little Tallassee, which would take away 
the power that Okchai and Okfuskee had generated over the years being in close contact 
                                                 
25 Talk From the Creeks Assembled at Tallassee to Governor Ellis, 4/25/1760, Tallassee Square, in Juricek, 
GT, Vol. 11, 316. 
26 Mortar and Gun Merchant to Governor Wright, 5/8/1763, Okchai, in Juricek, GT, Vol. 11, 352. 
27 Reply to The Upper Creek Talk of July 22nd by the Superintendent Stuart and Governor Johnston, 
Pensacola, 11/19/1764, in GFT, Vol. 12, 225. 
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with Augusta and Charles Town traders. Instead, a southern Upper Creek Town such as 
Little Tallassee would therefore serve as a gateway through which all Creeks towns could 
acquire and benefit from a newly formed Creek-British relationship centered on trade.28 
Although trade with Mobile and Pensacola would benefit the Creek Nation as a whole, 
one must remember that the talwa or town, was the center of Creek society. Individual 
headmen made political and economic decisions to advance themselves or their 
immediate town, not a remote nation. Okchai and Okfuskee’s ties to Augusta, no doubt, 
assisted in building the reputations of both Mortar and Gun Merchant as two of the most 
respected headmen and warriors of the entire Creek Nation. Their respected position in 
Creek politics was not something that the two men would easily want to give up, or in the 
best case, leave to chance. They had no interest in supporting a conference at Augusta 
that would open new trade routes out of Mobile and Pensacola. [See Figure 6.] 
Town politics were not the only obstacle that stood in the way of Stuart’s desire 
for the Upper Creeks to attend the peace conference at Augusta. A trade alliance, for 
Creeks, was more than a business transaction; it was a partnership between friends and 
extension of Creek diplomacy. Trade relationships were understood by the Creeks to go 
beyond the realm of economics and include politics as well. More specifically, any 
alliance made between Creeks and Europeans was believed to be an extension of kinship. 
 
                                                 
28 Piker, “White & Clean & Contested,” 316. 
113 
 
 
Figure 6. Map of Creek Country and Trade Paths. Circa. 1770. Adapted from Kathryn E. 
Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 
1685-1815 (Lincoln, NE, 1993), 10, 91. Also Found in Joshua Piker’s White & Clean & 
Contested, 316. 
 
Paired with these symbolic alliances was the physical space where trade was 
conducted. Agreeing to trade at Mobile and Pensacola would require the Creeks to 
literally open up a new path or ‘road’ that would allow future economic transactions to 
take place. Veering away from Augusta and placing Creeks and their fellow traders in 
unfamiliar territory, constituted a break from tradition and ceremony. “The Great Old 
Path” also known as the path that linked the Upper towns to Augusta had been a place of 
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peace and friendship for generations between the British and Creeks.29 From this 
perspective, Stuart was not just asking the Upper Creeks to enrich Indian trading options, 
he was proposing that they reconsider tradition and open themselves up to a major 
change. 
Understanding the significant implication of changing trade routes, it was no 
surprise that when Mr. Colbert, an interpreter for the Chickasaw and Choctaw nation, “set 
out with an express for the upper Creeks” that invited them to Augusta, the headmen of 
Okchai greeted him not with a presentation of eagle feathers or tobacco, but by “pointing 
their guns.”30 Although Colbert reported that “all the headmen of the upper Creeks” were 
present at the time of his visit, the hostile greeting he received was most likely Mortar’s 
idea, the primary headmen and warrior of Okchai, as well as the most verbal about his 
hesitation to open a new trade path to the South.31 “They have known the path to Augusta 
and no other and as there are goods enough there to supply his people, it will occasion 
disturbances in his Nation, should a new set of traders come in amongst them,”32 Mortar 
told Governor Wright at a meeting in Little Tallassee in 1764. The Great Old Path, 
Mortar informed John Stuart a month earlier that year, was the path “made before he was 
born” and “no alteration will be made.”33 “He will not suffer any horses with goods from 
                                                 
29 Piker, “White & Clean & Contested,” 322. 
30 Copy of Mr. Colbert’s Journal, as enclosed in Superintendent Stuart’s letter to the Governors, 7/13/176, 
Augusta, “Journal of the Proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” in CO5/65. Colbert was the 
interpreter for the Chickasaw and Choctaws at the conference of Augusta in 1763. 
31 Copy of Mr. Colbert’s Journal, as enclosed in Superintendent Stuart’s letter to the Governors, 7/13/176, 
Augusta, “Journal of the Proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” in CO5/65. 
32 Mortar to Governor Wright, 8/24/1764, Little Tallassee, in Juricek, GFT, Vol. 12, 16. 
33 A Talk from Mortar to John Stuart, 7/22/1764, Little Tallassee, in the Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 28 
(Hereafter cited as TGP, vol. number), William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI. (WHLP). 
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Pensacola or Mobile to come to his nation,” Mortar continued, making it clear that he 
desired only for the Great Old Path “between Augusta and his Nation, may be kept White 
and Clean,” and they “want to know no other.”34  
Although the idea of opening a new trade path challenged Creek traditions and 
pre-existing power arrangements among the Upper Creek towns, it did not mean that 
Mortar, Okchai, and the rest of the “northern upper Creeks” were not inclined to make a 
peace alliance with the British. Furthermore, one should not mistake Mortar and Gun 
Merchant’s resistance to the new southern path as the voice and thoughts of the entire 
Creek Nation. Rather, new trade sources from the Gulf Coast threatened the monopoly 
that the Okchai headmen had enjoyed over trade with the British. 
Trade and Authority 
 Mortar and Gun Merchant’s resistance to opening a new trade path out of the Gulf 
Coast in order to protect Okchai’s monopoly over Creek trade offers important insight 
into the dynamics of Creek diplomacy in regards to the realm of trade. Since by the 1760s 
Creeks were heavily reliant on European manufactured goods, headmen used access and 
control over trade to bolster their authority. Trade items were not only necessary for a full 
functioning Creek society, but they were also believed to be items of spiritual power. 
European goods were seen as miraculous in nature, as items such as guns and metal tools 
were considered superior to their own handicrafts. They were also objects from a distant 
and unknown world. Given the fact that outside people, lands, and objects were seen as 
                                                 
34 Mortar of Okchai to Superintendent Stuart and Governors of Georgia and South Carolina, 8/13/1764, 
delivered by Handsome Fellow of Okfuskee, in Juricek, GFT, Vo.12, 14. 
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sources of spiritual power, and those who had the unique ability to harness control over 
that power were quickly elevated in rank and status amongst fellow Creeks.35  
  In order to maintain such an elevated status, headmen were expected to 
redistribute trade goods to their family and individual towns. As demands for these goods 
increased, the headmen needed to amass large reservoirs of goods through trade alliances 
with Europeans to continue to funnel those items to their supporters.36 Mortar and Gun 
Merchant had a steady supply of trade items coming out of established alliances with 
Augusta traders, which allowed the two to bolster their authority not just amongst their 
home town of Okchai, but with all Upper Creek towns. A new trade path based out of 
Pensacola and Mobile would redistribute trade into the hands of other headmen, and 
consequently would jeopardize Okchai’s monopoly on trade but also undermine Mortar 
and Gun Merchant’s power within Creek society. 
 Reliance on trade as a source of authority was a dangerous venture. War with 
neighboring groups of Indians or Euro-Americans could easily disrupt established 
methods of exchange. If headmen lost access to crucial trade routes, then their prestige 
and power would deteriorate. By the late eighteenth century control over continued 
access to trade goods, not just the possession of European manufactured goods, became a 
new way to exert authority over others and bolster one’s authority. Successful treaty 
negotiation with political powers, rather than informal agreements with individual 
traders, was one way headmen acquired this new source of trade power.37 
                                                 
35 Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 71-76.  
36 Greg O’Brien, “The Conquered Meets the Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-
Revolutionary Southern Frontier,” 151-152. 
37 Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, Chapters 3 and 4 in particular. 
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The Treaty of Augusta (1763) 
While the prospect of Gulf Coast trade threatened Okchai’s dominance over 
British trade, it presented an opportunity for Little Tallassee to position itself as the new 
center of Anglo-Creek trade. As far back as 1758, Lachlan McGillivray (resident trader 
of Little Tallassee) had told Governor Lyttelton of South Carolina that it would be a 
“great advantage” if the British possessed Mobile and New Orleans.38 Profit gained from 
Gulf Coast ports would not only benefit McGillivray and Brown and Rae, but would also 
allow Little Tallassee to replace Okchai’s monopoly over British trade and bolster Little 
Tallassee’s power and prestige amongst its Upper Creek neighbors. Furthermore, it 
allowed Emistisiguo to become one of the primary Creek backers of opening the new 
trade with the British in the Gulf Coast.  
 Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee did not hesitate to capitalize on this opportunity. 
On October 15, 1763 Emistisiguo and Neothlucco (Little Tallassee’s Second Man) led a 
large party of Upper Creeks to Augusta to conduct a new peace and trade alliance with 
the British. Emistisiguo was accompanied by “the leader of the Chickasaws, Pia-mattah” 
as well as “one considerable leading man of the Choctaw nation called Red-Shoes.”39 
Emistisiguo was not only the first Upper Creek to arrive at the conference of Augusta, but 
he was accompanied by two prominent leaders from neighboring Southeastern Indian 
Nations. 
                                                 
38 Lachlan McGillivray to Lyttelton, 07/13/1758, Augusta, Box 6, WHLP. 
39 Letter from Mr. Stuart to his excellency Thomas Boone Esq, 10/15/1763, Fort Augusta, in Virginia 
Treaties, 1723-1775, ed. W. Stitt. Robinson, Vol. 5 of Early American Indian Documents Treaties and 
Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989), 270. 
Stuart referred to Emistisiguo in this document as “the Upper Creek warrior Mustisicah.” See also, Juricek, 
Endgame for Empire, 47-48. 
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 Emistisiguo’s appearance at Augusta in October is significant in two ways. First, 
it demonstrates Emistisiguo’s strong support for Gulf Coast trade and a British alliance. 
Second, the fact that he was the individual elected to lead the Upper Creek delegation is 
evidence of the popularity and respect he and Little Tallassee had earned among his 
fellow Upper Creeks by the fall of 1763. Red Shoes and Piamattah’s choice to 
accompany Emistisiguo allows one to assume that his reputation had extended beyond 
Creek towns, and that within only a short period of time Emistisiguo began to act not 
only as a warrior and headmen, but as a diplomat for Little Tallassee and several other 
Southern Upper Creek towns. 
 Approximately a week after Emistisiguo’s arrival, Stuart reported a total of “five 
hundred or more” to be present at Augusta. Although “about three hundred Cherokees” 
were the bulk of this figure, Stuart did note that there were about “seventy” Upper Creeks 
in attendance by October 23.40 Not long after the Upper Creeks arrived, the 
Superintendent was alarmed to the fact that “all the Creeks were setting out on their 
return home,” which Stuart believed to be the consequence of rumors circulated by the 
Mortar of Okchai regarding several “late murders” which demanded blood revenge.41 
Fortunately for Emistisiguo and Stuart, the news arrived while the Upper Creeks were 
encamped only a mile or two outside of Augusta at one of Lachlan McGillivray’s 
plantations known as Indian Springs. McGillivray and trader George Galphin were 
present at the site, along with Emistisiguo. Many of the Upper Creeks dismissed the 
                                                 
40 John Stuart to Thomas Boone, Arthur Dobbs, and Francis Fauquier, Esqrs., 10/23/1763, Fort Augusta, 
Virginia Treaties, Vol. 5, 278-279. 
41 John Stuart to Thomas Boone, Arthur Dobbs, and Francis Fauquier, Esqrs., 10/23/1763, Fort Augusta, 
Virginia Treaties, Vol. 5, 278-279. 
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report of Mortar’s actions as false and remained at Augusta to negotiate, a true testament 
to Emistisiguo’s evolving powers of persuasion and influence amongst the Upper Creek 
population. Galphin no doubt had some influence over the Upper Creeks’ choice to 
remain at Augusta. Emistisiguo, however, as a headman and warrior who supported these 
traders, as well as someone well acquainted with Mortar, in all probability had the 
greatest impact on the Upper Creek’s decision to stay for the conference.42  
Despite Mortar’s and many other northern Upper Creek town headmen’s 
objections, the Creeks attended the Treaty of Augusta on November 5, 1763. According 
to Stuart, the Creeks arrived in “two distinct bodies,” which included “one hundred and 
seventy” Lower Creeks and “about 117” Upper Creeks.43 Out of these approximate 305 
Creeks in attendance, most of the leading Upper Creek headmen remained absent. Wolf 
of Muccolossus, Duval’s landlord (Hopithlepoya Hadjo) of Pucknatallahassee, and 
Neathluko Chupko of Pallachicola were in attendance.44 These headmen and their 
corresponding towns were all close neighbors to Little Tallassee, being Southern Upper 
Creek Towns, and their presence a statement that they shared Emistisiguo’s vision. As far 
as the Lower Creek headmen, the most notable and outspoken was Captain Aleck of 
                                                 
42 Edward Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, 220; Colin Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen, 103; Juricek, 
Endgame for Empire, 49. Governor James Wright had also been reported to have asked George Galphin to 
provide his “best assistance” to convince the Upper Creeks to attend the conference in November of 
1763.For Wright’s instructions to Galphin, see Letter from James Wright, 10/11/1763, Savannah, “Journal 
of the Proceedings of Augusta,” CO5/65. 
43 Stuart to B.T., 12/1/1763, in Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, Colonial Records of South Carolina. 
2 vols. Edited by William L. McDowell, Jr. (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1958), 
2:303-5 (Hereafter DIASC, vol., page number(s). See also, John T. Juricek, Endgame for Empire: British-
Creek Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2015), 
51. There is another account that puts the Upper Creek headmen count at 70, For this statistic, see Letter 
from Superintendent Stuart, 10/23/1763, Fort Augusta, “Journal of the Proceedings of the Southern 
Congress at Augusta,” in CO5/65. 
44 Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 63. See also, Juricek, GFT, Vol. 12, 385. 
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Cusseta, followed by Sempoyaffi, Togulki, and Telletcher (the White King), all of whom 
were from the prominent and leading Lower Creek Town of Coweta.45 
The conference of Augusta opened with several talks from Lower Creek 
headmen. Telletcher of Coweta made it known that the Lower Creeks were in favor of the 
new British trading paths to Mobile and Pensacola, having stated that they “shall be kept 
open to the traders that are peaceable.”46 The Young Twin, the late Malatchi’s nephew, 
appeared to have seconded this motion when he stated that he desired to “hold his hand 
out to the white people,” in hopes to carry on a peaceful trade alliance as his father did 
many years ago, along with Captain Aleck, who told Stuart that “the four governors here 
are all beloved,” and he being “appointed to speak,” declared “half of his body to be 
English and half Indian,” and although the “talk the governors gave was in writing . . . his 
heart is the same in inclination.”47 It is clear that the Lower Creeks came to Augusta to 
open the path to Pensacola and Mobile. 
The Lower Creek delegation present at Augusta may have been in favor of 
opening a new trading path, but this decision was not made without reservations. 
Sempoyaffi, often referred to as “Fool Harry” in British documents, followed Captain 
Aleck’s talk, and requested British officials acknowledge his presence and concerns: “As 
                                                 
45 A Talk to the Indians, 11/5/1763, “Journal of the proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” in 
CO5/65. Togulki is the nephew of Malatchi of Coweta. 
46 The Talks of the Chickasaw, Upper and Lower Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Catawba Indians to their 
excellences’ James Wright, Arthur Dobbs, Thomas Boone, Francis Fauquier, John Stuart, interpreted by 
James Colbert, 11/7/1763, Fort Augusta, “Journal of the proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” 
in CO5/65. 
47 The Talks of the Chickasaw, Upper and Lower Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Catawba Indians to their 
excellences’ James Wright, Arthur Dobbs, Thomas Boone, Francis Fauquier, John Stuart, interpreted by 
James Colbert, 11/8/1763, Fort Augusta, “Journal of the proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” 
in CO5/65. 
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the governors had heard the rest of his nation, he hoped they would hear him.” 
Sempoyaffi was agreeable to trade with Pensacola and Mobile, as long as the traders 
remained out of the woods, and went “into the towns to trade.”48 He also asked that “no 
rum be sold to the Indians in the woods, because the young people there get drunk,” and 
as a result “disposed their skins for that commodity [rum]” that they were then “unable to 
pay their debts to the traders in the nation, which frequently occasioned quarrels and 
mischief among them.”49 
The Lower Creeks may have been the first to open the conference at Augusta, but 
the headman who closed the conference on behalf of the Upper and Lower towns was 
Emistisiguo.50 Emistisiguo and the remaining Upper Creeks present at the conference 
embraced change with expanding their trade markets to include Pensacola and Mobile. 
Tallechea, a seasoned warrior from the Ocmulgee Upper Creek town stated, “That no 
                                                 
48 The Talks of the Chickasaw, Upper and Lower Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Catawba Indians to their 
excellences’ James Wright, Arthur Dobbs, Thomas Boone, Francis Fauquier, John Stuart, interpreted by 
James Colbert, 11/7/1763, Fort Augusta, “Journal of the proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” 
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seeing you,” Wright stated, no doubt with the intention to flatter Emistisiguo to begin marking the 
boundary line of the lands that were ceded at the above conference, which he clearly laid out during the 
duration of his speech. See, Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Another Murder, 
Stuarts Journal, 5/16/1767, in Juricek, GFT, Vol. 12, 7; Provincial Council: Talks with Emistisiguo, 
9/5/1768, Savannah, in Juricek, GFT, Vol.12, 55. 
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settlement should be made by the white people at Pensacola, but within the ebbing and 
flowing of the tide. Mobile to be settled in the same manner. The path shall be kept open 
to the traders that are peaceable.”51 It is clear that Tallechea’s words are an echo of 
Lower Creeks’ Captain Aleck’s and Sempoyaffi’s concerns in regards to newly agreed 
boundary and ceded lands, but it is also safe to conclude that the “path” he spoke of was a 
new trade road, from Creek country to Pensacola and Mobile.52 “Mustisikah 
[Emistisiguo]” was reported to have “declared to the same effect” as Tallechea and had 
“finished the Creek’s talk” for that day.53 Additionally, the last day of the conference, 
James Colbert, interpreter to Superintendent Stuart, reported to have witnessed 
Emistisiguo to be engaged in “friendly talks” with Lower Creek headman Fool-Harry of 
Coweta, as well as two Cherokees, Young-Warrior and Tisowih, and gave beads to each 
of the Creeks. These beads were white clay symbolizing peace and friendship between 
the two Nations.54 
Emistisiguo’s role in facilitating a successful peace between the prominent Creek 
and Cherokee headmen present at Augusta highlight the amount of diplomatic skill he 
                                                 
51 The Talks of the Chickasaw, Upper and Lower Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Catawba Indians to their 
excellences’ James Wright, Arthur Dobbs, Thomas Boone, Francis Fauquier, John Stuart, interpreted by 
James Colbert, 11/5/1763, Fort Augusta, “Journal of the proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” 
in CO5/65. 
52 Trade out of Mobile was included in the fourth article of the final copy of the Treaty of Augusta in 1763. 
See, Articles of the Augusta Treaty, 11/10/1763, Augusta, in Virginia Treaties, Vol. 5, 296-298, Mobile 
being on 298. 
53 The Talks of the Chickasaw, Upper and Lower Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Catawba Indians to their 
excellences’ James Wright, Arthur Dobbs, Thomas Boone, Francis Fauquier, John Stuart, interpreted by 
James Colbert, 11/5/1763, Fort Augusta, “Journal of the proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” 
in CO5/65. 
54 The Talks of the Chickasaw, Upper and Lower Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Catawba Indians to their 
excellences’ James Wright, Arthur Dobbs, Thomas Boone, Francis Fauquier, John Stuart, interpreted by 
James Colbert, 11/9/1763, Fort Augusta, “Journal of the proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” 
in CO5/65. 
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had amassed within Creek society by November 1763. The peace talks between the 
Creeks and Cherokees that took place at Augusta were a separate, diplomatic affair 
between the Indian groups, aside from the treaty negotiations with the British. Since the 
diplomatic meetings on foreign soil and between two polities required a spiritual 
specialist to establish a sacred atmosphere in order for diplomacy to take place, 
Emistisiguo’s participation was essential. The bestowment of white beads to Emistisiguo 
and his fellow Creek by Cherokee headman indicates that a peace between the two parties 
was indeed successful that day, and Emistisiguo, as the leader of the Creek delegation 
was the individual responsible for creating the opportunity for that peace to take place. 
His journey to Augusta aided him in gaining access to an esoteric source of power and his 
ability to transform strangers into kinfolk demonstrated to Creek society he was an 
individual of great knowledge and mastery of spiritual forces. As a result, Emistisiguo’s 
authority within Creek and Southeastern Indian society had reached new heights by the 
winter of 1763.55 
The prospect of Gulf Coast trade was the primary reason why Emistisiguo, 
Duval’s Landlord, Wolf as well as the lesser known members of Emistisiguo’s delegation 
attended the conference at Augusta, and Mortar, Gun Merchant, and Handsome Fellow 
returned or remained home. The British possession of Pensacola opened up a new trade 
                                                 
55 Emistisiguo’s rise in diplomatic power resembles that of Taboca, a Choctaw traditional headman and war 
prophet, who bolstered his authority amongst Southeastern Indian society during the Eighteenth-Century 
through his command of spiritual power as well. I am indebted to Greg O’Brien’s detailed analysis of the 
life of Taboca throughout his scholarship on the Choctaws, which has enabled me to draw the parallels to 
Emistisiguo’s life. For more information on spiritual specialists, diplomacy, and the example of Taboca, 
see Greg O’Brien, “The Conquered Meets the Unconquered,” 148-173, especially 155-156, 169; Greg 
O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, “Chapter 4,” 50-69, 52-55 and 64 in particular. 
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path for their Indian allies, which was only 225 miles from the southern-most Upper 
Creek Towns, whereas the path to Augusta, known as the “Great Old Path” or the 
“Eastern Path,” was 280 miles away. This new path, which later became known as the 
“southern path,” was also much easier for traders to travel, lacking the many river 
crossings, and waterfalls that plagued the Eastern path, as well as the fact that the 
Alabama River that linked the Upper Creek towns to the Gulf Coast could “be navigated 
with large boats up to” the southern towns, but no further. The Tallapoosa River, the 
Alabama’s tributary, was equally challenging for traders to navigate with the southern 
Creek town of Tuckabatchee being “the farthest any boat or canoe can go up with this 
river on account of falls which begin at the upper end of the Town.”56 Thus the opening 
of a new southern trading path would decrease the prominence of Northern Upper Creek 
towns such as Okchai and Okfuskee, while it offered the southernmost Upper Creek 
towns the opportunity they had been waiting for: to be at the very center of Creek-British 
trade relations and the growing Trans-Atlantic economy of the American Southeast. [See 
Figure 2.] 
After Emistisiguo closed the Creek talks at Augusta in favor of a new Gulf Coast 
trade alliance with the British, all five of the Upper Creek headmen present signed the 
treaty. They supported Emistisiguo’s talk as well as a collective vision of economic 
growth and prosperity for the towns along the southern part of the Tallapoosa and Coosa 
River.57 Emistisiguo, then, at the Treaty of Augusta in 1763, became the first Upper 
                                                 
56 Piker, “White & Clean & Contested,” 317. See all of Joshua Piker’s article for more information on this 
topic. He is the first historian to point out the significance of the two trade paths. 
57 For a list of the treaty signers, including the Lower Creeks, see Augusta Treaty Articles, Virginia 
Treaties, Vol. 5, 299. 
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Creek headman to consent to a new southern trade path and envision the future potential 
of Gulf Coast Trade for not only Little Tallassee, but the neighboring Upper Creek towns. 
Emistisiguo’s talk and the relative silence of his fellow Upper Creek headmen 
during the assembly at Augusta offers significant insight into his evolving status as a 
warrior and headman to a spokesperson and diplomat. Emistisiguo and Tallechea were 
the only Upper Creek to speak at the conference, which allows one to assume that the two 
were the elected spokesmen to speak on behalf of the Upper towns.58 Although Captain 
Alleck (Lower Creek) announced that he was “appointed to speak” not just for the Lower 
Creeks, but “for the upper, middle, and lower towns,” it makes more sense that the Upper 
Creeks would have their own spokesperson.59 The Creeks were far from being united in 
1763, the idea of the “Creek Nation” still a misleading assumption on behalf of the 
Europeans. 
Emistisiguo also had experience in diplomatic affairs prior to 1763. As discussed 
in Chapter I, a council was held in 1761 at Little Tallassee to make forge a peace alliance 
with the British, where prominent chiefs such as Wolf and even Gun Merchant were 
present. Emistisiguo’s ability to persuade the Upper Creeks to remain at Augusta instead 
of retreating to Creek country despite the fierce opposition by the respected headmen of 
                                                 
58 It is my guess that although British records of the treaty only documented Emistisiguo to have spoken a 
single line, “having declared to the same effect” (Virginia Treaties, 286), the fact that he finished the Creek 
talks for the conference is an indication that Emistisiguo most likely had much more to say on the topic, but 
still being a lesser known headman to the British and Colbert (the interpreter), his talk was not thought 
important enough to record. 
59 The Talks of the Chickasaw, Upper and Lower Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, and Catawba Indians to their 
excellences’ James Wright, Arthur Dobbs, Thomas Boone, Francis Fauquier, John Stuart, interpreted by 
James Colbert, 11/9/1763, Fort Augusta, “Journal of the proceedings of the Southern Congress at Augusta,” 
in CO5/65. 
126 
 
Okchai was a testament of his growing oratory skills. Emistisiguo’s and his town’s close 
relationship to traders such as Lachlan McGillivray and the lucrative Brown and Rae 
company were also signs to neighboring Creeks that Emistisiguo possessed savvy 
business skills and valuable knowledge of Indian trade. The fact that Emistisiguo was 
also known to be not just a successful warrior, but a war prophet, which only added to his 
evolving reputation as an individual who possessed and demonstrated control over a 
variety of traditional spiritual powers. 
Emistisiguo Champions Gulf Coast Trade: Talks at Little Tallassee 
Emistisiguo continued to advocate for trade with the British at Mobile and 
Pensacola the following year, and he did so by holding several diplomatic meetings 
within his own town of Little Tallassee. During one of these assemblies in May of 1764, 
Emistisiguo informed Superintendent Stuart that he had “used his utmost endeavor” to 
“adhere strictly to the promise and agreement made at the Congress made at Augusta,” 
which in this case, happened to be trade with Mobile and Pensacola. Emistisiguo voiced 
his pleasure to see the vessels at Mobile and Pensacola “going and coming there with 
goods to supply his Nation” so that his town and “other Indians” will “never want for 
goods.”60 His statement, short and subtle, clearly implies that Emistisiguo supported 
redirecting Creek trade to the Gulf coast. 
Mortar was present during the meeting in April at Little Tallassee, but remained 
silent. However, Oakchoy King, another headman of Okchai, was eager to make peace 
                                                 
60 Oakchoy King was another prominent headman from the Upper Creek town of Okchai. For quotes and a 
list of headmen, see Upper Creek “Great Talk” to Superintendent Stuart and Governor Wright, 4/10/1764, 
Little Tallassee, in Juricek, GFT, Vol. 12, 216. See also, Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 76-77. 
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with the British and supported Emistisiguo’s ideas to open a new trade path. “As to the 
English taking possession of Mobile and the former Spanish settlements we are satisfied, 
proving they keep within the Bounds the French and Spaniards did,” Oakchoy King 
proclaimed to all headmen and British officials present at Little Tallassee. As long as the 
British respected Creek boundaries, he was willing to concede the town’s former 
monopoly over British trade.61 The talk of Oakchoy King proved that Emistisiguo’s 
vision of Gulf Coast trade had begun to appeal to even dissenting Northern Upper Creek 
towns such as Okchai, and therefore was a testament to both the benefits of multiple 
trading paths as well as Emistisiguo’s power of persuasion.  
In early July, a second meeting was held at Little Tallassee, where Mortar took a 
lukewarm stance regarding a new Anglo-Creek trade based out of the Gulf Coast. Mortar 
proclaimed that he preferred the Great Old Path and he would “not suffer any horses with 
goods either from Pensacola or Mobile to come to his Nation.”62 Mortar continued: “he 
desires no settlements to be made on this side of the Alabama River from Mobile,” but 
made a strong point to inform all in attendance at Little Tallassee that “thou by this 
[statement] he does not Mean that they should Either Quit Mobile or Pensacola, but keep 
on the other Side of the River, and Leave this Side for their use.” His speech was 
accompanied with red and white beads that Mortar explained to Stuart he sent to the 
                                                 
61 Upper Creek “Great Talk” to Superintendent Stuart and Governor Wright, 4/10/1764, Little Tallassee, in 
Juricek, GFT, Vol. 12, 214. If the British remained within the French and Spanish boundaries, Oakchoy 
King stated the following in response: “If so we shall be contented, and that we may have Trade as usual.” 
For a list of headmen in attendance, see Upper Creek “Great Talk” to Superintendent Stuart and Governor 
Wright, 4/10/1764, Little Tallassee, in Juricek, GFT, Vol. 12, 212. 
62 Mortar and Other Upper Creek Headmen to Superintendent Stuart, Rejecting Trade from West Florida, 
Little Tallassee, 7/22/1764, in GFT, Vol. 12, 217. Emphasis is mine. 
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Commander at Pensacola, where he desired the Commander to “throw away the Red” if 
he was for peace and “return him the white, with a white Flag, that he might shew the 
same to his Nation and let them know that the English as well as he was for Peace.”63 
Mortar’s talk at Little Tallassee that July demonstrated a significant shift in the 
prominent headman’s previous stance on both Gulf Coast trade and possible British 
alliance. Mortar preferred trade with Augusta for his town of Okchai, but he did not 
oppose it for the rest of the Upper Creeks. His lukewarm attitude was a dramatic change 
from his outright refusal to treat with the British at Augusta the year before, which leads 
one to believe Emistisiguo had convinced the Okchai headman of the benefits of trade 
from Mobile and Pensacola for all Creeks. Or Mortar himself accepted the new southern 
trade path as an inevitability. While the reason for the shift in attitude is unknown, 
Mortar’s talk in July reflected his desire for a peace agreement with the British, and his 
larger concern about the proposed alliance was not trade but land encroachment. Creek 
boundaries were to remain in place, just as they had under French and Spanish rule before 
the end of the French and Indian War. 
During another assembly at Little Tallassee that month, Emistisiguo strengthened 
his authority by serving as a diplomatic liaison for Superintendent Stuart and Mortar of 
Okchai. Evidence of this role can be seen where Emistisiguo reminded Stuart that “when 
he was at Augusta you desired him to tell all the Talks to Mortar, and get him Mortar to 
Send down a Talk which he has done.” Afterwards, Mortar delivered a second talk, 
                                                 
63Mortar and Other Upper Creek Headmen to Superintendent Stuart, Rejecting Trade from West Florida, 
Little Tallassee, 7/22/1764, in GFT, Vol. 12, 218. Emphasis is mine. 
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where Emistisiguo apprised Stuart of Mortar’s new pro-British stance: “Mortar has given 
his promise through the whole nation that a firm Peace should be maintained for four 
years.”64 Emistisiguo was not only successful in procuring a talk from Mortar as 
requested by Stuart, but he also persuaded the most prominent Upper Creek warrior to 
commit to a peace alliance with the British for the first time since before the Seven Years 
War. The fact that Stuart selected Emistisiguo to be his chosen liaison also serves as a 
testament to his growing reputation amongst the British as a valuable ally and persuasive 
individual. Mortar ’s trust in Emistisiguo was equally impressive, and an indicator that 
the Little Tallassee headman and warrior by the summer of 1764 had become a very 
important person not only among the Upper Creeks, but to high ranking British officials 
as well.  
Little Tallassee rose in status along with its headman, Emistisiguo. All peace 
overtures shortly before and after the Treaty of Augusta took place at Little Tallassee. In 
former years, leading Upper Creek towns such as Okfuskee, Tallassee, or in most cases, 
Tuckabatchee, would be the elected location to conduct Creek diplomacy. By 1761 all 
discussions in regards to trade or peace with the British began to take place at Little 
Tallassee. As a successful diplomat, warrior, and a man of inherent spiritual power, 
Emistisiguo served multiple needs of Creek culture as a traditional headman. His 
presence at Little Tallassee created the necessary sacred ceremonial setting for diplomatic 
meetings between other Indian groups or Euro-Americans. Little Tallassee was no longer 
                                                 
64 Mortar and Other Upper Creek Headmen to Superintendent Stuart, Rejecting Trade from West Florida, 
Little Tallassee, 7/22/1764, in GFT, Vol. 12, 218. I describe Emistisiguo as a diplomat. Juricek described 
him as a “go between.” See, Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 75. 
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just a place to conduct trade or a Creek town of little significance, it was the favorite 
locale for Upper Creek-Anglo relations by the mid- eighteenth century. 
The Congress at Pensacola 
 In 1765, the British organized a congress with the Creeks to be held at Pensacola 
to ratify a peace treaty with the Creeks to officially secure a Gulf Coast trade with the 
Upper Creeks. It was during this conference that Mortar finally abandoned his attachment 
to the “Great Old Path,” and fully endorsed Emistisiguo’s vision to rewrite the map of 
Creek trade to include Pensacola and Mobile.65 While the meeting at Little Tallassee in 
1761 might have been Emistisiguo’s debut to Creek politics and the historical stage, it 
was the Congress at Pensacola that allowed him to pursue his agenda for the Upper 
Creeks to embrace Gulf Coast Trade, as well as to convince his fellow Upper Creeks to 
do the same.66 
 During the Congress of Pensacola, both Emistisiguo and Mortar confirmed their 
new leadership roles adopted the year before during the April and July talks at Little 
Tallassee. Mortar introduced himself as a peace chief by declaring himself to be “a King” 
and “the voice of my People,” and Emistisiguo announced his identity as “a warrior” and 
that Mortar was indeed his “king.” By this time Emistisiguo was indeed Mortar’s “head 
warrior” on behalf of all Upper Creeks and continued to act as a diplomatic liaison and 
spokesperson on his and British behalf during all Upper Creek matters of trade and peace 
                                                 
65 Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 76. 
66 John Juricek contends Emistisiguo’s debut to the historical stage to be 1763. See, Juricek Endgame for 
Empire, 95. I suggest that 1761 is perhaps a more fitting date.  
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brokerage.67 It is clear, from the proceedings of the treaty, both Emistisiguo and Mortar 
embraced their roles as “peace” and “war” headmen, but on equal footing. Emistisiguo 
did not surpass Mortar as the primary war leader of the Upper Creeks, but during this 
congress his words were on equal footing to that of Mortar’s as the Upper Creek’s chosen 
war headman. Mortar and Emistisiguo acted as “dual headmen” during the Congress of 
Pensacola, and both Creek and British parties officially signed the treaty on May 28, 
1765.68 His ascension meant that in a period of four years, Emistisiguo had climbed the 
ranks of Upper Creek society from warrior to head warrior and lastly a warrior-diplomat. 
 The actions of Emistisiguo and Mortar during the assembly at Pensacola offer 
incredible insight into the complexities of their newly acquired leadership and dualistic 
roles. As custom, during the proceedings before the treaty, Mortar was “first introduced 
to the Governor and Superintendent,” followed by the rest of the warriors, “all seated in 
order, and after smoking as customary on such occasions.”69 Yet, instead of speaking 
first, Mortar yielded the floor to Emistisiguo.70 Emistisiguo rose and spoke as follows: “I 
remember what was said at the late congress at Augusta, all which I faithfully recounted 
on my return home to my Nation and in compliance where with I continue to hold the 
English fast by the hand.”71 The mention of Augusta was in regard to the Gulf coast 
                                                 
67 Congress at Pensacola with the Upper and Lower Creeks, 5/26-28/1765, Pensacola, GFT, Vol. 12, 261-
263. Quotes taken from 262. 
68 On the concept of “dual headmen” see Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 76; GFT, Vol. 12, 541n98. The 
dualism makes even more sense when one considers that Emistisiguo was a Tallapoosa and Mortar was an 
Abeika, and thus showing a sign of unity between the Upper Creeks. 
69 Congress at Pensacola with the Upper and Lower Creeks: Proceedings Before the Treaty, 5/26/1765, in 
Juricek, GFT, 256. 
70 Congress at Pensacola with the Upper and Lower Creeks: Proceedings Before the Treaty, 5/26/1765, in 
Juricek, GFT, Vol. 12, 262. 
71 Congress at Pensacola with the Upper and Lower Creeks: Proceedings Before the Treaty, 5/26/1765, in 
Juricek, GFT, Vol. 12, 262. 
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trade, and the gesture to hold the English by the hand, a common phrase used to by the 
Creeks to offer friendship. Emistisiguo elaborated on this desire for peace through a 
series of metaphors. “I observe that amongst the white people friendship is compared to a 
chain which links people together,” he said. “In our Nation friendship is compared to a 
grape vine which though slender and weak when young, grows stronger as it grows 
older.” Thus, Emistisiguo hoped that “friendship and harmony” would “daily increase” 
between “the Great King’s White and Red Children,” and as they grow “their hearts, like 
the tendrils of the vine” overtime become “strong, united, and knit together.”72 
Emistisiguo’s opening words at Pensacola provide a clear example of his new role as a 
warrior-diplomat. 
After Emistisiguo declared that he had “nothing more to say at present,” Mortar 
then rose and fully adopted his role as headman for peace, not war, by the presenting “a 
pair of “white wings” to the Governor, Superintendent Stuart, as well as the rest of His 
majesty’s council for the Province of West Florida.”73 “These white wings are emblems 
of peace,” Mortar said, “untainted and spotless” and a mark of his own “good and 
friendly intentions.”74 In addition to these peace offerings, Mortar also instructed his 
warriors to strip themselves of all their “warlike implements,” which were “now buried in 
oblivion.”75 
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After making his desire for peace known, Mortar then addressed the second treaty 
topic; Gulf coast trade. “I am determined that the Path shall not only be made white and 
straight here but everywhere,” Mortar stated. He declared that “in order preserve peace 
and good order,” a white path and friendship between the English was necessary.76 
Mortar presented a “belt of wampum,” to the Governor of East Florida, which Stuart had 
noticed, “he had kept in his hands all the time he was speaking.”77 Afterward, both 
Mortar and Emistisiguo received a “string of white beads” from the Superintendent, and 
the talks for that day came to a close.78 By the time of the meeting in 1765, it is clear that 
Mortar had a change of heart in his decision towards the Gulf Coast Trade, likely due to 
the influence of Emistisiguo. Importantly, with Emistisiguo leading the proceedings, the 
Creeks were formalizing the process of turning Pensacola into an extension of their 
trading operations. 
The following day, Mortar, who had just declared himself to be the “king” of his 
Nation, once again elected Emistisiguo to speak first on his behalf and the rest of the 
Upper Creek Nation. It was during this talk and the many more to follow, that, when 
carefully analyzed, one can see the talent Emistisiguo possessed for translating Creek 
customs into words and metaphors that the English could understand. For example, after 
Emistisiguo presented Governor Johnston and Stuart with an “eagles tail,” he explained 
that it was “custom” of his country to do so. The eagle’s tail “spreads like a sheet of 
                                                 
76 Congress at Pensacola with the Upper and Lower Creeks: Proceedings Before the Treaty, 5/26/1765, in 
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77 Congress at Pensacola with the Upper and Lower Creeks: Proceedings Before the Treaty, 5/26/1765, in 
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paper,” Emistisiguo told the English. Although the “three parts of my Nation here” 
cannot speak, Emistisiguo continued, “they have heard your talks,” which “like the eagles 
tail” is “white, and covers us all over.”79 Granted, Emistisiguo’s words are subject to 
interpretation. Nevertheless, his analogy, of an eagle’s tail to a piece of paper, suggests 
Emistisiguo had learned the importance of writing things down in English culture, and 
desired that Creek oral customs be known to have the same weight and worth. The 
headman conveyed to the British that their paper treaty had the same meaning of peace as 
the Creek’s eagle feathers signified. 
It is through these diplomatic and newfound oratory skills that a new, evolving 
relationship between Mortar and Emistisiguo is made visible, as well as Emistisiguo’s 
own priority to assert his own identity and value apart from Mortar. In one of his first 
talks during the Pensacola conference of 1765, Emistisiguo stated the following: 
 
I have observed that the Admiral, whom I look upon as a warrior of the Great 
Kings, has spoke before the Governor, who is the king on this land, and as I am a 
Warrior in my nation as the Admiral is in yours, I will follow his example and 
will reply before my King Mortar.80 
 
By drawing a comparison between the admiral and himself, Emistisiguo not only 
displayed his ability to dismantle cultural misunderstandings of power, but also identify 
himself as an important individual in front of the English Superintendent, the Governor of 
East Florida, and his fellow Creeks. Emistisiguo kept this particular talk short, noting at 
                                                 
79 Congress at Pensacola, MPAED, 1: 201. 
80 Congress at Pensacola, MPAED, 1: 198. 
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the time he had “nothing more to say at present,” which suggests that he was aware of his 
audience and the message he intended to convey.81 
After the Treaty at Pensacola was signed, Superintendent Stuart held a “medal 
ceremony,” where select headmen were awarded by the British with both a physical 
medal and title of “great medal chief” or “small medal chief.”82 These medals, for British 
purposes, were visible markers of status. They were not used by Europeans typically to 
create leaders, but award those who already established an important and chiefly role. 
The French were the first to bestow these medals of rank to the Southeastern Indians, the 
British borrowed the idea.83 Indians that were given medals were also given commissions 
and were to act as diplomatic liaisons for the British when called upon. Among the great 
medal recipients, were Mortar, Emistisiguo, the Gun Merchant, and Duvall’s Landlord, 
all of whom were Upper Creek headmen. The small medal recipients were Topalga, the 
White Lieutenant, and the Beaver Tooth King from Lower Creek towns.84 
The Creeks placed an incredible amount of significance on the medals that were 
given to them by both the French and the British. Access to foreign prestige items and 
monopolization of trade, as well as the ability to redistribute these goods had long been 
associated with elite status amongst the Creeks and Southeastern Indians in general. 
Access to European wares demonstrated a mastery of both diplomacy and trade, which 
required one to possess the ability to not only step outside the bounds of Creek society, 
                                                 
81 Congress at Pensacola, MPAED, 1: 198. 
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83 Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750: 1830 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska 
press, 2002) 79. 
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but “demanded the expertise of political-religious specialists,” or one who could 
“manipulate spiritual forces” and therefore have control over the objects or knowledge 
gained.85 The title of great medal chief had two important meanings within eighteenth-
century Creek society. First, it was a visible material display of rank and status. Second, 
it demonstrated that rank or status to be a result of one’s ability to master spiritual power 
in both diplomacy and trade. Emistisiguo, by 1765, was not only a great medal chief and 
a facilitator of Gulf Coast Trade, but also a war prophet and warrior-diplomat. According 
to Creek standards, he was a man who not only possessed great spiritual power but 
commanded it. 
 Much of Emistisiguo’s success can be attributed to his own talents and 
determination to climb the social ranks of Creek society. The foundation of that success 
was Little Tallassee. In the aftermath of the French and Indian War, all Creek towns and 
their corresponding headmen were challenged to reinvent politics of trade and diplomacy. 
Under the leadership of Emistisiguo, the town of Little Tallassee transformed this 
challenge into an opportunity, and as early as the conference of Augusta set out to form 
an alliance with the British at Pensacola and Mobile. This Gulf Coast trade brought Little 
Tallassee into a regional center of social, cultural, and economic exchange during the 
second half of the eighteenth century, and a much larger and growing Trans-Atlantic 
economy. 
 
                                                 
85 Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 71 and 77. O’Brien points out that the Choctaw Indians 
called these medals tali hullo or sacred stones. The word for a metal stone in Creek was cvto. The suffixes 
naphvtke (silver) naplane (gold) added on occasion. See Martin, 19.  
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Land Encroachment and Violence: Alliances Tested 
 While peace was being restored between the Creeks and British between 1763 and 
1765, hostilities between British settlers, traders, and neighboring Southeastern Indians 
were beginning to reach a boiling point. For example, in December of 1764 “an Indian of 
note belonging to the Lower Cherokee Towns” was out hunting when he was “surprised 
in his Camp by a Justice of Peace with an armed Possee and detained many days, bound 
with ropes like A Felon.” Just a few months before this unwarranted bloody affair, a 
“party of Overhill Cherokees having gone into the back Settlements of Virginia, with 
friendly Intentions were set upon by the Inhabitants.” According to Stuart, “five of them 
were murdered, and those who returned to their Nation Several died of their wounds.” 
Stuart admitted that a “succession of such events greatly enraged the Indians” but he was 
more concerned that “Encroachment on their Lands may become very Serious, having 
roused the attention of all the Nations.”86 
 Stuart’s concerns were not unfounded. Only two months after the Treaty of 
Pensacola, news of the slain innocent Cherokees and invasion of their hunting grounds 
had reached Mortar. Stuart reported, “In a message which I received of late from Mortar 
he upbraids me of having a double Tongue, for Says he, while you are making things 
Straight in one Corner, your people are killing the red men and Stealing their land in 
another.” Mortar added that, “it was time for the red people to look about them and 
                                                 
86 Superintendent Stuart to the Earl of Halifax, on Talks with Mortar, 8/24/1765, Charlestown, GFT, Vol. 
12, 280-281. My emphasis. 
138 
 
prepare for their defense,” which was quite an ominous threat from a headman who had 
just promised peace at the Pensacola Congress.87 
 The fact that Mortar had such hostile words for British Superintendent Stuart 
shortly after the meeting at Pensacola was not surprising. Land encroachment had been a 
legitimate concern of Mortar since the British obtained the former French and Spanish 
territories. By the 1750s and 1760s, Mortar of Okchai along with his brother in law, Gun 
Merchant, were actively pursuing a multi-tribal resistance movement against British 
encroachment. Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws held several conferences 
throughout this time period in order to keep the peace between the Indian groups and 
work towards a much larger, collective goal of raising anti-British sentiment to protect 
Native land.88 Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that Mortar had a number of family 
members living in the Cherokee Nation in 1765. His brother-in-law had married a 
Cherokee woman and chose to reside within the Cherokee Nation along with his wife and 
several children. The Cherokees were also the Upper Creek’s closest neighbors and the 
infiltration of South Carolinians onto their land and the murder of innocent Cherokee 
hunters raised legitimate concerns for the Creek town of Okchai.89 
 Not long after the Cherokee murders, frontier violence spread into Lower Creek 
country and three white men, William Payne, George Payne, and James Hogg were killed 
                                                 
87 Superintendent Stuart to the Earl of Halifax, on Talks with Mortar, 8/24/1765, Charlestown, GFT, Vol. 
12, 280-281. 
88 For more information on Mortar’s role in a multi-tribal resistance movement against the British, see Greg 
O’Brien, “Quieting the Ghosts: How the Chickasaws and the Choctaws Stopped Fighting,” in The Native 
South: New Histories and Enduring Legacies, eds. Tim Alan Garrison and Greg O’Brien (Lincoln, NE: The 
University of Nebraska Press, 2017), 47-69, 51 and 52 in particular. 
89 Wolf ’s Reply to Messages from Governors Wright and Bull, 5/17/1761, Little Tallassee, GT, Vol. 11, 
244. 
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by a party of Lower Creeks and Limpiki, the son of a prominent headmen of the Lower 
Creek town of Coweta known as Sempyaffi. Governor Wright reported the murders took 
place in late December of 1765 and noted that the Lower Creek war party also stole 
Payne and Hogg’s “horses, guns, and other belongings” and carried them “into Cherokee 
Country” after the crime was committed. Governor Wright demanded “satisfaction” for 
the three men and proclaimed that “if any Indian should thereafter murder or kill a White 
man, the offender should without any delay excuse or pretense whatever, be Immediately 
put to death in a Public manner in the presence of at least 2 of the English who may be in 
the Neighborhood.”90 The Payne and Hogg murders coupled with the slaying of innocent 
Cherokee served as two examples of the escalation of frontier violence by 1765 included 
not only the Cherokee and the British, but the Lower Creeks as well. Thus, while 
Mortar’s town of Okchai remained uninvolved in the frontier hostilities, his instinct that 
the Indians needed to be on the “defense” proved to be true. As more and more white 
bodies filtered beyond the agreed upon boundaries between Indian Country and the 
British colonies and or newly acquired territories, frontier violence was inevitable. 
 Only a year later, in May of 1766, Mortar “resigned” his medal and commission 
bestowed upon him by the British at Pensacola.91 The medal was reported by William 
Struthers to have been “at present in Possession of the Headman of Little Tallasey,” 
where Emistisiguo was reported to have returned it to Governor Johnstone at Pensacola.92 
                                                 
90 Governor Wright and Superintendent Stuart to Upper Creek Great Medal Chiefs, Protesting Payne-Hogg 
Murders, 12/27/1765, Savannah, GFT, Vol. 12, 17. Juricek notes that the murders occurred in September of 
of 1765, which makes more sense than December. See, Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 108-109. 
91 Answer to His Excellency of Governor George Johnstone’s Talk to the Creek Nation delivered by Otis 
Mico & Other Headmen, 5/15/1766, Okchai, MPAED, Vol. 1., 531. 
92 William Struthers to Governor Johnstone, 4/10/1766, Mobile, MPAED, 515-517. 
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The resignation and exchange of Mortar’s medal, in many ways, can be seen has a highly 
symbolic gesture of his choice to step down from his position and reject the British as a 
peace chief and entrust Emistisiguo with another leadership role. From that moment on 
Mortar is only documented to have acted as the primary war leader of the Upper Creeks 
and left peace overtures to prominent warrior-diplomats such as Emistisiguo. It is 
plausible that Mortar’s resignation was less a declaration of war on the British than a 
resignation as a peace chief and a move to encourage his head warrior (Emistisiguo) to 
taking on an even more prominent status amongst both Creek and British societies. 
 The frontier violence between the Creeks and their white neighbors in 1765 was 
the beginning of a long period of hostility, land encroachment, and bitterness between the 
two parties. The one element that continued to keep both the Creeks and the British 
united however, was trade. Emistisiguo continued to promote the benefits of Gulf Coast 
trade among the Upper Creeks and took it upon himself to ensure that the new path 
towards Mobile and Pensacola remained open and fruitful for Little Tallassee and all 
Upper Creek towns well into the 1770s. 
 Emistisiguo’s ability to engineer a new southern trade path based on the Gulf 
Coast ports redefined Upper Creek trade and diplomacy between the years of 1763 and 
1765. Little Tallassee replaced Okfuskee and Okchai’s monopoly on Anglo-Creek trade, 
and along with its powerful connections to Brown and Rae developed itself into a 
thriving place of Trans-Atlantic and Colonial exchange. In addition, as Emistisiguo 
earned and embraced new leadership roles as a head warrior, spokesman, and diplomatic 
liaison, the town of Little Tallassee mirrored its headman in advancements. By 1765 
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Little Tallassee replaced Tuckabatchee as the favored Upper Creek town and sacred 
space to conduct matters of diplomacy, and was an important place within Creek and 
British Colonial society during the mid-eighteenth century. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
WAR 
1765-1776 
 
Over a period of ten years, Emistisiguo faced several obstacles in advancing his 
agenda to promote Gulf Coast Trade to his fellow Creeks and position Little Tallassee to 
be at the center of that trade. First there was increased violence along the Georgia / Creek 
border between Creeks and British settlers. A close second was the inability of Creek 
headmen to prevent their people from participating in the violence. Third, long standing 
abuses within the Anglo-Creek trade only further complicated the goal of Emistisiguo 
and the townspeople of Little Tallassee to find peace within that trade. Finally, the 
eruption of the Choctaw-Creek war in 1765-1775/76 was Emistisiguo’s greatest 
challenge. Instead of concentrating on issues of Gulf Coast Trade, Creek headmen and 
warriors channeled their energy towards military prowess and clan (blood) revenge. 
Instead of abandoning his agenda, Emistisiguo utilized this framework provided by the 
Choctaw-Creek War to advance and protect Anglo-Creek trade, particularly along the 
Gulf Coast. 
The context of war created a space that allowed Emistisiguo and Little Tallassee 
to further their claim as the center of Upper Creek society. Emistisiguo’s reputation as a 
successful warrior grew as he led war parties throughout the Choctaw-Creek war, as did 
his role as a diplomatic liaison on behalf of the Upper Creeks. In addition, Emistisiguo 
emerged as arguably the first Creek headman to engineer a meeting that united all Creeks 
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at a single location without European intervention to meet a common goal: protect 
Anglo-Creek trade. This national Creek conference took place at Little Tallassee in 1774, 
which not only elevated the town’s status amongst its Creek neighbors but its larger place 
within the Colonial Southeast.  
The Beginning of the Choctaw-Creek War 
The Creeks and Choctaws shared a mutual history of conflict and violence 
towards one another. Both groups claimed the hunting grounds along the Alabama and 
Tombigbee rivers to be their own, and Choctaw villages had been easy targets for Creek 
slaving and raiding during the latter of the seventieth century and the first decades of the 
eighteenth century. The aftermath of the French and Indian war escalated tension 
between the two Nations. The British had invited the Choctaws to attend the first Treaty 
of Augusta in 1763, but the Creeks blocked all their headmen from attending, except Red 
Shoes. In 1765, the British held a separate conference at Mobile with the Choctaws, and 
promises of guns and ammunition threatened Creek power and leverage over their 
formerly inadequately supplied, French-allied neighbors.1 Red Shoes summarized the 
conflict to Charles Stuart (Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs and nephew to 
Superintendent John Stuart), at Mobile in July of 1766 as follows, “I do not tell you that I 
want to go to war; the Creeks are your children as well as we, but you must not let one 
child kill another nor give the one powder and the other none. It grieves me to see the 
Creeks come and take away our scalps with impunity.”2 
                                                 
1 Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo America 1685-
1815 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 133-134. 
2 Red Shoes Talk to the Deputy Superintendent, 7/4/1766, Mobile, Records of the British Colonial Office, 
Class Five Files, Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, The Board of Trade, The French and Indian War, ed. 
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 The catalyst behind this conflict can be attributed to the death of a Choctaw man 
named Suei Nantla, one of many victims of an endless cycle of aggression between Creek 
and Choctaw warriors. The Creek war party responsible for Suei Nantla’s death placed a 
“bloody war stick” near the body, which abiding by Creek tradition was an invitation to 
war.3 The Choctaws answered the Creek’s call for war by murdering six Creeks and 
capturing a woman.4 Soon after, in May of 1766, the Choctaws dispatched a war 
challenge to the Creeks that was addressed to Emistisiguo. The Choctaws reported that 
they had “lost above twenty men at different times,” and planned to “send 100 men to lye 
between Pensacola and the Upper Creeks,” as well as an additional 200 men to 
specifically destroy the towns of Muccolossus and Puckatalahassee. The Choctaws 
confidently declared that they would fight the Creeks openly “in the plains and not 
behind trees like cowards,” for they were convinced that the Creeks were solely 
responsible for the deaths of their loved ones.5 Emistisiguo, head warrior of Little 
Tallassee, accepted the challenge on behalf of the Upper Creeks, and consequently set in 
motion a decade of inter-tribal warfare.6 
                                                 
Randolph Boehm (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983) vol. 67 (Hereafter cited as 
CO5/vol. number). 
3 George Johnstone’s Answer to the Talk of the Creeks, 6/9/1766, Pensacola, in Mississippi Provincial 
Archives: English Dominion, 1763-1766, ed. Dunbar Rowland (Nashville, TN; Press of Brandon Printing 
Company, 1911), 524 (Hereafter cited as MPAED). Johnstone stated that the “murther of Suchee Nathla by 
the Creeks” was the “reason the Choctaws go to War.” 
4 William Tayler to General Thomas Gage, 6/1/1777, in the Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 28 (Hereafter cited 
as TGP, vol. number), William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI. 
5 The Choctaws included in their war challenge that they had reserved 500 men to remain within the Nation 
to protect women and children. Stephen Forrester to Governor Johnstone, Reporting Upper Creek 
Acceptance of Choctaw-War Challenge, 5/25/1766, Chister-ca-lusfa, in Georgia and Florida Treaties, 
1763-1776, ed. John T. Juricek, in vol. 12 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607- 
1789, ED. Alden t. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002), 296 (hereafter 
cited as GFT). 
6 Three scholars have examined the multifaceted causes of the Creek-Choctaw War in depth. The first to do 
so was Kathryn E. Holland Braund, who argues that England’s emergence after the French and Indian War 
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Emistisiguo did not need to deliberate the idea of war with the Choctaws for very 
long. The peaceful trade alliance that he had negotiated with the British at Pensacola in 
1765 was quickly disrupted and in danger of retraction due to escalated violence between 
Creek warriors, white settlers, and unlicensed traders. Only four months after the 
congress of Augusta, Governor Johnstone claimed that the Creeks “killed fourteen men in 
cold Blood” and estimated that “upon an accurate state of facts it appears that not less 
than one hundred and thirty-eight people have been killed by them [Creeks] since the 
year 1731.”7 These deaths were pardoned by the British, according to Johnstone, but the 
hostilities continued. In September of 1765, William Payne and James Hogg were killed 
by an Indian named Limpiki, the son of the well-known Coweta headman Sempoyaffi 
(alias The Fool Harry). The men had been hunting in Creek territory near the head of 
Little River, “about seventy miles” from the boundary agreed upon at Augusta in 1763.8 
                                                 
as the sole supplier of trade goods prompted Creeks and Choctaws to compete for better prices, access, etc., 
which eventually erupted into a full-scale war. The second historian to tackle the complexities of the Creek 
Choctaw War is Greg O’Brien, whose arguments inspired this dissertation. O’Brien agrees with Braund but 
conducts a closer and much more detailed analysis of Choctaw society during the mid-eighteenth century. 
As a result, O’Brien draws several conclusions. The first being that Choctaw and Creek elites initiated war 
with the Creeks in order to restore power that seemed to be falling into the hands of common traders and or 
young and restless warriors. In addition, O’Brien argues that the Choctaws and Creeks promoted intertribal 
warfare to redirect violence away from white frontiersman and preserve and renew Anglo trade tries. Last, 
Steven Peach adds to this historiography by exploring the role that clans and towns played on a non-elite 
level to cause and perpetuate the Choctaw-Creek War. See the following works by these individuals for 
further reading on the subject: Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 133-124 and Chapter 7; Greg O’Brien, 
“Protecting Trade Through War: Choctaw Elites and British Occupation of the Floridas,” in Pre-Removal 
Choctaw History: Exploring New Paths, ed. Greg O’Brien (1999; repr., Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2008), 103-122, and O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830 (Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), Chapter 3 and 84-85; Steven J. Peach, The Three Rivers have 
Talked”: The Creek Indians and Community Politics in the Native South, 1753-1821 PhD. dissertation: 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2016), 108-111 and Chapter 3. 
7 Governor Johnstone’s Report, 6/23/1766, Pensacola, MPAED, 511. 
8 Governor Wright to Superintendent Stuart and Upper Creek Great Medal Chiefs, Protesting Payne-Hogg 
murders. Savannah ,10/27/1765, GFT, 17-18. Emistisiguo was included in this letter as one of the Great 
Medal recipients. William Struthers referred to the victims as “two men and a boy.” See, William Struthers 
to Governor Johnstone, 4/20/1766, Mobile, MPAED, 516. 
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Outraged, Governor Wright demanded satisfaction, “if any Indian should thereafter 
murder or kill a white man, the offender should without any delay excuse or pretense 
whatever be, immediately put to death.”9 Johnstone heeded a similar warning in regards 
to trade. In June of 1766, Johnstone warned Emistisiguo: “Peace cannot long be 
maintained where murders are every Day committed . . . without any provocation on our 
Side, and without any Satisfaction from you after the most solemn Promises.”10 Violence 
continued despite the Governor’s requests. In August of 1766 two more English traders 
by the names of Goodwin and Davis were killed by the Creeks.11 
 War with the British was not an option for Emistisiguo, but he could fight an 
intertribal war with the Choctaw Nation. British trade was too vital to Little Tallassee, 
especially the potential for economic growth as promotion of high status amongst fellow 
Creeks that Pensacola and Mobile now offered. By accepting the Choctaw war challenge, 
Emistisiguo redirected the aggression of Creek youth to Choctaw warriors, away from 
white traders.12 Creek warrior and small medal chief of Cusseta, Topoye (alias the 
Fighter) agreed with Emistisiguo’s plan. In a letter to Charles Stuart in June of 1766, the 
Fighter reported that “the Choctaws and Creeks are now going to war,” and will “turn the 
bows and arrows they were preparing against the English on the Choctaw.”13 The Fighter 
                                                 
9 Governor Wright to Superintendent Stuart and Upper Creek Great Medal Chiefs, Protesting Payne-Hogg 
murders. Savannah ,10/27/1765, GFT, 17-18. The Italics are not mine, but Governor Wright’s own hand 
and emphasis. Wright also demanded that there be two English witnesses and the death be public. Italics 
are mine. 
10 Governor Johnstone to the Upper Creeks, Pensacola, 6/9/1766, GFT, 298. Johnstone particularly 
addressed Emistisiguo within his letter. 
11 Stuart to ?, Pensacola, 10/1/1766, CO5/67 
12 Greg O’Brien is the first historian to make this argument. I have found it to be the case with Little 
Tallassee under the leadership of Emistisiguo. See, Greg O’Brien “Protecting Trade through War” in Pre-
Removal Choctaw History, ed. O’Brien, Chapter 3, 103-122. 
13 Topoye alias the Fighter, his Talk to the Deputy Superintendent, 6/25/1766, Mobile, C05/67. 
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added that he thought the Creeks who harmed British traders to be “a wild people for 
thinking any harm against the English, who alone can supply them with everything they 
wanted,” including “skins” to “cover their wives and children.”14 Emistisiguo and the 
Fighter were not alone in their thoughts. Effatiskiniha, also referred to as “Mackay’s 
Friend,” who claimed to have led the first war party against the Choctaws, told 
Superintendent David Taitt, years later that he “made war on purpose to keep his young 
people from falling out with the English,” for “he knows they must be at war with 
somebody.”15 Thus, by Creek consensus and under Emistisiguo’s leadership, the 
Choctaw-Creek war became a means to protect British trade.16 
Satisfaction for Trade 
As many Creek warriors set off to wage war against the Choctaws in 1766, 
Emistisiguo remained at Little Tallassee to answer British demands for satisfaction of the 
Payne-Hogg and Goodwin-Davies murders. In early October, Emistisiguo and several 
other headmen from his district among the Creeks assembled a general council to meet 
with Governor Johnstone to discuss their desire to cooperate with these demands. During 
this meeting Emistisiguo clarified the situation: “We the chiefs of this District are 
determined that the offender should die. He was accordingly put to death and shall 
everyone who is guilty of the like crime.”17 Conscious of the fact that the Royal 
                                                 
14 Topoye alias the Fighter, his Talk to the Deputy Superintendent, 6/25/1766, Mobile, C05/67. 
15 David Taitt’s Journal To and Through the Upper Creek Nation, 1772, in Travels in the American 
Colonies, ed. Newton D. Mereness (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1916), 532-34. 
16 The Choctaw implemented a similar policy. See, Greg O’Brien “Protecting Trade Through War,” in Pre-
Removal Choctaw History, ed. O’Brien, Chapter 3. 
17 Tallapoosa Chiefs to Governor Johnstone, Reporting Execution of the murderer of Goodwin and Davies. 
10/11/1766, GFT, 312-313; A General Council held of the Chiefs of Fourteen Towns of the Tallipoosas, 
10/11/1766, CO5/68. Emistisiguo is referred to as “Mr. Sego” in this document. 
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Governors required a British witness for proper satisfaction, Emistisiguo added that, “we 
have shown the deceased offender to a white man,” which he hoped would “clear the 
blame” from his people as “agreeable to treaty.”18 
Evidence indicates that out of all the Tallapoosa headmen present during the 
council, Emistisiguo took it upon himself to implement a plan that appeased the British. 
“I spoke to the Governor as well as to the beloved Men some time ago at Pensacola and 
promised them if anything disturbed the peace between us I would endeavor to keep the 
peace,” Emistisiguo related to Johnstone.19 Emistisiguo then made it known to Johnstone 
that he would personally see that he and his fellow Creeks intended to keep that promise. 
Towards the end of the council, he confidently declared: “I am a Head Warrior and I have 
asserted myself against the late Murderers. Otherwise he would not have been put to 
Death . . . I hope you will not blame the whole for the misbehavior of that one.”20 
Emistisiguo’s determination to pacify the British during the October council was 
part of a much larger agenda to restore peaceful trade relations. Emistisiguo beseeched 
Governor Johnstone, 
 
The path between us and Pensacola was Straight & Clear but some of the young 
men have endeavored to stop it up, but we the Headmen will endeavor to keep it 
                                                 
18 Tallapoosa Chiefs to Governor Johnstone, Reporting Execution of the murderer of Goodwin and Davies. 
10/11/1766, GFT, 312-313; A General Council held of the Chiefs of Fourteen Towns of the Tallipoosas, 
10/11/1766, CO5/68. Governor James Wright declared that satisfaction required 2 English witnesses. See 
also, Governor Wright to Superintendent Stuart and Upper Creek Great Medal Chiefs, Protesting Payne-
Hogg murders. Savannah ,10/27/1765, in GFT, 17-18. The treaties spoken of were the Treaty of Pensacola 
and the Treaty of Augusta, 1763 and 1765. 
19 A General Council held of the Chiefs of Fourteen Towns of the Tallipoosas, 10/11/1766, CO5/68. 
20 A General Council held of the Chiefs of Fourteen Towns of the Tallipoosas, 10/11/1766, CO5/68. 
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open. The reason of our keeping the Path open is that our Guns may fire and that 
we may have a free trade to supply ourselves with ammunition and Cloathing.21 
 
In light of the Choctaw-Creek war, a steady flow of ammunition was necessary. Clothing 
would also supplement any shortage that Creek men could not provide while they were at 
war instead of hunting. Last, Emistisiguo had seen the economic opportunity trade with 
Pensacola and Mobile offered his own town of Little Tallassee, as he expressed at the 
1763 Augusta meeting. Emistisiguo’s efforts to appease British demands for satisfaction 
had one primary motive: to preserve trade with Little Tallassee as the focal point for 
British-Upper Creek relations and protect his own elevated status as a war leader and 
diplomat. 
Notably, Emistisiguo’s cooperation with British demands of satisfaction for the 
deaths of a few white traders was not a common occurrence. European concepts of justice 
were starkly at odds with those of the Creeks. European laws stated that the punishment 
for an individual proven guilty of a murder charge was death. Governor Johnstone could 
not close the case of the Goodwin-Davies or Payne-Hogg killings until the execution of 
the guilty party (or parties) was carried out and met the criteria of British satisfaction. 
Creek views on murder abided by the cultural practice of “clan” or “blood revenge,” 
which stipulated that a Creek warrior not only had the right to kill any person or their 
relative responsible for the murder of a fellow clan member, but it was their duty to carry 
out that revenge. If clan revenge was not performed, the soul of the dead Creek kinsman 
                                                 
21 A General Council held of the Chiefs of Fourteen Towns of the Tallipoosas, 10/11/1766, CO5/68; 
Tallapoosa Chiefs to Governor Johnstone, Reporting Execution of the murderer of Goodwin and Davies. 
10/11/1766, GFT, 312-313. 
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and or family member would be suspended on an earthly plane and by Creek tradition 
prevented from entering the spirit world.22 “Our method of punishing offenders Differs 
from that of yours,” Emistisiguo stated to Superintendent Stuart on the matter.23 
Furthermore, Creek laws of clan revenge did not find those responsible for the killing of 
the British traders as guilty of murder. The Goodwin-Davies and Payne-Hogg murders 
were a necessary cultural act to restore balance to Creek society, not a crime that in 
British society was punishable by death. 
Whether or not Stuart understood the concept of blood revenge, he knew the 
tradition was nearly impossible to break. Stuart’s comment to General Thomas Gage on 
the matter supports this claim: “I am told the satisfaction they have given us is very 
uncommon amongst them.”24 These peace efforts often failed because they were part of a 
culture that obeyed the dictates of retributive justice despite the efforts of leading 
headmen trying to negotiate for peace on several occasions. The Creeks were not a static 
people, nor were they bound to culture that was incapable of change. By 1766, frontier 
violence fueled by clan revenge threatened Anglo-Creek trade and to protect it, the 
leading headmen cast clan laws aside. Emistisiguo was one of them, if not the first. His 
decision to bend to British law for the sake of protecting trade was not only a testament 
of his unique diplomacy regarding eighteenth century Anglo-Creek relations, but also the 
                                                 
22 For a discussion on clan/blood revenge, see Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing 
Face of Captivity in Early America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 80-82. 
23 Tallapoosa Chiefs to Governor Johnstone, Reporting Execution of the murderer of Goodwin and Davies. 
10/11/1766, GFT, 12, 312-313; A General Council held of the Chiefs of Fourteen Towns of the 
Tallipoosas, 10/11/1766, CO5/68 
24 Stuart to Gage, 11/20/1766, Pensacola, TGP, Vol. 59. 
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value he and others in Little Tallassee placed on the preservation of Anglo-Creek trading 
ties.25 
The execution of those guilty for the murder of Goodwin and Davies under 
Emistisiguo’s instructions was not enough to satisfy the Royal Governors.26 James 
Wright insisted that Payne and Hogg be avenged, and that their deaths serve as an 
example of British law and order.27 In December of 1766, Superintendent Stuart 
appointed Roderick McIntosh as ‘Commissioner to the Creeks,’ and issued him the task 
of venturing into Creek Country to discuss with “Great and Small medal chiefs” the need 
for satisfaction for the unanswered Payne-Hogg murders.28 Stuart instructed Roderick: 
“After delivering my talks to the Lower Creeks, you will proceed to Emistisiguo’s town 
of the Little Talasses,” and “deliver to him a white wing and some tobacco with a 
particular talk from me.”29 These tokens were to communicate to Emistisiguo that Stuart 
acknowledged his role in providing satisfaction for the Goodwin and Davies murders, but 
that he “expects and requires justice be reciprocal” upon all occasions.30 In addition, 
Roderick was ordered by Stuart to deliver to Emistisiguo and his second man a “string of 
                                                 
25 By 1773, Emistisiguo, Little Tallassee, and several Upper and Lower Creek towns all broke from 
tradition and cast their clans aside to preserve trade. This is a direct contradiction to historian Steven J. 
Peach’s argument that Creeks could not “escape the tug of war” between town and clan and needed to carry 
out clan revenge no matter what cost. See, Steven J. Peach, “The Three Rivers have Talked, Chapter 3, 107-
108. 
26 Stuart to McIntosh, 12/19/1766, Charlestown, CO5/68. In this letter, Stuart discusses that satisfaction has 
been given for the Goodwin and Davies murders, but the need for British law and order are still of the 
upmost importance. 
27 John T. Juricek, Endgame for Empire: British-Creek Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776 
(Gainesville: FL, University of Florida Press, 2015), 113-114. Stuart to Gage, 11/20/1766, Pensacola, TGP, 
Vol. 59. 
28 Stuart to McIntosh, 12/19/1766, Charlestown, CO5/68. 
29 Stuart to McIntosh, 12/19/1766, Charlestown, CO5/68. 
30 Superintendent Stuart to the Upper Creeks with Warning Black Beads, 12/17/1766, Charles Town, GFT, 
320-321. 
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white Beads with Seven black beads at the End.” The black beads, Stuart related, “shall 
be taken off and thrown into the River” only after Emistisiguo provided “every proof in 
your power of your love for justice.”31 
Emistisiguo could not provide proof of a crime that his people did not commit. 
The Payne-Hogg murders took place in the Lower Creek town of Coweta, not Little 
Tallassee or any other Upper Creek town. In April 1767, Emistisiguo clarified to Stuart 
that “we [Upper Creeks] look upon the Lower Creeks, to be a different nation from us,” 
and not he nor any other Upper Creek headmen or warrior had any power to interfere in 
their affairs. According to Emistisiguo, the Cowetas had no desire to seek out those 
responsible for the Payne-Hogg murders, or any other killing of a white man. Emistisiguo 
explained to the British official that 
 
Some time ago, there happened to be two black spots, made by the nation, one by 
the Cowetas; and the other by our nation. The Great Beloved man then sent a Talk 
from Charlestown to have the Spots washed white. The Cowetas then threw that 
Talk away, and still do; but we received it, and we washed our spot white.32  
 
The only Creeks that could provide satisfaction for the deaths of Payne and Hogg were 
the headmen of Coweta. By casting Stuart’s talk away, the people of Coweta had spoken; 
European concepts of justice would carry no meaning in Lower Creek Country.  
                                                 
31 Superintendent Stuart to the Upper Creeks, with Warning Black Beads, 12/17/ 1766, Charles Town, 
GFT, 322. 
32 Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Replying to his December 17 Talk, 4/20/1767, GFT, 335. 
Stuart did send Coweta a talk in April. See, Talk to Captain Aleck, Talechea, White Coweta King, 
Sempoyaffee, the Young Lieutenant, and other Chiefs and Warriors of the Lower Creek Nation, 4/1/1767, 
CO5/68. 
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Emistisiguo’s departure from Creek tradition to accommodate the British notions 
of crime and punishment throughout the spring of 1767 can be considered an extension of 
his larger plan to protect trade and place his town at the center of that trade. On April 20, 
1767 Emistisiguo had McIntosh deliver a talk to Stuart. The highlight of this talk was that 
Emistisiguo not only desired that the path “from Charlestown thro this Nation into the 
Chickasaws should be kept clean and white,” but also the path towards the Gulf coast. 
Emistisiguo elaborated on this point: “It is not the Governor of Carolina only, we have 
often assured our friendship; but also the several Governors of Georgia, and Pensacola, 
and through them we assure the subjects of the Great King of our real Love and 
Friendship.”33 Approximately one month later, Stuart responded to Emistisiguo’s talk and 
sent word to Little Tallassee of what needed to be done in order for both paths to be kept 
open. Stuart’s reply, “I expect from your Headmen and Warriors, that you will Co-
Operate with me, that you will keep our young men Orderly; that you will protect the 
white men in your nation,” and last, “procure restitution and justice to all his Majesty’s 
subjects,” was nothing new.34 
Superintendent Stuart did not have to wait long to see how far Emistisiguo was 
willing to compromise his own values to keep his investment in British trade alive. In 
early May 1767, another white man was killed by an Indian in Upper Creek Country. The 
victim, most likely, was a case of mistaken identity in the ongoing Creek-Choctaw War. 
According to Emistisiguo, the death was an “unlucky accident” for he had “carried a 
                                                 
33 Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Replying to his December 17 Talk, 4/20/1767, GFT, 335. 
34 Superintendent Stuart to Emistisiguo and the Upper Creek, 5/10/1767, Augusta, GFT, 336. 
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woman and some Choctaw hair with him.”35 The headman was quick to act after he heard 
the news. During a talk on May 16, Emistisiguo reported to Stuart that he “immediately 
went up to the Hillibys” where the “man was killed in the woods,” the killing “just done 
by one of their people.”36 Emistisiguo attested, “My business to the Hillibys was entirely 
to have this Murderer killed but he had been off to the Mountains five or Six days before 
I got there; however we are resolved to send some of our best runners after him to have 
him killed.”37 The possibility that the murderer had fled to the Cherokee Nation was also 
mentioned during Emistisiguo’s talk, which he assured Stuart would not prevent the 
Creek effort to kill the perpetrator “as soon as we know of it.”38 
Emistisiguo was not alone in his decision to provide satisfaction to the British. 
Although Stuart had addressed his previous talks and letters to Emistisiguo, the headman 
did not have the authority to order the execution of a Creeks from other towns; instead, 
Emistisiguo relied on the support of his town and fellow Upper Creek headmen to 
support his diplomatic goals. On May 16, 1767, in the presence of The Mortar, Molten, 
and another Creek referred to as “Old Bob Warrior,” Emistisiguo clarified this fact: “I 
don’t send this Talk of myself but with the advice and consent of all Headmen in the 
upper Creeks.” Neothlucco, Second Man of Little Tallassee, confirmed this statement to 
                                                 
35 Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Another Murder, 5/16/1767, Little Tallassee, 
GFT, 27. 
36 Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Another Murder, 5/16/1767, Little Tallassee, 
GFT, 27. 
37 Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Another Murder, 5/16/1767, Little Tallassee, 
GFT, 27-28. 
38 Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Another Murder, 5/16/1767, Little Tallassee, 
GFT, 28. 
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be true. “This Talk is not from one Man but from all Headmen and Warriors of the Upper 
Creeks so it should not be thrown away.”39 Not one headman said otherwise. 
Emistisiguo’s talk was a promise to the British that he and the Upper Creeks 
agreed to capture and put to death the Indian responsible for the recent murder. 
Suspecting that the perpetrator had fled to Cherokee Country, the talk requested Stuart to 
“be so good as to send a man up to the Nation [Cherokee] with this talk to all the 
headmen particularly to the great Warrior of Chote and let them know we shall take it as 
a great favour and piece of friendship if they will do their Endeavors to have him killed.” 
Emistisiguo added that he and the Upper Creeks wished that this talk also be sent to “all 
the white people in that nation and that we shall esteem it a great favour if they will kill 
him.”40 
Creeks abided by laws of clan justice and blood revenge. Concepts of punishing 
an Indian by death for killing a white man was both a foreign concept and a departure 
from Creek cultural understandings of life and death. The continuous unregulated frontier 
violence between young Creeks and white settlers threatened to destabilize these 
established trade relationships as well as the power of respected headmen to control them. 
During the late 1760s, however, ensuring that access to British trade remained in the 
hands of elite Creek headmen, such as Emistisiguo, was of utmost importance. The talk 
delivered by Emistisiguo on May 16, 1767 exemplifies this fact, as well as provides 
                                                 
39 Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Another Murder, 5/16/1767, Little Tallassee, 
GFT, 28. 
40 Upper Creek Chiefs to Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Another Murder, 5/16/1767, Little Tallassee, 
GFT, 28. 
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significant insight to the level of trust the Upper Creeks held in Emistisiguo as their 
chosen diplomatic liaison. 
In less than a month following Emistisiguo’s talk, another white man was killed in 
Upper Creek Country in June 1767. A meeting was held at Little Tallassee immediately 
to discuss the matter and Emistisiguo was “appointed” by the “Upper Towns” to speak on 
their behalf.41 According to Emistisiguo, Mortar and several other head warriors were on 
their way to attend the meeting at Augusta when “a white man fell by the hands of one of 
our mad young men,” which prevented their attendance. They returned “to see Justice 
done and the Path rendered clear.”42 As a “testimony of their good intentions,” 
Emistisiguo presented Stuart with a pipe and suggested that they “smoke it together.”43 
Emistisiguo was given the pipe by the Mortar to hold in his absence, and was to serve as 
a gesture of peace and confirmation that Mortar and his warriors were determined to 
provide retribution for the crime committed in their Nation. Adhering to British law to 
keep trade open was originally Emistisiguo’s idea, but by 1767 the headmen and warriors 
of all the Upper Creek towns trusted his decision and followed his lead. Emistisiguo 
assured Stuart of his faith in Mortar by referencing the white and black spots that had 
clouded their former talks: “You shall soon have proof of our Love of Justice and the 
black at the End of your Talk shall be washed off.”44 
                                                 
41 A Meeting in Augusta, 6/6/1767, Augusta, GFT, 34. The meeting included John Stuart (Superintendent), 
Mr. Roderick McIntosh (Commissary to the Creek Nation), The Principal Merchants and Traders, as well 
as the interpreters John Proctor and James Forrest. Emistisiguo was named the Great Medal Chief in 
attendance. 
42A Meeting in Augusta, 6/6/1767, Augusta, GFT, 34. Mortar is mentioned under the alias of Otis Mico in 
the document. For the sake of consistency, I refer to him as the Mortar. 
43 A Meeting in Augusta, 6/6/1767, Augusta, GFT, 34. 
44 A Meeting in Augusta, 6/6/1767, Augusta, GFT, 36. 
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Emistisiguo’s role as the Upper Creek spokesperson and diplomatic liaison to the 
British regarding the Goodwin-Davies and Payne-Hogg murders bolstered his authority 
as one of the Upper Creek’s leading headmen and cemented his role as a warrior-
diplomat. In addition, Emistisiguo’s evolving relationship with Stuart as a diplomatic 
liaison between the Upper Creeks and the British also served to validate his importance to 
both the white and Indian world during the mid-eighteenth century. As discussed in 
Chapter II, successful war leaders often won over the respect of their own people and 
neighboring towns and were entrusted to take on additional and much larger diplomatic 
and political responsibilities. By 1766, Emistisiguo had assumed several roles, ranging 
from war leader, diplomat, cultural broker, and lastly that of pioneer in Gulf Coast trade 
and innovative Anglo-Creek diplomacy to protect that trade. Superintendent Stuart did 
not conduct a single affair without a consultation with Emistisiguo, which served as an 
indication of the Little Tallassee headman’s recognized authority in negotiating deals on 
behalf of the Creeks. Both the Upper Creeks and British officials recognized Emistisiguo 
as a capable and trustworthy diplomat capable of serving their best interests. 
Emistisiguo’s achievements in war, trade, and diplomatic relations proved that by the 
mid-1760s Emistisiguo held significant authority within the Creek society, based upon 
both Creek defined spiritual power as well as a newer trade-based power. 
As the talks regarding the Goodwin-Davies and Payne-Hogg murders ended, 
Emistisiguo warned Stuart that the retribution the British desired would not be as 
immediate as Stuart expected. “We are now engaged in War with the Choctaws,” 
Emistisiguo reminded Stuart. “Neither party seems inclined for peace. Each has lost 
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friends and want revenge . . . we are not as yet tyred of war and do not want to bury the 
Hatchet so Soon.”45 Emistisiguo’s words spoke volumes about the priorities of the Upper 
Creek Nation. Neither he nor any of his warriors could ignore the cries for blood revenge 
against the Choctaws that echoed throughout Little Tallassee and Creek Country. That 
said, there were limits as to how far Emistisiguo and his fellow Upper Creek headmen 
would compromise their own laws of justice in favor of the British. If they continued to 
press Upper Creeks for retribution, the British would simply have to wait. 
Buzzard Roost and Emistisiguo’s Raid 
While Creek warriors carried on their war with the Choctaws during the early 
winter of 1768, Emistisiguo prepared a different type of battle plan. On February 7, “a 
gang of Indians 27 in number,” robbed “Bussard Roost,” a “detached village about 
seventy miles from any town” within Upper Creek Country. The roost was purported to 
be a popular place for white men to gather and conduct illicit trade.46 According to the 
deposition of William Frazier (a notable Indian trader), Emistisiguo was the mastermind 
behind the raid. Frazier reported, “The big fellow’s [alias Struthers’] friend at the head of 
them robbed the store at the Buzzard Roost and carried off everything in it together with 
the provisions packsaddles and six valuable horses.”47 The party also included the Young 
Lieutenant (Escotchaby) and Fool Harry (Sempoyaffi) of Coweta, who then proceeded to 
                                                 
45 A Meeting in Augusta, 6/6/1767, Augusta, GFT, 36. 
46 Deposition of William Frazier, 3/16/1768, Georgia. Parish of St. Paul, GFT, 41; Commissary McIntosh 
to Superintendent Stuart on Emistisiguo’s “authorized” raid, 5/29/1768, GFT, 44. Mad Dog of the Upper 
Creek town of Tuckabatchee also participated in the raid. 
47 Deposition of William Frazier, 3/16/1768, Georgia. Parish of St. Paul, in GFT, 41. Frazier stated that the 
robbery was committed “on or about the 7th of February.” Big Fellow is also a known alias for Emistisiguo. 
Similar to Big Man or Big King. 
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rob “a great amount in leather and goods” from two more stores that same day.48 In the 
deposition, Frazier related that “raw skins” were also amongst the items that Emistisiguo 
and his party had stolen in large quantity, but not a single drop of blood was shed. His 
deposition confirmed this fact, saying, “Mr. Dureseau who had the Care of Mr. Galphin’s 
store at the Buzzard roost was not in the least molested.”49 
Before Emistisiguo set out for Buzzard Roost, he asked Commissary Robert 
McIntosh for a “paper” that sanctioned the raid. McIntosh complied with Emistisiguo’s 
request, and drew up a document authorizing Emistisiguo “to Size upon and take away all 
the undressed Deer Skins he may find with any White Man or Indian Trading in or at 
Villages Hunting Grounds or any Part of the Woods.”50 The raid ignored the Lower 
Creek Indians who supported trade at Buzzard Roost and expropriated licensed traders 
who were members of one of George Galphin’s companies.51 McIntosh justified his 
actions with the following response: 
 
I could not help looking upon myself in some degree authorized to give the Paper 
I did to Emistisiguo, for in that Talk the Indians were told that I had orders to call 
in all the straggling Traders in the out settlements and as far as lies in my power 
to remedy the Evils they Complained of.52 
 
                                                 
48 Deposition of William Frazier, 3/16/1768, Georgia. Parish of St. Paul, GFT, 41-42. The two addition 
trade stores belonged to a Mr. Munrow and Stephen Smith. 
49 Deposition of William Frazier, 3/16/1768, Georgia. Parish of St. Paul, GFT, 42. 
50 Commissary McIntosh to Superintendent Stuart on Emistisiguo’s “authorized” raid, 5/29/1768, in GFT, 
44-45. 
51 Juricek T Juricek, Endgame for Empire: British-Creek Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776 
(Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2015), 123-124. 
52 Commissary McIntosh to Superintendent Stuart on Emistisiguo’s “authorized” raid, 5/29/1768, in GFT, 
45. The “talk” he referred to took place at Augusta in May and June of 1767. 
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Buzzard Roost was an outlying illegal trade center, which is why McIntosh fulfilled 
Emistisiguo’s request. 
Emistisiguo’s raid was an extension of a much larger, calculated Creek agenda. 
Since the signing of the Augusta Treaty in 1763, Emistisiguo and the entire Creek Nation 
had asked the British to remove the illegal traders who had infiltrated Creek Country, as 
well as lower the price of trade goods.53 The raid at Buzzard Roost was a political 
statement crafted by Emistisiguo to redirect British attention toward these grievances. 
The head warrior of Little Tallassee may have placated the British to the best of his 
ability by procuring satisfaction to protect trade, but he demanded that trade be conducted 
on Creek terms. These terms included that weapons and ammunition be made available to 
the Creeks, so they could continue to participate in their fight against the Choctaws.54 
Illicit trade also threatened profits to be made in Little Tallassee, as well as threatened 
Emistisiguo and other elite headmen’s control over trade. As an illegal and outlying trade 
center, Buzzard Roost jeopardized the long-term stability of Indian societies dependent 
on Anglo-Creek trade. 
In September 1768, Emistisiguo traveled to Savannah to discuss these terms with 
Governor James Wright. These terms were the opinion of both the Upper and Lower 
Creek towns, as Emistisiguo proclaimed the following at the beginning of the Provincial 
Council: “For his part, what he has to say he is authorized to do by a general Meeting of 
                                                 
53 These complaints resurfaced during the June meeting at Augusta in 1767, where the Mortar asked that 
prices be “greatly reduced” and Emistisiguo “strenuously insisted in restraining white people from trading 
in the woods and villages.” See A Meeting in Augusta, 6/6/1767, Augusta, GFT, 35; Commissary McIntosh 
to Superintendent Stuart on Emistisiguo’s “authorized” raid, 5/29/1768, GFT, 44. 
54 Sempoyaffi and the Young Lieutenant’s participation in the robbery at Buzzard Roost demonstrated 
Lower Creek support in this matter. 
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headmen of both upper and lower Creeks.”55 Emistisiguo continued and informed 
Wright, “that the Traders are instructed that they shall not take any Raw Skins, yet those 
Orders are broke through every Day, notwithstanding a Remonstrance was made to the 
Deputy Superintendent.”56 These illicit traders were also carrying “spirituous liquors” 
into the Nation on a daily basis—a clear violation of the agreement made at Augusta in 
1763 that no rum was to be carried into Creek Country.57 The consequences of this treaty 
breach were grave. Emistisiguo lamented to Wright, “The Indians are often induced to 
part with their skins for rum, which should be laid out in Cloathing and Necessaries for 
their Families; and they also part with and sell their Horses for rum.”58 The root of these 
grievances was the number of illicit traders that had been steadily infiltrating Creek 
Country throughout the 1760s. Emistisiguo summarized the situation to Wright at the end 
of their Council at Savannah: “There is too many Traders and too great a Quantity of 
Goods in their Nation, more than they can possibly purchase or pay for.”59 Emistisiguo 
and the Upper and Lower Creek headmen he represented agreed that British trade was 
essential for Creek survival and economic growth; now they needed to decide what price 
they were willing to pay.60 
Unregulated British took trade control away from elites within Creek society. 
More specifically, it enabled any Creek to obtain access to European manufactured 
goods. New traders also ignored the fact that trade was only to be carried out in 
                                                 
55 Provincial Council: Talks With Emistisiguo, 09/3/1768, Savannah, GFT, 51. 
56 Provincial Council: Talks With Emistisiguo, 09/3/1768, Savannah, GFT, 57. 
57 Provincial Council: Talks With Emistisiguo, 09/3/1768, Savannah, GFT, 57. 
58 Provincial Council: Talks With Emistisiguo, 09/3/1768, Savannah, GFT, 58. 
59 Provincial Council: Talks With Emistisiguo, 09/3/1768, Savannah, GFT, 57. 
60 Provincial Council: Talks With Emistisiguo, 09/3/1768, Savannah, GFT, 51.  
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designated towns, where more established traders (and essentially their creditors) were 
waiting to supervise all Creek-Anglo transactions.61 Trade was only legal in established 
Creek towns with designated headmen, not in the woods or forest places, such as Buzzard 
Roost. This illegal trade threatened the traditional role of Creek headman to control that 
trade, as well as their chiefly authority and power they derived from funneling goods into 
their own hands. Many warriors who had risen from head warrior to diplomat had gained 
their power and authority from their ability to access and manipulate the Anglo-Creek 
trade to their advantage. In addition, acquisition of trade goods built reciprocal and 
obligatory relationships which enhanced the authority of whomever had control over the 
distribution of trade. More specifically, the power of elite Creek headmen rested on their 
exclusive ability to distribute trade goods to their towns. The unregulated trade in the 
1760s allowed traders to exchange their products with any Indian instead of acting 
according to Creek tradition and trading according to the terms set by established 
chiefs.62 Thus, Emistisiguo’s complaints to Governor Wright during the September 
council of 1768 was an effort to maintain town-based trade and protect the tradition of 
chiefly control over Anglo-Creek trade. 
Emistisiguo: A Diplomat for Peace 
In November of 1768 a party of Choctaws killed several Creeks from Little 
Tallassee and “carried off five prisoners” before they departed. After the attack, 
Emistisiguo reported to Superintendent Stuart that he was going to war “immediately in 
                                                 
61 Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 107-108. 
62 For a discussion on the growth of illegal trade in the 1760s during the Creek-Choctaw war and its 
disruption of chiefly power, see Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 84-85; “The Conquered 
Meets the Unconquered,” in Pre-Choctaw History, ed. O’Brien, 151. 
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pursuit of them.”63 During a meeting at Fort Augusta on November 12, Neothlucco 
(Second Man) confirmed Emistisiguo’s accusations: “The Choctaw’s sent a sharp 
Hatchet into our town, they burnt Puckatalahassee, killed several of our own people.” 
Neothlucco then asked if Emistisiguo as well as the rest of the Upper Creek Nation’s 
headmen and warriors could be pardoned for not attending the conference. “We cannot 
come to see our Father. We must pursue our Enemies,” the Second Man declared.64  
Before ending his talk, the Second Man relayed a request from Emistisiguo to 
John Stuart asking if the British would cut off trade with the Choctaw Nation entirely. 
The reality that the Choctaws continued to receive guns and ammunition from the British 
as they had at Tombecby, Pensacola, and Mobile in 1767 had unsettled the Creeks. If 
trade could not be cut off entirely, the Second Man communicated that Emistisiguo and 
the Upper Creek headmen requested “supplies of ammunition to the Choctaw” at the very 
least, be discontinued.65 However, the British supported the Creek-Choctaw war, for it 
was in the best interest of the Crown if the Southeastern Indians were at war with one 
other rather than their white neighbors.66 Deputy Charles Stuart denied Emistisiguo’s 
request: 
 
The Great King was quiet when he heard that his red Children Spilt each other’s 
blood, yet he had not directed me to take part in their quarrels, or to interfere any 
                                                 
63 Copy of a Letter to His Excellency Governor Wright from John Stuart Esq, 11/0?/1768, Augusta, 
CO5/73. 
64 A Congress of the Principal Chiefs & Warriors of the Creek Nation, 11/12/1768, Fort Augusta, CO5/73. 
65 A Congress of the Principal Chiefs & Warriors of the Creek Nation, 11/12/1768, Fort Augusta, CO5/73. 
66 Greg O’Brien, “Protecting Trade Through War,” 106. British support of the Creek-Choctaw War was so 
great that many scholars attribute British officials to be the war’s sole instigators. For a comprehensive list 
of scholars and works that make this claim, see 177, note 15. 
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otherwise, than by interposing my mediation, and good offices, to bring about a 
reconciliation, when the parties at war should desire it.67 
 
The war between the Creeks and Choctaws continued. 
By the spring of 1770, both the Creeks and Choctaws attempted to put down their 
war clubs. After five long years of conflict, peace was desired by both parties. On June 
12, Deputy Charles Stuart reported to Stuart that peace overtures had begun and “after 
repeated promises and tokens of friendship interchanged on both sides,” he observed 
peace to be “firmly established.”68 In fact, Charles Stuart assured the Superintendent that 
the Choctaws were “so confident” that peace was amongst them at last “they buried all 
their war sticks and clubs.”69 The deputy spoke too soon. Shortly after the tokens of 
friendship were exchanged, four Creeks out hunting were killed by a party of Choctaws. 
The deputy received information that the Choctaws had also taken a woman prisoner who 
happened to be the niece of Mingo Houma, Great Medal chief of Little Muccolossus. The 
attack and kidnapping of a Great Medal Chief’s niece was a strategic choice by the 
Choctaws, and as a result abruptly put an end to all peace efforts. The misfortune Stuart 
concluded had “rubbed up old sores” and “left them in doubt what to do.”70 
Deputy Stuart, however, was in luck. Less than a week later Emistisiguo arrived 
at Pensacola. Charles Stuart had anticipated Emistisiguo’s arrival and expected that he 
would have the power and authority among the Creeks to quickly repair the thwarted 
peace plan. “I expect here this day or tomorrow, Emistisiguo, who will I hope put all 
                                                 
67 A Congress of the Principal Chiefs & Warriors of the Creek Nation, 11/12/1768, Fort Augusta, CO5/73. 
68 Charles Stuart to John Stuart, 06/12/1770, Pensacola, CO5/71, frame 284. 
69 Charles Stuart to John Stuart, 06/12/1770, Pensacola, CO5/71, frame 284. 
70 Charles Stuart to John Stuart, 06/12/1770, Pensacola, CO5/71, frame 284. 
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Right,” Stuart commented on the subject. Emistisiguo did not disappoint and upon his 
arrival immediately initiated the first of a long series of peace overtures to the Choctaw 
Nation on behalf of Little Tallassee and the majority of the Upper Creek towns.71 Earlier 
that month Emistisiguo had been appointed by his fellow Creeks to serve as their 
“principle [principal] speaker” in all Creek-Choctaw negotiations.72 This appointment 
along with the accountability that Deputy Stuart placed upon Emistisiguo in order to 
restore peace is a testament to the high level of authority Emistisiguo had achieved. 
According to Deputy Stuart, Emistisiguo presented him with “two white strings 
and some tobacco” which he then instructed Stuart to deliver to the Choctaw “as the last 
token of friendship to wipe away all bad talks.” The delivery was to be accompanied by 
two white wings, one from Mortar and the other Emistisiguo, along with the request that 
several Choctaw headmen be sent “into their towns” to prove that Emistisiguo’s words 
were true and that no Choctaw would be harmed.73 
Not all Creek warriors shared Emistisiguo and the Mortar’s desire for peace. In 
September 1770, Emistisiguo had received word that his peace talks were “thrown away” 
and that the Choctaws had no intention of putting down their war clubs. There were 
several Lower Creeks who had yet to participate in the war against the Choctaws and 
refused to miss the chance to earn respect and recognition through battle.74 According to 
Emistisiguo, Gun Merchant of Okchai had heard a rumor that there “was no Appearance 
                                                 
71 Charles Stuart to John Stuart, 06/12/1770, Pensacola, CO5/71, frame 284. 
72 Charles Stuart to John Stuart, 6/17/1770, Pensacola, in Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-
1783 (Colonial Office Series) (hereafter cited as DAR), ed. K.G. Davies (Great Britain: Colonial Office, 
1972-1981), 2:109. 
73 Charles Stuart to John Stuart, 06/17/1770, Pensacola, CO5/72. 
74 Charles Stuart to John Stuart, 06/12/1770, Pensacola, CO5/71, frame 211. 
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of Peace but War as the Choctaws were coming in great armys against them,” this 
intelligence he imagined “made the lower towns go to war,” and consequently caused the 
Choctaws to cast his peace talks aside.75 During a talk in late September of that year, 
Emistisiguo informed Charles Stuart that a group of white men with packhorses traveling 
from Pensacola “heard of six Choctaws being killed some where about Mobile and one 
wounded.” Emistisiguo admitted, “If that is true I cannot blame the Choctaws.”76 Given 
this information, it was quite clear that individual factions of both Creeks and Choctaws 
had their own reasons to decline Emistisiguo’s peace overture. 
Emistisiguo was determined to save the peace promises. In December of 1770 
Emistisiguo asked Deputy Superintendent Charles Stuart to dispatch a “belt of 
whampum” to the Choctaws to communicate this desire.77 Wampum are small beads that 
were traditionally extracted from various types of seashells. These beads were first used 
by the Algonquian and Iroquois Nation in the Northeast, and traditionally served as 
mnemonic devices during acts of diplomacy. The beads varied in color and size and were 
arranged in a precise manner to convey a message to the recipient from the speaker. 
Wampum belts could therefore be read like a text, each bead representing the equivalent 
of an alphabetical letter.78 By the middle of the eighteenth century, Creek Indians began 
to create wampum belts of their own, but used European ceramic beads rather than 
                                                 
75 Abstract of a talk from the Creeks to Charles Stuart by Emistisiguo, 09/?/1770, CO5/72; Emistisiguo 
stated in this talk that he believed Nicholas Black, the Interpreter, to be at fault for the miscommunication 
and therefore had made he and Charles Stuart appear to be “liars.” See also, Upper Creeks to Charles 
Stuart- Speak Emistisiguo, Late September of 1770, GFT, 372. 
76 Upper Creeks to Charles Stuart- Speak Emistisiguo, Late September of 1770, GFT, 372. 
77 A Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, in CO5/72. 
78 Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of 
European Colonization (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 47. 
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shell.79 The “belt of whampum” that Emistisiguo asked Deputy Stuart to deliver was an 
expression of the Creek’s desire for a long lasting peace. 
Evidence to support this claim can be seen in Emistisiguo’s elaborate description 
of the wampum belt he entrusted Deputy Stuart to deliver to the Choctaw from the Upper 
Creeks in December of 1770. Emistisiguo explained to Stuart that the beads on the belt 
were “all one as a letter in our way,” and that he looked upon Stuart “to be a brother and 
friend” whom he trusted to communicate its meaning.80 According to Emistisiguo, the 
“black ring” on the end of the belt “resembled the Whole Creek Nation,” but the color 
black was chosen specifically to represent the number of deaths that the Tallapoosa and 
Abihka Creeks had suffered at the hands of the Choctaw throughout the course of the 
war.81 At the opposite end of the belt, a “white bead” was woven into the belt to express 
Creek desires to make peace with the Western Division Choctaw town of Congeetoo.82 
Emistisiguo explained to Stuart, “The White Bead to the one End he reckons to be a clear 
path to Cungitio.” Lastly, there was a “strap” in the middle of the belt; its purpose to 
symbolize the joining of the two Nations in a “broad” and “clear path.” At the strap’s 
center was a collection of beads that represented Emistisiguo, the principal speaker and 
                                                 
79 James Adair, The history of the American Indians, ed. Kathryn E. Holland Braund (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
University of Alabama Press, 2005), 201-201, 504n169. Adair states that beads replaced conch shells as the 
primary medium for wampum by the mid eighteenth century. 
80 A Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, in CO5/72. 
81 Emistisiguo to Charles Stuart, Explaining Accompanying Peace Belt to the Choctaws, 12/13/1770, in 
GFT, 373; A Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, in CO5/72. Black is the color that 
represents death within Creek society. 
82 Cungito is another spelling for the town of Congeetoo. This was the home of the prominent Choctaw 
warrior and headmen Taboca. See Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 21- 22. 
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diplomat of the Upper Creeks, taking “Holaghtaobaye” (Choctaw headman) by the hand, 
with whom he hoped would “meet him at Mobile” to establish a permanent peace.83 
Although Emistisiguo was at the belt’s center, the beads were fashioned to 
represent many other Upper Creeks towns and their collective plans for peace. 
Emistisiguo explained to Stuart that “the white beads round each shall be a sign of peace 
from the trading town of the nation,” and when they (The Choctaw) “see you will know 
whom it belongs.”84 This “trading town” (Little Tallassee) was accompanied by a cluster 
of “four towns,” all located within close proximity to the “Alabama Fort” (Fort 
Toulouse).85 Headmen Gun Merchant and Mortar of Okchai both interpreted smaller 
portions of the wampum belt to Deputy Stuart, along with their own tokens of peace 
which included tobacco and beads enclosed in a “blue bag.”86 Emistisiguo, as principal 
speaker of the Upper Creek peace delegation, clarified what was to be done with these 
tokens, 
 
The Old Gun Merchant desires that Mr. Stuart will smoak out of this Pouch and 
the Choctaws the same. And inform them alto an ugly one and an ugly man sent it 
yet the Tobacco in it is good and so is his Heart. And alto Old yet if they keep his 
Pouch he will see them at Mobille and smoak with them in Friendship.87 
                                                 
83 Emistisiguo to Charles Stuart, undated, enclosed in John Stuart to Gage, 12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98. A 
Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. Holahataobaye was most likely the Choctaw 
headmen named Taboca, who resided at Congeetoo. 
84 “A Peace Talk The Creeks to the Choctaws,” enclosed in John Stuart to Gage, 12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98; 
A Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. 
85 Emistisiguo to Charles Stuart, undated, enclosed in John Stuart to Gage, 12/13/1770, TGP; A Talk to 
Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. 
86 Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, Explaining Peace Tokens, Enclosed in Stuart to Gage, 
12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98; Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, late September 1770, in GFT, 373-
374; A Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. 
87 Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, Explaining Peace Tokens, Enclosed in Stuart to Gage, 
12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98; Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, late September 1770, in GFT, 375; 
A Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. 
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Given this request, the headmen of Okchai had clearly agreed that they longed to put 
down their guns and war clubs. 
Okfuskee, although not part of the “four town” cluster, was another Upper Creek 
town that desired peace. Handsome Fellow, leading headman of Okfuskee, directed that a 
“long string of Barley Corn Beads” be delivered alongside the wampum belt and other 
secondary peace tokens.88 These beads represented the “farthest part” of the Upper Creek 
Nation and were “to be sent to the farthest part” of the Choctaw. The beads were “long 
and white,” just as Handsome Fellow’s intention that the two Nations put an end to war 
and begin a “path” to perpetual harmony.89  
Following Handsome Fellow’s requests, Emistisiguo presented Stuart with a 
“white wing” and a “cane/bone,” which he hoped the Choctaw would “hold fast always 
as a token of friendship” on behalf of all the Upper Creek towns.90 In addition, 
Emistisiguo personally forwarded a “long” eagle wing to represent “all the warriors in the 
[Creek] Nation,” and their commitment to peace. This long wing was accompanied by a 
few “white beads” with “double strands,” which if accepted by the Choctaws and not 
“thrown away” as the year before, “nothing but love and friendship” would exist between 
the two Nations.91 Finally, Emistisiguo advanced a pipe, tobacco, and his own personal 
                                                 
88 Handsome Fellow is documented as “Handsome man (Fellow) in Emistisiguo’s talk. Emistisiguo and the 
Mortar to the Choctaws, Explaining Peace Tokens, Enclosed in Stuart to Gage, 12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98; 
Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, late September 1770, GFT, 375; A Talk to Charles Stuart 
from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. 
89 Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, Explaining Peace Tokens, Enclosed in Stuart to Gage, 
12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98; Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, late September 1770, GFT, 375; A 
Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. 
90 A Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. 
91 A Peace Talk The Creeks to the Choctaws,” enclosed in John Stuart to Gage, 12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98; 
A Talk to Charles Stuart from Emistisiguo, 12/2/1770, CO5/72. 
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“pouch” to the Choctaw headmen, which was to be the “last token” of peace sent before 
the desired meeting “on the fifth moon” at Mobile.92 
All these tokens symbolized the sincerity of the select Upper Creek towns and 
their desire for reconciliation Autumn of 1770. “I have been thinking of this long time,” 
Emistisiguo told Deputy Stuart after handing over the tokens. “All I want is peace that 
our Children may frequent the woods without dread or Fear.”93 As the appointed 
principal speaker and diplomatic liaison between the Choctaw and Upper Creeks, 
Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee was determined to establish that peace. During the mid to 
late eighteenth century, diplomacy was just as important a skill as warfare. By 1770, 
Emistisiguo had proved himself capable of both. 
 Deputy Superintendent Charles Stuart delivered the Upper Creek peace tokens to 
the Choctaws as promised, but the outcome did not go as they had hoped. On December 
12, Stuart reported that he had “not yet Received any Answer to the Talks I sent into the 
nation.” The silence he imagined to be a response to traveling news that “a large party of 
Red men came over across this bay last Friday or five days ago to War against the 
Choctaws.” The identity of this war party most likely belonged to the “Cusadoes or the 
Cousa King,” a pro-war faction of the Lower Creeks.94 By the time Emistisiguo arrived at 
Mobile “4 or 5 of their people” had been killed by the Choctaws, no doubt casualties of 
the recent violence brought on by the Lower Creeks. Emistisiguo concluded that “it 
                                                 
92 “A Peace Talk The Creeks to the Choctaws,” enclosed in John Stuart to Gage, 12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98; 
Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, late September 1770, GFT, 375. 
93Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, Explaining Peace Tokens, Enclosed in Stuart to Gage, 
12/13/1770, TGP, Vol. 98; Emistisiguo and the Mortar to the Choctaws, late September 1770, in GFT, 375. 
94 Charles Stuart to the Upper Creek Headmen, 12/12/1770, Mobile, GFT, 380. 
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would be to no purpose to make the Peace today and War tomorrow, for they had lost 
their friends in that action” and “would surely seek Revenge.”95 The Choctaws who did 
respond to the Upper Creek peace overtures were reported by Stuart to have left Mobile 
“sorely disappointed.”96 
Emistisiguo the Warrior 
In Autumn of 1772, peace between the Choctaws and Creeks remained elusive.  
Emistisiguo “takes a good deal of trouble to keep peace,” David Taitt (British 
Commissary to the Creek Nation) reported to Superintendent John Stuart in October of 
that year, but he could not quell the Lower Creek’s appetite for war.97 “The [Upper] 
Creeks are bent on peace with the Choctaws,” Taitt added, but “some are now going to 
war, others are going to hunt for some time, then going to war.” Emistisiguo was 
documented twice that year to have done both. According to Taitt, Emistisiguo departed 
Little Tallassee with a rather “large party” to hunt about the Escambia River on October 
31 and was accompanied by the Fighter the following month on a second hunting trip 
“towards Pensacola.”98 After each excursion Emistisiguo was noted to have “afterwards” 
gone to “war against the Choctaws.”99 
                                                 
95 Charles Stuart to the Upper Creek Headmen, 12/12/1770, Mobile, GFT, 381; Charles Stuart to John 
Stuart, 12/12/1770, Pensacola, in DAR, 2:205. Stuart’s report that the Creeks casualties were “their people” 
and the fact that Emistisiguo referred to them as “their friends” indicates that they were most likely clan 
members, and for that reason Emistisiguo sought revenge. 
96 Charles Stuart to the Upper Creek Headmen, 12/12/1770, Mobile, GFT, 381. 
97 David Taitt to John Stuart, 10/31/1772, Little Tallassee, CO5/74. 
98 David Taitt to John Stuart, 10/31/1772, Little Tallassee, CO5/74. 
99 Taitt to Stuart, 11/22/1772, Little Tallassee, CO5/74. The Mortar was also reported to have temporarily 
put aside his efforts for peace as well and went off to war somewhere across the Coosa River. David Taitt 
reported that Emistisiguo left Little Tallassee in December of 1773 and “had gone to war” as well. See also, 
Abstract of a Letter from David Taitt Esq. Commissioner in the Creek Nation, 11/12/1773, Hickory 
Ground, in Mr. Stuart’s Number 15 of 12/21/1773. 
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 Emistisiguo embraced his role as the head warrior of Little Tallassee with the 
same level of dedication as he did when he was brokered for peace with the Choctaws 
two years before. After hunting about the Escambia River and Pensacola, Emistisiguo’s 
war party scalped seven Choctaws. In addition, they party managed to kill several small 
and great medal Choctaw chiefs including Tattoully Mastabe from Coosa, Cholko Oulaca 
from Ayanabe, and Yasi Mattaha from East Yazoo.100 
In January 1774, Emistisiguo and his war party were “fired upon by a party of 50 
Choctaws from a swamp,” which left him “shot through the left breast” and “dangerously 
wounded.”101 According to Commissary Taitt, Emistisiguo would not have survived “had 
not three of his sons who were part of the party got him into a cane branch,” which 
provided shelter from any remaining fire and were later able to make a getaway. 
Although Emistisiguo’s injuries were grave, the headman of Little Tallassee narrowly 
escaped death after being rescued by his sons and others in the Creek war party.102 Only 
one month later, Emistisiguo was back at Little Tallassee where he organized a meeting 
with Superintendent Stuart in regard to matters of Gulf Coast trade.103 Emistisiguo was 
truly an individual of incredible spiritual power, strength and fortitude, and a committed 
diplomat not only on behalf of his town, but all Upper Creeks. 
                                                 
100 Greg O’Brien, “Protecting Trade,” in Pre-Choctaw Removal, ed. O’Brien, 112. 
101 Abstract of a Letter from Robert Mackay, Established Merchant at Augusta, dated 30 November 1773, 
in Mr. Stuart’s No 15 of 12/12/1775, CO5/75. 
102 Abstract from a letter from David Taitt, Little Tallassee, 1/3/1774, CO5/75. This document reported that 
there were “sixty” Choctaws. 
103 Emistisiguo to Superintendent Stuart, Proposing Redirection of Upper Creek Trade Toward Pensacola 
and Mobile, 2/4/1774, Little Tallassee, CO5/75. 
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 Emistisiguo’s success through war had long ago advanced his reputation among 
the Upper and Lower Creeks. Men distinguished themselves within Creek society 
through success in war and their ability to harness spiritual power. Emistisiguo’s ability 
to lead men in war, defeat powerful enemies, as well as survive a near death attack all 
testified that he was not only a skilled warrior, but an individual capable of controlling 
his spiritual gift as a war prophet and living up to his warrior title of a hopaya.104 
Emistisiguo’s achievements in war also served to bolster his abilities to control spiritual 
power in civil life, as he proved himself to be an adept diplomat in matters of trade and 
peace negotiations throughout the Choctaw-Creek War. To that end, whether it was 
through peace or war, Emistisiguo’s power and reputation amplified within all contexts 
of a war-torn Creek Society and his eminent status also raised the profile of Little 
Tallassee as a place that dominated trade and diplomacy.105  
The White and Sherrill Murders 
On January 29, 1774 news reached Little Tallassee by a letter addressed to British 
Commissary David Taitt from “His Majesty’s Interpreter” that relations between Creek 
and Georgia settlers had taken an unprecedented and violent turn.106 Houmatchla of 
Coweta, Ochlulkee of Okfuskee, and a few other Creeks (mostly from the town of 
Coweta) had ventured into the “newly ceded land” to the British along the “Ogeechee 
River” in search of an Indian “they intended to kill on account of witchcraft.” During the 
manhunt, Houmatchla, Ochululkee, and their party “stole the Indians horses” in attempt 
                                                 
104 See Chapter I of this dissertation, 47-48. 
105 See Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 27-35. 
106 Commissary Taitt to Governor Chester Warning of Creek Danger, 1/29/1774, Little Tallassee, in GFT, 
440-441. 
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to “draw him off from the rest.” The plan was foiled when the horses turned out to not 
belong to the intended target, but to a white settler named William White. According to 
John Stuart, White’s neighbor William Sherrill took it upon himself to retrieve the horses, 
and “pursued and overtook two Creeks with the horses which the Indians refused to give 
up, whereupon White shot one of them.” After discovering their fellow Creek’s “body 
bloody” and “tracts of four horses” that led to White’s house on the Ogeechee River, 
Houmatchla, Ochlulkee, and the rest of the war party calculated their revenge.107 
The Creeks retaliated on December 25 when they attacked White and Sherrill’s 
homesteads and “murdered White and all his family.”108 Approximately The war party 
returned on January 14 and killed William Sherrill, his wife and daughter, two slaves, and 
“four more whites.” Sherrill had two sons who “defended themselves bravely” for “six 
hours.” The Sherrill sons killed at least one or two of their Indian attackers, which 
prompted the war party to abandon the scene.109 The colony of Georgia quickly 
responded and deployed a “militia of twenty-five men and ten rangers” to the White-
Sherrill residences. Ambushed only two or three miles from the Sherrill and White 
residences by a party of approximately sixty Creeks, three militia men were killed. 
Lieutenant David Grant was reported to not only have been gravely wounded but also 
tortured: “his mangled body was found tied to a tree, his scalp and ears cut off, a gun 
barrel thrust into his body supposed to have been red hot, twelve arrows sticking in his 
                                                 
107 David Taitt to John Stuart, 1/22/1774, Little Tallassee, in CO5/75. 
108 John Stuart to Earl of Dartmouth, 2/13/1774, Charleston, DAR, 8: 48. 
109 John Stuart to Earl of Dartmouth, 2/13/1774, Charleston, DAR, 8:48 (four more whites); Stuart to 
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breast.”110 After the loss of their lieutenant, the militia retreated, as did Houmatchla, 
Ochlulkee and the rest of their party.111 
Governor James Wright of Georgia demanded immediate satisfaction for the 
White-Sherrill murders, but consult from Superintendent James Stuart and Commissary 
David Taitt convinced him to consider a more effective option; suspension of the Anglo-
Creek trade. “Had only two or three people been killed it might be very proper to demand 
satisfaction here,” Taitt replied to Stuart, “but as there is so many and committed by 47 
Creeks; it is what they will never give us.” Taitt argued that even if he were to “call a 
general meeting of all the headmen it would immediately cause these villains to murder 
every trader here.” The situation was entirely too volatile to consider the execution of all 
responsible for the White-Sherrill killings.112 Governor Wright did not need to consider 
Stuart and Taitt’s advice for long. On January 31, 1774 Wright solicited the Royal 
Governors of South Carolina and both East and West Florida to join and cut off all trade 
to the Lower and Upper Creeks. Although Wright himself did not take any immediate 
action, East Florida placed an embargo on trade with the Creeks by early February.113 
The first Creek headman to respond to the Gulf Coast trade embargo was 
Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee. Supplies of guns, gun powder, and bullets were all 
necessary if the Creeks were to continue their war with the Choctaws and redirect 
violence towards the Choctaws rather than the British settlers. Most important to 
                                                 
110 John Stuart to Earl of Dartmouth, 2/13/1774, Charleston, in DAR, 8:48 
111 It is unclear whether or not the Lieutenant died immediately or survived after been tortured due to 
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112 Taitt to Stuart, 2/25/1774, Usitchie Lower Creeks, C05/75. 
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176 
 
Emistisiguo was that his town of Little Tallassee needed Gulf Coast trade to maintain 
their new position as the Upper Creek center of Anglo-Creek trade. Determined to not 
only to remove the East Florida trade embargo but prevent the rest of the British 
provinces from taking any further action, Emistisiguo orchestrated a meeting with British 
Superintendent Stuart at Little Tallassee on February 4, 1774.114 
Emistisiguo began the meeting by announcing that he was going “to talk a great 
talk” on behalf of all the “Abekas, Tallipooses, and Aliabamas at the Little Tallassies.”115 
The emphasis placed on the talk being “great” an indication that Emistisiguo placed an 
“unusual importance” on the restoration of Anglo-Creek trade.116 Emistisiguo utilized the 
recent unrest due to the White-Sherrill murders to advance his agenda to get British 
traders to abandon the “Great Old Path” for the new “Southern Path,” based out of 
Pensacola and Mobile. “The Traders are always complaining of losing their Horses Bells 
etc. and it is as if they had their Enemies Country to bring their Pack horses through,” 
Emistisiguo explained to Stuart. “If they have a mind to Carry on the Trade from Augusta 
they may, but they are white people enough to send us goods from Pensacola and Mobile 
which are the safest Paths.”117 Emistisiguo then presented Stuart with “white clay,” which 
he used as a symbolic metaphor to remind Stuart that Little Tallassee that was not 
responsible for the recent breach in British-Creek relations: “This white Clay is the Same 
                                                 
114 Upper Creek “Great Talk” to Superintendent Stuart, Seeking Georgia- Lower Creek Reconciliation, 
GFT, 136. 
115 Upper Creek “Great Talk” to Superintendent Stuart, Seeking Georgia- Lower Creek Reconciliation, 
GFT, 136. 
116 John T. Juricek notes in his chapter “Crumbling Controls,” 191 in Endgame for Empire that “a great 
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117 Emistisiguo to Superintendent Stuart, Proposing Redirection of Upper Creek Trade Toward Pensacola 
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as our Square, there is nothing black upon it. It is not bloody.”118 Emistisiguo assured 
Stuart that he would “try everything in my power to put a stop to the mischief,” and he 
hoped that Stuart would also “try to put a stop to the difference between the People of 
Georgia and the Cowetas before the Talks become too great.”119 Instead of stopping 
Anglo-Creek trade, Emistisiguo tried to redirect it. Confident in his proposal, Emistisiguo 
ended his talk with no further mention of the White-Sherrill murders. His final words 
were only of future trade with the Gulf Coast: “When a path is newly made it does not at 
once become a great path. I hope when everything is made straight again that the 
Governor of Pensacola and the Deputy Superintendent Mobile will hear this talk.”120 
Unfortunately for Emistisiguo, British officials had no intention of discussing any 
matters of trade until justice was achieved for the White-Sherrill murders. Superintendent 
Stuart and Governor Wright went around Emistisiguo and attempted to negotiate with 
Coweta and Okfuskee, the two towns responsible for the recent killings. The principal 
headman of Coweta, Escotchaby (The Young Lieutenant) was not open to negotiation. 
On the February 22, 1774 the Georgia Gazette reported that Escotchaby had Mad Turkey 
of Okfuskee deliver a message to George Galphin which summarized Escotchaby and the 
town of Coweta’s sentiments on the British official’s demands of satisfaction. 
Escotchaby’s nephew had been killed by a white man during the incident, and according 
to Mad Turkey, “this loss grieved him very much, and therefore he sent out his people 
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twice to take satisfaction.” After Escotchaby obtained blood revenge, Mad Turkey 
explained to Galphin that he had no plans to cooperate with Governor Wright or Stuart’s 
demands. Escotchaby’s final words on the subject were as follows, “the white people 
would put up with their losses” and they “had people plenty.”121 
Okfuskee, Ochullkee’s home town, did not get a chance to negotiate. Mad 
Turkey, Escotchaby’s envoy and notable Okfuskee warrior, was killed by a blacksmith 
named Thomas Fee in Augusta, Georgia in late March 1774. In early April, Fee and a 
group of other white settlers got Mad Turkey drunk and then used an iron bar to “beat his 
brains out.”122 Although Fee was arrested and jailed for the crime, a mob that was 
“encouraged and head by some magistrates and militia officers,” broke him out of jail 
and he “made his escape” to Carolina.123 Governor Wright offered a reward of one 
hundred pounds sterling silver for Fee’s capture, which the Governor of South Carolina 
purportedly doubled, but Fee was never found.124 Mad Turkey’s death combined with the 
mob action taken by whites to protect his killer only amplified tension between the 
Creeks and Georgia settlers. Not only did the town of Okfuskee refuse to provide 
satisfaction for the White-Sherrill murders, it appeared as if both the Upper and Lower 
Creeks were on the verge of waging war on two fronts; one with the Choctaws and the 
other with their southern British neighbors. Governor Wright’s reaction to the recent 
violence confirmed the gravity of the situation: “If you make Warr with us in Georgia, It 
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is the same as making WARR with the GREAT KING. And what are you to get by a 
WARR? The Trade with you will be stopped, from all parts.”125 
To prevent war and restore Anglo-Creek trade, a small party of Creeks “headed 
by Emistisiguo” attended a conference orchestrated by Governor Wright at Savannah on 
April 14, 1774.126 According to Superintendent Stuart, it was his and the Governor’s idea 
to recruit Emistisiguo to convince the Coweta and Okfuskee headmen to provide the 
“satisfaction” of the White-Sherrill murders that they themselves had failed to achieve. 
“Mr. Taitt who resided as an agent in the Upper Creeks behaved with much prudence and 
firmness. As soon as he had received my Letters, he convened the Chiefs and proposed 
their coming to Savannah,” Stuart explained to General Thomas Gage in a letter he wrote 
describing the meeting a month later. Among these chiefs, Stuart continued, “Emistisiguo 
was to have conferred with us and to have stipulated the Nature and extent of the 
satisfaction that would be required.”127 
Although Wright and Stuart had looked to recruit Emistisiguo to mediate what 
had grown into a very tense situation, Emistisiguo’s decision to parlay with Wright at 
Savannah was entirely of his own accord. In fact, not even a month after the White-
Sherrill murders were committed, Little Tallassee’s Second Man (Neothlucco) was 
reported to have “sent out for Emistisiguo to come immediately” in order to “consult 
together and settle Affairs with Sempoyaffe,” both of whom were away at war with the 
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Choctaws at the time.128 On March 9, Wright heard news that Sempoyaffi had returned to 
Coweta and after hearing the news was immediately “gone to the Tallasses,” where 
Wright “was to set out the next morning to talk with Emistisiguo & the Second Man.”129 
Given Emistisiguo’s commitment to maintain peaceful and profitable trade relations with 
the British, the Gulf Coast in particular, there is little reason to doubt that Emistisiguo 
had made his own plans to mediate the White-Sherrill murders. In the past, Emistisiguo 
had done his best to provide the British with the satisfaction they desired for the Payne-
Hogg and Goodwin-Davies murders in order to protect Little Tallassee’s interests 
regarding Anglo-Creek trade. Almost a decade later, Emistisiguo’s diplomacy remained 
the same: to cooperate with British laws of justice in exchange for trade. 
During the April conference at Savannah, Emistisiguo’s priority was to prevent Governor 
Wright from placing an embargo on Anglo-Creek trade and to convince East Florida to 
rescind the block they had already placed.130 To achieve this goal, Emistisiguo first made 
it a point to clarify that the White-Sherrill murders were not a random act of violence, but 
a product of Britain’s failure to regulate Anglo-Creek trade. “Formerly the Trade was 
                                                 
128 Taitt to Stuart, 1/22/1774, CO5/75 (quote). The most important advisor to the leading headman of a 
Creek town was a “Henihalgi” whom the Europeans referred to as the Second Man. The duties of a Second 
Man were to carry out all orders from “the mouth of the chief” to the townspeople. The Second Man was 
also known as the town administrator and oversaw the building of public works and communal fields. 
Neothlucco of Little Tallassee was the most notable amongst the Creeks during the 1760s and 1770s. For 
more information on the duties of the Second Man, see Kathyrn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 
21. Henihalgi is based on the Creek root word, henehv, which translates to “second in command.” See, Jack 
B. Martin and Margaret McKane Mauldin, A Dictionary of Creek/Muskogee (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2000), 49 and 306. On Neothlucco’s identity, see John Stuart to Emistisiguo and 
“Neothlucco” (the Second Man), July 1774, enclosure 8 of Stuart to Earl of Dartmouth (?), 8/2/1774, 
CO5/75. 
129 Wright to Stuart, 3/9/1774, Savannah, CO5/75. Historian John T. Juricek 
130Governor Wright’s Meeting with a Small Creek Party Headed by Emistisiguo, 4/14/1774, Savannah, 
GFT, 141-143. Emistisiguo made it clear that “He hoped the Trade would not be Quite Stop’t” upon his 
arrival at the Conference in Savannah. 
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Carried on by a few People in their Principal Towns, but now great Numbers of Traders 
are Amongst Them from All Parts and Trade about in the Woods and Hunting grounds, 
and in the villages and wherever they can find a Single House,” Emistisiguo explained to 
Wright and Superintendent Stuart. “Many Unruly Bad White People are Amongst them 
and Carry great Quantities of Rum,” Emistisiguo continued, “and that by this Means the 
Young People become Unruly, and will not be Governed by their head men as Usual.” In 
addition, Emistisiguo reminded them that British were equally to blame for the violence, 
for they “could not Govern their own Men who are very disorderly and do bad things as 
well.”131 Mad Turkey’s murder and the violent Georgia mob that aided his killer to 
escape bolstered Emistisiguo’s claim: “the confusion in the Trade have been the Cause 
and Foundation of all Evils.”132 
Emistisiguo’s argument in the Creek’s defense could not have been more 
accurate. Houmatchka of Coweta, Oktulki of Okfuskee, and the rest of their party did not 
set out to murder white settlers, but a fellow Indian rumored to be practicing “witchcraft.” 
It was only when the party mistook White’s horses to belong to their intended target that 
violence erupted.133 The White-Sherrill murders were committed in an out settlement 
known as Pucknawheatly, an illicit trade venue located along the Ocmulgee River half 
way between Augusta and the Creek town of Coweta.134 Business conducted at 
                                                 
131 Governor Wright’s Meeting with a Small Creek Party Headed by Emistisiguo, 4/14/1774, Savannah, 
GFT, 141-143. 
132 Governor Wright’s Meeting with a Small Creek Party Headed by Emistisiguo, 4/14/1774, Savannah, 
GFT,141-143. 
133 David Taitt to John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 1/22/1774, CO5/75. 
134 Pucknawheatly was more commonly known by the English as “The Standing Peach Tree.” See, Stuart to 
Haldimand, 2/3/1774, DAR, 8:35. 
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Pucknawheatly was supervised by an unauthorized trader employed by George Galphin, 
who happened to own several of the illegal trade stores that Emistisiguo himself had 
raided with the Crown’s permission at Buzzard Roost in 1768. In addition, Gaphin was 
based in Augusta, giving more reason for the Little Tallassee Headman to oppose him. 
Rumor had it that George Galphin had supported the White-Sherrill murders, the 
South Carolina Gazette having reported the following in regard to his character and 
activity: “he is said to have encouraged those Indians who committed the late Murders, to 
settle at the Place called the Standing Peach Tree, and to carry on an advantageous Trade 
[with him] in their Hunting Grounds.”135 Galphin’s letter to Escotchaby written shortly 
after White and Sherrill’s deaths supported the Gazette’s claim, the content strictly 
pertaining to Galphin’s desire to convince Governor Wright that the incident was isolated 
and his eagerness to return to business as usual. “I told everyone not to be afraid,” 
Galphin wrote Escotchaby, “that it was only a parcel of Young mad men about 17 that 
had done all the damage that was done, and that the Headmen and Beloved Men knew 
nothing about it.” Galphin also added that he asked the remaining settlers “not to leave 
their houses and all would be made well again,” and assured Escotchaby that he was 
doing “all that is in my power to keep peace here with your People and the white 
people.”136 
                                                 
135 South Carolina Gazette, 2/4/1774 in Juricek’s, Endgame for Empire, 293, note 3. 
136 George Galphin to Escotchaby of Coweta, ca. February 1774, GFT, 138. 
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The White-Sherrill murders were not only a product of British authorities’ inability to 
regulate Anglo-Creek trade, but their short comings in providing a remedy to 
longstanding grievances within that trade. 
 It was not surprising that the owner of several of the illegal trade stores 
Emistisiguo had raided at Buzzard Roost was George Galphin. Neither was the fact that 
Galphin offered asylum to the Indians who were responsible for the White-Sherill 
murders. Galphin was an independent and wealthy Irish deerskin trader who resided in 
Creek Country during the middle to late eighteenth century. Galphin championed 
independent agents over the centralized authority model that British Superintendent John 
Stuart promoted that placed regional stability over individualized returns.137 Similar to 
Stuart, Galphin was held in high esteem by many Creeks, specifically the Lower Creek 
town of Coweta, and he often acted as their diplomatic liaison to British authorities. 
Galphin’s main residence was Silver Bluff, a large brick home with a warehouse for 
storage of Indian trade goods, just a few miles south of Augusta, Georgia and along the 
South Carolina River.138 In all probability Galphin lobbied on behalf of Escotchaby not 
only to keep the peace between Lower Creeks, angry British officials, and backcountry 
settlers, but to ensure that his independent trade ventures carried on without further 
interruption.139 
                                                 
137 Michael P. Morris, George Galphin and the Transformation of the Georgia-South Carolina Backcountry 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 1-2. Morris described Galphin’s “for profit” economic mentality 
as “thinly disguised capitalism.” 
138 Michael P. Morris, George Galphin, 26. 
139 Michael P. Morris, George Galphin, 33 (on Coweta diplomatic liaison) and 45 (Escotchaby). 
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 Emistisiguo’s fears of a complete breach in Anglo-Creek trade were realized only 
a few days after he left Savannah. West Florida Governor Wright joined East Florida and 
placed an embargo on “all trade and intercourse whatever with any of the said Creek 
Indians” until satisfaction was given for the White-Sherrill murders.140 Within only two 
weeks the provinces of South Carolina and West Florida followed Governor Wright’s 
lead and severed all trading ties with the both the Upper and Lower Creeks. Although 
“Stopping the Trade” might have been a “Bold or in some Degree Rash decision,” it was 
“the only Effectual means we had in our power to bring them to do us Justice,” Wright 
wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth a few months after the decision was made.141 In late April 
1774, the Creeks were still at war with the Choctaws and in desperate need of 
ammunition. In addition, Creek women felt the loss of trade as men spent their hunting 
seasons at war instead of scouting deer. According to Wright, “The fact that the trade 
could be stop’t,” was a reality the Creeks needed to face if the British were to not only 
secure satisfaction for the White-Sherrill murders, but put a stop to the “destruction” and 
“violence” in the Georgia province.142 
 Once news arrived at Little Tallassee that all four British provinces in the deep 
south had placed an embargo on Creek trade, Emistisiguo and Neothlucco immediately 
organized another meeting to address the matter. The conference took place either on 
May 23 or 24 at Little Tallassee.143 The correspondence surrounding the meeting 
                                                 
140 Juricek, Endgame for Empire, 196. 
141 Governor Wright to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State, 10/24/1773, Savannah, GFT, 156. 
142 Governor Wright to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State, 10/24/1773, Savannah, GFT, 156-157. 
143 Historian John T. Juricek argues that the May 23 and 24 meeting of 1774 took place at Great Tallassee, 
not Little Tallassee. His argument for this location is based upon the fact that the single document that 
summarizes the events of the meeting was dated to be at “the Tallassies” which Juricek equates to be 
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recorded that “Head Men from 26 Towns” were in attendance, and “three headmen from 
every town were desired to attend on that day.”144 Although the names of the exact towns 
and particular headmen that convened at Little Tallassee that May are not known, 
documentary and circumstantial evidence indicates that both the Lower and Upper Creek 
towns were in attendance and therefore made the meeting a matter of National 
importance. David Taitt’s letter to Stuart on the matter supports this conclusion: 
“Emistisiguo had appointed a meeting of the Chiefs of the Upper and Lower Creeks at 
the Tallassies of last month,” and “by the same advice his excellency is acquainted that 
the Nation in general seems inclined to give satisfaction.”145 Reports that the Seminoles 
                                                 
“presumably great Tallassee.” Wright to Stuart, June 13, 1774, GFT, 145 (the Tallassies); Juricek, 
Endgame for Empire, 192. Based upon historical context as well as plentiful documentation that 
Emistisiguo organized the meeting, I argue that the May conference of 1774 took place at Little Tallassee, 
not Great Tallassee. All evidence indicated that Emistisiguo organized the May 23 and 24 meetings. “‘I 
received a letter said to have been wrote by Direction of Emistisiguo to the Second Man dated at Little 
Tallassee the 26 of May’ wherein they acquaint me on their return they Summoned Three Headmen from 
every Town to meet and Consult.” Wright to Stuart, June 13 1774, GFT, 145. This is not surprising for 
Emistisiguo had been planning and rallying the Lower and Upper Creeks to attend the conference to get the 
British to retract their threat of a trade embargo and put aside clan revenge to protect trade as early as 
January of 1772. For a discussion on Emistisiguo’s actions between 1772 to 1774, see Juricek’s own 
account in Endgame for Empire, 163-201, especially 168-174, 190- 200, and 201. There is also evidence 
that “the Tallassies” was just a short form for Little Tallassee and its surrounding towns. For example, 
British commissioner David Taitt (later Stuart’s replacement as Superintendent) resided at Little Tallassee 
on the 22 and 23 of January 1774. Taitt appeared to be at Little Tallassee on January 3 1774, but that 
document states "Tallassies" to be his location whereas he is clearly at “Little Tallassee” in late January. 
For a closer reading on these documents, see Taitt to Stuart during the month of January in CO5/75. Lastly, 
if one places the May 23 and 24 meetings in historical context, Little Tallassee would have been the 
selected Upper Creek town, not Great Tallassee. By 1774, Little Tallassee had supplanted Tuckabatchee 
and Okchai as the center of diplomacy for the Upper Creeks. I argue that the meeting took place at Little 
Tallassee, due to the amount of evidence and historical context. Great Tallassee or Big Tallassee was not 
active in diplomacy during this time. 
144 Governor James Wright to J. Stuart, 6/13/1774, Savannah, in Vol. 121, TGP. The actual date of the 
meeting was either the 23 or 24 of May. Wright wrote his account based on a letter he received from an 
interpreter by the name of Murneac. Murneac wrote the letter “by the direction of Emistisiguo and the 
Second Man, dated at the Little Tallassies May 20.” For more on this topic, see Juricek’s note in GFT, Vol. 
12, 521n12. See also, David Taitt to Stuart, 6/3/1774, Savannah, Vol. 121, TGP (“three headmen from 
every town were desired to attend). 
145 David Taitt to Stuart, 6/3/1774, Savannah, in TGP, Vol. 121. 
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might also have been in attendance had even surfaced by June of 1774.146 Eighteenth-
century botanist and traveler William Bartram summarized the affair during his Georgia 
travels as follows: “the whole Creek confederacy were assembling at one of their 
principle towns . . . determined to oblige the Cowetas who were the aggressors to give up 
the Murderers.”147 
 William Bartram’s comment only captured a portion of the magnitude of the 
diplomacy that took shape during the meeting organized by Emistisiguo in late May 1774 
at Little Tallassee. For the first time in Creek history the Lower and Creek towns united 
as one Nation for a common cause; the preservation of Creek trade.148 This major 
decision made by all twenty-six headmen after consultation with Emistisiguo, that 
“satisfaction should be given” in order to restore that trade was also extraordinary.149 
Prior to the meeting, Emistisiguo had been one of very few headmen to put aside Creek 
traditions of blood revenge and execute fellow Creeks to protect Anglo-Creek trade. The 
execution of Oktullkee in the Lower town of Hitchitaw after the meeting in May, proved 
that other headmen, particularly the Lower Creeks, were inclined to do the same.150 No 
European was present at the May meeting, except the interpreter Emistisiguo had 
                                                 
146 Wright to Stuart, 6/13/1774, Savannah, GFT, 146. 
147 William Bartram, Travels and other Writings (New York, Library of America, 1996),150. 
148 I am indebted to John T. Juricek’s insight into “national” aspect of this conference. Endgame for 
Empire, 197-198. 
149 Governor Wright to Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Creek Promise of Satisfaction, 6/13/1774, in GFT, 
Vol. 12, 145; Haldimand to Gage, 7/14/1774, in TGP, Vol. 121. 
150 Stuart to Emistisiguo Warrior of the Little Tallassies and Neaolthucko Second Man, July 1774, in Stuart 
to Dartmouth, 8/2/1774, CO5/75. The identity of who executed Oktullee is not known, but Stuart reported 
that it was “with the consent of the chiefs of the 26 towns” that he had been put to death. A second 
document provides evidence that Pumpkin King might have expedited the execution. For this account, see 
also, Lower Creek Headmen to Governor Wright and Superintendent Stuart, Reporting Two Executions, 
6/23/1774, Hitchitee, GFT, 147. 
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requested to record the gathering’s proceedings. His attendance highlighted another 
significant detail about the conference at Little Tallassee; it may have been one of the 
first meetings to take place between both the Upper and Lower Creeks without European 
involvement.151 To that end, under the direction of Emistisiguo, all Creeks worked 
together to provide the satisfaction the British requested and restore trade by whatever 
means necessary. 
 Emistisiguo’s diplomacy produced results. By October of 1774, the Upper and 
Lower Creeks met Governor Wright at Savannah and signed a peace treaty. 
Approximately 150 Indians were reported to have been in attendance, the most notable to 
have signed the treaty being Emistisiguo, The Second Man, and Sempoyaffii of 
Coweta.152 Emistisiguo and Neothlucco had agreed prior to the October engagement that 
the Creeks would give “moderate satisfaction” in exchange for the British to lift the trade 
embargo.153 Their agreement stipulated that “five of the leaders or chiefs of the Indians 
who were concerned in the said Murders” were to be “put to death,” along with the return 
of “the white People’s horses and cattle” that were stolen by the “Indians aforesaid.”154 
The execution of these five Creeks was based upon the grounds that the White-Sherrill 
murders were a “direct breach” of the Treaty of Augusta of 1763 and “all other treaties 
                                                 
151 Steven Hahn argues in his book, The Invention of the Creek Nation that Creek social convergence was a 
form of political consolidation. More specifically, Creek Nationhood was a “function of politics.” (244). 
Hahn provides several examples of Lower and Upper Creek towns aligning together for common causes in 
the face of change throughout the eighteenth century but does not mention any meeting/conference where a 
representative of all Creek towns were present and assembled without a European third party. It is safe to 
say that Emistisiguo’s may conference is the first solely Creek organized meeting on a national scale. 
152 Emistisiguo signed the treaty first; a symbol of his role in negotiating the peace made that day. For the 
full list, see Treaty with the Upper and Lower Creeks at Savannah, 10/20/1774, GFT, 156-157. 
153 Endorsed Talks from the Superintendent to Emistisiguo, Warrior of the Little Tallassies and to 
Neothuocko, second Man, 9/15/1774, CO5/75. 
154 Treaty with the Upper and Lower Creeks at Savannah, 10/20/1774, GFT, 153. 
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subsisting between the Great King and his subjects, and the said Creek Indians.” The 
breach being that 
 
in all cases and upon all occasions, Full and ample Justice should be done to each 
other . . . that if any Indian or Indians whatever should hereafter murder or kill a 
white man, the offender or Offenders should without and [any] delay, excuse or 
Pretense whatever be Immediately put to Death.155 
 
At the time of the treaty, the Creeks had already carried out three out of the five 
executions, and all headmen in attendance pledged to carry out judgment against the 
remaining two perpetrators.156 In return, the British agreed to restore Creek trade: “The 
Trade shall be Opened to the Several Towns, of the said Upper and Lower Creeks.”157 
Together, the Upper and Lower Creeks, carried out Emistisiguo’s diplomacy of 
“satisfaction for trade,” and British-Creek trade relations repaired. 
Reconciliation: The End of the Choctaw-Creek War  
Although the British promised to lift the embargo on all Creek trade at the Treaty 
of Savannah in October 1774, merchants and traders from all four provinces were slow to 
arm a Nation they saw as potential enemies. “Having received no Supplies for ten 
months” by Autumn 1775, Neothlucco (Second Man of Little Tallassee) pleaded to 
                                                 
155 Treaty with the Upper and Lower Creeks at Savannah, 10/20/1774, GFT, 153-154. The same stipulation 
applied to the murder of any Indian: “That if any White man should Kill or Murder an Indian He should be 
Tried for the Offence in the same manner, as if he had Murdered a white man, and if found Guilty should 
be Executed Accordingly.” 
156 Treaty with the Upper and Lower Creeks at Savannah, 10/20/1774, GFT, 154; John Stuart to Dartmouth, 
7/21/1775, St. Augustine, C05/76. Two Indians by the name of “Howmahta and Sophia” were said to have 
escaped but would be executed when found. 
157 Treaty with the Upper and Lower Creeks at Savannah, 10/20/1774, GFT, 155. 
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Superintendent Stuart to assist in a peace negotiation to end the Creek’s ten-year war with 
the Choctaws.158 Neothlucco stated, 
 
We in this part of the nation are made very poor by long war not being able to 
hunt, to feed and clothe our women and children as we used to do. I therefore 
hope that you will take pity on your friends and endeavor to get a peace made for 
us and as soon as I see your answer I will speak to our headmen about it.159 
 
Little Tallassee and its surrounding Upper Creek towns were still in the thick of the war, 
while the Lower Towns continued to focus much of their energy towards their Georgian 
neighbors. “They are heartily tired of war as the burden lays upon the frontier towns in 
the upper Creeks,” David Taitt described in a letter to Superintendent Stuart from his 
residency at Little Tallassee. 
 
Lately the Flats [Choctaws] came into Puecantallyhousie, and killed a woman 
while the men were dancing in the Square and a few days ago a party came within 
three miles of the Coosada town and painted themselves in order to proceed but 
on hearing the drum beat for black drink they returned leaving their war tokens 
behind.160  
 
Emistisiguo’s previous peace overtures were not in vain. Peace between the Creeks and 
the Choctaws was now a necessity for the Upper Towns; so much so that Little Tallassee 
was inclined to ask the British to involve themselves in an inter-tribal affair. 
                                                 
158 Governor Wright to the Earl of Dartmouth, 10/24/1774, Savannah, GFT, 156-157. Trade was stopped in 
April of 1774 and promised to be restored in October of 1774. Yet, Wright states that the Creek’s went 
without trade for “ten months” and the poor the Creeks were in by October of 1775 proves that trade 
relations were not restored to the Creek’s as quickly as promised. 
159 A Talk from the Second Man of Little Tallassee, 10/20/1775, in Stuart to unknown, 1/6/1776, CO5/77. 
160 David Taitt to J. Stuart, 10/20/1775, Little Tallassee, CO5/77. “Flats” was a term used to describe the 
Choctaws. 
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Neothlucco’s request on behalf of Emistisiguo for British assistance was 
welcomed. In fact, one year prior to the request, British General Thomas Gage had 
instructed Superintendent Stuart to promote peace among all the Indians of the Southeast 
in order to secure allies for a war against the American colonies, which by late 1775 
appeared to be inevitable. By October 1776 Stuart therefore not only insisted that he act 
as a mediator between both parties but organized a peace conference to take place in 
Pensacola between the Creek and Choctaw Nations.161 Neothlucco and Emistisiguo 
embraced Stuart. To put an end to war, the use of a neutral third party was required by 
traditional Creek and Southeastern Indian diplomacy.162 
The Upper Creek headmen met delegates from both the Eastern and Western 
division of the Choctaw Nation that October and a peace was finally both concluded and 
ratified.163 The individual headmen who attended the conference are not noted, but it is 
likely that either Emistisiguo or Neothlucco were present (Emistisiguo the former 
diplomatic liaison between the two parties and Neothlucco’s recent request for peace).164 
During the conference, each party carried a “white flag as an emblem of peace and were 
highly painted.” They also sang songs while “waving eagles’ tails and swans’ wings over 
their heads,” all gestures of peace and friendship. Stuart reported that “at least both 
parties met” and “after saluting each other joined hands” in his presence. The headmen 
then entered his house and “delivered” into Stuart’s hands “two war clubs painted red as 
                                                 
161 Greg O’Brien, “Protecting Trade Through War,” in Pre-Choctaw Removal, ed. O’Brien, 113. 
162 Greg O’Brien, “Protecting Trade Through War,” in Pre-Choctaw Removal, ed. O’Brien, 111. 
163 John Stuart to Lord George Germain, 10/26/1776, DAR, 12:239-40. 
164 Stuart also stated, “for ten days past I have had the chiefs of the Upper Creek nation with me.” John 
Stuart to Lord George Germain, 10/26/1776, DAR, 12: 239-40. 
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the last ceremony of laying down arms,” which he then “promised to bury very deep into 
the earth.”165 At long last, both the Choctaw and Creek headmen were at peace with one 
another. 
To ensure that friendly relations continued, a party of Choctaws led by renowned 
warriors Franchimastabe and Taboca journeyed to Little Tallassee in August of the 
following year.166 Once the Choctaw delegates arrived, it was revealed that Handsome 
fellow of Okfuskee and a few other “rebel” Creeks had continued to violate the peace 
made at Pensacola. To remedy this fracture in Creek-Choctaw relations, the delegates 
requested that Creeks had “go and visit the Choctaws that no doubt or supposition might 
remain on the minds of the young people of either nation” and that the “professions of 
friendship” promised at Pensacola were “sincere” and thus not to be broken.167 
Franchimastabe and Taboca also pledged to assist the Creek’s in their continued conflicts 
with Georgia and encroaching American settlers. Although the headmen controlled the 
peace proceedings, British officials were present as a neutral third party. The conference 
ended with the British bestowment of gifts, which included guns, ammunition, and other 
coveted European manufactured goods to the leading Creek and Choctaw headman 
present at Little Tallassee. 
                                                 
165 John Stuart to Lord George Germain, 10/26/1776, DAR, 12: 239-40. 
166 Emistisiguo reached out to Taboca during his first peace overture towards the Choctaw in Fall 1770, but 
that negotiation had failed due to ongoing violence between Choctaws and Lower Creeks at the time near 
Mobile. Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 21-22. (Taboca) Charles Stuart to the upper 
Creek Headmen, 12/12/1770, Mobile, GFT, 381. (Lower Creeks killed by Choctaw) 
167 Extract of a Letter from Mr. Taitt Deputy in the Creek Nation to the Superintendent, 8/3/1777, Little 
Tallassee, CO5/78. For more on this topic, Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 35-36. 
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These gifts and the promise of a steady supply of goods were clearly given by the 
British to secure Southeastern Indian allies as the American Revolution had just began. In 
addition, the gifts strengthened the authority of the leading headmen present. 
Emistisiguo’s leadership of the final peace overtures to the Choctaw Nation and his 
acquisition of trade goods bolstered his authority amongst the Upper and Lower Creeks. 
The conference between Choctaw delegates and Emistisiguo at Little Tallassee in 
October 1776 did not just bring about the end of a decade of violence but also helped to 
facilitate the redirection of Anglo-Creek trade back into the hands of the leading headmen 
within Creek society; Emistisiguo and the town of Little Tallassee in particular.168 
*** 
Between 1765 and 1776, Creek Country was a volatile place. Frontier hostilities 
between Creeks and their white Georgian and Alabama neighbors was at an all-time 
height, and Creek elders struggled to control violence carried out by restless Creek 
warriors. The outbreak of the Choctaw-Creek War, however, enabled headmen like 
Emistisiguo to redirect this violence away from their British trade partners and towards 
their long-standing Indian rivals. In addition, Emistisiguo temporarily cast aside the 
Creek tradition of blood revenge to placate British officials and lift the threat of an 
embargo on Anglo-Creek trade. Although this was a radical departure from Creek norms, 
Emistisiguo’s radical diplomacy was embraced by all Creek headmen during his meeting 
at Little Tallassee in 1774. Whether it was through intertribal warfare or revolutionary 
                                                 
168 Taboca and Franchismastabe returned to the Choctaw Nation with their reputations bolstered as well 
after the acquisition and promise of a steady trade with the British. Greg O’Brien, “Protecting Trade 
Through War”, in Pre-Choctaw Removal, ed. O’Brien, 113-114. 
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political maneuvers, Emistisiguo crafted a new type of diplomacy that successfully 
preserved Anglo-Creek trade out of the Gulf Coast during one of the most war-torn 
decades in Creek history. 
Emistisiguo utilized the framework of war to amplify the importance of Little 
Tallassee as well as bolster his own authority within both Creek and Anglo societies 
during the mid-eighteenth century. Not only was Emistisiguo appointed “leading 
headman and warrior of the Upper Creek Nations” by 1777, but he was also the elected 
diplomatic liaison and spokesperson on behalf of the Upper Creeks to conduct matters of 
peace and war when deemed necessary, whether it be the end of the Choctaw-Creek War 
or satisfaction for frontier violence.169 As a result, Little Tallassee remained the center of 
Anglo-Creek trade, but it was no longer a meeting ground for trade exchange alone. 
Under the leadership of Emistisiguo, Little Tallassee surpassed its neighboring towns of 
Okchai and Tuckabatchee in domestic and foreign affairs. On the eve of America’s war 
for Independence, Little Tallassee was a sacred space and town where Creeks decided 
questions of both peace, war, and diplomacy. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
169 Extract of a Letter from Mr. Taitt Deputy in the Creek Nation to the Superintendent, 8/3/1777, Little 
Tallassee, CO5/78. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
REVOLUTION 
1776-1783 
 
When the American Revolution erupted in July of 1776, the Creek Confederacy 
viewed the colonists’ declaration for independence as nothing more than a dispute 
between their longstanding British neighbors. Little Tallassee, along with the rest of the 
Upper and Lower Creek towns, wanted no part in a “white man’s war,” and immediately 
declared neutrality. The concept of neutrality was a precarious notion for a nation 
dependent on the continuous flow of manufactured trade goods. Throughout the war, the 
Americans and the British competed for Creek allegiance, trade their primary means of 
leverage. Although a few Creek towns chose to align themselves with the Americans, 
most of both Upper and lower Creek towns remained loyal to their longstanding British 
trade partners and fictive kin.1 
Little Tallassee, under the leadership of Emistisiguo, was the first of the towns to 
forgo neutrality and form an advantageous alliance with the British. As the Americans 
took control of Savannah, Charlestown, and Augusta by 1776, the British were forced to 
relocate to St. Augustine and conduct all trade negotiations with the Creeks out of Mobile 
and Pensacola. Emistisiguo had championed Gulf Coast Trade as far back as his 
historical debut in 1763 at the first Treaty of Augusta. The creation of a new southern 
                                                 
1 Okfuskee, Tallassee, and the Lower town of Cussita chose to align themselves with the Americans, and 
during and after the American Revolution remained at odds with the bulk of the Creek Nation. Details on 
this subject will be discussed throughout this chapter. 
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path towards Pensacola and Mobile made Little Tallassee the center of Creek-Anglo trade 
and had by default bolstered Emistisiguo’s reputation in both the Creek and outside 
world. 
The war time climate of the American Revolution marked the height of 
Emistisiguo’s career as a head warrior, headman, and spokesperson for both the Upper 
and Lower Creek towns and further solidified Little Tallassee’s place as the center of 
Creek diplomacy. Emistisiguo’s success in recruiting Creek allies to serve as scouts and 
warriors on behalf of the British demonstrated a mastery of the art of Creek persuasion. 
In addition, Emistisiguo’s ability to mobilize these warriors in such a prompt manner 
exemplified his ascendancy as a prominent leader of the Creek Confederacy by the 
middle of the 1770s. Even more noteworthy was Emistisiguo’s ability to recruit allies 
outside of the Upper and Lower Creek towns, among the Cherokees, Choctaws, and 
Chickasaws to protect British trade along the Gulf Coast. This Pan-Indian alliance 
ushered in a new era of diplomacy for the Creek Confederacy, and Emistisiguo of Little 
Tallassee was its pioneer. It is time that historians recognize this fact and see Little 
Tallassee’s role at forefront of Creek History. 
 The significance of Emistisiguo and Little Tallassee has yet to be explored by 
historians studying the Creek Indians during the American Revolution. Emistisiguo 
continued to act as the leading diplomatic liaison on behalf of the Upper Creeks, but 
instead of embracing intertribal war to preserve Anglo-Creek trade during the 
Revolutionary period, Emistisiguo fought against the Americans to protect his and all 
Creek interests along the Gulf Coast. The decisions Emistisiguo and the Upper Creeks 
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made regarding peace and war can be viewed as an extension of the innovative 
diplomacy Emistisiguo had crafted during the Choctaw-Creek War. Creek self-interest 
remained the focal point of this diplomacy, not loyalty to the British, Americans, or any 
European party. However, during this period, Emistisiguo’s diplomatic policies worked 
within both a national and international framework, and the town of Little Tallassee 
remained the central space where this diplomacy was conducted.  
Alexander McGillivray 
Alexander McGillivray, the “mixed-blood” leader and spokesperson of the Creek 
Nation in the late eighteenth century, has dominated Creek historiography for decades, 
the Revolutionary war period being no exception. McGillivray made his historical debut 
in 1777 when he came to Little Tallassee as an assistant commissary in the British Indian 
service, and quickly assumed a role as cultural broker and spokesperson for Creek 
Country.2 Historians such as Kathryn E. Holland Braund and Kathleen Duval argue 
Alexander McGillivray was responsible for the recruitment of Creek allies on behalf of 
the British to preserve Gulf Coast trade, and his military service was crucial in preserving 
                                                 
2 Michael Green stated, “Alexander McGillivray is probably the best-known Creek in the history of the 
Creek Confederacy.” See, Michael Green, “Alexander McGillivray,” in ed. David Edmunds, American 
Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), 41-42. For the best 
biographical summaries on Alexander McGillivray, see also: McGillivray of the Creeks, ed. John Walton 
Caughey (Columbia, SC: 2nd ed, 2007), 3-57; Linda Langley, “The Tribal Identity of Alexander 
McGillivray: a Review of the Historic and Ethnographic Data,” in Louisiana History: The Journal of the 
Louisiana Historical Association, Vol. 46 (Spring 2005), 231-239; J. H. O’Donnell, “Alexander 
McGillivray: Training for Leadership, 1777-1788,” in The Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. 49 (June 
1965), 172-186; Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the 
American Revolution (New York, NY: Random House Press, 2015), 24-35; Claudio Saunt, A New Order of 
Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-1816 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 67-89. 
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British Florida until Spanish forces seized control of Pensacola in 1783.3 Other scholars, 
such as Claudio Saunt and Steven Hahn contend that McGillivray fostered a sense of 
nationalism during and after the American Revolution, and credit McGillivray for being 
the first Creek leader to unite both the Upper and Lower towns. The concept of an actual 
“Creek Nation” was a supposedly foreign concept before Alexander McGillivray’s 
arrival.4  
 Although Alexander McGillivray began to assert himself among the Creeks 
during the Revolutionary War period, previous historians have failed to point out the fact 
that McGillivray’s twin strategies regarding trade and war were already established by his 
predecessor and contemporary Emistisiguo. Alexander McGillivray was born at Little 
Tallassee in December 1750 and resided there until he was six years of age. He relocated 
to Augusta and later Charlestown to receive a formal British education and 
apprenticeship within his Scottish father’s (Lachlan McGillivray) prominent fur and skin 
trade business.5 When McGillivray returned to Little Tallassee in 1777, besides being a 
member of the Wind clan by his matrilineal birthright, he was unfamiliar with Creek 
tradition, barely spoke or understood the Muskhogean language, and had no experience in 
hunting or war.6 McGillivray was only one quarter Creek, his mother Sehoy being the 
                                                 
3 Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-
1815 (1993; repr., Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 164-175; Kathleen DuVal, 
Independence Lost, 24-35 and 135-188. 
4 Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 38-63, 67-135; Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-
1763 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004) 110-120, 274-275. 
5 The classic biography on McGillivray by John Walton Caughey states that Alexander McGillivray was 
fourteen when he left Little Tallassee, but recent scholarship has now come to the consensus that he was 
only six years of age at the time. For Caughey’s argument, see McGillivray of the Creeks, 15-16. For recent 
scholarship, see also Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 29; Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 83-84. 
6 There have been up to fifty distinct clans in Creek history, but out of those seven to ten clans were more 
prominent than others. The Wind clan, for example, was one of these prestigious clans that was known for 
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daughter of a French Captain named Marchland.7 In both appearance and behavior, 
Alexander was a stranger to his home town and the people of Little Tallassee, but he was 
still recognized as Creek.  
McGillivray’s literacy and command of the English language as well as his 
knowledge of European trade and economics were assets in Creek society. Emistisiguo, 
headman and warrior of Little Tallassee, how important those abilities were to the 
Creeks. It was under his guidance that Alexander McGillivray acquired the skills needed 
to gain acceptance and respect from traditional Creek society. Emistisiguo proved to be 
an excellent mentor. By the the end of the Revolutionary War period, Creeks began to 
call McGillivray Isti atcagi thulucco or Great Beloved Man.8 Alexander was never a 
Creek headmen or warrior, but with the aid of Emistisiguo he did earn a place within 
Creek Society as a respected leader, spokesperson, and representative of both Little 
Tallassee and the Creek Confederacy. McGillivray proved to be an adept student and 
clever individual, but his policies regarding war, trade, and even “nation” building were 
not innovative. Emistisiguo was the engineer of Creek diplomacy during the late 
eighteenth century. McGillivray merely followed the blueprint his mentor left behind. 
                                                 
containing the highest ranking officials and leadership roles within Creek society and the National Council. 
McGillivray’s Uncle, Red Shoes, was one of these high ranking Creek leaders, specifically in civil 
(domestic) affairs. Michael D. Green, “Alexander McGillivray,” in American Indian Leaders: Studies for 
Diversity, ed. R. David Edmund (Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 1980), 42. For more 
information on Alexander McGillivray’s need for an interpreter, see Linda Langley, “Tribal Identity of 
Alexander McGillivray,” 236; Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 83-84. 
7 Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader, 72-73; John Walton Caughey, “Lachlan and 
Sehoy,” in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 9-13. See also, Albert James Pickett, History of Alabama 
and Incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi from the Earliest Period. 1851. (Repr. Birmingham, AL: 
Birmingham Book and Magazine Co., 1962), 343-33; Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 28. 
8 Michael Green, “Alexander McGillivray,” 42-43; Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 77. 
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Often, the physical space in which war is conducted is of equal importance to the 
individuals who set historic diplomatic measures in motion. Little Tallassee was more 
than the home of Emistisiguo and Alexander McGillivray during the Revolutionary War 
period; it was an established meeting ground for both the Upper and Lower Creeks, as 
well as many of their Southeastern Indian neighbors. Headmen, warriors, and beloved 
men gathered in Little Tallassee’s town square to deliberate questions regarding war and 
peace, as well as who to trade with and for how long.9 In fact, it was during a meeting at 
Little Tallassee that Emistisiguo first rallied the Creeks to raise the war hatchet against 
the Americans, and later agreed to lay that hatchet down. Little Tallassee was more than 
the home of these two notable Creeks; it was the geographical location where Creek 
diplomacy was formulated during the Revolutionary War period. 
Disruptions in Creek Country 
 
 In August 1775, British Superintendent John Stuart informed the Creeks that there 
was “an unhappy Dispute between the People of England and the white People of 
America.” The dispute, better known as the American Revolution, forced Stuart and other 
British loyalists to abandon their homes and trading posts in Charlestown, Savannah, and 
Augusta to relocate to East Florida. Despite these events, Stuart assured the Creeks that 
trade necessities would continue to flow between the two parties. The only change 
required on behalf of the Creeks was that they officially commit to trade out of East 
                                                 
9 For evidence that there was indeed, a town square, see “Great Talk” to Superintendent Stuart, Seeking 
Georgia-Lower Creek Reconciliation, 2/4/1774, Little Tallassee, in Georgia Treaties, 1733-1763, ed. John 
T. Juricek, in vol. 11 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. 
Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002). See also, David H. Corkran, The 
Creek Frontier, 1540-1783 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 258. 
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Florida and the Gulf Coast: Pensacola, Mobile, and Saint Augustine now being the only 
viable option for British trade.10 
 David Taitt, deputy agent to Stuart, organized a meeting at Little Tallassee that 
same month to better explain the conflict “amongst the white People” as well as the 
sudden geographical relocation of the British and their centers of Southeastern Indian 
trade. According to Taitt, the Indians that were present at Little Tallassee seemed 
“exasperated at the Virginians, meaning traders like Galphin based in Augusta, for 
stopping the flow of their ammunition and fighting against the great King’s people.” 
Even though they had to change trade paths, many headmen were hesitant to leave them 
behind the “Old Path” and embrace the new path towards Pensacola and Mobile.11 
Although the Creeks “agreed to pay no regard to any Talks but what come from Mr. 
Stuart or the Governors of the different colonies as they look upon them only to have the 
Great Kings Mouth,” Taitt related to Stuart, Emistisiguo had informed him that most 
Creek headmen were “very much Confused with different Stories brought into their 
Nation by different people.”12 
 Their uncertainty was most likely because several headmen from five of the 
principal Lower Creek towns had just arrived in Little Tallassee from Augusta, where 
                                                 
10 Superintendent Stuart to Lower and Upper Creek Chiefs (Intercepted), 8/15/1775, St. Augustine, in 
Georgia and Florida Treaties, 1763-1776, ed. John. T. Juricek, in vol. 12 of Early American Indian 
Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications 
of America, 2002), 169-170. Quote on 170. (Hereafter cited as GFT). 
11 Taitt to Stuart, Little Tallassee, 8/1/1775, in Records of the British Colonial Office, Class 5 Files: 
Westward Expansion, 1700-1783, ed. Randolph Boehm (Frederick, MD: University Publications of 
America, 1983) Vol. 76. (Hereafter cited as CO5/Vol. Number.) 
12 Talk to Deputy Superintendent Charles Stuart (Extract), 8/27/1775, Little Tallassee, GFT, 170-171. 
Quotes on 171. 
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they heard a much different “talk” from Galphin regarding the future of Creek trade. 
Before the outbreak of the Revolution, Galphin was a prominent deerskin trader in Creek 
Country and oversaw several stores and merchants in Augusta, Savannah, and 
Charlestown. Not long before Galphin met with the Lower Creeks, he was appointed the 
position of “Superintendent of Indian Affairs” by a Patriot Congress in Georgia.13 
Galphin had broken ties by 1775 with Loyalist Governor James Wright and accepted a 
commission to be a Continental Indian Commissioner for the Continental Congress. As 
an ambassador for the Continental Congress, George Galphin’s sole agenda was quite 
simple: convince the Creeks to detach themselves from the interests of the British and 
solely rely upon the Americans for trade.14 
 During his meeting with the Lower Creeks at Augusta that August, Galphin 
promised the Creeks that “ammunition” was to be sent to them “as a present to the 
Indians from the Rebels.” Galphin admitted that the ammunition had been “taken by 
force of Arms” from the British, but they intended to “share it with their friends the 
Creeks,” as a gesture of good will. Galphin was quick to ameliorate any concerns that 
ammunition would be short in supply, for he told the Creeks that he and his merchants 
“now make powder at Hollow Creek,” between his store and “the three runs in 
Carolina.”15 Lastly, the Lower Creeks reported to David Taitt during their meeting with 
                                                 
13 Talk to Deputy Superintendent Charles Stuart (Extract), 8/27/1775, Little Tallassee, GFT, 170-171. 
14 The first Continental Congress met in the fall of 1774 in Philadelphia. By 1775, the Congress created the 
position of a Continental Indian Commissioner to handle Indian affairs. These Commissioners are often 
referred to as “American Commissioners.” See, Michael P. Morris, George Galphin and the 
Transformation of the Georgia-South Carolina Backcountry (Lanham, MY: Lexington Books, 2015), 85-
86, 88. 
15 Talk to Deputy Superintendent Charles Stuart (Extract), 8/27/1775, Little Tallassee, GFT, 171. 
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Galphin that it was said that “lately there was some difference between them and this 
Nation but now the Path is again opened and made straight and White.”16 Given the fact 
that by the Summer of 1775, Americans had seized control of Georgia, North Carolina, 
and South Carolina, the “path” Galphin spoke of was none other than the “Great Old 
Path” that many Upper and Lower Creeks were reluctant to abandon.17 
Galphin and the rest of the American Commissioners made several promises to 
the Creeks that they could provide a steady supply of trade goods but were later proved to 
be in vain. The Americans’ ability to supply gunpowder and other trade necessities was 
next to impossible, given that all their imports and exports up until this point had been 
limited to the empire they were now fighting against. In addition, the powder and 
ammunition the Americans did manufacture and later received from France and Spain, 
they used for their own war, not trade with the Creeks.18  
Choosing Sides 
 Emistisiguo turned a deaf ear to Galphin’s talks. “We know very well that no 
white man but a Governor or the Alabama king can make a Talk or give to or receive 
anything of a red man, and no one man can make a Talk himself or give anything away,” 
Emistisiguo assured Stuart in a talk he had forwarded to the Superintendent by way of 
David Taitt in September 1775.19 He expected Stuart not Galphin, to provide the Creeks 
                                                 
16 Talk to Deputy Superintendent Charles Stuart (Extract), 8/27/1775, Little Tallassee, GFT, 171. 
17 Gary D. Olson, “Thomas Brown, the East Florida Rangers, and the Defense of East Florida,” in 
Eighteenth Century Florida and the Revolutionary South, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: FL, The 
University Presses of Florida, 1978), 15. 
18 John T. Juricek, Endgame for Empire: British-Creek Relations in Georgia and Vicinity, 1763-1776 
(Gainesville: FL, University of Florida Press, 2015), 223-224. 
19 The Alabama King was a Creek title of respect given to Superintendent John Stuart by the upper Creek 
chiefs. Neothucco (The Second Man of Little Tallassee) bestowed the title to Stuart at a conference in 
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with “powder and bullets,” and in large quantities. “We are not a small people but many 
in Number,” Emistisiguo stressed to Stuart. He then suggested that Stuart personally 
travel to Pensacola to deliver the ammunition as “St. Augustine . . . being so far off” from 
Little Tallassee and the rest of the Creek Nation. “You can come in a ship there and if 
you will appoint a time to meet we will meet you in Pensacola but Cannot at St. 
Augustine.”20 Emistisiguo’s demands were clear. West not East Florida would be the 
center of Anglo-Creek trade during the Revolutionary War period. 
 The following week the Lower Creeks sent a collective talk to Stuart notifying 
him that they preferred to remain neutral and receive goods from both the Americans and 
the British. The Lower Creeks did not differentiate between the two parties. “You are all 
one people and our oldest white Brothers,” and “we all see now your good talk and the 
talk from the beloved men from Georgia is the same,” the Lower Creeks explained to 
Stuart. The Americans and the British were then viewed by the Lower Creeks to be one 
and the same, and they awaited “to hear the difference settled and all at peace again.” In 
the meantime, trade goods and talks were welcomed from either party in Lower Creek 
Country as “they [The Americans] have sent us a handful of Powder and Lead, and now 
we see your good talk and send us world to come down and get some more.”21 The 
                                                 
Pensacola in 1771. The term “Alabama” a term used to describe the Tallapoosa towns and neighbors of 
Little Tallassee as a whole. “At a Congress of the Principle Chiefs and Warriors of the Upper Creek 
Nation,” 10/29/1771, Pensacola, CO5/73; Emistisiguo’s Reply to Superintendent Stuart’s Talk of August 
15th, dated 9/20/1775, Little Tallassee, in GFT, 174. Jacob Moniac served as the Interpreter. 
20 Emistisiguo’s Reply to Superintendent Stuart’s Talk of August 15th, dated 9/20/1775, Little Tallassee, in 
GFT, 175. 
21 Lower Creek Reply to Superintendent Stuart, Declaring Neutrality, 9/29/1775, Cussita Square, GFT, 
177-178. Quotes taken from 177. Sempeyoffee of Coweta and Blue Sault of Cussita were both present 
during this talk. Samuel Thomas served as the Interpreter. 
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Lower Creeks had no interest in the war they saw as a “difference between the white 
People.” Instead, they were focused on only the trade goods each side had to offer.22 
 As the war “between the whites” carried on into fall and winter of 1775, neutrality 
became an increasingly precarious notion. As the warfare intensified, allies were required 
by both parties, and it became clear to the Creeks, if it had not already, that the whites at 
war with one another were no longer “one” people. The American Board of 
Commissioners, led by George Galphin, began to increase efforts to win over the Creeks, 
as did Superintendent John Stuart. The Revolutionary South quickly became a 
competition for Indian allies. The Creeks were not pawns in the game but active players 
who chose their partners with careful discretion.23 
 In October 1775, John Stuart instructed his brother Henry Stuart to visit the Upper 
and Lower Creek towns and do his best to secure their allegiance to the British in both 
trade and war. Stuart wrote, “You’ll apply in Private to Emistisiguo and the second man 
of the Little Tallaessees and endeavor by every practical means to engage them to act in 
his Majesty’s Service.”24 Stuart also directed his brother to remind Emistisiguo “in 
private” that “he will draw to himself the greatest honour by exerting himself in the 
Kings Cause.”25 Given Emistisiguo’s recent offer to meet Stuart at Pensacola for trade 
and his disinterest in the Americans’ talks, Stuart’s request that Henry approach 
                                                 
22 Lower Creek Reply to Superintendent Stuart, Declaring Neutrality, 9/29/1775, Cussita Square, GFT, 
177-178. 
23 Neutrality not a viable option for those who are not financially independent. For more on this discussion, 
See Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and diversity in Native 
American communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 31 and 43-46. 
24 John Stuart to Henry Stuart, Saint Augustine, 10/24/1775, CO5/77. 
25 John Stuart to Henry Stuart, Saint Augustine, 10/24/1775, CO5/77. 
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Emistisiguo with these requests was not surprising. Between 1763 and 1775, Emistisiguo 
had proven himself to be a headman and warrior who had fulfilled most requests made by 
the British if those requests enabled Anglo-Creek trade to continue with Little Tallassee 
at its center. 
 Instructions for Henry Stuart’s “public talk” at Little Tallassee also addressed 
matters of trade. “Confirm the confidence in his Majesty and his Servants to convince 
them [the Creeks] that their want of Trade and Ammunition is entirely owing to the bad 
designs of the Rebels,” John Stuart told Henry.26 “Whereas by attaching themselves to 
the King’s Interest they will find plenty of all necessaries pouring in upon them from 
Pensacola and mobile as well as from St. Augustine.”27 Stuart procured a large “quantity 
of ammunition” to be “distributed to the Upper Creeks” in order to bolster this promise 
which gave Henry’s talks “greater weight and influence.”28 Henry Stuart had only 
recently been employed in the King’s service and was a stranger to the Creeks compared 
to his brother whom was a Beloved Man amongst the Upper Creeks.29 
 The head warrior and principal headman of Little Tallassee had championed 
forging a southern trade path towards the Gulf Coast long before Henry Stuart arrived 
with his brother’s talk or gifts of ammunition. Emistisiguo foresaw Pensacola and Mobile 
as a new supply line that would secure Little Tallassee preeminence among the Upper 
Creek Towns. In early March 1776, during a talk directed to Stuart, Emistisiguo formally 
                                                 
26 John Stuart to Henry Stuart, Saint Augustine, 10/24/1775, CO5/77. 
27 John Stuart to Henry Stuart, Saint Augustine, 10/24/1775, CO5/77. 
28 John Stuart to Henry Stuart, Saint Augustine, 10/24/1775, CO5/77. 
29 “At a Congress of the Principle Chiefs and Warriors of the Upper Creek Nation,” 10/29/1771, Pensacola, 
CO5/73. 
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declared his plans. “I am going to make a new Path,” Emistisiguo announced to Henry 
Stuart, while “holding a Strap of White Beads with three Squares of brown in it,” that he 
had “received form the Coosa King of the Cherokees.”30 “I am now going to forward it to 
Pensacola,” Emistisiguo explained in reference to the strap, “on account of the Ships 
going that way.”31 The strap Emistisiguo received from the Coosa King was of particular 
significance to his talk. Emistisiguo’s initial vision of a trade path towards the Gulf Coast 
only included the Upper Creek towns. The revised plan now not only encompassed the 
entire Creek Nation, but the Cherokees as well. Emistisiguo summarized his 
“transnational” trade plan as follows: “Here is Chotey [Chota], this is the Creek Nation, 
and this is Pensacola, and we hope that the Path will be kept clear and white from Chotey 
to this nation and from this to Pensacola.”32 
 In exchange for British trades supplies, Emistisiguo pledged his and Little 
Tallassee’s allegiance to Stuart and the British Crown. “I am now talking to my great 
King, and although we cannot reach him, we all hold out our Hands across the Sea to 
him,” Emistisiguo stated, a handshake being a metaphor for friendship and peace between 
the two parties. Regarding the Americans, Emistisiguo continued to turn a deaf ear and 
desired that the Great King be apprised of this. Presenting a “broad strap of white beads,” 
Emistisiguo instructed the “Alibama King” to “acquaint the Governors of St. Augustine, 
Georgia, and Carolina, and their beloved Men that I have heard that the People in these 
parts have thrown away their Great King’s Talks, but we are not so here, but listen 
                                                 
30 Emistisiguo’s Talk to the Honorable John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 3/2/1776, CO5/77. 
31 Emistisiguo’s Talk to the Honorable John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 3/2/1776, CO5/77. 
32 Chota was the capital city of the Cherokee Nation. Emistisiguo’s Talk to the Honorable John Stuart, 
Little Tallassee, 3/2/1776, CO5/77. 
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attentively to what he says.”33 For the people who “do not agree” or refuse to “give Ear to 
the Great King’s Talks,” Emistisiguo declared that he then “shall know the great King’s 
enemies and will look upon them as my Enemies as well.”34 By March 1776, the town of 
Little Tallassee was the first Creek town to abandon the idea of neutrality and enter a new 
era of diplomacy, as partners in trade and war with the British during the American 
Revolution. 
 Not long after Emistisiguo assured Stuart of Little Tallassee’s allegiance to the 
British Crown, the Indian Commissioners for the Continental Congress held their first 
official conference in mid-May. The congress was held at Augusta and was led by 
American Commissioners George Galphin, John Rea, and Edward Wilkinson, all who 
had been members of the renowned trade firm Brown, Rae, and Company.35 All of the 
prominent Lower Creeks towns were present, Nitigee, head warrior of Chowalga (Little 
Coweta) the elected principal speaker. Very few Upper Creeks were present: a testament 
to Emistisiguo’s continuous ascension in power and prestige. Talks were made on behalf 
of the Commissioners to win over the Creeks, but they had no goods to accompany 
them.36 
                                                 
33 Emistisiguo’s Talk to the Honorable John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 3/2/1776, CO5/77. St. Augustine was 
still in possession of the British in 1776, so I believe Emistisiguo meant only Georgia, Carolina, and 
wherever the rest of the American Commissioners were stationed. 
34 Emistisiguo’s Talk to the Honorable John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 3/2/1776, CO5/77. 
35 The Continental Congress appointed John Walker and Willie Jones to serve as Patriot Indian 
Commissioners in North Carolina shortly after the conference. See, Michael P. Morris, George Galphin, 
94. 
36 Journal of a Congress between the American Commissioners and the Creeks of Augusta, May 16-19, 
1776, Augusta, GFT, 183-190. 
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 Instead, the American Commissioners appealed to Creek kinship practices to gain 
the favor of the Creeks that May. Galphin was married to a Creek woman named 
Metawney, who was from the prominent Lower Creek town Coweta.37 By way of 
marriage Galphin was adopted as fictive kin. The importance of this kinship can be seen 
in how Cussita Mico, a prominent headman of Cussita, formally acknowledged Galphin 
and his business partner Rae as family during closing statements during the mid-May 
talks. Not only did the Cussita Mico pledge to his allegiance to the American 
commissioners, he declared “Messrs. [commissioners George] Galphin and [John] Rae 
not only as my Elder brothers but as my father and mother.”38 
 The Commissioners were largely successful. By early July 1776, Lower Creek 
headman Blue Salt, “got about sixty of the Cussataw Indians to agree to go with him to 
Savannah,” to hear more of what Galphin and the Commissioners had to say.39 While 
Sempeyoffee and Escobee of Coweta were not part of Blue Salt’s crew, Taitt informed 
Superintendent Stuart that he had reason to suspect that their allegiance to the Americans 
“may soon be gained” as well.40 Determined to put Blue Salt’s journey and any other 
Creek plans to collude with the Americans to an immediate halt, Taitt quickly notified 
Stuart that he had “got Emistisiguo and a party to agree to go to the Oconee in order to 
call back these fellows and to watch the motions of the rebels.”41 
                                                 
37 Michael p. Morris, George Galphin, 26. 
38 Journal of a Congress between the American Commissioners and the Creeks of Augusta, May 16-19, 
1776, Augusta, GFT, 190. Captain Aleck was the intermediary during this process. 
39 David Taitt to John Stuart, 7/7/1776, Little Tallassee, CO5/77. 
40 David Taitt to John Stuart, 7/7/1776, Little Tallassee, CO5/77. 
41 David Taitt to John Stuart, 7/7/1776, Little Tallassee, CO5/77. 
209 
 
Handsome Fellow of the Upper Creek town of Okfuskee was just as interested in 
what the American Commissioners had to say. Just “before the appointed day for the 
party’s setting out, Handsome Fellow came in from Augusta and called a meeting of the 
Upper Creeks in order to give out the talks he had heard.”42 A seasoned warrior and 
headman of a prominent town, Handsome Fellow’s talk was welcomed by a large 
audience. “This prevented most of the people” from joining Emistisiguo’s party, and by 
the end of the day Taitt reported that “only twelve men accompanied Emistisiguo to the 
Lower Creeks,” the Okfuskee headmen having done “everything in their power to 
prevent Emistisiguo proceeding.”43  
Little Tallassee’s Northern Neighbors 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1776, American Patriot forces from Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia invaded Cherokee country. Within only a 
few months the Cherokees were defeated: their homes, villages, and corn fields destroyed 
and burned to the ground. Deputy James Cameron estimated the rebels to be “about 4000 
men,” a number too great for him to even “prevail upon them [the Cherokees] to make a 
stand.”44 Left only with two options, the Cherokees could elect to send peace overtures to 
the Americans or flee. The majority chose the latter. By the winter of 1776, Cherokee 
refuges had poured into Little Tallassee, women and children were starving and in need 
of shelter.45 
                                                 
42 David Taitt to John Stuart, 7/7/1776, Little Tallassee, CO5/77. 
43 David Taitt to John Stuart, 7/7/1776, Little Tallassee, CO5/77. 
44 Stuart to Germain, 11/25/1776, Pensacola, CO5/78. Stuart noted to Germain that his information on the 
incident was provided by an express sent by Cameron “dated the 5th of October from Little Tallassee in the 
Upper Creeks.” 
45 Colin G. Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 43-44. 
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The Cherokees were not the only friends of the British Crown that had been 
ousted from their homes and driven South that year. American Patriots grossly 
outnumbered British Loyalists in both Savannah and Augusta, and Royal Governor James 
Wright was exiled in 1776.46 Patriots forced John Stuart, the British Superintendent of 
Southeastern Indian Affairs and Beloved Man to the Creeks to leave Charlestown as early 
as June 1775. By the summer and fall of 1776 the Cherokees fled for their lives, and 
Patriot leaders had consolidated their control over both South Carolina and Georgia.47 
Wright, Stuart, and the remaining backcountry British Loyalists relocated to St. 
Augustine: East and West Florida remained the only British strongholds in the southern 
part of North America.48 David Taitt, deputy Superintendent to Stuart, remained at Little 
Tallassee, which contributed to the town’s and Emistisiguo’s important role during the 
American Revolutionary era. 
By November 1776, neutrality in trade and war was no longer an option for Little 
Tallassee and the Upper Creeks. The destruction of the Cherokee Nation and the 
proximity of the rebel forces propelled Little Tallassee to formally join the British in their 
war with the Americans. “I have sat quietly a long time without joining either party, but 
the Virginians are now very near my nation and I do not want them to come any nearer,” 
                                                 
46 Edward J. Cashin, The King’s Rangers: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern 
Frontier (New York, New York: Fordham University Press, 1999), 40. 
47 David H. Corkran, The Creek Frontier 1540- 1783 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 
289. 
48 Gary D. Olson, “Thomas Brown, the East Florida Rangers, and the Defense of East Florida,” in 
Eighteenth Century Florida and the Revolutionary South, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville, FL: The 
University Presses of Florida, 1989), 15-16. Mobile and Baton Rouge also remained in British hands at this 
time. 
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Emistisiguo apprised Stuart.49 “I told you that if the red warriors to the northward would 
hold a red stick against the Virginians there, I would hold one against them here,” 
Emistisiguo told Stuart, the “red stick” was another phrase for a war hatchet and 
represented the declaration of war. In return for their service, the Creeks expected ample 
and prompt assistance from the British. “I am in hopes that the Great King will fight 
strong and not drop the hatchet,” Emistisiguo communicated to Stuart. “I hope we shall 
not want for ammunition,” but if given ample supplies, Emistisiguo assured the 
Superintendent that the Creeks would not retract their war declaration: “if we begin [war] 
we will never leave off until we are desired by you and the rogues conquered.”50 
The threat of American encroachment on Creek land was not the only driving 
force behind Emistisiguo’s decision to lead Little Tallassee into war. Protecting the 
remaining British trading centers held equal weight in Emistisiguo’s mind, especially his 
long-term vision of Little Tallassee being the nexus of a “new” path to the Gulf Coast for 
both Creeks and Cherokees. Emistisiguo conveyed his thoughts on the matter succinctly 
to Stuart: “I know that St. Augustine, Pensacola, and Mobile are the places from which 
we may expect assistance, and should the Virginians get possession of these places we 
are ruined.”51 Emistisiguo’s decision to assist the British in their war against the 
Americans was not based solely upon loyalty to the English Crown, but as a means to 
                                                 
49 Emistisiguo to John Stuart, 11/19/1776, Little Tallassee, in Documents of the American Revolution, 
1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series), 12: 250-251, ed. K. G. Davies (Great Britain: Colonial Office, 1972-
1981). (hereafter, cited as DAR). A copy of Emistisiguo’s talk to John Stuart was delivered to Alexander 
Cameron at Little Tallassee, who then forwarded the talk to Stuart. Translator unknown. 
50 This conversation has implications for the later “Red Stick Movement” during the the War of 1812. War 
stick meaning “at war” or “taking up the hatchet.” Emistisiguo to John Stuart, 11/19/1776, Little Tallassee, 
in DAR, 12: 250-251. Quotes on 250. 
51 Emistisiguo to John Stuart, 11/19/1776, Little Tallassee, in DAR, 12: 250-251. Quote on 251. 
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protect Anglo-Creek trade, as well as advance his longstanding agenda to redirect that 
trade towards the Gulf Coast. 
Recruitment 
On May 30, 1777, Emistisiguo engineered a conference at Little Tallassee to 
convince “the chiefs and head warriors of the Upper Creeks” to band together and join 
the war against the Americans. Emistisiguo was quite persuasive, for the headmen and 
warriors did not deliberate long before a consensus was reached to send “out a large body 
of their people against Georgia,” as soon as their annual “Green Corn dance” 
concluded.52 The Upper Creeks also agreed to “immediately send off one of their 
warriors with a Talk and some Tobacco for the Handsome Fellow,” in hopes to “bring 
him back” from Ogeechee, Georgia and thwart any further collusion between he, 
Okfuskee, and the American Commissioners.53  
 Emistisiguo was not alone in his recruitment efforts. On June 5, 1777 Alexander 
McGillivray arrived at Little Tallassee “with a message from Sempeyoffee and the Chief 
of the Cowetas” addressed to Mad Dog, head warrior and prominent headman of the 
Upper Creek town Tuckabatchee.54 The message “required Mad Dog to get the Warrriors 
of Tuckabatchee, Sawanogi, Coosada, and Okchoy Towns to send out men immediately” 
to assist Coweta “against the settlements of Georiga.”55 Mad Dog, already at Little 
Tallassee for Emistisiguo’s talk there, did not hesitate to fulfil Sempeyofee’s request. 
                                                 
52 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. Taitt noted that the meeting began “on the 
30th of May.” 
53 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
54 This is the earliest mention of Alexander McGillivray at Little Tallassee in the documentary record. 
Before this he was at Augusta, Georgia. David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
55 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
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According to David Taitt, “After Consulting with Emistisiguo,” Mad Dog “set out for 
Coosada where he met the Chiefs of the Alibamas, Tuckegee, and Coosada” towns.56 The 
headmen agreed to join Mad Dog in the proposed frontier raid against the Georgians, 
“whenever he was ready to lead them.”57 Afterwards, Mad Dog “proceeded to the 
Savannas [Shawnees] who also agreed to go with him and afterwards went home to 
Tuckabatchee to muster his own people.”58 Once Mad Dog organized his warriors, he 
informed David Taitt that he would return to Little Tallassee to discuss “at what time he 
would lead these men out,” an indication that even a seasoned warrior such as Mad Dog 
would not raise the hatchet without discussing his battle plans with Emistisiguo.59  
 Taitt dispatched a letter to Superintendent Stuart apprising him of the plans of 
Mad Dog, Emistisiguo, and the rest of the Upper Creek headmen and warriors had 
formulated. Their “design” Taitt wrote Stuart, “is to carry out what he can in a body and 
afterwards disperse in small parties along the frontier.” The purpose of this, Taitt 
continued, was to “keep the Georgians in play until the main body of the Nation can turn 
out” and assist.60 Mad Dog led several frontier raids against the Americans, but the 
                                                 
56 Coosada was an Alabama town that was located downstream from Little Tallassee. Tuckegee was a 
Koasati town. Recent studies suggest that the two towns most likely spoke the Koasati dialect best 
described as an offshoot of Muskogean. See, Sheri Marie Shuck-Hall, Journey to the West: The Alabama 
and Coushatta Indians (Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma press, 2008), 31 and 215n60 (Tuskegee) 30-
31 (Coosada). 
57 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
58 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. There was a Shawnee town amongst the 
Creeks. Taitt wrote “Savannas,” but in all likelihood meant Shawnee. All of the town’s Mad Dog visited 
were Upper Creek Towns and Sawanogi was mentioned specifically in Sempeyoffee of Coweta’s request 
for assistance. Okchai was almost amongst the towns that Sempeyoffee asked Mad Dog to garner 
assistance from, but for some unknown reason he bypassed the town or Taitt failed to document the visit. 
59 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
60 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
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Creeks did not launch a significant attack against the colony of Georgia, nor defend West 
and East Florida until the 1780s.61 
 The meeting that occurred at Little Tallassee from May 30 to June 5, 1777 did not 
end with Mad Dog’s journey through the Upper Creek Nation. David Taitt reported that 
during the same conference the headmen “desired to know” the whereabouts of a 
“Northward belt” and several “tokens” that accompanied it. More specifically, the Creek 
headmen asked Superintendent Stuart to “forward” the belt on their behalf to the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, as well as “different nations on the Mississippi and 
Ohio.”62 Taitt also noted that the belt was also to be sent to the “Shawnee Warrior,” in 
order to “see how they stand affected and what part they have taken in the present 
dispute.” The Creeks were not just interested in the procurement of allies but curious as 
to what side the Indians to the far north, in particular the Shawnee Nation, had taken in 
the Revolutionary War.63 
 The “Northern Belt” served as an example of a new form of “international” or 
“intertribal” Creek diplomacy and Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee spearheaded it. David 
Taitt dispatched the belt and requested that it be restored to Little Tallassee, his 
instructions dictating that the belt be “returned to the nation whence it came.”64 Creek 
domestic and foreign policy merged together to take on an international role for the first 
time in Creek history. More specific to Little Tallassee, Emistisiguo’s attempt to gather 
                                                 
61 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 188-189; Edward J. Cashin, The King’s Ranger: Thomas Brown and 
the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier (New York, NY: The University of Fordham Press, 
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62 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
63 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
64 David Taitt to John Stuart, 6/5/1777, Little Tallassee, CO5/78. 
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allies outside of the Upper and lower Creek towns was a notable move towards a Pan-
Indian alliance. 
Lessons in Diplomacy: Alexander McGillivray Intervenes 
 In September 1777, Alexander McGillivray stumbled upon a plot devised by a 
number of pro-American Okfuskee warriors to murder David Taitt and the Deputy Indian 
Superintendent Alexander Cameron.65 McGillivray was on the road “by desire of Mr. 
Taitt to stop the Okfuskee chiefs from going to the rebels,” when he encountered “several 
parties” of Okfuskee warriors that appeared to be on their way to Little Tallassee. 
McGillivray questioned the party and “asked them where they were going” but the 
warriors “refused to answer.” Suspicious of their intentions, McGillivray sent an “express 
to Mr. Taitt with a caution” that trouble might be coming his way.66 
 Alexander McGillivray persuaded the warriors to put their mission on hold and 
come down from their horses for a brief parley. After “a good deal of talk” McGillivray 
“prevailed on the chiefs to return to their homes with the young people,” but the headmen 
insisted that they were in need of “clothing to last the winter” and continued onward to 
Little Tallassee.67 The Okfuskee headmen, according to McGillivray, plundered several 
stores at Hickory Ground, but “spared the store at Mr. Taitts.”68 McGillivray’s warning 
must have reached Taitt and Cameron in time, for the two were already on their way to 
safety to British West Florida by the time the Okfuskee raiders reached Little Tallassee.69 
                                                 
65 Edward J. Cashin, The King’s Ranger, 71-81. 
66 Copy of a Letter from Mr. Alexander McGillivray to John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 9/21/1777, CO5/79. 
67 Copy of a Letter from Mr. Alexander McGillivray to John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 9/21/1777, CO5/79. 
68 Copy of a Letter from Mr. Alexander McGillivray to John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 9/21/1777, CO5/79. 
69 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 82-83. 
216 
 
 Whether or not the Okfuskee warriors intended to murder Taitt and Cameron, the 
destruction of multiple stores in Little Tallassee was enough of a disturbance for 
Emistisiguo to decide it was time to assemble the Upper Creeks for a second time to 
discuss the troublesome Okfuskee behavior. Emistisiguo and his British and anti-
American counterparts needed allies, not enemies to protect the “new” trade path to the 
South as well as keep the Virginians (Americans) from destroying the Creek Nation as 
they had flooded the Cherokees. Rather than conducting the meeting himself, however, 
Emistisiguo appointed Alexander McGillivray to be the principal speaker of the late 
September conference at Little Tallassee. McGillivray verified Emistisiguo’s request in a 
letter he drafted to John Stuart during the meeting. “In a few days I shall have a meeting 
with all the chiefs of the whole upper towns, Okfuskee, and all,” McGillivray wrote; “I 
shall give them a very strong talk, as the Big Fellow [Emistisiguo] insists . . . he says my 
powerful clan will support me,” and “I mean to try.”70 
 Emistisiguo, the headmen and warrior of Little Tallassee, had good reason to 
appoint Alexander McGillivray to speak on his behalf. By the time of the September 
conference, McGillivray had proven himself to be a valuable intermediary between the 
Creeks and Euro-Americans. McGillivray’s intervention with the Okfuskee war party had 
saved the lives of Taitt, Cameron, and possibly Emistisiguo, which aligned with Little 
Tallassee’s growing reputation as a center of diplomacy. By the 1770s Little Tallassee 
had established itself as a “white” (peace) town, and its population largely supported 
                                                 
70 Copy of a Letter from Mr. Alexander McGillivray to John Stuart, Little Tallassee, 9/21/1777, CO5/79. 
The Big Fellow another name for Emistisiguo. 
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peaceful relations within and outside the Creek Nation.71 Born a Creek and member of 
the prominent Wind Clan, Alexander McGillivray had the potential to earn the respect of 
the people of his home town and the rest of the Creek Confederacy. Although 
McGillivray had resided at Little Tallassee until he was six, most of his mature years 
were spent at Charleston and Augusta as an apprentice to the Creek trade empire that his 
father had built. McGillivray’s literacy and knowledge of the Atlantic market by default 
made him an extremely useful ally to have in Little Tallassee’s corner.72 
 British Superintendent John Stuart agreed with Emistisiguo. Although the exact 
date is not known, Stuart appointed Alexander McGillivray assistant to David Taitt, 
deputy Superintendent of Southeastern Indian Affairs, by the time of the conference at 
Little Tallassee on September 21, 1777.73 A born intermediary, McGillivray accepted the 
commission. McGillivray’s responsibilities as Taitt’s assistant were to keep the peace 
between the British and the Upper Creeks, as well as organize a military alliance 
throughout the duration of the war. Why Alexander as a young man chose to involve 
himself in a major war rather than return to Scotland with his Loyalist father remains an 
open question. Most scholars have speculated that he was far more motivated to engage 
in a war against the Americans to regain he and his father’s business and lands rather than 
any outstanding affinity for the Creeks.74 Regardless, McGillivray had made his choice 
by returning to his mother’s home town of Little Tallassee in Summer 1777. Emistisiguo, 
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the Upper Creeks, and the British needed all the allies they could get. Once McGillivray 
arrived, he quickly began to assist in the recruitment of Creek warriors and backcountry 
loyalists.75 
 Out of their mutual need to protect Anglo-Creek trade, Alexander McGillivray 
started an apprenticeship under the leadership of Emistisiguo, where the elder headmen 
and warriors of Little Tallassee instructed McGillivray in the arts of Creek tradition, 
diplomacy, politics, and lastly, warfare. French Brigadier General Louis LeClerc Milfort 
reported to have seen Emistisiguo and McGillivray travelling “around the sixty or so 
towns” in both the Upper and Lower Creek Nations.76 Emistisiguo’s intentions were 
twofold; to familiarize McGillivray with Creek Country as well as demonstrate his 
support of his chosen student. Alexander McGillivray may have been a member of the 
Wind Clan by birth, but to most Creeks he was an outsider. 
Emistisiguo’s mentorship was essential for Alexander McGillivray to carry out 
his respective duties as an assistant to David Taitt as well as Creek spokesman. Literacy 
and command of the English language assisted in peace brokerage between Creeks and 
Europeans, but without an understanding of Muskogean (Creek) as well as traditional 
Creek diplomacy, McGillivray’s British education fell flat for both parties. McGillivray 
also lacked the trust and respect needed by the leading headmen and warriors of both the 
Upper and Lower Creek towns to serve as a proper intermediary. His mentor, 
                                                 
75 The need for backcountry loyalists were equally important to the recruitment of Creek allies. For more 
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Frontier (Gainesville, FL: The University Presses of Florida, 1976), 1-15, especially 2-3. 
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Emistisiguo, as the principal speaker and elected diplomatic liaison on behalf of the 
Upper Creeks, had proven himself by 1777 to be a master of traditional Creek diplomacy, 
a skillful orator, and highly respected headman and warrior. The skills that McGillivray 
learned as an apprenticeship to Emistisiguo during his years in Little Tallassee served as 
a significant component of his success as an intermediary throughout the American 
Revolution, as well as a much larger contributor to his rise in popularity as a ‘Beloved 
Man’ and appointed spokesperson for the Upper Creeks during the 1780s. 
 Alexander McGillivray was successful in assembling the Upper Creeks, including 
Okfuskee, the town’s headmen already beginning to “to show signs of repentance” at 
Little Tallassee on September 21, 1777.77 McGillivray wrote to Stuart on his 
achievement: “The upper town chiefs are now with me. I talked to them today, they 
express the utmost abhorrence of these disturbances and declared themselves openly 
against them.”78 Most of the towns “were ready to join Mr. Taitt on the intended 
expedition against the Rebels,” McGillivray added, including the Lower, for “the second 
man of the Ussithes is now here” and “says the whole lower towns are yet for us.”79 
McGillivray’s assessment of the Lower Town’s affinity for the British was fairly 
accurate. David Taitt held a meeting the following month with the Lower Towns and 
confirmed that all the chiefs were present, “except the Cussitahs.”80 Superintendent Stuart 
was pleased with McGillivray’s service. “I have great hopes and expectations from Mr. 
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McGillivray’s activity and good sense,” he wrote to Lord George Germaine shortly after 
David Taitt’s meeting.81 Emistisiguo was, no doubt, of similar mind. 
 In mid-January of the new year, Alexander McGillivray, now officially the 
“assistant Commissary in the Upper Creek Nation,” traveled to Pensacola “with a 
message from the Chiefs of the Oakfuskies” addressed to Stuart.82 The new 
commissioner embraced his role as a Creek diplomat and intermediary. When 
McGillivray arrived at Pensacola, he presented Stuart with “white beads and tobacco and 
other symbols of friendship” on behalf of the Okfuskee headmen. According to 
McGillivray, the Okfuskee headmen “declared their sorrow for what had happened and 
wished to be forgiven,” for their past digressions.83 The message from the Okfuskee 
headmen also included their “hope the rest of the nation would not be punished for their 
fault,” although this declaration might have been McGillivray’s own words; Okfuskee’s 
affinity towards the rest of the Upper Creeks was dubious at best.84 
 Stuart was skeptical of Okfuskee’s new loyalty to the British but agreed to 
entertain the thought of an alliance if the headmen agreed to listen to a talk by deputy 
David Taitt. After Taitt was sure of their honest intentions, Stuart instructed Taitt to 
invite the Okfuskees to Pensacola to meet with him personally. Handsome Fellow, the 
town’s leading headman, had died a few months earlier and the Americans had cut all 
trade with Creeks by March 1777.85 Given the situation, McGillivray was “fully 
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persuaded” that the Okfuskees would “accept” the invitation, and left for Little Tallassee 
shortly after the meeting to relay Stuart’s response.86 
 The Okfuskee headmen arrived at Pensacola on May 19, 1778.87 The pro-
American towns of Tallassee and Cussita also made the journey to talk with Stuart, the 
Americans’ inability to supply the towns with trade goods their motivation. The result of 
the meeting restored Stuart’s trust in the three towns. The Superintendent wrote the 
following on the matter: “In order to remove any misunderstandings on account of their 
behavior since when I have had many conferences with them; the result of which was of 
the strongest assurance of their part of future good behavior.” In addition, Stuart was 
convinced that Okfuskee, Tallassee, and Cussita would “cut off all commination with the 
rebels” from that moment on, due in part to “their place whole dependent on supplies 
from this place [Pensacola].”88 There is no reason not to believe Stuart’s assessment of 
the towns’ loyalty. By 1777, the American Commissioners failed to fulfil their promises 
of goods in exchange for Creek allegiance to the Patriot cause, which most likely 
prompted Okfuskee, Tallassee, and Cussita to turn to the British for material goods and 
payment. The American Revolution was not a Creek fight. Trade, not allegiance to the 
British or Americans, ruled the hearts and minds of all Creeks during the American 
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Revolutionary period. Creeks acted primarily from perceptions of their own self-interests, 
not blind loyalty to Europeans.89 
St. Augustine: Diplomacy and the War Effort 
 The spring and summer of 1778 was a difficult time for the British and their 
Creek allies. After the American victory at Saratoga the previous year and France 
officially declaring war on England the following year, the rebels began to look towards 
the South to expand their victories.90 Governor Patrick Tonyn of East Florida 
communicated his fear for the safety of the Southern colonies in a letter to Stuart: “The 
Carolina and Georgia rebels, said to be near two thousand with artillery, are advancing 
with intentions to reduce this province. The assistance of the Indians is absolutely 
necessary in the most speedy and forcible manner.”91 Governor Tonyn’s concern for his 
province was not exaggerated. In August 1778, the Continental Army as well as the 
militias of Georgia and South Carolina had orders from the American Congress to invade 
St. Augustine.92 
 Alexander McGillivray confirmed Governor Tonyn’s report. On September 1, 
1778, McGillivray wrote Stuart from his post at Little Tallassee that “he received 
accounts from deserters in Georgia that a large body of the Rebels of about six thousand 
                                                 
89 Creek warriors also utilized the context of the American Revolution to achieve military prowess as well 
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men were on their March against St. Augustine.”93 In response Stuart wrote, 
“considerable parties of the Creek Indians immediately turned out to attack the Frontiers 
of Georgia and South Carolina,” but “did not massacre women and children, only 
attacking bodies of the Rebels whenever they found them under Arms.”94 The journey to 
St. Augustine was too far for Creek forces to travel in order to make an impact, but their 
strategy to lure the rebels away from East Florida through consistent frontier raids was 
quite successful. The Americans were forced to “abandon several Forts on the Frontiers” 
and the rebel soldiers in East Florida, having “suffered greatly,” were left with no choice 
but to retreat.95 
 While intermittent skirmishes rolled on throughout the Georgia and Carolina 
frontier during the fall 1778, Alexander McGillivray continued to fulfill his role as 
assistant Commissary to the British Superintendent. Utilizing his Charlestown education, 
McGillivray apprised Stuart of the Creek war effort through a series of monthly 
correspondences. McGillivray reported that Creek scouts obtained valuable “intelligence 
respecting the movement of the Rebels,” on a routine basis and that the “war whoop” 
continued throughout the Nation.96 As long as the “war whoop” continued, McGillivray 
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explained, the Creeks who “have taken up the hatchet against his enemies and will never 
bury it until they have orders from you.”97 
 Being the appointed spokesperson on behalf of the Upper Creeks by Emistisiguo, 
McGillivray was also needed to carry out his duties as diplomatic liaison of Little 
Tallassee. Part of those tasks were to relay messages from Emistisiguo and the other head 
warriors of Creek country to Superintendent Stuart. One of these requests was on behalf 
of Emistisiguo, who desired to speak with Mr. Cameron or “anyone from the Cherokees,” 
of any information they might have obtained in regards to the movements of the rebels as 
well as if any of the Indian Nations to the north had agreed to join the Creeks in their 
fight against the Americans.98 Clothing was an additional request of Emistisiguo’s for 
Stuart, their summer hunt disrupted by continuous warfare. “They expect to be clothed by 
you,” McGillivray frankly wrote to Superintendent on November 12 later that year.99 
Emistisiguo’s demands were a testament to the dilemma the Creeks were facing as winter 
approached, as well as a reminder to the British of their commitment to supply the Creeks 
in exchange for their service. 
Trials of Mobilization: Georgia and McGillivray’s War Debut 
In February the following year, the British not only sent the Creeks their long 
overdue supplies, but also a “considerable force” of British soldiers to Georgia and the 
                                                 
97 Report on the State, Temper, and Disposition in the Upper Creek Nation made by Alexander McGillivray 
assistant Commissary in that nation to the Colonel Stuart Superintendent for the Southern District, 
9/1/1778, Little Tallassee, CO5/80. 
98 Report on the State, Temper, and Disposition in the Upper Creek Nation made by Alexander McGillivray 
assistant Commissary in that nation to the Colonel Stuart Superintendent for the Southern District, 
9/1/1778, Little Tallassee, CO5/80. 
99 Alexander McGillivray Assistant Commissary in the Upper Creek Nation to Colonel Stuart, 11/20/1778, 
CO5/80. 
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Carolinas to assist the Creeks. To “subdue the Rebellious Southern Provinces,” as Stuart 
and his British counterparts were determined to do, a much larger turnout of Creek 
warriors than during the assault on St. Augustine was a necessity.100 David Taitt received 
Stuart’s instructions on February 1: “You will use your utmost endeavors to collect and 
march a body of Indians to Augusta and you will provide horses, provisions, and other 
necessaries which you shall judge required.” Emistisiguo and Alexander McGillivray 
were to assist Taitt in procuring that “body of Indians.”101 
After Emistisiguo, McGillivray, and the rest of the Upper Creek warriors and 
headmen convened on February 20, 1779 at Little Tallassee, the decision was made by all 
to send as many war parties they could assemble in time.102 David Taitt, who was present 
at the meeting, estimated the number of recruits to be “upwards of 1000” by early Spring. 
He also reported that he was to “be joined by Mr. William McIntosh, commissary for the 
Lower Creeks,” whom had recruited a “large body from that part of the Nation.”103 The 
quick mobilization of both Upper and Lower Creeks was a testament to Emistisiguo’s 
power of persuasion, as well as his student, Alexander McGillivray’s growing popularity.  
Alexander McGillivray got the chance to bolster his popularity among the Creeks 
during his first wartime engagement in April 1779. According to Jacob Moniac, Stuart’s 
interpreter, McGillivray set out with a party of “about four hundred men red and white” 
                                                 
100 Talk to the Principal Chiefs, Head Men and Warriors of the Upper and Lower Creek Nation, 2/1/1779, 
Pensacola, CO5/80. Duval, 85. 
101 Instructions to David Taitt deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 2/1/1779, CO5/80. 
102 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 85. 
103 Alexander Cameron and Charles Stuart to Lord George Germain, 4/10/1779, Pensacola, in DAR, 17:98. 
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on a mission to secure Augusta.104 Midway, the Creeks split into smaller parties to attack 
frontier settlements along the way, and by the time Alexander McGillivray reached 
Fulson’s Fort, near the Little River in Georgia, he was left with a meager party of only 
“fourty Indains and ten white men.”105 Although the Creeks had time to burn the fort, 
McGillivray and his party were ambushed “by a party of two hundred rebels,” and six 
Indians and one white man were “killed on the spot.”106 Alexander McGillivray and “a 
few more of the white people” were able to escape “between the two fires from the Right 
and Left,” the rest of the Indian war party, according to Moniac, “straggling and going in 
small parties in Order to Join Mr. McIntosh in the Rear with some Indians of the Lower 
Creeks.”107 An express message was sent to McGillivray by way of David Taitt that told 
McGillivray and the remainder of the men to meet General Provost at his Ebenezer 
encampment, located twenty miles from Savannah on the path to Augusta.108 Alexander 
McGillivray had survived his first wartime experience, but the combat he saw was far 
from glorious nor did it gain him any respect amongst the Creeks.  
The British haphazardly coordinated one last attempt to take Georgia during the 
summer 1779. Information had spread throughout the Southeast that General John Ashe’s 
North Carolinian Troops crossed the Savannah River and planned to sever ties between 
                                                 
104 Minutes at a Board of the Commissioners for Exercising the Offices of the Superintendent, 4/16/1779, 
Pensacola, CO5/80. It is noted within the document that the document was “dated (by mistake) the 16 th”, 
when it was actually the first. Moniac the Interpreter was also Alexander McGillivray’s father in law by 
way of marriage. 
105 Minutes at a Board of the Commissioners for Exercising the Offices of the Superintendent, 4/19/1779, 
Pensacola, CO5/80. 
106 Minutes at a Board of the Commissioners for Exercising the Offices of the Superintendent, 4/19/1779, 
Pensacola, CO5/80. 
107 Minutes at a Board of the Commissioners for Exercising the Offices of the Superintendent, 4/16/1779, 
Pensacola, CO5/80. 
108 Shaw to Germain, 8/7/1779, DAR, 9: 183-4. 
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the Creeks and the British army at Brier Creek. General Provost assembled a body of 
“one hundred and twenty Creeks” to march towards the enemy, but most of those Creeks 
quickly left the force and returned to their homes after the arrival of more American 
troops under General Benjamin Lincoln.109 Disorganized, inadequately supplied, and 
undermanned, the Creeks and their British counterparts had failed to come together and 
win Georgia. 
The Battle for the Gulf Coast  
 On June 21,1779, the Spanish officially declared war on England. Determined to 
win back the territory Spain lost after the Seven Years War, Florida and the Gulf Coast 
became the central deep South theatre of war during the remaining years of the American 
Revolution. Preoccupied with the rebellion to the North between 1775 and 1778, the 
British government had neglected Florida in manpower, resources, and finances. British 
leaders prized their sugar islands over West Florida, viewing Pensacola only as a 
potential base to capture New Orleans. The trade hubs of Mobile and Baton Rouge were 
for the most part ignored as Spain was an unanticipated enemy during America’s war for 
independence. Baton Rouge quickly fell to Spanish forces in September of 1779, as did 
the remaining British posts along the entire Mississippi River. Mobile was captured by 
the Spanish in February of the following year, which left Pensacola vulnerable and in 
immediate danger.110 [See Figure 7.] 
                                                 
109 Charles Shaw to Lord George Germain, 8/7/1779, DAR, 9:184; Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 87-
88. 
110 For a short summary on Spain’s quick entrance to the war, see “Introduction” in Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, ed. Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), Vol. 2, XXXVII-
XXXI (Hereafter cited as SMV). For information on the Choctaw involvement in the battle of Pensacola, 
See Greg O’Brien “The Choctaw Defense of Pensacola in the American Revolution,” in ed. O’Brien, Pre-
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Figure 7. Map of the Province of West Florida. Kitchen, Thomas, 1718-1784. Taken from 
the London Magazine or Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer. (May 1781), vol. 50, 240. 
Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/item/2014589388/ 
 
News of the fall of Mobile and Spain’s plans to capture Pensacola reached Little 
Tallassee within less than a month’s time. Emistisiguo’s terms from the start of the 
Creek-British Revolutionary wartime alliance were simple: service in exchange for Gulf 
                                                 
Removal Choctaw History, 123-43 (Chapter 6). In regards to Britain’s neglect of Florida, see Robin F. A. 
Fabel, “West Florida and the British Strategy in the American Revolution,” in Eighteenth Century Florida 
and the Revolutionary South, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: FL, The University Presses of Florida, 
1978), 49-53, 65. For the most recent summary of the Battle of Pensacola, see Kathleen Duval, 
Independence Lost, 188-223 (Chapter Thirteen).  
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coast trade. If the fall of Mobile was not enough to persuade the Creeks to unite and fight 
to protect that very trade, the threat of Pensacola having the same fate was. In March 
1780, Alexander McGillivray received an “express from major general Campbell” that 
informed him that “on February 10 a Spanish fleet of fourteen” was on its way from 
“Mobile Bay and New Orleans” to seize Pensacola.111 Emistisiguo and Alexander 
McGillivray gathered a force of about six hundred Upper Creek warriors and set out for 
Pensacola on March 20 of the same month.112 William McIntosh, Commissary to the 
Lower Creek’s followed McGillivray and Emistisiguo’s lead: “The Upper Creeks set off 
for Pensacola this day and I propose setting out the 28th instant with 100 Cowetah and 
shall take the towns as I go.”113 By May, as many as “between fifteen hundred and two 
thousand Creeks” were reported to have arrived in West Florida.114 The large turnout was 
an example of Emistisiguo and McGillivray’s combined powers of persuasion. 
While droves of Creek warriors rode to Pensacola’s aid throughout 1780, 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown counted only “a body of about three hundred and 
fifty” Creeks that May in “his service” to take on the Americans at Augusta. The number 
doubled to “about 450 Creeks Indians” by September, after Brown sent out an “express to 
                                                 
111 A Copy of a letter from Alexander McGillivray, Commissary in the Upper Creek Nation to 
Superintendent, 3/25/1780, Little Tallassee, CO5/81. 
112 A Copy of a letter from Alexander McGillivray, Commissary in the Upper Creek Nation to 
Superintendent, 3/25/1780, Little Tallassee, CO5/81; 
113 Extract from William McIntosh Commissary in the lower Creek nation to superintendent, dated little 
Coweta, 3/20/1780, CO5/81. 
114 The number of Creeks was probably closer to “between eleven and twelve hundred men.” See, 
Alexander McGillivray to Brown, 5/15/1780, Pensacola, CO5/81; Liut-Colonel Thomas Brown to Lord 
George Germain, 5/25/1780, in DAR, 18:99. Two hundred of that count were most definitely Lower 
Creeks. 
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the disaffected Chiefs of the Creek Nation” to meet him at Augusta.115 McGillivray 
defied orders to report to Augusta with a larger body of Creeks, “assistance” being “ 
more needed at west Florida,” he told the Superintendent.116 The significance of 
McGillivray’s statement lies not in whether or not Augusta or Pensacola was in more 
immediate danger in 1780, but more in the fact that Pensacola held more value to Little 
Tallassee. Okfuskee and Tallassee, the two “disaffected” Upper Creek towns that longed 
to preserve the “Great Old Path” to Augusta most likely made up the 450 warriors Brown 
spoke of.  
The large body of Creek warriors present at Pensacola saved the British post in 
1780.117 By June of 1780, when no Spanish troops had arrived, many Creeks returned to 
their homes. Consumed by fears of Spanish piracy and warfare, few British merchant 
ships sailed to Pensacola and food and supplies became scarce. The gifts that were 
promised to the Creeks in return for their service thus never arrived, and the annual Creek 
Green Corn Harvest was quickly approaching. Given the fact that neither the Spanish nor 
the Americans had made any attempt on the post, the Creeks disbanded.118 Alexander 
McGillivray was reported to have been one of the last to return home, his salary as 
                                                 
115 Liut-Colonel Thomas Brown to Lord George Germain, 5/25/1780, Savannah, DAR, 18:99; Governor Sir 
James Wright to Lord George Germain, 9/18/1780, Savannah, DAR, 18:167. 
116 A Copy of a letter from Alexander McGillivray, Commissary in the Upper Creek Nation to 
Superintendent, 3/25/1780, Little Tallassee, CO5/81. 
117 James H. O’Donnell III makes an excellent argument for this case. See his article, “The Florida 
Revolutionary Indian Frontier: Abode of the blessed or Field of Battle?” in ed. Samuel Proctor, Eighteenth 
Century Florida: Life in the Frontier (Gainesville, FL: The University Presses of Florida, 1976), 60-74, 67 
in particular. 
118 The Cherokee and Choctaws that assembled to protect St. Augustine also returned home by June of 
1780. See, Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 182. 
231 
 
Commissary to continue to recruit Creek allies the most probable motivation for him to 
remain so long.119 
The siege of Pensacola took place approximately one year later, between late 
February and May 1781. Without Creek protection, Pensacola was significantly 
undermanned. At the time of the Spanish attack, Pensacola was manned by diseased 
garrisons, a small number of troops, Africans (slave and free), unreliable loyalist refugees 
and local citizens. The best defense for Pensacola was Hessian mercenary units and the 
British navy, but ships failed to arrive on time when Spanish General Bernado de Galvez 
landed at Pensacola on April 19, 1781 with 7000 or more fresh troops or more from 
Havana.120 Galvez’s forces also included French and African Louisianans, Irish troops, 
and the French navy. Alexander McGillivray returned to Pensacola on April 8, but only 
with “about fourty” Creeks, compared to the near fifteen hundred warriors he and 
Emistisiguo had recruited the previous year. Alexander Cameron did report that a total of 
“500” Indians composed of Chickasaws and Choctaws accompanied McGillivray.121 
Despite the low Creek turn out, a significant body of Southeastern Indians did arrive at 
Pensacola. 
In fact, by the time General Galvez landed at Pensacola on April 19, a total of 
approximately two thousand soldiers both Indian and white arrived to defend Pensacola. 
                                                 
119 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 180-181. According to McGillivray, his salary was “fixed at 10 
pounds a day.” See Alexander McGillivray to Brown, 5/15/1780, Pensacola, CO5/81. For more information 
on the involvement of Hessian troops as well as other minor participants in both the British and Spanish 
forces at Pensacola, see also, Greg O’Brien, “The Choctaw Defense of Pensacola in the American 
Revolution,” in ed. O’Brien, Pre-Choctaw Removal, 123-124, 128 (Chapter 6). 
120 Robin F. A. Fabel, “West Florida and British Strategy,” 65-67; SMV, Vol. 2, XXX-XXXI. 
121 Envoys on the Tallapoosa River Upper Creeks by Alexander Cameron, 5/27/1781, CO5/82. 
232 
 
The late arrivals included Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles.122 
Emistisiguo’s vision of a pan-Indian alliance on behalf of British to defend Gulf trade 
may not have been as large as he had planned, but the turnout itself was significant. 
However, the British supplies of food and ammunition in exchange for service were 
meager. There was also an outbreak of smallpox within Creek country along with crop 
failure.123 The Southeastern Indians of Little Tallassee that defended Pensacola in April 
and May 1781 were there for one reason and one reason only; protection of the Gulf 
Coast trade. 
 Despite Indian allies, Pensacola fell quickly to the large number of Spanish 
forces. On May 8, the British Fort George was under heavy artillery fire and the 
powdered magazine exploded. The explosion killed nearly 100 men and the chaos of the 
Spanish artillery continued to bombard Pensacola. General Campbell officially 
surrendered two days later, leaving the Gulf Coast entirely in the hands of the Spanish. 
Afterwards, Alexander McGillivray demanded that Alexander Cameron write down the 
Creek’s participation in the siege, the warriors’ bravery, honor, and commitment all were 
to be included. Whether McGillivray had the events recorded for his own personal fame 
or to honor the Creek commitment to Pensacola is questionable. Regardless, Cameron 
agreed, and the written narrative of the Creek defense of Pensacola became a 
monumental break from the use of traditional Creek oral history.124 [See Figure 8.] 
 
                                                 
122 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 205. 
123 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 205-206. 
124 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 216-217. Cameron to Germain, May 27, 1781, DAR, 20:150. 
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Figure 8. The Taking of Pensacola, Engraved by H. G. Berteaux and Nicolas Ponce, 
Paris, 1784. Rare Book Collection, Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Taken from Kathleen Duval, Independence 
Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution (New York, Random House Press, 
2015), 215. 
 
The Death of Emistisiguo and the Defeat of the British 
 Just a few months later, after a loss for the British at the Battle of Yorktown, 
General Cornwallis surrendered to the French and the Americans on October 19, 1781. 
Despite the defeat at Yorktown, the Southeastern Indians and their British counterparts 
refused to give up. Just as Emistisiguo envisioned, Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, 
Chickasaws, loyalists and back country settlers all joined together and continued to raid 
the western edge of the southern states. The raids continued well into the summer of the 
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following year, until Emistisiguo and the rest of the Upper Creek headmen received word 
that the rebels (both French and American) were besieging Savannah. The Americans had 
attempted to siege Savannah in 1779, but it remained largely under British control until 
the winter of 1781-82, when the Americans under General Anthony Wayne attempted to 
strip the British of one of their last strongholds along the east coast.125 Alarmed that the 
last British-Creek trading post would be destroyed, Emistisiguo “immediately sent off 
[head warrior of the Upper Creeks] with “one hundred and fifty chosen Indians.”126 
According to Lieutenant Brown, Emistisiguo and his warriors “marched near five 
hundred miles” and soon learned that “the rebel army under General Wayne was 
encamped within five miles of the town.” The Creeks, under the leadership of 
Emistisiguo, “not disheartened at this intelligence” were “determined to cut a passage 
through the rebel army or perish in the attempt.”127 Although the Creeks estimated that 
they killed or wounded 100 or so rebels, there were a total of seventeen Creek casualties. 
“The brave, gallant Emistisicho,” was one of those casualties, along with Savannah. 
Shortly after, the British along with the Creek survivors evacuated Savannah, and sailed 
to the only remaining British stronghold in the post-war South: St. Augustine.128 
                                                 
125 For more information on the American’s extended efforts between 1779 to 1782 to successfully besiege 
Savannah, see David Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 1540-1783 (Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma, 
1967), 309-325. 
126 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown to Sir Guy Carleton, 10/9/1782, St. Augustine, Report on American 
manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain, Vol. 3, 1972, 157. 
127 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown to Sir Guy Carleton, 10/9/1782, St. Augustine, Report on American 
manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain, Vol. 3, 1972, 157. For a detailed account on the 
Creeks last effort to take Savannah and Emistisiguo’s death, see David Corkran, The Creek Frontier, 319-
322. 
128 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown to Sir Guy Carleton, 10/9/1782, St. Augustine, Report on American 
manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain, Vol. 3, 1972, 157; Liuet-Colonel Thomas Brown to 
Earl of Shelburne, 9/25/1782, Fort Picolata, St. Johns River, DAR, 20:122-123. Kathleen Duval reports 
Emistisiguo’s death to have taken place on Jun 24th, 1782. See, 228-229. The Creeks were joined by the last 
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 In late 1782, the Spanish, French, British, and American representatives gathered 
together in Paris to negotiate an end to the Revolutionary War and redraw the lines 
defining the land each empire owned. Even though both Southern and Northern Indians 
had fought extensively in the very same war, not a single Indian representative was 
welcomed to join. The main topic of discussion during the Treaty of Paris was boundary 
lines. The Thirteen American colonies that rebelled negotiated control over their territory, 
free navigation of the Mississippi River and the western boundary of the United States as 
far south as the thirty-first degree of north latitude. The Southern boundary was agreed to 
follow that parallel to the Apalachicola or Chattahoochee River. On September 3, 1783, 
England ceded both East and West Florida to Spain, but their treaty did not provide any 
definitive boundary lines. In addition, a secret article was embedded in the Treaty 
between England and the United States that confirmed the thirty-first parallel to be the 
border between the new nation and West Florida. Spain had no knowledge of this article, 
and the Treaty of Paris ended without a clear boundary between the United States and 
Spanish Florida, as well as disagreements about American use of the Mississippi River.129 
 The English defeat along with the death of Emistisiguo marked the end of an era. 
In December of 1783, only a few months after England had ceded Florida to Spain, the 
Upper Creeks held a talk at Little Tallassee. During the talk, they not only expressed their 
disbelief in regards to the British evacuation of Pensacola and Mobile, but their 
sentiments of abandonment by a Nation they regarded as fictive kin: “We are now in 
                                                 
of the British loyalists, as well as bands of Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokees in East Florida 
throughout 1782 to early 1783. 
129 SMV, Vol. 4, XII. Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 229-238. 
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great distress- Our hearts are heavy-our beloved Whiteman have left the Land . . . Out 
fathers told us that the English were Men- that their hearts were good and their Arms 
Strong. We believed them.”130 “You tell us that the Sun is darkened” and that “you 
believe the English will soon cross the Great Water,” the headmen continued. “Father- 
we know you will not tell a lye- if this is the Talk, we will follow our friends for while 
we live we will not take a Spaniard or a Virginian by the hand.”131 
 The Upper and Lower Creek headmen had no choice but to make an alliance with 
one of their new neighbors. McGillivray, following Emistisiguo’s faith in Gulf Coast 
Trade, looked to Spain for the continuation of Creek Trade. His decision was by no 
means unanimous. The Tame King of Tallassee as well as the Fat King of Cussita 
foresaw a more secure future with the new American Republic and the restoration of the 
“Great Old Tye” towards the former trade ports and posts of Charlestown, Augusta, and 
Savannah. The end of the American Revolution in 1783 ushered in a new set of 
challenges, both political and economic, internal and external for the Creek Confederacy. 
The Upper and Lower towns that had unified to protect English trade began to splinter in 
a state of uncertainty. 
 Emistisiguo left behind a diplomatic legacy that provided a clear blueprint for all 
Creeks to navigate a new ‘American’ world of uncertainty. Emistisiguo spent his entire 
political career as a Creek warrior and headman prioritizing and protecting Creek trade 
based out of the Gulf Coast over all other civil and foreign concerns throughout the mid-
                                                 
130 Sustenance of a Talk from the Chiefs of the Upper Creeks To Lieut. Colonel Brown Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, 12/30/1783, Tallassie, CO5/82. 
131 Sustenance of a Talk from the Chiefs of the Upper Creeks To Lieut. Colonel Brown Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, 12/30/1783, Tallassie, CO5/82. 
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to-late eighteenth century. Spain’s grip on the Gulf Coast did not mean the end of Creek 
trade, it simply indicated a change in European partners. Alexander McGillivray, utilizing 
the knowledge acquired from Emistisiguo in addition to the unity the former headman 
had instilled between the Creeks and Southeastern Indians to protect that trade, embraced 
the challenge. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
A NEW LEADER? 
 
Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee spent most of his life transforming a small trading 
outpost into a Creek town that not only became the center of Anglo-Creek trade, but also 
a sacred and diplomatic space within the heart of Creek Country. After his death, 
however, the memory of his legacy was quickly supplanted by Alexander McGillivray, 
who “is probably the best-known Creek in the history of the Creek Confederacy.”1 
Emistisiguo’s choice to select McGillivray as Little Tallassee’s principal spokesperson 
and Creek intermediary was well calculated. Due to McGillivray’s education, literacy in 
language and economics, and heightened understanding of the Anglo-Creek trade, 
Emistisiguo most likely presumed he would serve his town and the interest of the Creeks 
well. McGillivray carried out his duties, but his power and influence never went beyond 
the role the Creeks carved out for him within their society. All decisions, treaties, land 
cessions, were all predetermined by the headmen and warriors of the individual towns 
that made up the Creek Confederacy. There was no unified Creek “Nation” and 
Alexander McGillivray was far from being the sole or most important leader among the 
Creeks. The real movers and shakers of Creek history during the 1780s remained the 
Creek village headmen, and the politics of Little Tallassee and its American and Spanish 
neighbors during this period demonstrate this fact. 
                                                 
1 See Michael Green, “Alexander McGillivray,” in David Edmunds, American Indian Leaders: Studies in 
Diversity (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), 41-61, quote on 41. 
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Alexander McGillivray was first and foremost a Creek trader, not a headman or 
warrior. He was a representative of the British trade firm Panton, Leslie, and Company, 
as well as a replacement for his father, Lachlan McGillivray, as a primary facilitator of 
Euro-Creek trade throughout the post-revolutionary era until his death in 1793. 
Alexander’s connections to the world of trade coupled with his apprenticeship to 
Emistisiguo, allowed him to assume the well-respected role as the Upper Creek’s primary 
spokesperson and diplomatic intermediary. Thus, Alexander was welcomed by many of 
the Upper Creek towns to serve in an advisory capacity during the 1780s, but that was the 
extent of his authority within Creek Country. 
Alexander McGillivray spent his entire life in an effort to grasp unobtainable 
achieve power and influence among the Creeks, and as a result abused his advisory 
position. By the mid-1780s, Panton, Leslie, and Company held a monopoly over the 
Southeastern Indian trade, and McGillivray turned to violent and manipulative tactics to 
protect his personal interests within that trade. These acts included not only embargoed 
trade on towns who did not support McGillivray’s desire for power among the Creeks, 
but also organized warfare against the state of Georgia and the United States to extract a 
steady and continued profit from that trade. McGillivray’s support for military 
mobilization was backed by his attempt to unify the Creeks into a much larger, cohesive 
“Nation.” Throughout McGillivray’s time as advisor and resident trader to the Upper 
Creeks, McGillivray championed the idea that the best chance of Creek self-preservation 
in the face of American expansion was to create a strong centralized government. 
Although this idea has been interpreted by scholars as a strategy to protect Creek 
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sovereignty, further analysis exemplifies that McGillivray championed Creek sovereignty 
only when it proved to be advantageous to his own personal economic and political 
agenda. A unified Creek ‘Nation’ at war with the United States was an insurance policy 
to protect his monopoly over Creek trade. As early as 1784, McGillivray was granted 
complete control over Panton, Leslie, and Company’s trade within the Creek Nation. This 
information paired with McGillivray’s unsavory actions to promote and protect his 
personal trade investments among the Creeks reveal an individual who prioritized 
business and private wealth over the townspeople of Little Tallassee and the interests of 
both Upper and Lower Creeks as a whole.2 
The death of Emistisiguo essentially marked the end of Little Tallassee as a 
leading Creek town and sacred space. Sources do not indicate any significant headman or 
warrior to have taken Emistisiguo’s place, only that McGillivray’s connections to the 
Euro-Creek trade and spokesman capabilities allowed him to become the face of Little 
Tallassee in name only. Unfortunately, McGillivray’s singular focus on trade slowly 
eroded all traditional components that made Little Tallassee a Creek town, not a mere 
trade depot. McGillivray’s fixation on trade was in his own self-interest but not 
necessarily in the best interests of the Creeks. Lacking the respect, position, and authority 
                                                 
2For examples of McGillivray’s compulsory efforts to unify the Creeks, see Michael D. Green, “Alexander 
McGillivray,” in American Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity, ed. David Edmunds (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1980), 59-60; Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the 
American Revolution (New York: Random House Press, 2016), 253-255. On McGillivray’s violent tactics 
to preserve his and Panton, Leslie, and Company’s monopoly on Creek trade, see also Claudio Saunt, A 
New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733- 1816 
(Cambridge University of Press, 1999), Chapters Three and Four; Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian 
Removal (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 33-35, 34 for control over Panton, Leslie, and 
Company’s trade with the Creeks. 
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to unite the Creeks, McGillivray utilized his hold over Creek trade to force individual 
Creek towns to conform to a foreign and uniform style of government they simply did not 
want. Alexander McGillivray was unsuccessful in his quest for power and authority. In 
fact, not only did he make enemies with many of the Creek towns he was trying to unite, 
but his singular and militarized focus on trade stripped Little Tallassee of all elements 
that defined a sacred space, a place of diplomacy, and a Creek town.3 
The Identity of Alexander McGillivray 
By 1783, Alexander McGillivray was often referred to as Isti atcagagi thlucco 
(Great Beloved Man) by the Upper Creeks who knew him best. The title was a significant 
reflection of McGillivray’s position in Creek society, as he was not a chief but someone 
of importance that was entitled by the Creeks to sit on the sidelines during town meetings 
and offer advice. Creek Country was full of Beloved Men, which is why McGillivray’s 
title was accompanied by the word, thlucco, to distinguish him as Little Tallassee’s and 
the neighboring Upper Creek town’s elected spokesperson as well as advisor. The title 
was a deliberate reminder orchestrated by leading Creek headmen to remind Alexander 
McGillivray of his fixed place and obligations within Creek society.4 
McGillivray left behind countless letters and correspondence between both 
Spanish and American officials, where he presented his audience with an image of 
                                                 
3 By the time of McGillivray’s death in 1793, Tuckabatchee had replaced Little Tallassee as the center of 
Upper Creek affairs. The Alabamas and the Kosatis as well as the “westernmost partners in the 
Confederacy” were ignored by both the Upper and Lower Creek towns after McGillivray’s passing. See, 
Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian Removal, 40. I argue throughout this chapter, however, that Little 
Tallassee fell out of favor with the Upper Creeks as early as the mid to late 1780s. There is no scholarship 
or evidence that I know of that identifies a headman or warrior to replace and or succeed Emistisiguo.  
4 Michael D. Green, “Alexander McGillivray,” 41-43, 49. Emistisiguo was the headman who most likely 
engineered McGillivray’s title, though this point remains unclear. 
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himself as an invaluable Creek leader. Closer analysis of Spanish and lesser- known 
English sources, however, prove McGillivray’s writings to be tainted with self-
aggrandizement and fueled with grand illusions of power and authority within Creek 
society. The majority of historians have continued to take Alexander McGillivray’s 
personal writings at face value, and the image of McGillivray as a renowned Creek 
representative and adept politician continue to appear in current historiography.5 Placed 
within historical context, McGillivray’s correspondence, as well as reexamined 
documentary evidence, allows one to unravel the complexities of McGillivray’s identity 
as both a Creek and a Mestizo. Deeply alienated from Creek society for the majority of 
his life, McGillivray’s identity resembled a white landed planter, a Scots trader and 
businessman, but not a Creek headman or warrior.6 
Alexander McGillivray was only six years of age when he moved away from his 
birth town of Little Tallassee, his mother Sehoy, and sisters.7 McGillivray relocated (with 
his biological father), Lachlan, to the McGillivray family’s plantation and trading post 
just north of Augusta. It was there that McGillivray observed the life of a landed planter, 
where he watched his father’s slaves work in the fields, the gristmill, serve as boatmen 
                                                 
5 The most recent publication to tackle this subject is Kathleen DuVal’s, Independence Lost. Although 
DuVal does imply throughout her book that McGillivray may have had less power than former historians 
have thought, she is inconsistent in her analysis. McGillivray is admitted to never have been a chief, but at 
the same time credited to be a great diplomat and politician. Yet, the ideas behind all McGillivray’s policies 
were not his own. They were Emistisiguo’s or the surrounding Creek headmen and warriors, which will be 
discussed throughout the duration of this chapter. 
6 Claudio Saunt is the first historian to make this argument. See, Saunt, A New Order of Things, 67-90. See 
68-69 specifically on historians’ failure to recognize the bias behind McGillivray’s writings and the illusion 
of power and authority he held among the Creeks. McGillivray’s volumes of correspondences are still 
worthy of analysis, as they do offer invaluable insight to not only the mind of the man who wrote them, but 
Creek society during the late eighteenth century. 
7 Historians debate the actual age of McGillivray when he left Little Tallassee. Kathleen DuVal, however, 
has made the best case for him being six years of age. See, Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost, 28. 
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and dress deer hides daily. In the early 1760s, Alexander relocated to his (Paternal Uncle) 
John Bullock’s house in Charles Town and learned to read and write in not only English, 
but Latin and Greek. By 1765, McGillivray moved to his third residence, Vale Royal, a 
plantation just outside of Savannah. While Alexander was at Vale Royal he served as an 
apprentice to the notable shipping company Inglis and Hall, where he learned to 
understand the economics behind the Anglo-Creek skin and fur trade. At an age when 
Creek boys transitioned into adulthood by earning war names and titles, Alexander 
McGillivray spent his formative years observing the daily operations of a Southern 
plantation and keeping ledgers of the deerskins he would have been carrying to Augusta 
or Charles Town himself if he were to have remained in Little Tallassee.8 Although it was 
Creek tradition for male children to be raised by their maternal uncles (mother’s brother), 
Sehoy most likely married Lachlan McGillivray to secure access to British trade goods. 
Sehoy and his family’s choice to immerse Alexander at a young age in the world of that 
trade is not surprising. Literacy as well as indispensable knowledge of British trade was 
advantageous not only to young McGillivray, but his family and town of Little Tallassee 
as well.  
As an adult, Alexander McGillivray was the embodiment of a Southern 
Gentleman. He Alexander McGillivray owned several plantations, one near the colonial 
settlement known as Tensaw, which was located above Little River near Mobile, and the 
second at his home town of Little Tallassee. At Little Tallassee, McGillivray owned 
                                                 
8 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 28-29; Andrew Frank, Creeks and Southerners: Biculturalism on the 
Early American Frontier (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 32. 
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about sixty black slaves, several stocks of horses, hogs, and cattle, and employed an 
overseer by the name of William Walker for his plantation.9 McGillivray’s house was 
built in an English clapboard style, very similar to his brother in law’s residence (George 
Colbert) built in 1790. Colbert claimed that the total cost of the house’s construction was 
$650 dollars, which was near the equivalent of 850 deerskins.10 
Alienated from his Creek roots, McGillivray did not speak, look, or act like a 
traditional Creek male. McGillivray employed an interpreter throughout his adult years in 
Creek country, Muskogean being a foreign language to him in comparison to English and 
classic languages such as Greek and Latin.11 Traditional Creek warriors also had tattoos 
on their limbs and torso that depicted their victories in warfare or hunting.12 McGillivray 
abstained applying any type of tattoos to his body, and he never participated in a 
victorious hunt or particular battle that might have been worth marking.13 McGillivray 
                                                 
9 Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things, 70-71. 
10 Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things, 71-72. 
11 James Moniac was the most notable of all his interpreters and was also his Father in Law. For more on 
Moniac and McGillivray’s interpreters, see Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 87, Amos J. Wright, Jr., 
The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders on the Old Southwest Frontier 1716-1815 (Montgomery, AL: New 
South Books, 2007), 219 & 267; McGillivray to O’Neil, 4/4/1787, Little Tallassee, in Caughey, 
McGillivray of the Creeks, 147-148; 
12 William Bartram, “Travels of William Bartram April 1773- October 1776”, in William Batram on the 
Southeastern Indians, eds. Gregory A. Waselkov and Kathryn E. Holland Braund (Lincoln, NE: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1995), 122 & 144. Bartram described the tattoos to be of “bluish, lead, or indigo color” 
and often depicted “a sketch of a landscape representing an engagement of battle with their enemy, or some 
creature of the chase.” Quote on 144. 
13 Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 75. Alexander McGillivray did participate in small skirmish during the 
American Revolution (1776) and was present at battle of Pensacola (1781). There are multiple accounts of 
his participation in the skirmish, but all indicate that he “fled to safety” whether out of fear or pure luck is 
debatable. As far as Pensacola, McGillivray primarily served as a recruiter for Creek and British allies. 
After the American Revolution, McGillivray had no interest in war for he left all military operations to his 
Upper Creek allies such as Red Shoes or Mad Dog. Milford wrote, “Right at the very beginning of the 
engagement, McGillivray hid in the underbrush where he remained til nightfall.” Three days later, 
McGillivray remarked to Milford “he did not like to witness such affairs, that never again would he be 
caught in a similar situation.” Quotes and summary found in Louis LeClerc de Milford, Memoir: or A 
Cursory Glance at My Different Travels & My Sojourn in the Creek Nation, trans. Geraldine De Courcy, 
ed., John Francis McDermott (Chicago, IL: The Lakeside Press, 1956), 94-95. About simply retreating and 
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also conceptualized time according to the European calendar rather than the annual Creek 
Busk, and drafted a will at the time of his death in 1793 that left his property to his sons, 
instead of abiding by Creek matrilineal customs and leaving his land to his sisters and 
women of the Wind Clan.14 These actions further exemplified McGillivray’s identity as 
representative of a Scottish trader, similar to that of his paternal father Lachlan 
McGillivray. 
Alexander McGillivray was not a well man and even if he had desired to 
participate in long hunts, gain military prowess, or a ball game, his health most likely 
prevented it. He was riddled with rheumatism, gout, headaches, and was confined to his 
bed for weeks at a time. In August 1786, McGillivray described his ill health in vivid 
detail: “The Fever has reduced me very low & it has been Succeeded by a breaking out 
over my body. I’m Apprehensive that I shall lose all my finger Nails & tis with much 
difficulty, that I can take the pen in my hand to write.”15 Two years earlier, McGillivray 
described his condition to be so severe “that made it totally impossible for me to mount a 
horse.”16 Between 1791 and 1792, McGillivray complained that “his constant companion 
                                                 
his role in the battle of Pensacola, see Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 87 and 205-217. On delegating 
military duties, see Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 5, as well as McGillivray’s correspondence, “War 
on the Cumberland and Georgia”, in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 153-166. In one incident, 
McGillivray sends Emistisiguo’s brother to “ravage the settlement of Cumberland and destroy their houses 
and plantations.” McGillivray remarked on the “Big Fellow’s” brother to be someone to “take some notice 
of,” McGillivray to O’Neil, 6/10/1787, in John Walter Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, ed. Will J. 
Bauer, Jr. (University of Oklahoma Press, 1938, reprinted Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2007), 155. (hereafter Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks). 
14 Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 84 (time) 89 (will). Initially, McGillivray’s wishes were fulfilled, until his 
sisters, Sophia Durant and Sehoy Weatherford (both married to traders) who lived in Creek Country, 
confiscated all of Alexander McGillivray’s land, slaves, and livestock. For more on the McGillivray’s 
sisters’ success on maintaining Creek tradition regarding McGillivray’s will, see also, Benjamin Hawkins 
to William Eustis, 8/27/1809, in Letters, Journals, and Writings of Benjamin Hawkins, Two Vols., ed. C.L. 
Grant (Savannah, GA: Beehive Press, 1980), 2:556. (Hereafter LBH, Vol. number, Page(s).). 
15 McGillivray to O’Neil, 8/12/1786, Little Tallassee, in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 127-128. 
16 McGillivray to McLatchy, 9/18/1784, Little Tallassee, in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 81n29. 
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the Rheumatism has made a fresh attack upon me,” and “every periodical attack” of the 
gout grew “more severe & longer in continuance.” McGillivray elaborated on the gravity 
of his illness to William Panton: “It now mounts from my feet to my knees & [I] am still 
confined to the fireside.”17 McGillivray was so often plagued with pain and stiffness, that 
his joints did not allow him to carry out every day activities that remotely resembled a 
powerful headman or warrior.18 Given these circumstances, it is hard to imagine any 
Creek warrior seeing McGillivray as an equal or a man worthy of respect outside his 
trade connections, literacy, and knowledge passed down to him by Emistisiguo.  
McGillivray was Little Tallassee’s spokesperson and served the Creeks as a 
valuable intermediary throughout the course of the post-Revolutionary war period. He 
assisted in peace alliances with Spain, utilized his connections to Panton, Leslie, and 
Company to preserve Gulf Coast trade, and through many correspondences to both the 
Americans and Spaniards was able to communicate the desires of many Creek men and 
women. However, Alexander McGillivray had little personal attachment to the Creeks 
and was a man who acted mostly out of self-interest from the very day he relocated to 
Little Tallassee. The history of Little Tallassee and the Creeks during the Post-
Revolutionary War period is multi layered like an onion, the truth buried under the 
voluminous written records of a man who projected an image that reflected an unrealistic 
amount of power and authority. 
 
                                                 
17 Amos J. Wright, Jr., The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders, 255. For quotes, see Caughey, McGillivray 
of the Creeks, pages 322-323 (Rheumatism), 348 (Gout & confined to fireside). 
18 Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 3-4, 43, 52-56. Alexander McGillivray died at the age of 34 of his 
prolonged illness. See, Panton to Carondelet, 2/20/1793, Pensacola, in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 
353-354. 
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The Treaty of Augusta 1783 
  
 American Commissioners organized a series of meetings between 1781 and 1783 
inviting Upper and Lower Creeks to forge a trade alliance with the new American 
Republic. Two notable headmen accepted the American’s invitations. Hopothle Mico 
(better known as Tame King or Tallassee King) of the Upper town of Big Tallassee was 
one of these headmen, and Fat King (Neha Mico) of the Lower town of Cussita was the 
second.19 The attendance of these prominent headmen during these meetings proves that 
not all Creek towns were ready to commit to an alliance with Spain over the new 
American Republic. Fat King and Tame King’s serious consideration of an American-
Creek trade alliance also signified that Little Tallassee and Alexander McGillivray did 
not have the support of the entire Creek Nation, contrary to McGillivray’s growing trade 
monopoly. The American Commissioners invitations to trade created new opportunities 
for Tame King and Fat King to challenge Little Tallassee as the center of Creek trade and 
restore power and prominence to their towns. 
Just months after Britain’s surrender at Yorktown in October of 1781, Tame King 
attempted to forge a peace alliance with the Americans. The meeting of the two parties 
was postponed until May 28, 1782, when Tame King traveled to Augusta along with “his 
headmen of Tallassee” to negotiate with the American Commissioners. He addressed the 
Americans as “old friends” while professing “that now the Time is drawing near that 
there will be nothing but peace” and “that the Path between them and us may be kept 
                                                 
19 Tallassee or big Tallassee was a separate Upper Creek town and not related to Little Tallassee. See pages 
8 and 9 of Chapter II, People and Places, of this dissertation. 
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white and straight.” Tame King explained to the commissioners that during this period of 
peace the Americans and Creeks should acknowledge each other as equals: “it was 
ordained that our children should eat out of one dish that is one with a Red hand and the 
other with white and as brother and Friends,” there would be “no Forked Tongue” 
between the two.20 Tame King requested that the “great warriors that are now laying near 
Savannah and Charlestown and also the Virginia King at Philadelphia be acquainted with 
this Talk,” as a reminder that his men had served as staunch allies to the Americans 
throughout the Revolutionary War.21 
Towards the end of his talk, Tame King bestowed upon the commissioners a 
“number of white beads as a Token of friendship from all the Sundry Towns of the 
Nations,” which included the Hitchiti, Apalachichola, Ococnee, Sauwoogelo, and the 
Sauwoogelooche. That these towns supported Tallassee King’s vision for peace with the 
Americans was not surprising. Trade was still essential to Creek survival and in the 
absence of the British the Americans now controlled the former “Great Old Path” to 
Augusta and Charlestown.22 
Tame King was not alone in his desire for peace with the young American Nation. 
In December of that year, the Neha Mico (better known as Fat King) of the Lower town 
of Cussita apprised John Rae (an American Commissioner) that he also wished for peace. 
                                                 
20 A Talk given by the Tallassee King and Sundry Head Men of the Upper and lower Creek Nation, 
5/28/1782, Augusta, Document TCC260, Telamon Cuyler Collection, in Southeastern Native American 
Documents, 1730-1842, Digital Library of Georgia, http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu (hereafter cited as SNAD). 
21 A Talk given by the Tallassee King and Sundry Head Men of the Upper and lower Creek Nation, 
5/28/1782, Augusta, Document TCC260, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
22 A Talk given by the Tallassee King and Sundry Head Men of the Upper and lower Creek Nation, 
5/28/1782, Augusta, Document TCC260, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
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“I hope that our old Friends the Virginians will take fast hold of the Chain of Friendship 
that their forefathers held and we the Creeks will hold fast also,” Fat King communicated 
to Rae. However, in exchange for that peace, Fat King demanded trade. “If the Governor 
will come to Augusta my Heart will be glad. I hope they have Shirts, Paint, Powder, and 
Rum and Goods of every kind for my people are poor and want goods of every kind,” Fat 
King explained. He added that in exchange for those goods, he would return “what 
Negroes and Cattle & Horses” he could find in his town of Cussita as well in Broken 
Arrow, a neighboring village of the Lower Creek town of Coweta.23 
 Before any peace could be made, Tame King, Fat King, and the rest of the leading 
headmen of the Lower Towns who supported reconciliation with the Americans needed 
to persuade the head warriors of each town that it was time to lay down the hatchet. Tame 
King commented the following during his talk to the commissioners in May of 1782: 
“The Time is now at hand that peace and Plenty is so near but that it depends entirely 
upon our warriors how soon.”24 Both the Fat and Tame King were peace headmen whose 
civic duties were to promote harmony with neighboring towns and nations. It was their 
responsibility to ensure that avenues to negotiate peace remained open always. White or 
peace towns functioned similarly, as they were designated spaces to conduct diplomacy 
year-round.25  
                                                 
23 A Talk given by Fat King, enclosed in James Rae to John Martin Esquire, 12/27/1782, Augusta, 
Document TCC124, Telamon Cuyler Colleciton, SNAD. 
24 A Talk given by the Tallassee King and Sundry Head Men of the Upper and lower Creek Nation, 
5/28/1782, Augusta, Document TCC260, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
25 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 251-252. 
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The head warriors of the Upper town of Tallassee were the first to consent to 
peace with the Americans. Following Tame King’s talk, the town’s Head Warrior 
informed the commissioners that it was not “his Business as a Warrior” to make peace 
but, “his king has talked to him and told him to be at peace and on that account, he has 
received the white wing.” Tallassee’s Head Warrior then assured the commissioners that 
his decision was not made from haste, but after consultation with all his warriors who 
stood beside him. The warriors declared that their wings once “red” now “turned white,” 
and that they intended “nothing but Peace and Friendship” from that moment forward.26 
The rest of the leading warriors of the pro-American towns followed suit when 
they agreed to assemble at Augusta in November of 1783, along with Tallassee King, Fat 
King, and thirteen other leading headmen. Two of these headmen included the notable 
Tallassee Warrior and Hitcheto Warrior.27 Since Creek politics were always based upon 
town consensus, these warriors were most likely persuaded to make peace in exchange 
for the promise of a fruitful Creek-American trade. The treaty drafted and signed that day 
promised “that a trade shall be carried on by the traders and merchants” of the state of 
Georgia, but also that the Creeks agreed to cede the Lower Creek hunting grounds of the 
east Oconee River. All of the headmen present that day signed the treaty, but whether 
they did so by their own free will is debatable.28 In June 1784, Fat King told Alexander 
                                                 
26 A Talk given by the Tallassee King and Sundry Head Men of the Upper and lower Creek Nation, 
5/28/1782, Augusta, Document TCC260, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
27 Treaty of Augusta With the Creeks, 11/1/1763, Document 7, in “Revolution and Confederation”, ed. 
Colin G. Calloway, in vol. 18 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789, ed. 
Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University of Publications of America, 1994), 372-373 (hereafter cited 
as RC). 
28 Treaty of Augusta with the Creeks, 11/1/1763, Document 7, 372-373, RC. 
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McGillivray that he and his followers were “threatened with instant death if he did not 
comply” with the demands of the American Commissioners at Augusta, and “wishing to 
preserve their own and company’s lives” he and the rest of the headmen consented.29 
Fat King, Tame King, and several Lower Creek towns had met with the American 
Commissioners several times the year before to discuss matters of peace and trade, and 
evidence indicates that Fat King’s accusations of being “threatened by death” when he 
signed the treaty were fabricated. Not only did Fat King desire peace, but he and Tame 
King had sided with the Americans throughout the war. If trade were to fall into the 
hands of Alexander McGillivray, a British loyalist and an outsider to most Creeks, Little 
Tallassee would continue to be the center of Creek trade- not Tallassee or any of the 
former leading Lower Creek towns. Power and town politics were at play during the 
meeting at Augusta in November 1783 and would continue to be so as the Creeks slowly 
navigated a world without the British empire. 
Opposition 
News of the east Oconee land cession reached Little Tallassee by June 1784. 
After receiving a report, “prevailing among the Indians that the Georgians were 
surveying the land on the Oconee under the pretext that Fat King of Cussita and the 
Tallassee King had Ceded it to them and finding them on this Occasion on the point of 
rushing to war,” Alexander McGillivray of Little Tallassee was “determined to call a 
general meeting of the whole nation” to discuss the event in an “amicable manner” and in 
                                                 
29 Alexander McGillivray to an unidentified Georgia official (possibly John Houstoun, Governor of 
Georgia, 1784), 6/30/1784, Little Tallassee, Document TCC901, SNAD. 
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return avoid any unnecessary hostilities. By June 30, McGillivray remained true to his 
word and “thirty-four of the principal towns were assembled” in the town square of Little 
Tallassee.30 The large turnout to Little Tallassee that June signified that the majority of 
the Lower and Creek towns still considered Little Tallassee a place of great diplomatic 
importance as first established by Emistisiguo. 
It was during this meeting that Fat King claimed he was threatened by death if he 
did not sign over the East Oconee lands, but no other headmen or warrior present at 
Augusta supported this claim. After all the headmen present “deliberated on the matter” 
McGillivray informed the Governor of Georgia by letter that the treaty of Augusta was 
considered to be invalid and demanded the surveyors abandoned their posts.31 The 
Oconee lands were ceded by only two chiefs of two towns, and a land cession to the 
Americans could only be validated “by the unanimous voice of the whole, as joint 
proprietors, in common.”32 McGillivray explained to Governor Houstoun that treaties 
could only be ratified by the entire Creek Nation, not two single towns or chiefs. “It 
therefore behooves the Authority of your Government to prevent the consequences of an 
Indian War which will Certainly attend the Settling of the Oconee Lands.”33 His words to 
the Governor made the dissatisfaction of most of the Creeks to the Treaty of Augusta 
clear. 
                                                 
30 Alexander McGillivray to an unidentified Georgia official (possibly John Houstoun, Governor of 
Georgia, 1784), 6/30/1784, Little Tallassee, Document TCC901, SNAD. 
31 Alexander McGillivray to an unidentified Georgia official (possibly John Houstoun, Governor of 
Georgia, 1784), 6/30/1784, Little Tallassee, Document TCC901, SNAD. 
32 Alexander McGillivray to James White, 4/8/1787, Little Tallassee, Document 4, 445, RC. 
33 Alexander McGillivray to an unidentified Georgia official (possibly John Houstoun, Governor of 
Georgia, 1784), 6/30/1784, Little Tallassee, Document TCC901, SNAD. 
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McGillivray had no more power to overturn the Treaty of Augusta than the Fat 
and Tame King did in signing it but the power was reserved to the chiefs of the thirty-
four towns that assembled at Little Tallassee, as well as Governor Houston of Georgia. 
The decision to discredit the Treaty of Augusta was therefore a reflection of the Creek 
majority on the matter, and the letter drafted by McGillivray to Houston the means by 
which they both communicated and exercised their powers to negate any negotiation with 
Americans or Europeans made without the consensus of the entire Creek Confederacy. 
Forging an Alliance with Spain 
Alexander McGillivray of Little Tallassee, Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee, and 
several other Upper Creek towns looked to Spain instead of the new American Republic 
to reestablish peace and a profitable trade in the absence of the British. Little Tallassee 
was the leading town of Gulf Coast-based trade before the outbreak of the American 
Revolution, and McGillivray worked to ensure that Little Tallassee maintained that 
position. Disgruntled over the confiscation of his father’s properties in South Carolina, 
Alexander McGillivray had no interest in forging any ties with the new American Nation 
or any trade promises it had to offer.34 Mad Dog, like any other Creek headman, wanted 
access to a steady supply of trade goods, and in the early winter of 1784 an alliance with 
Spain appeared to be the most plausible option. 
After the Treaty of Paris in 1783, Spain not only held possession of East and West 
Florida, but also the previously British-occupied trading ports of Mobile and Pensacola. 
                                                 
34 Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 246. See also, D.C. Corbitt, Notes and Documents, “Papers Relating 
to the Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1784-1800,” in The Georgia Historical Quarterly, 20:4 (December 1936), 
357-358. (Hereafter cited as GHQ). 
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Emistisiguo had campaigned his entire life for Creek trade along the Gulf Coast, and his 
successful efforts positioned Little Tallassee as a lucrative center of Atlantic trade. If a 
peace alliance was made with Spain in exchange for trade, Little Tallassee would have 
access to Mobile and Pensacola once again. In addition, if Spain agreed to McGillivray, 
Mad Dog, and the rest of leading headmen and warriors of the Upper Creek town’s terms, 
there would be no need to create an entire new trade system as they would need to do 
with the United States.  
As the elected spokesperson for Little Tallassee, McGillivray began to draft an 
alliance with the Spanish in early January 1784. The details were communicated through 
a letter McGillivray addressed to Arturo O’Neil, the newly appointed Governor of 
Pensacola. “I shall offer some reasons to Shew that it would be a good Policy in the 
crown of Spain to Grant us [the Creeks] our desires,” McGillivray penned. Amongst 
those desires, was the “One Principle Consideration” that there “should be a plentiful 
supply of Goods [that] should be carried to trade in the Nation on the footing that the 
English used to do,” McGillivray explained to O’Neil, “for Indians will attach themselves 
to & Serve them best who Supply their Necessities.”35 McGillivray requested that an 
additional “stipulation be made” where “the Indian Trading Merchants remain and carry 
on their trade as usual,” but “it is much more convenient for the Upper Nation to have 
                                                 
35 McGillivray to O’Neil, 1/1/1784, Little Tallassee, in John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 
introduction by William J. Bauer, Jr. (1938: repr., Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 
2007), 64 (Hereafter cited as Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks). 
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trade from West Florida,” and goods be moved from “St. Augustine to Mobile,” where 
the Creeks could easily transport their trade “by water carriage.”36 
The requests made by McGillivray to the Spanish were almost an exact duplicate 
of the arrangement Emistisiguo had configured with the British years before. Shortly 
after the French and Indian War, Emistisiguo had led a delegation of Creeks to Augusta, 
Georgia in 1763 to forge an Anglo-Creek trade alliance based out of England’s newly 
acquired Gulf Coast ports. Emistisiguo continued to champion trade based out of 
Pensacola and Mobile in 1765, where he signed a treaty to seal the deal. When Anglo-
Creek trade was threatened, during a decade of frontier violence between 1765 and 
1775/76 as well as throughout the American Revolution, Emistisiguo orchestrated a 
diplomacy that protected Anglo-Creek trade on the Gulf Coast, whether through peace or 
war. Just as England had replaced France as the major European power in the aftermath 
of the French and Indian War, Spain supplanted England after the American colonies 
gained independence. By opening Anglo-Creek trade out of the Gulf Coast, Little 
Tallassee was already the center of Creek trade by the time Alexander McGillivray had 
assumed his role as spokesperson. All McGillivray needed to do was protect the legacy 
that Emistisiguo had built, not just for Little Tallassee but all Upper Creeks. 
Panton, Leslie, and Company 
 Alexander McGillivray provided an additional advantage to the Creeks if they 
supported his desire to ally with Spain; he had been a silent partner in one of the largest 
                                                 
36 McGillivray to O’Neil, 1/1/1784, Little Tallassee, McGillivray of the Creeks, 65. Water Carriage simply 
meant by boat, rather than the traditional use of pack horses. 
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and most successful Scots led British trade firms of the late eighteenth century and sole 
operator of Creek trade within that firm.37 Panton, Leslie, & Company consisted of five 
original partners, all of whom were Scotsman who had been trading with the 
Southeastern Indians long before the American Revolution. These men were William 
Panton, John Leslie, John Forbes, Charles McLatchy, and William Alexander, and their 
trade with the Indians before the Revolution sprawled from East and West Florida to 
Augusta, Charlestown, and Savannah.38 During the American Revolution, the company 
relocated to East Florida, and funneled ammunition and an assortment of goods for both 
the English Crown and its Southeastern Indian allies through William Panton’s close 
contacts with wealthy London and Glasgow merchants. After the war, Spain granted the 
company permission to remain in East and West Florida, and by 1785 Panton, Leslie, and 
Company had warehouses located in Saint Augustine, St. Marks, Pensacola, Mobile, New 
Orleans, as well as along the Mississippi River. The company even had successful 
warehouses in Nassau and New Providence Island, John Forbes the partner who first took 
the initiative to dabble in Caribbean waters. By the late 1780s, the British firm was 
                                                 
37 Panton offered McGillivray “one-fifth share” of the company’s profits until the time of his death, which 
McGillivray accepted. John Leslie Memorandum, 12/31/1792, Saint Augustine, The Indian Trade in the 
Southeastern Spanish Borderlands Collection, in the Papers of Panton, Leslie and Company, Gale 
Document Number SC5009634675, http://go.galegroup.com.libproxy.uncg.edu (Hereafter cited as the 
Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company). For more information on McGillivray becoming a partner to 
Panton &Leslie, see also McGillivray to O’Neil, 1/3/1784, Little Tallassee, in Caughey, McGillivray of the 
Creeks, 67. McGillivray confirms that appointment when he wrote to O’Neil, “those Gentleman [Panton] 
offered me a part in it” and “They have hopes of succeeding, and I am certain will be good policy to permit 
such a measure by the Court of Spain.” Additional information can be found in William S. Coker & 
Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands: Panton, Leslie & Company 
and John Forbes & Company, 1783-1847, forward by J. Leitch Wright, Jr. (Gainesville, FL: University of 
Florida Press, 1986), 54. In regards to the Spanish government granting sole control over the Creek trade to 
McGillivray, see Michael D. Green, The politics of Indian Removal, 34. 
38 William S. Coker & Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 23-
25. 
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granted an “unofficial commercial monopoly” over the Southeastern Indian trade- and in 
Spain’s last American frontier.39 
 The story behind Alexander McGillivray’s role as a silent partner in the company 
dates to the formation of his home town of Little Tallassee. William Panton was an 
apprentice to John Gordon and Company of Charleston in 1765. Gordon’s partner was 
John McQueen, who not only had several trade stores at Little Tallassee but was a partner 
in Lachlan McGillivray’s successful deerskin trade company, Brown and Rae.40 After 
Panton’s apprenticeship was over, Panton mingled with other successful Indian traders 
and slowly built his career. Among these successful “mercantile adventurers” was 
Lachlan McGillivray, whom Panton met in Charlestown somewhere in the early 1770s 
handling business for Gordon. It was at this point that Panton not only formed a 
friendship with Lachlan McGillivray, but most likely began trading with the town of 
Little Tallassee- the central locale of Anglo-Creek trade. There is no evidence that Panton 
met Alexander McGillivray at the time, but one can speculate the two might have met, 
given the fact that Alexander resided at a nearby cousin’s residence in Charlestown.41 
 For a British owned Indian trade outfit to maintain residency in Spanish territory 
once the American Revolution was over, Panton and his partners knew they had to make 
themselves useful to the region’s new colonial master. Luckily for Panton & Company, 
after the Peace of Paris was signed in 1783 Spain was in desperate need of Indian allies. 
The British generously gave the Americans the right to navigate the Mississippi River as 
                                                 
39 William S. Coker & Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, x-xii. 
40 William S. Coker & Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 15-
17. 
41 William S. Coker & Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 24. 
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well as the territory east of the Mississippi River and south of the Great Lakes. Although 
Spain did receive West Florida, the southern boundary of the United States was marked 
at the 31st parallel and ignited a fierce contest for control over the Mississippi River and 
its nearby territories for nearly two decades. Spain insisted that Britain had no right to 
give away territory that was already claimed as Spanish territory by Bernardo de Galvez 
by right of conquest. Action was taken the following summer, June 1784, when Jose de 
Galvez (minister of the Indies) ordered that American citizens were forbidden to navigate 
the Mississippi River. Spain then declared its own definition of the U.S.-West Florida 
boundary, which is best defined by an outline of the confluence of the Mississippi, Ohio, 
Tennessee, and Flint Rivers.42 Spain was not equipped for a war with the Southeastern 
Indians. They were also in desperate need of some type of buffer to prevent American 
encroachment. To maintain these contested boundaries and control over the Mississippi 
River, Spain needed to make an alliance with the individuals who held real power within 
those boundaries: The Creek Indians and the Panton, Leslie, & Company. 
Spanish officials deliberated the peace overtures made by Panton, McGillivray, 
and his Creek allies with careful examination. Estevan Miro (Governor of Louisiana 
between 1780 to 1782), wrote a letter to Josef de Ezpelete (acting general of Havana until 
1790) that expressed his feelings on the matter. “I beg your Lordship not to forget the 
letter of the half-breed, Don Alejandro McGillivray, in which is shown the urgent 
necessity to befriend the said nations within His Majesty’s dominion,” Miro stated. 
                                                 
42 William S. Coker & Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 2-4. 
Bernardo de Galvez was the Governor of Louisiana during the pre and post American Revolutionary War 
Era. 
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“There is in this province a total lack of Indian effects [merchandise with which to make 
gifts to the Indians] and Your Lordship knows that without them it is impossible to retain 
their friendship and subordination.”43 Governor Miro was not the only Spanish official 
who realized the importance of established trade with the Creeks. Vincent Manuel de 
Zespedes, the Governor of East Florida not only seconded Miro’s advice, but specifically 
argued for Panton, Leslie & Company to be the means of the coveted trade. “It is clear 
the house of Panton and company, who have handled for ten years the trade of this 
province, have much influence over the neighboring Indians,” Zespedes explained to his 
fellow Spanish officials. “If it is desired, therefore, to win effectually the friendship of 
these Indians for ourselves, it would be risky to expel this firm and company at one 
stroke, or even until several years have passed . . .”44 Zespedes logic was sound, but bold 
for a Spanish Governor. 
The men of Panton, Lesile, & Company were not only British Loyalists, but they 
continued to operate out of London, England and Glasgow, Scotland. The Scotsmen, 
however, had the most experience with the Southeastern Indian trade, as well as the 
partnership of an educated and influential Creek man such as Alexander McGillivray. 
McGillivray reminded Spanish officials of that fact in a lengthy letter to an unknown 
Spanish official. “In order to Secure & firmly attach the Nations to the Crown of Spain, 
the first measure that ought to be adopted is by a Well-regulated trade,” McGillivray 
wrote, 
                                                 
43 Estevan Miro to Josef de Ezpeleta, 8/1/1784, Gale Document SC5009617026 
Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company. 
44 Zespedes to Galvez, de Bernardo, 8/16/1784, St. Augustine, Gale Document SC5009617076, Papers of 
Panton, Leslie, and Company. 
260 
 
for which purpose it will be necessary to establish a house in Pensacola the 
Holders of which ought to be permitted to Import English goods to which the 
Indians have long been accustomed & which it will be difficult to wean them 
from the use of, without much discontent . . .45 
 
Treaty at Pensacola 
 On June 1, 1784, a treaty was signed between Spain, McGillivray, and the Creeks 
that cemented the long-awaited alliance. The terms of the treaty appeased both parties. 
The Creeks present at Pensacola agreed to recognize Spain as “their sole protector” in 
exchange for Spain’s pledge to allow the Creeks to continue trading along the Gulf Coast 
with Panton, Leslie, & Company. The terms of the treaty also dictated that the Creeks 
prevent any U.S. citizens without passports from entering the contested territory as well 
as stop any clandestine trade or unapproved navigation of the Mississippi river. Spain 
also acknowledged Creek land claims and promised to assist in the protection of that land 
if any Nation, such as the United States, try to violate those claims. Lastly, a tariff was 
placed on the goods that Panton, Leslie & Company imported and exported, in 
accordance with the value of deerskins at the time.46 
 In addition to these terms, Alexander McGillivray was appointed “commissary of 
the Creek nation,” and was awarded a salary of “fifty pesos monthly” in return for his 
                                                 
45 The use of italics are my own to emphasize McGillivray’s endorsement of the British trade firm. For 
quote usage, see McGillivray to ?, 7/?/1784, Gale Document Number: SC5009616871, Papers of Panton, 
Leslie, and Company. For information in regards to Spain’s tendency to adopt British trade rather than 
create their own system, see Stanley and Barbara Stein, Edge of Crisis: War and Trade in the Spanish 
Atlantic, 1789–1808 (Baltimore, MY: John’s Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
46 Copy of a treaty between the Spanish Government and the Tallapuche (Tallapoosa) Indians. May 31-June 
1, 1784, Pensacola, Gale Document Number: SC5009616759, The Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company; 
Treaty of Pensacola, 6/1/1784, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 75-77. For a good secondary source on 
the treaty, see also William S. Coker & Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish 
Borderlands, 58-59. 
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services.47 As commissary, McGillivray was expected to “use his influence among the 
Creeks” to maintain their allegiance to Spain, as well as promote peaceful and friendly 
relations with their Southeastern Indian neighbors. Spanish officials also negotiated for 
Alexander McGillivray to supervise the Indian trade according to the terms agreed upon 
at Pensacola. McGillivray was ordered to monitor the said company for any suspicious 
activity that might jeopardize Spain’s control over the Indian trade even though Spain 
agreed to let Panton, Leslie, & Company continue as the primary source of Indian trade 
within Spanish and Indian territory.48  
Alexander McGillivray—A Trade Intermediary 
 Alexander McGillivray was indeed the spokesperson for Little Tallassee and 
penned many letters on behalf of the Creeks, which included the correspondence that 
resulted in the above treaty. However, evidence indicates that McGillivray’s authority 
was limited to that of an intermediary only, not the authority of the Creek ‘Nation’ that 
the Spanish envisioned him or as he portrayed himself to be. Only one month prior to the 
signing of the treaty at Pensacola in June of 1784, McGillivray met with a number of 
headmen and warriors from various Upper and Lower Creek towns at Little Tallassee to 
discuss the details of the forthcoming alliance. Little Tallassee was the chosen town for 
                                                 
47 Miro & Estevan to McGillivray, 6/7/1784, Pensacola, Gale Document Number: SC500961683, The 
Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company. For McGillivray’s salary of “fifty monthly pesos”, see Miro to 
Ezpeleta, 8/1/1784, Gale Document Number: SC5009617026, The Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company. 
For “an annual 600 pesos,” see also Miro &Estevan to Galvez, de Bernardo, 8/1/1784, New Orleans, 
Language Spanish, Gale Document Number: SC5009617031, The Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company. 
48 Miro & Estevan to McGillivray, 6/7/1784, Pensacola, Gale Document Number: SC500961683, The 
Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company. See also, William S. Coker & Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders 
of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 59-60. 
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such an important and large-scale assembly, which emphasized that the town had 
cemented its place within Creek society as a sacred and diplomatic space.  
The meeting was documented by McGillivray, in a letter to Arturo O’Neil, 
Governor of Pensacola. “I held a General Meeting with all the Nation last Month, where I 
sent to the Governor of Georgia a positive refusal to everything they desired of us,” 
McGillivray informed O’Neil. “This notice [today] is sent to the greatest Chiefs in the 
Nation, that they prepare to Set off in ten days for Pensacola.”49 Since Creek decisions 
were based on consensus of all headmen and warriors, McGillivray had no authority to 
make any decisions for all the Creeks. The congress was held with the principal headmen 
and warriors of various Creek towns before the treaty was signed at Pensacola, which 
bolsters the notion that the Spanish were mistaken in regards to McGillivray’s authority. 
As a spokesperson and intermediary, McGillivray could organized meetings where Creek 
foreign and domestic affairs would be discussed, but he did so only by the direction of 
the principal headmen and warriors whom he represented. McGillivray performed the 
role of a cultural broker, but all decisions in regards to making an alliance with Spain 
remained in the hands of the Creek headmen, not McGillivray. He could offer advice, but 
that was the extent of his influence among the Creeks in regards to politics. The Spanish, 
                                                 
49 McGillivray to O’Neil, 5/1/1784, Little Tallassee, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 75; In another 
copy of the letter, McGillivray adds that “young warriors” attended the meeting as well as “most capital 
chiefs.” See, McGillivray to Miro, 5/1/1784, Little Tallassee, in Spain in the Mississippi Valley, Vol. 3, 
101. ed. Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1946) (Hereafter 
cited SMV). The italics are my emphasis. 
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strangers to Creek town politics, assumed that McGillivray had more power than he 
actually possessed.50 
 A careful reanalysis of the treaty document itself also serves as evidence that 
McGillivray’s authority among the Creeks was exceedingly exaggerated. The text of the 
treaty documented that Alexander McGillivray was the “principal representative of the 
towns of the Upper Tallapuches, Middle Tallapuches, and Lower Tallapuches, called 
Seminoles or Wanderers.”51 Several notable headmen and their corresponding towns are 
mentioned from the above towns, the most notable being Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee, but 
they were reported to have remained in the nation “having given consent” to Alexander 
McGillivray to treat in their absence. The majority of the Upper Creek towns were 
located on the fall line of the Tallapoosa river valley, but the towns along the Coosa and 
Alabama Rivers were conspicuously absent.52 Not only did significant towns choose not 
to align themselves with McGillivray and the Tallipoosas, but “consent” to the treaty 
rested in the hands of the headmen and warriors of the respected Upper Creek towns – 
not Alexander McGillivray. 
                                                 
50 Kathleen Duval discusses the Treaty of Pensacola in her latest book, Independence Lost. Her analysis 
does indicate that Alexander McGillivray did not have as much authority as he claimed to have, but she 
argues that McGillivray’s treaty held more weight than the former held at Augusta in 1763 by the Tallassee 
and Fat King. Her argument is that “while fourteen Creeks signed in Augusta,” and only “McGillivray did 
at Pensacola, “the Pensacola treaty was more representative of the Creek Confederacy for “Creek headmen 
from every town participated in the negotiations.” This assertion ignores the fact that Tallassee and Fat 
King had the support of their entire towns, as well as the fact that the number of towns present at Pensacola 
are not known. Duval wrote that “McGillivray signed as their legitimate representative,” but she does not 
discuss of which Creeks he was representing. See, Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost, 257-258 for more 
on this historiographical discussion. 
51 Copy of a treaty between the Spanish Government and the Tallapuche Indians. May 31-June 1, 1784, 
Pensacola, Gale Document Number: SC5009616759, The Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company. 
52 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of 
North Carolina Press), 68-69. 
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As a matter of fact, European sources throughout the latter half of the 1780s 
indicate that if there was any one town or individual that had more influence over any 
other particular Upper Creek town it was Mad Dog and the town of Tuckabatchee. In 
May 1786, Governor O’Neil acknowledged McGillivray to have been the “Commissary 
of the Creek Indians,” but stated to the Minister of the Indies that “Mad Dog of the Chief 
of the Indian Village of Tuckabache” was the one he considered to be “of most 
importance in the said [Creek] Nation.”53 Similarly, in November the same year, a letter 
was drafted by a Frenchmen who referred to Mad Dog as the “king and chief of the 
whole Nation,” which supported O’Neil’s observation.54 That McGillivray was noted as 
commissioner, not a headmen of a town or the Creeks as a whole, was a strong indication 
that real political power resided with Mad Dog, Tuckabatchee, as well as other village 
headmen. Alexander McGillivray served as a conduit between the two nations, his town 
of Little Tallassee the center of a new budding Creek-Spanish trade. McGillivray was 
something more akin to a mouthpiece for Creek headmen and warriors such as Mad Dog. 
Vincent Folch, Governor of Mobile, commented on McGillivray’s tendency to 
exaggerate his role among the Creeks in a letter he wrote to Arturo O’Neil: “The disease 
                                                 
53 O’Neil to Galvez, 5/30/1786, Pensacola, in “Papers From the Spanish Archives Relating to the Tennessee 
and the Old Southwest, 1783-1800” edited and translated by D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, in The East 
Tennessee Historical Society’s Publications (Knoxville, TN: East Tennessee Historical Society, 1937), No. 
9, 139-140 (Hereafter ETHS). 
54 Within this document, Alexander McGillivray is noted to be one of three other commissioners, whom the 
author wrote “These four are white.” The four being Jacob Maganaque, Joseph Cornel, Richard Belly, and 
Alexander McGillivray. See, Linder to Favrot, 11/13/1786, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 137; Mr. 
J. Linder, “Senior” to Pedro Favrot, 11/13/1786, Tensaw, SMV, Vol. 3, 190. 
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of wishing to be king has possessed him as a great delirium.”55 Folch’s comment was 
short and sarcastic, but based on the evidence one cannot deny the truth of his words. 
The “delirium” was real. McGillivray manipulated the privileges bestowed on 
him as Commissioner to the Creeks in order to bolster his own individual power and 
authority within Creek society. As a Spanish commissary McGillivray was the 
intermediary between the Spanish and the Creeks when it came to gift distribution. More 
specifically, if a headman of a particular town was in need of ammunition, McGillivray 
would be the one to write to the Governor at St. Augustine or Pensacola to convince the 
Spanish of the necessity of such coveted items.56 For example, McGillivray wrote to 
Zespedes on behalf of a request made by the headmen of Chiaja and Usiche, and in return 
the Governor of East Florida replied: “I will continue attentively giving powder and balls 
and other presents . . . to whoever gives me a letter from you for the purpose.”57 Within 
Creek society, the ability to access and distribute European goods was a highly respected 
skill, but not one that automatically resulted in being recognized as a town headman. 
McGillivray, utilized his position as a commissary and his ability to both read and write 
in such a way that Creek headmen were more often left with no choice but to rely on him 
as the recognized intermediary in regard to gift distribution. Although McGillivray’s 
access to trade allowed him to manipulate Creek trade, it did not promote him to any 
position of authority within the Creek Confederacy. Only traditional spiritual 
                                                 
55 Folch to Miro, 7/2/1789, Fort of San Estevan, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 242. Vincente Folch 
was the nephew of Arturo O’Neil. 
56 Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 75-76. 
57 Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 76. 
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accomplishments of success in hunting and war could enable a man to eventually be 
considered a headman. 
The ability to regulate trade was the second method Alexander McGillivray 
employed to direct power within Creek Country in his direction. According to the articles 
of the recent Treaty at Pensacola, all traders were to report to Alexander McGillivray to 
receive their license. The Scots Indian’s tight business relationship with Panton & Leslie 
& Company also served to tighten McGillivray’s control over Creek trade. By 1787 the 
company had an unofficial monopoly over the Southeastern Indian trade, and 
McGillivray himself even resorted to violent means to help protect that monopoly as well 
as his share of profits as a silent partner.58 Tustanagee Thlucco (Big Warrior) commented 
on McGillivray and Panton’s systematized efforts to ensure their control of the Indian 
trade when he remarked that the partners “were always giving out talks, to keep the trade 
in their hands.”59 American agent Daniel Murphy, known to the Indians as “Yellow Hair” 
dispatched a letter to Govenor O’Neil on the topic of the monopoly. Murphy stated, 
 
. . . the Traders requiring to show their Lycences When I found they had not any 
from the State of Georgia, but had a Lycense from Alexander McGillivray. The 
said traders to be subject to him & no other & to observe the regulations given by 
former Superintendents.60 
                                                 
58 Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 77-78. 
59 Copy of a talk from Big Warrior to General Twiggs, 4/20/1793, in American State Papers, Documents, 
Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, from the First Session of the First to the 
Third Session of the Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1789, and Ending March 3, 
1815, ed. Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), Vo1. 1, 
401. (Hereafter cited as ASPIA, volume number, page number). See also, Claudio Saunt, A New Order, 77.  
60 McMurphy to O’Neil, 7/11/1786, Lower Creek Nation, Gale Document Number SC5009620493, The 
Papers of Panton, Leslie, And Company. 
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McGillivray strived to protect Creek trade out of self-interest. Not only did he 
withhold licenses from individual traders, but he also refused to sell or distribute 
gunpowder to Creek towns that opposed him. To carry out these unsavory tactics, 
McGillivray formed a private group of “constables” to either reward or punish those who 
supported or challenged his trade monopoly. Alexander McGillivray also organized a 
group of constables to serve as personal body guards, as McGillivray reported to uncover 
several plots to assassinate him. Other times, the same constables that protected 
McGillivray also acted as executioners as he did not hesitate to eliminate his enemies.61 
The use of both a private police force and essentially placing a trade embargo on Creek 
towns that opposed Panton, Leslie, and Company came with repercussions. Over time, 
dissent within the Upper Creek community spread and Creeks gradually moved away 
from Little Tallassee.62 As Creek men and women no longer felt safe within their own 
town, Little Tallassee started to lose its place within the Creek community as a sacred 
space. 
Alexander McGillivray was not just an intermediary, but the resident trader of 
Little Tallassee. McGillivray’s mother Sehoy was a Creek from the prominent Wind clan, 
but this did not grant him any status within Creek society as a headman. In fact, the only 
difference between McGillivray and his father Lachlan besides McGillivray’s Creek 
blood, was the fact he used unsavory means to enforce his trade monopoly. Control and 
                                                 
61Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis (Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 33-34; McGillivray to Zepedes, 11/15/1786, Little Tallassee, in 
Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 139. For more information on the role of constables, see also Green, 
“Alexander McGillivray,” in American Indian Leaders, 51. Attempts on McGillivray’s life, see also, 
McGillivray to O’Neil, 3/4/1787, Little Tallassee, in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 144-145. 
62 Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian Removal, 34. 
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or access to trade meant nothing within Creek society without traditional 
accomplishments in hunting and warfare. Additionally, respect by prominent headman 
and warriors was necessary. By the mid-1780s, McGillivray had clearly abused his 
connections to Panton, Leslie, and Company, rather than implementing trade policies 
based on consensus that benefitted not only Little Tallassee, but all Creek towns.  
Galphinton 
 During spring 1785, land encroachment by citizens of Georgia into Creek Country 
significantly increased. Frustrated that only Congress could treat with the Indians for 
land, not the states, many individuals of Georgia disregarded the laws of Congress and 
treated Creek Country as their own. In late April, Alexander McGillivray authored a 
letter to the American official William Clark about his concerns regarding encroachment, 
the Ogeechee lands in particular. “I must observe that the nation in their Talks protested 
in the strongest manner against your people settling over the old Boundary of Ogeechee,” 
McGillivray wrote, “The Indians are extremely tenacious of their hunting grounds, of 
which that between Oconee and Ogeechee form a principal part and on which they 
generally take three thousand Deer Skins yearly.” In the same letter, McGillivray backed 
his request up with the threat of military action. The Scots Indian informed Clark that 
since the Creeks had formed an “alliance and friendship” with the “Spanish Nation,” 
Spain was ready to “stand engaged and protect our territories entire to us.” McGillivray 
concluded his letter as follows: “All this I beg leave to submit to the consideration of 
your legislature, tis my sincere wishes that the result of their deliberations will tend to 
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remove the horrid effect of a savage war to a great distance.”63 Encroachment simply was 
not to be tolerated by the Creeks. Access to an abundance of deer was crucial for Creek 
hunters to trade. McGillivray’s actions to ward off Georgia encroachment protected his 
personal interests in that trade while simultaneously expressing the concerns of both 
Upper and Lower Creek headmen. 
 To alleviate tension between the Creeks and the state of Georgia, three newly 
appointed members of the American Continental congress sent a request to Little 
Tallassee to meet them at a new town called Galphinton.64 The three members of 
Congress were Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin, and Benjamin Hawkins, who would 
become the Superintendent of Southeastern Indian Affairs in the 1790s. The invitation 
was addressed not to McGillivray, but the “to the Kings, Headmen and Warriors of the 
Creeks,” and the purpose of the summoning was “for making peace with you” and 
“removing between us all causes of future Contention & Quarrels.”65 Congress also 
communicated through its correspondence that the Creeks were welcomed into the 
“favor” and “protection” of the United States, a response directed most likely to 
McGillivray’s recent letter that implied that American encroachment on Indian land was 
to be answered with both Creek and Spanish force.66  
                                                 
63 Alexander McGillivray to William Clark, 4/24/1785, Tuckabatchee, Gale Document Number 
SC5009619354, The Papers of Panton, Leslie, and Company. 
64 Galphinton was located west of the Ogeechee River and named after George Galphin, a veteran Creek 
trader who served as an agent to Congress during the American Revolution. See, Duval, Independence 
Lost, 299. 
65 Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin to The Kings, Headmen, and Warriors of the 
Creeks, 5/10/1785, Charleston, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 96. 
66 Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin to The Kings, Headmen, and Warriors of the 
Creeks, 5/10/1785, Charleston, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 96. Emphasis mine. 
270 
 
 On September 5, Alexander McGillivray wrote to Andrew Pickens and informed 
him that he and the Creeks declined to meet him at Galphinton. The reason being, 
McGillivray professed, was that the Americans were simply too late in their peace 
overtures and interests in Creek trade.67 “When we found that the American 
independency was confirmed by the peace, we expected that the new Government would 
soon have taken some steps to make up the differences that subsisted between them and 
the Indians during the war,” McGillivray wrote. These steps included taking the Creeks 
“into protection and confirm to them their hunting grounds,” as Spain had done at 
Pensacola in 1784. “I am sorry to observe that violence and prejudice had taken the place 
of good policy and reason,” McGillivray explained, and the talks given by the state of 
Georgia, “breathed nothing to us but vengeance . . . as [if] we were wholy at their 
mercy”68 As a result, “as a free nation,” McGillivray emphasized, the Creeks opted for an 
alliance with Spain, which guaranteed by treaty to protect Creek hunting grounds, 
territory and boundaries, as well as “grant free trade in the ports of the Floridas.”69 In 
other words, there was simply no need to form an alliance with another country, such as 
the United States, when Spain already agreed to meet all Creek requests and allowed for 
the continuation of Creek trade via Panton, Leslie, & Company and Little Tallassee.70 
                                                 
67 “Delayed on your parts,” was the exact phrase McGillivray used to describe American tardiness. 
Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens, 9/5/1785, Little Tallassee, ASPIA, Vol. 1, 20. 
68 Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens, 9/5/1785, Little Tallassee, ASPIA, Vol. 1, 20. 
69 Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens, 9/5/1785, Little Tallassee, ASPIA, Vol. 1, 20. 
70 It is significant to note that McGillivray did not trust the Americans in any form. The Americans, also, 
had preconceived notions as to how much power he held over the Upper Creeks, asking him for a personal 
interview. He wrote: “The Americans likewise have twice Invited us to a conference pretending that they 
desire an amicable adjustment of our differences in preference to war, but having reason to distrust the 
sincerity of their professions, I have declined all proposals tending to a personal Interview.” See, 
McGillivray to Farvot, 11/8/1786, SMV, Vol. 3, 188-189. 
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 Mad Dog and several other Creek towns approved of McGillivray’s position in 
regards to Galphinton, and in all likelihood, asked him to decline the American’s 
invitation on their behalf. McGillivray dispatched a letter to Governor Miro in early May 
1786, which informed Miro that Mad Dog had held a council at Tuckabatchee the prior 
year, where all headmen and warriors present unanimously agreed an alliance with the 
Americans was not an option. “The Great Chief called the Mad Dog presiding at the 
council,” McGillivray’s letter stated, and “accordingly the Chiefs of the following towns 
[being those that always decide on National affairs of Importance] assembled at 
Tuckabatchee.”71 During the council, McGillivray claimed that he advised Mad Dog to 
opt for defensive measures over peace with the Americans. According to McGillivray, 
the “most decided measures in defense of & preservation of so Great a part of our Lands” 
for the Americans had “by fraud and Violence possessed themselves” of Creek land.72 
McGillivray’s words reflected war to be the best option to deal with American 
encroachment on Creek land, not diplomatic talks or treaties. He wrote to Miro that, “to 
prevent future evil being the General policy of all Nation it is our duty to Check the 
Americans in time before they get too Strong for us to Contest with Them.” Warriors 
present at the Tuckabatchee assembly were then instructed to “Set out in every direction 
to Where ever the Americans were Settled and where they were forming New 
                                                 
71 The following towns according to McGillivray included “Abechooches, Natchez, Coosaws, Upper 
Eufaules, Waccokoy, Weokey, Hillabee, Okchoy, Okfuskee, Kyalejie, Great Eufaules, Toushatchie, 
Ottapie, Cluewally Talessies, Coosadas.” Italics in the text are mine. McGillivray to Miro, 5/1/1786, Little 
Tallassee, in D.C. Corbitt, “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” in ETHS 9 (1937): 131-134. Quote taken 
from 132.  
72 McGillivray to Miro, 5/1/1786, Little Tallassee, “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHS 9 (1937): 
131-134. Quote taken from 133. 
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establishments . . . the Oconee Lands were the first [to be] visited.”73 Although 
McGillivray admitted that the deployment of several hundred warriors might have 
appeared to be “a declaration of war,” he ensured Miro that “is not yet our intention & 
which is evident from not pushing the affair to the extent we Might have done . . .” This 
decision, McGillivray added, was “unanimously resolved” to be “adopted” by all 
headmen and warriors present.74 
All evidence considered, the resolution not to treat at Galphinton was not 
McGillivray’s, but that of Mad Dog and the majority of the Upper Creek towns. Given 
that McGillivray was famous for projecting an image of being the sole leader of the 
Creek ‘Nation’ throughout his writings, it is no surprise that he wrote that he “advised” 
Mad Dog and the headmen during the meeting a Tuckabatchee - not vice versa. As a 
spokesperson for Tallassee his wisdom was welcomed during the assembly, but the 
decision to make war or peace was always town based. Warriors would also not be 
dispatched without the authority of their head warrior, in this case, Mad Dog. That 
meeting was held at Tuckabatchee, not at Little Tallassee, served as an indication that the 
initial idea not to make peace with the Americans was from Mad Dog. 
 The Creeks had every reason not to enter an alliance with the Americans. 
Preservation of Creek hunting grounds and access to a continuous and steady trade was 
essential for the Creeks during the Post-Revolutionary War period. McGillivray’s 
reference to the Creeks once again as a “free nation” gave the letter a European flare, but 
                                                 
73 McGillivray to Miro, 5/1/1786, Little Tallassee, “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHS 9 (1937): 
131-134. Quote taken from 133. 
74 McGillivray to Miro, 5/1/1786, Little Tallassee, “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHS 9 (1937): 
131-134. 
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it did serve the interest of many of the Upper Creek towns. Gulf Coast trade and a British 
company like Panton & Leslie were familiar and reliable.75 The new American nation 
was an unknown to the Creeks, and the trade between the two non-existent- a gamble 
many were not willing to take. 
 Not all Creeks shared the sentiment of McGillivray and his Upper Creek allies. 
In November 1785, Fat King, Tame King, as well as the notable Hollowing King of 
Coweta and a few Lower Creek towns met American Congressmen and Georgia 
commissioners at Galphinton. The meeting resembled that of Augusta two years prior, 
that granted the Oconee lands that were disputed by McGillivray, Mad Dog, and other 
Upper Creek towns. In addition, the new treaty signed in November 1785 included a 
cession south of the Altamaha River, lands which belonged to both the Creeks and 
Spanish Florida. In return, the Georgians promised to leave all other Creek lands alone.76 
Although neither the Fat, Tame, or Hollowing King desired to cede any Creek hunting 
grounds, the promise of peace with Georgia and the Americans in their minds outweighed 
the alternative. The ninth article of the treaty also guaranteed the Creeks a steady trade, 
although the details behind that trade were not discussed.77 Regardless, these three 
                                                 
75 William Panton was officially given a license by the Spanish to trade on October 4th, 1785. The treaty of 
Pensacola in 1784 already guaranteed that Panton, Leslie, and Company were to continue trading in the 
Gulf Coast as they had during British occupation, but McGillivray and the Creeks must have known that 
the Spanish were not far from making the companies license to trade official. See, The Intendant-General 
Martin Navarro to the Conde de Galvez, 10/4/1765, New Orleans, in “Papers Relating to the Georgia-
Florida Frontier, 1784-1800,” ed. and trans. D.C. Corbitt, The Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. 21. No. 1 
(March, 1937), 78. (Hereafter cited as GHQ). 
76 There was a total of fifteen headmen present. To see the articles of the treaty and the list of the treaty 
signers, see Treaty of Galphinton, 11/12/1785, in RC, 390-391. 
77 Article 9 read as follows “That the trade with the said Indians shall be carried on as heretofore.” Treaty 
of Galphinton, 11/12/1785, in RC, 390-391. Although details behind the trade were not discussed in the 
Treaty itself, all ten treaty articles reflected the Treaty at Augusta in 1783, which allows one to safely 
conclude the trade would be carried out of Augusta.  
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headmen whose traditional roles within Creek society were to maintain peaceful 
diplomatic relations with outsiders, the Treaty of Galphinton secured harmony between 
the Creeks and the new and quickly expanding United States. The treaty was therefore 
signed on November 12 by all fifteen headmen present.78 Given the large turnout of 
Lower Creeks at Galphinton, it seems clear that these Lower towns wanted their own 
trade and the Americans could provide it, just as the British had done before via 
Augusta.79 
Escalation of Frontier Violence 
 By early March the following year, news of the recent land cession to the 
Americans by the fifteen Lower Creek headmen reached Little Tallassee. McGillivray 
was quick to inform Spanish officials that the headmen present (Fat King and Tame King 
in particular) were “not authorized to make such Grant,” and that treaty once again was 
not legitimate, for “the Governor of that State [Georgia]” was “left to finish the treaty,” 
and only members of the American Congress had the power to authorize the cession of 
Indian land.80 Mad Dog and McGillivray at this time had already dispatched warriors to 
prevent further land encroachment, but Galphinton propelled Creek warriors to mobilize 
in greater numbers. McGillivray wrote to O’Neil on behalf of the Creeks and declared the 
                                                 
78 Treaty of Galphinton, 11/12/1785, in RC, 390-391; Kathleen Duval, Independence Lost, 299-301. 
79 For a list of Lower Creek headmen who signed the treaty of Galphinton, see Treaty of Galphinton, 
11/12/1785, in RC, 391. 
80 McGillivray to O’Neil, 3/28/1786, Little Tallassee, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 105; 
McGillivray to Miro, 5/1/1786, Little Tallassee, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 107. For more 
information on the powers of Congress and the Articles of Confederation verses the states, see “Report of 
Committee on Southern Indians,” 8/3/1787, in RC., 454-455. Within this document it is stated that 
“Congress shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the trade and managing all affairs 
with the Indians, not members of any of the States.” See also “Report of the Secretary of War on the 
Southern Indians,” 7/18/1787, in RC, 449-451. For a good discussion on this issue, see Kathleen Duval, 
Independence Lost, 333. 
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following: “We the Chiefs of the Nation have come to a resolution in this last general 
meeting to take arms in our defense & repel those Invaders of our Lands, to drive them 
from their encroachments fix them within their own limits.”81 
 Angry that McGillivray once again used the power of the pen to undermine yet 
another peace overture, Fat King of Cussita had a talk of his dispatched to John Galphin 
to both confirm the alliance formed at Galphinton as well as warn the Americans he 
suspected the Spanish to have armed Mad Dog’s warriors with ammunition for their 
frontier raids. Fat King reported that the Spanish had sent Cussita “a bad talk” that invited 
them to “come Down to murder the white people on the frontiers” and that they will 
provide “guns and ammunition” to all who chose to participate. According to his 
knowledge, “two parties” had already “gone out to kill people on the upper parts of 
Georgia and killed two white men on the Cumberland.” The talk ended with Fat King ’s 
promise to continue “hold the Virginia people by the hand” and “will always let them 
know when there is a bad talk in the Nation.”82 The Second Man of Coweta delivered Fat 
King ’s message to John Galphin, which is a significant indication that the town of 
Coweta as well as the rest of the towns that were present at Galphinton in November of 
1785 supported the talk. The Creek “Nation” that McGillivray had mentioned in his letter 
to O’Neil, was far from a nation and as Fat King ’s talk demonstrates that individual 
Creek towns continued protect and act on their own self-interests, as well as serve as a 
reflection of an obvious split between the Upper and LoweR Creek towns. 
                                                 
81 McGillivray to O’Neil, 3/28/1786, Little Tallassee, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 104. 
82 Copy of the Cussita (i.e., Cussita King’s talk delivered to John Galphin, 4/11/1786, document TCC205, 
the Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
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 The Spanish did arm the Creeks in their frontier raids, but in secret. Spain still 
needed to abide by terms agreed upon at Pensacola, for they needed the Creeks to remain 
as a buffer against American expansion. Trade with Panton, Leslie, & Company was also 
running smoothly, which secured the majority of the Upper Creeks allegiance to Spain. “I 
must warn you on the point of giving help to the Indian Nations against the Americans,” 
Conde de Galvez wrote to Miro on the subject, “it must be reduced to the least which can 
be given them, without compromising ourselves in any manner with them.” Galvez 
continued, “they may be given power, balls, and other things, which we may supply them 
as they were included in the trade with them, doing it nevertheless with the greatest 
secrecy and dissimulation.”83 Zespedes, Governor of East Florida, supported Galvez’s 
decision to discretely arm the Creeks. He wrote to McGillivray in mid-May that he “may 
rest assured” that he would continue to “attentively give powder and balls and other 
presents.”84 
 Mad Dog’s warriors and those of the allied Upper Creek towns used this steady 
supply of ammunition from Spain to fuel their campaign against encroaching Georgia 
settlers. An anonymous letter by a “Gentleman of Augusta” drafted to “another at 
Charleston” on May 16, 1786, provides a detailed and relatively unbiased account of the 
                                                 
83 Conde de Galvez to Miro, 5/20/1786, Mexico, “Papers from the Spanish Archives, 1783-1800,” trans. 
and ed. by D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, The East Tennessee Historical Society. No 9, 136-137. 
Bernardo de Galvez was made Conde de Galvez and Captain General of Cuba, Louisiana, and Florida after 
his position of Governor of Louisiana and service during the American Revolution. He was also minister of 
the Indies during the 1780s. 
84 Zespedes noted that there were few guns available but that he “took care that sufficient number were 
sent” to him. Zespedes to McGillivray, 5/22/1786, St. Augustine, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 113. 
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Creek raids.85 It is clear from the gentleman’s account that the violence was escalating 
specifically in the contested Oconee territory. Governor Telfair of Georgia reported a 
force of “about 300” Creeks West of Oconee and that Colonel Clarke and his “150 men” 
were “obliged to fall back and send a request to Washington County for reinforcement.” 
Three other large parties of Indians were noted to have crossed over the Oconee river and 
“some 65 miles from Augusta,” the “general opinion” that they intended to “loot” the 
town.86 McGillivray’s correspondence with Miro confirms that warriors were dispatched 
to the Oconee lands, as well as the Cumberland and “a place called Muscle Shoals” a new 
American settlement located in Northern Alabama.87 
Peace Overtures and Shoulder Bone Creek 
Fat King and Tame King refused to allow Mad Dog and McGillivray’s frontier 
violence to spoil their plans for peace with the Americans. In June and August 1786, both 
Lower Creek headmen sent several talks to American officials that explained they 
continued to desire peaceful relations in regards to their Georgia neighbors, and both 
headmen resolved to do their best to remedy the recent disturbances committed by the 
Upper Creek towns. “We remember the talks we have had together as Eating Drinking 
and Smoking in friendship together, as we will continue although there has been some 
                                                 
85 The Augusta Gentleman wrote the following: “It is clear beyond peradventure of doubt that for a long 
time the Georgians have being provoking the Indians and that they have long desired a pretext for seizing 
the hatchet.” This statement along with a purely factual account of his knowledge of the frontier raids have 
allowed me to draw this conclusion and find it to be a valuable account of the violence in Georgia during 
the spring of 1786. See, A Gentleman of Augusta, Georgia, to Another at Charleston, 5/16/1786, in 
Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 111. 
86 A Gentleman of Augusta, Georgia, to Another at Charleston, 5/16/1786, in Caughey, McGillivray of the 
Creeks, 111-112. 
87 McGillivray to Miro, 5/1/1786, Little Tallassee, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 109. 
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bad talks here among us,” Tame King related to American Agent Daniel Murphy.88 “We 
still remember friendly talks, which we had together at Ogeechee in particular . . . we 
there agreed that whenever we Saw a white man to hold our and to him,” for “we agreed 
upon for the benefit of our woman and children,” Fat King added, his talk supported by 
“the headmen and principle warriors of ten towns” of which he was appointed to be the 
“chosen speaker” on their behalf.89 
Although most of the Lower Towns, except for Tallassee, desired “nothing but 
peace and a clear path between us [the Americans]” Fat King asked the officials to “give 
us time” before any alliance to deal with Alexander McGillivray. During a meeting held 
at the Cussita town Square in August, Fat King described the “obstacle” to the Americans 
as follows: “McGilvery is an Indian that has brought the Nation to a great disturbance . . . 
we must settle this among us.”90 The Lower Creek headmen knew that Alexander 
McGillivray did not act alone in regards to the late frontier violence, but they were 
familiar with his propensity to filibuster all of their previous peace treaties and his 
formidable allies, like Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee. The Tallassee King and Fat King 
needed to quell any festering suspicions the Americans might have of their roles in the 
recent violent affairs. Fat King informed agent McMurphy that he and the Lower towns 
planned to “meet the headmen of the upper towns” as soon as the arrangement could be 
                                                 
88 A Talk from the kings, beloved men, and warriors of the Upper Towns [of the Creek Nation], the 
Tallassee King [acting as] speaker, 6/25/1786, Document TCC207, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
89 A Talk from the kings, beloved men and warriors of the Lower Creek Nations, Fat King as speaker, 
6/4/1786, Document TCC206, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
90 The exact quotation reads as follows “We Desire nothing but peace and Clear path between us you must 
give us time as McGillivray is an Indian that has brought the Nation into a great disturbance.” A Talk from 
the Lower Towns in the Creek Nation, 8/11/1786, Document TCC026, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
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made for “they are the people that must settle the matters as to what mischief was 
done.”91 In the headman’s opinion it was the “upper towns,” and McGillivray that were 
responsible for violating the agreements made between the Creeks and the Americans at 
Galphinton and Augusta in 1783 and 1785; not Tallassee King, Fat King, and the ten 
Lower Towns aligned with them. McGillivray and the Upper Creeks were not parties to 
those American treaties, the Tallassee King and Fat King were. 
 Tame King and Fat King did get their chance to make amends with the 
Americans. In late October 1787, fifteen Creek towns led by Fat and Tallassee King 
gathered at the tributary of the Oconee River known as Shoulderbone Creek to make 
peace with their Georgia neighbors for the third time in five years. A total of three 
hundred Creeks were estimated to be in attendance, including “men, women, and 
children.”92 The Georgia commissioners announced that it was their “sincere wish to 
make up the quarrel which has subsisted between our people and our nation for some 
time past,” but since the past two treaties were not honored, they were “sorry, to have to 
say” that they were “disappointed.”93 The terms of Shoulderbone were to be the same as 
those at Augusta and Galphinton, the commissioners having clearly stated that they 
“expected what was then agreed upon would have been carried into effect,” as well as 
“satisfaction for six of our People killed by yours last spring.”94 The alleged murders that 
                                                 
91 A Talk from the kings, beloved men and warriors of the Lower Creek Nations, Fat King as speaker, 
6/4/1786, Document TCC206, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
92 Linder to Favrot, 11/13/1786, Tensaw, SMV, Vol. 3, 139. 
93 A Talk to the Kings, Headmen, and Warriors of the Creek Nation, on Shoulder Bone Creek, near Oconee 
River, 10/21/1786, Shoulderbone, Document TCC117, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
94 A Talk to the Kings, Headmen, and Warriors of the Creek Nation, delivered by the Commissioners 
appointed by the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, 10/23/1786, Shoulderbone, Document 
TCC119, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
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were carried out by the Creeks were no doubt committed by the allied Upper Creek 
towns, but the Americans wanted the perpetrators put to death regardless of their town 
affiliation. 
 To ensure these terms were met, the Georgia Commissioners turned to violence 
and intimidation. An army of near “three thousand armed Americans” were “hidden 
nearby,” and surrounded the entire Shoulderbone settlement.95 The Commissioners 
claimed that they were provoked by McGillivray to display force during the treaty 
negotiations, for he acknowledged “the murders were committed by his direction” and 
approved by all since he was the “voice of the Creek Nation.”96 “It is owing to what this 
man has said that we have drawn out the numerous Army of warriors which you saw two 
days ago and whom we are determined not to send home until we get satisfaction for the 
injuries we have sustained,” the commissioners explained to Tame King and Fat King 
during the Shoulderbone assembly.97 The Georgians also claimed that the American 
Congress was “bound to assist” them “when we make war with your Nation,” although 
this claim was farfetched for Congress was not present at Shoudlerbone nor did they 
support war with the Creeks at this time.98 An account of the episode written a month 
later by Alexander McGillivray reported that Tame King gave a “furious Talk” in 
response to hostile environment the commissioners placed his fellow Creeks in, which 
                                                 
95 Linder to Favrot, 11/13/1786, Tensaw, SMV, Vol. 3, 189. 
96 A Talk to the Kings, Headmen, and Warriors of the Creek Nation, on Shoulder Bone Creek, near Oconee 
River, 10/21/1786, Shoulderbone, Document TCC117, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
97 A Talk to the Kings, Headmen, and Warriors of the Creek Nation, on Shoulder Bone Creek, near Oconee 
River, 10/21/1786, Shoulderbone, Document TCC117, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
98 A Talk to the Kings, Headmen, and Warriors of the Creek Nation, on Shoulder Bone Creek, near Oconee 
River, 10/21/1786, Shoulderbone, Document TCC117, Telamon Cuyler Collection, SNAD. 
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“frightened the Georgians from their purpose of keeping them and made them some 
presents and bid them go home.”99 Fat King, indeed, left Shoulderbone that day, but 
many headmen remained behind and on the third of November of 1786 fifty-five 
headmen signed the treaty that ceded the Oconee lands and approved the execution of six 
Creeks “responsible” for the recent frontier murders.100 
 Within less than a week, Daniel McMurphy and his interpreter John Galphin 
arrived in Tuckabatchee “for the purpose of calling a meeting of the chiefs” to inform and 
demand that the entire Creek Nation abide by the terms agreed upon at Shoulderbone.101 
McMurphey’s choice of Tuckabatchee as the town to deliberate the news, rather than 
Little Tallassee, was significant. Tuckabatchee was Mad Dog’s home town as well as the 
former meeting ground for diplomacy, before Little Tallassee replaced it under the 
leadership of Emistisiguo. After the death of Little Tallassee’s respected warrior, 
diplomat, and headman, the town began to lose its place as a space where diplomacy was 
conducted. Alexander McGillivray garnered a successful Euro-Creek trade for Little 
Tallassee during the immediate post-Revolutionary War period, but by the mid to late 
1780s he had abused his position as Little Tallassee’s resident trader. As McGillivray’s 
unsavory trade tactics began to create more enemies than allies, the Creek population of 
                                                 
99 Alexander McGillivray commented on the Tallassee King’s behavior as follows: “Tame King for once in 
his life time behaved like a man.” This statement is a bit ironic, for McGillivray was by no means a “man” 
according to Creek tradition or custom. His words did discredit the Tallassee King’s creditability as a 
headman, however, which was a common theme seen in McGillivray’s letters as well as in his attempts to 
centralize his own power. McGillivray to Governor O’Neill, 12/3/1786, in RC, 437; Caughey, McGillivray 
of the Creeks, 140. 
100 John Houston, “camp” near the Oconee, 10/26/1786, Keith Reid Collection, SNAD. For the list of 
headmen who signed the treaty at Shoulderbone as well as its terms, see Treaty of Shoulderbone with the 
Creek Indians, 11/3/1786, RC, 433-436. 
101 Letter Alexander McGillivray to John Habersham, Tuckabatches, 11/28/1786, Document TCC905, 
SNAD. 
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Little Tallassee and neighboring towns dwindled. By the winter of 1786 Little Tallassee 
began to resemble a trade community rather than a traditional Creek town and sacred 
space. There is no known evidence or clues in the documentary record that indicate who 
might have been the next headman of Little Tallassee. The position was oddly left vacant. 
The Creek town of Little Tallassee seemed to rise and fall along with the key personality 
who had once resided there: Emistisiguo.102 
 Alexander McGillivray was present at Tuckabatchee when McMurphey arrived 
and after the headmen and warriors heard the news, McGillivray fulfilled his duties as the 
Creek’s chosen spokesperson and communicated their refusal to abide by any of 
Shoulderbone’s terms. In a letter addressed to the Governor of Georgia, McGillivray 
explained that the rest of the Creek towns not present at Shoulderbone refused to cede the 
Oconee lands nor give any satisfaction for the death of any Georgian. “These demands 
affect our leaders of the first distinction and their friends,” McGillivray wrote, “now in 
their absence I loudly declare that if it is persisted in they will Swell the list of your killed 
tenfold. Better to die like men seeking revenge than at home like dogs.”103 
 
 
                                                 
102 Michael D. Green stated that “After McGillivray’s death, the center of Upper Creek affairs swung to 
Tuckabatchee.” See, Green, Politics of Indian Removal, 40. Little Tallassee most definitely declined during 
McGillivray’s lifetime and as the town’s resident trader, but I argue the start of this decline began shortly 
after Emistisiguo’s death. Green’s argument, however, does support my thesis that Little Tallassee did 
indeed decline, and other than McGillivray, there appeared to be no other individual of note residing at 
Little Tallassee. Thus, without a traditional headman to maintain Creek traditions, Little Tallassee was no 
longer a sacred space or center of diplomacy. For more on Green’s argument, see also, “Erosion of Creek 
Autonomy,” in Politics of Indian Removal, 17-45. 
103 Letter Alexander McGillivray to John Habersham, Tuckabatchee, 11/28/1786, Document TCC905, 
SNAD. 
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War Against Georgia 
The Creek declaration of revenge that McGillivray spoke of was no idle threat. In 
April and May 1787 “a general convention was held at Tuckabatchee” that not only 
reinforced the principal headmen and warriors’ position against Shoulderbone, but 
orchestrated a call for war against the state of Georgia. On April 8, 1787, McGillivray 
dispatched a letter to American Congressman James White having stated that both Tame 
King and Fat King were “severely censured for their conduct” at Shoulderbone and “the 
chiefs of ninety-eight towns agreed upon a talk to be sent to Savannah, disapproving, in 
the strongest manner, of the demand made upon their nation.”104 Within this talk, 
McGillivray explained, the American’s mandate for satisfaction and lands were 
unwarranted, for they [Creeks] “had warned the Georgians of the dangerous 
consequences that would certainly attend the settling of those lands in question . . . The 
nation, justly alarmed at the encroachments, resolved to use force to maintain their 
rights.” The deaths of the white settlers along the Oconee lands were simply casualties of 
the Creek actions of self-defense to “awaken” the Georgians to “a sense of justice and 
equality” in response to the “hostile intentions” of the commissioners and their use of 
military force at the Shoulderbone assembly.105 
Approximately a week later, Alexander McGillivray journeyed to the Lower 
Creek town of Coweta, and the town of Coweta decided to take up the hatchet against 
Georgia. James White, the American Congressman whom McGillivray had been in 
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correspondence with over the invalid satisfaction and land claims by the Georgians, was 
present during the talk. The Hallowing King, the town’s appointed speaker, explained to 
White that the Georgians “took and detained five principle men of the Coweta and 
Cussita as hostages” to get the Lower Creeks to provide the satisfaction demanded by the 
American commissioners at Shoulderbone.106 Although Coweta was inclined towards 
peace with their Georgia neighbors in November 1786, the use of armed force to sign the 
treaty as well as the seizure of five respected headmen had reversed Coweta’s decision to 
form an alliance with the Americans. Instead of compliance, the Hallowing King declared 
“severe retaliation” if the Georgians did not “deliver up” the Coweta and Cussita 
hostages.107 “The Cowetes I am certain by this time have attacked the Georgians on 
account of the hostages beside the war that is Carrying on against Cumberland,” 
McGillivray stated in a letter to O’Neil in a letter which summarized the mid-April talk 
of the Hallowing King.108 By late May 1787 Coweta had dissolved all ties with the 
Americans and joined McGillivray, Mad Dog, and its Upper Creek neighbors in their 
frontier war against Georgia. 
Coweta was not the only Lower Creek town that abandoned their affinity ties with 
the Americans that Spring. Besides the Cussita headmen that were taken hostage along 
with Coweta’s, six Cussitas were shot and killed in June 1787. Timothy Barnard, a trader 
who lived among the Creeks along the Flint River, drafted a letter on the June 8, 1787 to 
Governor George Matthews recounting the events that led up to the Cussita deaths. 
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“Seven in number were incamped [encamped] on the west Side of the ocone River, and 
had been over several times among the peaceable inhabitants beging [begging] of milk 
from them.”109 The Indian party was going about their business as usual, when they were 
then “surrounded by a party of white people and the whole six of them were Shot down 
and the camp stript ([stripped]) of everything of any value that could be found.” The 
seventh Creek, who was out hunting when the murders took place, returned to find his 
“dead comrades” and while “several guns were fired at him” and “pursed by a number of 
horsemen” he “dodged them and made his escape.” When he returned to town, Barnard 
heard of the events, which he himself declared to be a “very rash proceeding of some 
headstrong men” in his letter to the Georgia Governor.110 A war between the state of 
Georgia and all its Creek neighbors appeared inevitable. 
In July 1787, Cussita held an assembly, led by Fat King, and it was during this 
council that war was unanimously declared upon Georgia. The murder of the six Cussita 
men at Buzzard Roost only amplified tensions that had brewed between the two 
neighbors since the previous November. “We have not forgot the Talks at Shoulder bone 
but you,” Fat King communicated in his talk addressed to Governor Matthews, but “it 
was proposed and agreed to us that no hasty revenges should be taken in by either side 
and in the late affair tis you that have been rash.”111 These “hasty revenges” Fat King 
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spoke of were not limited to the deaths at buzzard Roost, but also six more Cussita lives 
that were taken by the hands of white men. “You must give us immediate & ample 
Satisfaction life for life an equal number for twelve of our people destroyed by you—the 
leader of those mad people that did the mischief.”112 Only after this satisfaction was 
provided, peaceful relations between the two could be restored and “tears of the relations 
of the dead will be dried up and our hearts,” explained Fat King. The deaths of the white 
men along the Oconee River were done by the Upper Creeks and Fat King attested that 
he nor his town should be held “accountable for any measures of the upper Towns.” The 
recent murders of the townsmen of Cussita were a clear violation of the treaty of 
Shoulderbone and as result, the “chain of friendship” was made “in Vaine.”113 The town 
of Cussita proclaimed that they saw a war “determined against them” by the state of 
Georgia, and subsequently joined their Coweta neighbors in dissolving all peace 
overtures with the Americans.114 
The Upper Creek town of Tallassee joined forces with his longtime ally Cussita in 
the war against Georgia in September of 1787. Arturo O’Neil (Governor of Pensacola) 
drafted a letter to the Governor of Louisiana to inform him of Little Tallassee’s retraction 
of peace with the state of Georgia. According to O’Neil, “the Indians of the said towns 
[including Tallassee] together with other Nations are resolved to take vengeance for the 
                                                 
112 The Georgia militia, in pursuit of Upper Creek raiders, ambushed twelve Cussita bystanders, and 
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Dead of the eleven Indians from Casista [Cussita] who were murdered by the Georgians.” 
O’Neil also noted that The King of Tallassee, named Poismeco, “who was such an ardent 
friend of the Americans,” had visited him “last month with a recommendation from Mr. 
Alexander McGillivray that he be given two hundred and twenty-five pounds of powder.” 
O’Neil, pleased to hear that another Creek town was seeking an alliance with Spain, gave 
the powder to Posimeco, as well as an array of other trade goods. The Pensacola 
Governor concluded his letter with a simple, powerful, and accurate statement: “all the 
Creek Towns are now united and inflamed against the Americans, and I predict that in a 
sort time we shall have news of their raids.”115 
By summer 1787, almost all of the Creek towns formed a Pan-Indian alliance with 
their northern Indian neighbors in order to combat the expansion of the young American 
Republic into Indian Country. Alexander McGillivray informed Spanish Governor 
O’Neil of the alliance in a letter he drafted in late June. “We have had a great meeting 
with the Chiefs of the northern Nations” and “they have routed & dispersed many parties 
of Surveyors form the Ohio & Western Country.” After the meeting, McGillivray 
apprised O’Neil that the Creeks “agreed Jointly to attack the Americans in every place 
wherever they Shall pass over their own proper Limits, nor never to grant them Lands, 
nor suffer Surveyors to roam about the Country.”116 Another report, written by Spanish 
official Carlos de Grand Pre noted that the “confederate league” of Indians also included 
the Cherokees and Chickasaws. His account reported that the Creeks were to “ruin all the 
                                                 
115 O’Neil to Miro, 9/17/1787, Pensacola, in ETHS 12 (1940): 101. See also pages 112-114 of this issue of 
the East Tennessee Historical Society’s Publications for more details on these future raids. 
116 McGillivray documented the Northern Nations to include the “Iroquois, Hurons, Mohocks, Wyandots, 
Onedias, & Shawnees.” McGillivray to O’Neil, 6/20/1787, Little Tallassee, McGillivray of the Creeks, 153. 
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villages that have taken sides with the Americans” and the other Indian allies were to 
“surprise and destroy the Americans” established at the Chickasaw Bluffs, but failed to 
note which specific Creek towns did, indeed, aligned with one another.117 
There was a multifaceted significance to the alliance made between the Creeks 
and their Northern and Southern Indian neighbors in 1787. First, the Creek towns of 
Cussita, Coweta, and Tallassee, entered the alliance by their own free will. There is no 
evidence that indicates that Alexander McGillivray or Mad Dog coerced these towns into 
dissolving their peace plans with the Americans. Rather, it was their desire for clan 
revenge and sense of betrayal by the state of Georgia in both their violent tactics at 
Shoulderbone and careless murders of innocent Creeks that ultimately turned Coweta, 
Cussita, and Tallassee against the Americans. The Northern Indians, as well, had their 
own reasons for war, and the sent delegates to the Creeks. Thus, contrary to popular 
historiographical trends, McGillivray did not unite or centralize the Creeks and their 
Indian neighbors; instead, they did so on their own accord. 
McGillivray—The War Profiteer 
The unanimous decision to go to war by the Upper and Lower Creeks without 
holding an official assembly at Little Tallassee beforehand offers significant insight into 
its decline as anything more than a trading post. In 1774, Little Tallassee became the first 
Creek town to hold an assembly where all Creeks were in attendance. Emistisiguo was 
responsible for the assembly, where through a combination of logic, persuasion, and his 
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own reputation as a respected headman and warrior, he convinced his Creek neighbors to 
abandon clan revenge in favor of peace and trade. Two years later, Little Tallassee was 
also the chosen town to finalize peace between the Creeks and the Choctaws. These are 
just two examples of multiple occasions where Little Tallassee served as a diplomatic 
space to discuss important issues of both foreign and domestic affairs. By 1787, however, 
diplomatic decisions were conducted in the square grounds of individual Creek towns. 
Creek Country had lost its center of diplomacy, Little Tallassee, along with the individual 
who was responsible for its facilitation: Emistisiguo.  
Alexander McGillivray and Emistisiguo’s motivations for war, trade, and 
unification were opposite one another. As a traditional Creek headmen and warrior, 
Emistisiguo based decisions pertaining to trade and war for the benefit of the populaces 
of Little Tallassee and the Creek people. These decisions were also never made solely by 
Emistisiguo, but discussed and voted upon during town councils and larger assemblies 
conducted in the sacred square of Little Tallassee. McGillivray, however, encouraged 
fellow Creeks to go to war with Georgia to protect his interests in trade monopoly. If the 
Creeks were to develop trade with the Unites States, at the very least the profits of 
Panton, Leslie, & Company would suffer. The monopoly McGillivray had on the Creek 
trade would disintegrate, as well as the firm’s control over the rest of the Southeastern 
Indians. In addition, war by default increased trade. If Creeks needed ammunition, then 
the demand for European trade remained. As the resident trader of Little Tallassee and 
partner in Panton, Leslie, and Company, McGillivray’s interests rested in maintaining his 
personal trade monopoly over the Creeks, not their long-term welfare. Alexander 
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McGillivray’s disapproval of the Treaties of Augusta, Galphinton, and Shoulderbone and 
actions taken to nullify the subsequent treaties supports this argument. McGillivray’s 
support for war over diplomacy in response to frontier violence and land encroachment 
with Georgia further exemplifies this logic. 
Alexander McGillivray utilized this control over the Creek trade to augment his 
power among the Creeks and spent his entire political career attempting to unify the 
Upper and Lower towns into one cohesive Creek Nation. McGillivray did so under the 
guise of the idea that a Nation State, similar to the United States, was the optimum 
avenue to preserve Creek sovereignty during the early years of the American Republic. A 
sovereign Creek Nation, however, was also another means for McGillivray to maintain 
his monopoly over Creek trade in the face of American frontier expansion. McGillivray’s 
staunch promotion of Creek sovereignty and centralization advanced his agenda to 
maintain a commercial monopoly over Creek trade. If the Creeks were united in a war 
against Georgia, McGillivray not only reaped the benefits of the ongoing need for 
supplies and ammunition, but also the elimination of any trade competition that peace 
with the United States might bring. 
Waning Spanish Support 
In early October 1787, Spain’s support of the Creek war against Georgia was 
questionable. Spanish officials were delayed in dispatching supplies from their Gulf 
ports, and ammunition was a necessity in order for the Creeks and their Southeastern 
Indian neighbors to continue to protest American encroachment and frontier violence. 
“The supply of Ammunition which I received of the Governor of Louisiana, the delivery 
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of it was accompanied with some degree of backwardness and Caution,” McGillivray 
wrote to Zespedes. This “caution” McGillivray spoke of led him to suspect that “this 
present supply was given to me upon the condition of not using it against the Americans.” 
Skeptical of where Spanish loyalties lay, McGillivray declared that “If it is really the 
wishes of Government that I should be a peace with the Americans at the expense of 
every Sacrifice, surely they should speak a plain language & which I ought to Clearly 
Understand.”118 
McGillivray’s suspicion was not unfounded. Zespedes pleaded the necessity of 
maintaining the friendship of the Creeks through trade to Galvez, Governor of St. 
Augustine in March of 1788, no doubt a reaction to McGillivray’s correspondence as 
well his own misgivings of waning Spanish support. Zespedes argued that “to cut loose 
from McGillivray at the present time, or to throw out Panton, Leslie, and Company [to do 
one is to do the other] will be to lose at one stroke all that we have gained with the 
Indians, and to hand them over irretrievably to the Americans.” Zespedes also reminded 
Galvez that aid to the Creeks and their new pan-Indian alliance would only support 
Spain’s empire, not put it in jeopardy. “The said general confederation will add a new 
degree of perfection, directed toward curbing the evident usurpations that the State of 
Georgia and the other sates intend to make on the Indians Lands.”119 The Creeks and 
other Southeastern Indians were a vital buffer to American encroachment on contested 
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territory and navigation of the Mississippi between Spain and the American Republic. 
Thus, Zespedes supported the Creek war against Georgia. 
Zespedes did not trust McGillivray. Rather, McGillivray’s connection to Panton, 
Leslie, & Company and his role as Spanish ambassador to the Creeks was too vital to 
Spanish interests to ignore. Zespedess skepticism became visible when he recommended 
that a “Spanish Member and Spanish employees” be added to the “firm of Panton, Leslie, 
and Company” to spy on McGillivray and Panton. The fact that they were British 
loyalists could not be erased from the minds of the Spanish officials, and Zespedes letter 
confirmed this. Zespedes even suggested to Galvez that the Spanish subjects “reside 
among the Indians themselves, with secret orders to watch the movements of McGillivray 
and some Englishmen.”120 By 1787, it appeared that no one (Creek, American, or 
Spanish) trusted Alexander McGillivray. Despite his skepticism towards McGillivray, 
Zespedes did not waver in his argument in favor of arming the Creeks against Georgia. 
“Providing the Indians opportunely with Arms and Ammunitions for their hunts and for 
self-defense against any invader if necessary . . . will have them in an immediately an 
important barrier, be it against Adventurers or Americans,” Zespedes ultimately 
concluded.121 
Arturo O’Neil (Governor of West Florida) also had concerns regarding Alexander 
McGillivray’s loyalties as well his partners in Panton, Leslie, & Company. “British at 
Heart,” O’Neil described McGillivray in a letter to Estevan Miro (Governor of 
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Louisiana), “it is always necessary to distrust him.” O’Neil was equally skeptical of 
McGillivray’s trade partner William Panton. Spanish officials had asked Panton to 
“become a vassal” to the King of Spain, but according to O’Neil “Panton refuses to do 
so.”122 Both McGillivray and Panton were open British loyalists, and despite the alliance 
made at Pensacola in 1784, the Spanish did have good reason to wonder if the firm would 
abandon their pledges to Spain if a better opportunity presented itself. O’Neil confided in 
Governor Miro that he worried McGillivray’s “authority in the nation [Creek]” and 
Revolutionary ideas might “bring about the entire independence of the Indians.” If that 
were the case, O’Neil suspected that “he would prove more loyal to the British trade than 
to the Spaniards,” and he might “drive out the Americans.” The governor’s suspicions 
stemmed from the realization that Spain might one day become dispensable to the Creeks 
and the successful Panton, Leslie, & Company.123 
Although Spain understood the necessity of Indian country as a buffer to U.S. 
expansion, between 1788-1789 several Spanish officials developed a new strategy to deal 
with their American neighbors. Instead of refusing to allow U.S. citizens to immigrate to 
Spanish territory, Americans were welcomed. The idea behind this was to grow a larger 
population of individuals loyal to Spain, which therefore would provide strength in 
numbers and subsequently Spain could be less reliant on Indian country to provide a 
buffer from American advancement. These immigrants had to pledge their allegiance to 
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the King of Spain, but they were granted religious toleration and citizenship. By February 
7, 1789 the number of American transplants to the Natchez district was large enough for 
Governor Miro to create a post and appoint an official to manage the budding 
province.124 
American immigration only escalated the current war between the Creeks and 
their Southeastern neighbors against Georgia. In late April, Alexander McGillivray wrote 
to Folch that a “large number of Americans has been introduced into their lands on the 
Tombigbee River and its branches.” These Americans, McGillivray explained, have 
“greatly alarmed and inconvenienced” the “tribes of the Alabamas” as well as “roused 
complaints of the Choctaws,” and as a result “have decided to work together soon to evict 
and plunder the greater part of the settlers of these districts.”125 McGillivray admitted in 
his letter that he both predicted and feared the actions of the Alabamas and Choctaws, 
because he knew the “disposition and temper of the tribes located along the river.” On 
behalf of the Creeks, however, McGillivray reminded Folch that he had “strongly 
opposed” the “instruction of the government to introduce Americans,” and that he had 
asked Miro to “restrict the settlement” but “he did not give full attention to my warning,” 
and therefore placed the blame of the violence not on the Creeks or Choctaws, but the 
Spanish officials themselves. McGillivray did offer to “assemble the chiefs of the Upper 
towns” to curb the violence for the sake of keeping peace with Spain, but his powers 
were limited as “the Alabama chiefs seldom present themselves at our assemblies 
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protesting their great distance away.”126 McGillivray left out the fact that he simply did 
not possess the power to assemble these chiefs, for his role in Creek society was limited. 
As a spokesperson he could only rely messages between the Creeks and the Spanish 
officials, and his own personal powers of persuasion were mediocre at best within Creek 
society. 
Governor Miro was outraged that not only had frontier violence escalated, but that 
new Spanish citizens were the victims. Already suspicious of McGillivray’s loyalties to 
Spain, Miro accused McGillivray of having a hand in the planning of the recent attacks, 
despite McGillivray’s declaration that the Alabamas and Choctaws acted entirely without 
his knowledge. Miro penned to McGillivray that “it is not possible that without your 
knowledge your Nation would have launched upon such an outrage,” and added that 
McGillivray’s failure to “stop this disorder” was a breach of trust between two friends 
and alliances.127 Regardless if McGillivray had knowledge or not of the attacks, the 
Spanish officials continued to be disillusioned by McGillivray’s lack of power over the 
Creeks. “If he is king in Louisiana I am one in the Creek Nations,” Alexander 
McGillivray wrote to Folch on May 14, 1789.128 It is no wonder the Spanish remained 
deceived. In response to McGillivray’s “failure” to prevent the recent attacks, however, 
Miro threatened to cut off all “commerce and the distribution of munitions” to the Creeks 
until the violence was “remedied.”129 Trade was the one tie that bound the Creeks and the 
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Spanish together, and Miro’s threat to take that bond away was a sure indication that 
Spain’s support of their shared their interests was no longer their priority. 
Spain had another reason to threaten to dissolve trade unless the Creek agreed to 
make peace with the Americans. The Creeks and their new Southeastern and Northern 
Indian allies’ war against American encroachment had become burdensome and costly to 
Spain. War required ammunition and not only did the Creek’s require arms against their 
Georgia neighbors, but Spain’s new American allies.130 Spain had pledged to assist the 
Creek’s against American encroachment, but they were not interested in the 
aggrandizement of the Creek Nation or its neighbors. Spanish officials did not support an 
independent Creek state financed by their own economy.131 They retracted their support 
for the Creeks war against Georgia, and declared that “it was the utmost important to get 
a treaty of Peace” with the United States but “limited to their being friends without 
granting them the trade and commerce.”132 If the Creeks made peace with the Americans, 
Spain was happy to dissolve its threat to cut off commerce to the Creeks. 
American Peace Overtures and Divided Creek Responses 
Spain’s new policy put the Creeks in a difficult position. Trade was vital to the 
Creek economy, as well as Alexander’s position within that economy. Panton, Leslie, & 
Company’s ability to trade within Spanish territory allowed the Creeks to continue to 
receive arms and commerce from the Gulf Coast as usual. On the other hand, peace with 
Americans would require some type of land cession, for in every treaty beginning with 
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Augusta in 1783 officials from Georgia had demanded the valuable Creek hunting 
territory West of the Oconee River. The Upper and Lower Creek’s reactions to the 
prospect of peace with Americans varied from town to town. 
In April 1789, the Lower Creek towns, except for Tallassee (being an Upper 
Town), met with American Commissioner Andrew Pickens and revealed that they felt 
betrayed by their American friends and vowed to continue war against Georgian 
encroachment. Evidence of this sentiment can be seen in the words of Tame King, who 
was the first to speak during the assembly with Pickens. Tame King was documented to 
have declared: 
 
He had always been a friend to the white people, that after the war, he was invited 
to Augusta, where he expected to be treated like a friend, instead of which, the 
white people, their long knives in their hands, insisted on his making a land 
cession, which he had no right to do so.133 
 
Demands to take Creek hunting land by force was enough for Tallassee King to see the 
chain of friendship eroded, as treaties were diplomatic measures towards peace, not 
threats backed by armed force. 
Tame King’s talk was seconded by the Hallowing King of Coweta. Although he 
“expressed” the town of Coweta’s “thankfulness to the superintendent for coming so 
great a journey,” the hostile encroachment by the Georgians and the unreasonable 
demands for Creek lands made peace impossible. Hallowing King explained to Pickens 
that “these last strides tell us they [Americans] never meant to let their foot rest; our lands 
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are our life and breath; if we part with them, we part with our blood. We must fight for 
them.”134 The superintendent explained to the headmen that it was impossible to evacuate 
lands that the white people had already settled on “after buying them,” for the Georgians 
were under the impression that the lands were “granted by the Indians in atonement for 
the many unprovoked injuries the State had sustained.” Pickens words, however, were 
spoken in vain. Both Tame King and Hallowing King declared that “if nothing would do 
but relinquishing the lands on the Oconee,” then their answer was simple “war.” 
Disappointed, Pickens took his leave.135 
On June 1, 1789, the headmen and warriors of the Lower Creek towns delivered a 
second talk to the U.S. Commissioners. Their talk conveyed that their resolution towards 
war remained firm, but if their hunting lands could be preserved, they desired nothing 
more than peace with their neighbors. The speaker of this talk is unknown, but the 
content summarizes the Creek dilemma in a concise and sincere fashion.136 “As we are all 
made by the master of breath, although put in different parts of the earth, he did not make 
us to be at variance against each other, but it has happened, by the bad doings of our mad 
people, on both sides” the Creek spokesmen communicated via the interpreter James 
Derezeaux. “When we first met the white people” there was a “desire of being further 
acquainted with each other,” the Creek speaker informed the Commissioners. The two 
parties did not “meet in arms” until “the great encroachments of our lands,” which was 
responsible for the “late troubles” among the two. The Creek spokesperson appealed to 
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the commissioners by explaining the value of the lands to Creek society as well as the 
American economy. “What will be the use of goods brought among us, if your young 
men have not hunting ground to kill game, to purchase the goods brought to us?”137 It 
was not that the Lower Creeks were opposed to peace, the demands by the Americans 
were just impossible to satisfy. War continued to be the only option, or that was what the 
headmen and warriors of the Lower towns and Tallassee believed. 
By late May, Alexander McGillivray chose preservation of trade over hunting 
grounds. “I had pledged the Spanish good faith & my own Credit for the Certainty of a 
further Supply of Ammunition & arms to enable this Nation to obtain a Safe & honorable 
peace,” McGillivray informed Governor Miro. Although McGillivray admitted that 
during his meetings with the rest of the Upper Creek towns the headmen were “pressing” 
him for “information on the subject,” and reluctant to treat without knowing American 
land demands, McGillivray confirmed he believed that “peace with the Americans 
absolutely necessary for this Nation [Creek] under our present circumstances.”138 The 
circumstances McGillivray was referring to, no doubt, was Spain’s threat to cut off trade. 
  By June 1789, the United States had formed a new government that represented 
the constitution signed that year and created a department and policy to manage Indian 
affairs. General Knox (the Secretary at War) was appointed by President George 
Washington to head it. The new government had determined that peace with the 
Southeastern Indians was crucial to the success of young Republic. The Northern Indian 
                                                 
137 Talk from the Lower Creeks to the U.S. Commissioners, 6/1/1789, RC, 515-516. 
138 McGillivray to Miro, 5/26/1789, Little Tallassee, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 234-235. 
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nations had formed a confederacy, and Knox informed Washington that he feared a 
similar union would soon be formed in the South. Knox reported on the subject that “their 
situation, entirely surrounded on all sides, leads naturally to such a union, and the present 
difficulties of the Creeks and Cherokees may accelerate and complete it.” Fear that the 
Creeks and their neighbors would also cement a permanent alliance with Spain also 
troubled the United States.139 Determined to finally win over the Creeks to their side, 
Congress sent a special envoy led by Colonel Marinus Willet to invite Alexander 
McGillivray and the Creeks to treat in New York and meet with President Washington. 
Colonel Willet was no ordinary messenger. He was hand chosen by former 
Commissioner and Senator Benjamin Hawkins, and had an impressive war career during 
the American Revolution.140 
 Willet used a variety of tactics to convince Alexander McGillivray and the 
headmen of Creek towns at war with Georgia to agree to negotiate President Washington 
in New York. The first of which, was nothing out of the ordinary—promises the 
Americans never intended to keep. McGillivray reported the details of Willet’s visit to 
Creek Country to Panton shortly after the Colonel’s departure, where Willet assured the 
Creeks that “not one acre of Land shall be asked of us, but rather restore whatever is 
usurped,” and that “the attempts of any State to infringe on Indian Rights by force are 
Strongly reprobated & Washington wishes before his Career close to see formal peace 
pervade the land on all sides.” Although Willet’s promises were nothing but empty 
                                                 
139 Report of the Secretary of War on the Southern Indians (General Knox to the President of the United 
States), 7/7/1789, in RC, 526-529. Quote on 526. 
140 Hawkins to McGillivray, 3/6/1790, New York, Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 256-258. 
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words, the idea of a new president and directly negotiating with Congress, not the state of 
Georgia, appealed to McGillivray.141 
 Flattery and bribery also enticed Alexander McGillivray. First off, McGillivray 
seemed to be enamored by Millet: “I find him just as Genl. Pickens a Candid and 
Benevolent Character, possessing abilities but without Show or Parade.”142 Perhaps 
McGillivray saw a resemblance of himself in Willet, for he spent most of his life living as 
a Southern gentleman, landed planter, and tradesman. Willet did not neglect to inform 
McGillivray that be believed he would not only recover his father’s property in Georgia 
that was confiscated during the Revolution, but that the opportunity to conclude a peace 
with President Washington himself would long be revered by United States Citizens. 
Willet understood that McGillivray was an ambitious man and the idea that Creek lands 
might be bought through bribery was a farfetched notion.143 
 McGillivray himself, the spokesperson for the Creeks, could write all the letters 
he desired but only with the permission of the principal headmen and warriors of each 
towns did he have permission to agree to treat on their behalf in New York. Luckily for 
the Americans, Willet took the time to travel to deliver his talks to several assemblies of 
headmen and warriors at a number of towns including Tuckabatchee, Coweta, Oussitche, 
and Little Tallassee. “A favorable trade” along with the protection of the sacred hunting 
                                                 
141 McGillivray to Panton, 5/8/1790, Little Tallassee, in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 259-262, 
quote on 261. Willet had also explained to McGillivray that treating with President Washington and the 
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142 McGillivray to Panton, 5/8/1790, Little Tallassee, in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 259-262, 
quote on 260. 
143 “The Treaty of New York,” in Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 42-43. 
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grounds was promised by Willet during these assemblies. The Colonel also apprised the 
Creeks that Spain and England appeared to be on the brink of war over a territory dispute 
in Nootka Sound, and if a war broke out Panton’s trade would have slim chances of 
survival. A world without trade was unfathomable to the Creeks, and the reason that 
twenty-six headmen agreed to attending McGillivray at New York and supported the idea 
of a permanent peace with the United States.144 
 It was in early June that William Panton learned of Alexander McGillivray’s 
decision to go to New York. Panton agreed that peace was necessary, but he did not trust 
the United States. “When you see these men, you will learn their true Business which I 
shall like to hear—but take care of them, for there is no knowing what unworthy design 
they may harbor,” Panton advised. Panton did not hold much weight in the Nooka Sound 
debate, for he was confident that as long as McGillivray made peace with the Americans 
but remained loyal to Spain for protection, Panton, Leslie, and Company would continue 
to profit and “I shall then have it in my power to sell my goods as cheap as the Georgians 
can and I mean to do it.”145 Panton ended his letter with his final words of advice for 
McGillivray, “I am therefore of opinion you should decline a Commercial Treaty with 
these people [Americans] at least for some months to come until you see what may be 
determined by the Court of Spain.”146 
                                                 
144 Caughey, “The Treaty of New York,” in McGillivray of the Creeks, 41-42. 
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 Panton did not receive a response to his letter from McGillivray until he had 
already left for New York. Panton, who feared that a treaty negotiated outside of Creek 
country would be corrupted to the interest of the Americans only, hurried to Little 
Tallassee to speak with McGillivray personally before his departure. Unfortunately, 
Panton’s approximately three-hundred-mile trip was in vain. All that was left for Panton 
were a number of letters that assured Panton and the company that he would not buy into 
a commercial trade with the Americans.147 “I wish I had seen him before he went,” 
William Panton wrote to Miro, but “I nevertheless have confidence enough in his 
Steadiness to reply that he will reject any overture which may be made to him, that can be 
considered injurious to Spain or disgraceful to himself and friends.”148 Although 
McGillivray did not possess the power to make treaties on his own nor go against the 
wishes of the leading headmen, in particular Mad Dog, Panton knew that in New York 
McGillivray had an edge. Diplomacy in New York would be conducted not in a town 
square, but the office of President Washington and American Commissioners. The Treaty 
was a true test of McGillivray’s loyalties. 
The Treaty of New York 
Alexander McGillivray and thirty Creek headmen arrived in the capital of the 
United States in August of 1789.149 Reports said that McGillivray looked “like a white 
man” and the rest of the Creeks were adorned with eagle feathers, beads, earrings, silver 
                                                 
147 Caughey, “The Treaty of New York,” in McGillivray of the Creeks, 42-43. 
148 Caughey, “The Treaty of New York,” in McGillivray of the Creeks, 42-43. 
149 30 headmen traveled to New York, but only twenty-four signed the treaty, see “Treaty with the Creeks, 
1790,” 8/7/1790, New York, in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, compiled and ed. by Charles J. Kappler 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), Vol. 2, 28-29. (Accessed January 2018). 
(Hereafter cited as Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, Vol. Page(s). 
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gorgets; all symbols of high rank and status.150 They were escorted by Colonel Marinus 
Willet and were received with a grand display of roaring guns and a detachment of 
soldiers who escorted McGillivray and company up Wall Street to Secretary Knox’s 
residence. Interestingly enough, McGillivray spent the night at Knox’s residence, while 
the rest of the Creek party stained in a local inn. Mad Dog, head warrior and principal 
chief of Tuckabatchee and known ally of McGillivray was conspicuously absent from the 
delegation.151 
During the treaty, Creek leaders ceded the lands east of the Oconee to the United 
States, and in exchange the Creeks were awarded a lump sum of 1,500 in perpetuity.152 
Article 12 of the treaty also stipulated that the United States furnish the Creeks with 
domestic animals and farm implements in order to assist in order to elevate them to a 
“greater degree of civilization.”153 Additionally, select Creek headmen received an annual 
payment of $100 for their cooperation, and in a secret article of the treaty McGillivray 
accepted an annual salary of $1,200 and a military commission of brigadier general.154 
The Creeks were able to hold onto valuable hunting grounds along the Altamaha river, 
and were guaranteed protection by the United States against any encroachment by the 
state of Georgia.155 The most significant secret provision, however, was that McGillivray 
                                                 
150 Colin G. Calloway, The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, The First Americans, 
and the Birth of a Nation (New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2018), 366. 
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was to be granted a free port in southern Georgia where commercial goods could be 
imported tax free and therefore give McGillivray a complete monopoly over Indian 
trade.156 The only member of McGillivray and his Creek party to actually sign the secret 
articles, however, was Alexander McGillivray himself.157 
The preservation of a lucrative trade had always been a priority of the Creeks, as 
former Creek headmen and warrior Emistisiguo had spent his entire career advocating for 
and protecting trade, along the Gulf Coast in particular. The motivation behind Alexander 
McGillivray’s dedication to protect trade at the expense of such a large land session is 
unclear. In 1790 a war between Spain and England seemed likely, and it was quite 
possible that Panton, Leslie, & Company’s British sources of ammunition and commerce 
were in jeopardy. The secret article for the free port was McGillivray’s way of protecting 
Creek trade, but also his partnership in Panton & Leslie’s monopoly. More specifically, 
with a free and independent Creek port, the company could just shift its base from 
Spanish to American territory and continue trade as usual.158 Given the fact that 
McGillivray also received monetary compensation and a title, however, in addition to the 
duty-free port, suggests that Alexander McGillivray’s attempts to preserve Creek trade 
was for personal gain, not affection or loyalty to his fellow Creeks. 
Out of the thirty Creeks present, only twenty-four signed the Treaty of New York. 
It is quite possible that they did not have enough status to sign or were not presented with 
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the opportunity. Many may have objected to the treaty. Although Alexander Cornel was 
present to interpret the articles of the treaty, Alexander McGillivray was the 
spokesperson for the Creeks. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the majority of 
the discussion between Washington, Knox, and McGillivray during the ratification 
process was in English. Muskhogean was McGillivray’s second language and was almost 
always accompanied by an interpreter during Creek assemblies, which bolsters this 
assumption. Regardless, the majority if not all the headmen signed the treaty of New 
York were illiterate, and likely did not have full knowledge of the detailed contents of the 
treaty they had given approval.159 The protection of trade was agreed upon universally 
among the Creeks, but to what extent remains debatable. 
Aftermath 
By the fall of 1790, news had spread throughout Creek Country that the Oconee 
lands had been sold. The Creeks were not only outraged by the cession, but a sense of 
betrayal to the treaty signers lingered throughout the both Upper and Lower Towns. The 
deposition of a Georgia settler known as John Bradshaw offers valuable insight into the 
Creek’s dissatisfaction. Bradshaw traveled through the two prominent towns of Coweta 
and Tuckabatchee, both known to have long been physical and spiritual spaces where 
Creek diplomacy was conducted. While passing through both towns, Bradshaw remarked 
that the general attitude of the townsmen seemed “very surly, morose, and much 
displeased” with the news of cash for land deal signed by McGillivray and only twenty-
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four rather insignificant headmen.160 Bradshaw reported in his deposition that the Creek’s 
told him that they were “very much displeased by with the Treaty held at New York and 
also with McGillivray” and “payed very little respect to his authority.” The Creek 
informants continued to inform Bradshaw and his company that “Congress might do what 
they pleased with the Treaty, for they intended to do as they pleased with it,” which 
Bradshaw noted that “uttered with great contempt.” Last, they declared that the “the 
prisoners and property taken by the Indians would never be given up without a war,” and 
this property included the Oconee hunting grounds.161 War not peace, was the consensus 
among the Creeks at Coweta and Tuckabatchee in the aftermath of the Treaty of New 
York. 
Although Alexander McGillivray was Little Tallassee’s spokesperson and 
intermediary, he never earned the respect or trust that all of Creek Country had given to 
his predecessor. Given Emistisiguo’s dedication to the preservation of trade, it is difficult 
in hindsight to guess what the headman and warrior of Little Tallassee would have done 
if he were in McGillivray’s position. The one thing Emistisiguo would never have done, 
however, was treat without the consent of all the headmen and warriors of both the Lower 
and Creek towns. Emistisiguo was a Creek and he acted on behalf of Creek interests, 
despite his own personal ambitions to bring power and prestige to himself and town of 
Little Tallassee. Emistisiguo was a headman that earned his position through traditional 
Creek practices, McGillivray did not and was never a headman to begin with. Instead, 
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Alexander McGillivray was a man who traveled to New York, ignored the advice of his 
own business partner, and signed a treaty that gave him a monopoly on Creek trade, 
monetary compensation, and an American military title. All the while, he was only a 
mere spokesperson, and had no authority to do so. The opposition voices of the 
townspeople at Tuckabatchee and Coweta, embodied in many ways, the entirety of the 
Creek Nation. One Lower and one Upper town, both former respected spaces of 
diplomacy and politics, decided they would rather go to war with the Americans than 
concede to the demands of the Treaty at New York. 
Due to the heavy Creek backlash to the Oconee land cession, the Americans spent 
months waiting for the Creeks to meet them and run the newly agreed upon boundary 
line. The surveyors, however, eventually abandoned the project as no Creek delegation 
from the Upper or Lower towns ever showed up to do so. By September 1793, the 
American Secretary at War, Henry Knox, made an announcement that ironically 
summarized the sentiment of the entire Creek Nation. In a letter to James Seagrove, Knox 
asked the Indian Agent to locate “real chiefs” to return to New York and negotiate terms 
for a second time.162 Whether or not Knox ever understood that Creek politics were 
consensual, he did realize by 1793 that Alexander McGillivray was not the head over the 
Creek Confederacy nor did he hold any significant power. In fact, the Creeks were so 
angry with McGillivray’s decision he left Little Tallassee early in 1793, and spent the 
remaining few months of his life in the house of William Panton at Pensacola. Rumors 
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circulated that McGillivray still attempted to control Creek affairs from Pensacola, but no 
evidence indicated he had any credibility left among the Creeks to be able to do so.163 
Even if McGillivray had allies, his health declined rapidly. Panton described 
McGillivray’s condition in a letter on February 16, 1793 as follows: “Mr. McGillivray 
lies dangerously ill in my house of a Complication of disorders of Gout in the stomach 
attended with a perepneumony and he is so very bad as to leave scarcely any hope of 
recovery.”164 Panton’s letter of McGillivray’s impending death most likely never reached 
the Baron Carondelet on time. Alexander McGillivray passed away only four days later, 
at eleven in the evening at Panton’s home, accompanied by only Panton and a few 
unknown Creeks.165 
Alexander McGillivray spending his final days within the home William Panton 
and outside of Little Tallassee confirmed just how far removed McGillivray was from 
Creek Country not only at the time of his death, but his entire life. Years of compulsory 
trade and promoting war against Georgia to reap the benefits of that trade expose 
McGillivray’s identity as that of a European trader. It was only after his realization that 
Spain’s waning support jeopardized the survival of Panton, Leslie, and Company that 
McGillivray considered peace with the United States. By 1790, McGillivray was quick to 
surrender valuable Creek hunting grounds in exchange for the promise of a free port in 
southern Georgia to maintain his personal monopoly over Creek trade. The fact that the 
majority of the Upper and Lower Creeks had no voice in this matter did not faze him. 
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Alexander McGillivray’s last will and testimony encapsulates his identity as a Creek 
trade, as he abandoned Creek tradition and embraced European-style paternalism. He left 
all his assets to his sons; not to his maternal Creek family. Alexander McGillivray’s last 
priority was that the McGillivray trade legacy live on, not the preservation of Creek 
tradition and sovereignty in face of American expansion.166 
Little Tallassee’s position within Creek society rested in the quintessential 
individuals that inhabited it. Although Emistisiguo left McGillivray a blueprint to follow 
in order to utilize his literacy and trade knowledge for the benefit of Little Tallassee and 
the Upper Creeks, McGillivray’s alienation from the Creek world and hunger for power 
left Little Tallassee nothing more than a trade depot by the late 1780s. Without a 
traditional Creek headman and warrior such as Emistisiguo, Little Tallassee rapidly 
declined as the Upper Creek center of diplomacy and sacred space. By the time of 
McGillivray’s death, the Upper Creeks were already gathering at Tuckabatchee square to 
discuss matters of trade, war, and diplomacy and Mad Dog, the town’s head warrior, 
appeared to take on a very similar role to that of Emistisiguo during the 1760s. Creek 
towns are not towns without traditional headmen or war leaders. Despite the attention and 
importance that historians have long bestowed on Alexander McGillivray, when his 
career is placed within the context of the rise and fall of Little Tallassee, his 
accomplishments are outshone by his predecessor Emistisiguo. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Little Tallassee held a unique role within eighteenth-century Creek society. Born 
out of a colonial encounter, the space was home to Creek men and women, and the 
several Scottish, English, French, and later American traders who interacted with one 
another through various forms of exchange on a daily basis. Circumstance, ambition, and 
skill, enabled Emistisiguo of Little Tallassee to climb the ranks of Creek society as a head 
warrior, diplomat, spokesperson, as well as become the first and only headman to 
represent Little Tallassee. During the 1760s and 1770s, Little Tallassee evolved into a 
center of Euro-Creek exchange and Trans-Atlantic trade, as well as a sacred space and 
official Creek town where decisions in regard to domestic and foreign affairs were 
discussed within the town square. Even during times of war, whether it was inter-tribal 
(Creek-Choctaw War) or a Euro-American creation (American Revolution), Emistisiguo 
developed new diplomatic policies that addressed a war-torn society and bolstered his 
and Little Tallassee’s position within Creek society. Little Tallassee, originally a trade 
post in the 1740s, became by the middle of the eighteenth century, a place of importance 
for Creeks and their partners in trade. 
 The histories of spaces and places are indirectly and directly shaped by those who 
reside there. Little Tallassee is an example of such a relationship, for by the late 1780s 
the Creek town that Emistisiguo had created had dissolved into a place resembling a trade 
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depot more than a sacred space. Alexander McGillivray’s presence at Little Tallassee, 
despite his limited authority within Creek society, accelerated Little Tallassee’s decline 
as an official Creek town. Focused solely on trade and his personal use of the monopoly 
he held on Creek access to trade, Alexander McGillivray’s actions slowly stripped Little 
Tallassee of its credibility within Creek society. Creeks left Little Tallassee in search of a 
headman they could trust and respect to carry on Creek traditions.1 
 Close reading of both English and Spanish sources exposes Little Tallassee’s 
decline well before the death of Alexander McGillivray. By the winter of 1786 and early 
spring of 1787, assemblies in regard to Creek-American diplomacy were being conducted 
at Tuckabatchee, not Little Tallassee. Mad Dog, the former town’s head warrior, was the 
elected speaker and organizer of the majority of these meetings. For example, in April 
and May of 1787 several assemblies were conducted to express Upper Creek 
dissatisfaction with the ‘Treaty of Shoulderbone,’ which gave up large tracts of Creek 
hunting grounds to the new American Republic. Alexander McGillivray was present 
during these meetings and supported Mad Dog’s rejection of Shoulderbone in favor of 
war.2 McGillivray’s support, however was self-motivated. War against Georgia propelled 
Creek need for ammunition, which only strengthened his monopoly on Creek trade. 
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 It is also quite clear from these sources that McGillivray served as an 
intermediary on behalf of the Creeks during American and Spanish negotiations 
throughout the 1780s. However, Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee seemed to have replaced 
Emistisiguo as speaker and the head warrior among the Upper Creek Towns shortly after 
Emistisiguo’s death. In fact, Governor O’Neil often reported in his letters that Mad Dog 
was “of most importance in the said [Creek] Nation,” and several treaties documented 
McGillivray to have sought consent from leading Creek headmen and warriors before any 
decisions were made.3 The Treaty of Pensacola in 1784 is an example of such a scenario. 
Not only was Alexander McGillivray described to be the “principal representative” of the 
Upper towns, not a headman or warrior, but Mad Dog, unable to attend the Pensacola 
conference, was reported to have “given consent” to McGillivray to treat in his absence.4 
 By 1793, a series of diplomatic meetings conducted at Tuckabatchee confirmed 
the fact that Little Tallassee no longer held the seat of diplomacy in Upper Creek 
Country. During the late 1780s and early 1790s, the Creeks were engulfed in frontier 
violence. The U.S. was expanding all along the Oconee, Tennessee, Tombigbee, and 
Cumberland Rivers. The Cumberland happened to be a shared hunting ground between 
the Creeks and Chickasaws, which sparked fierce competition between the two that 
eventually erupted into what historians refer to now as the Creek-Chickasaw War (1793-
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1797). Similar to Emistisiguo’s diplomacy of protecting trade through intertribal war, 
Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee organized a similar policy which the Upper and Lower Creeks 
adopted to prevent further hostilities against American settlers. Creek trade was split 
between U.S. factors (government sponsored traders) and Spain in 1793, but the growing 
American presence in Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee made trade with the United 
States appear to be more the viable option for a sustainable trade. Embracing intertribal 
war to reduce hostilities with the American settlers therefore became the center of Creek 
diplomacy between 1793 and 1795, and Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee led the way.5 
 James Seagrove, the first permanent U.S. federal representative and agent to the 
Southeastern Indians, sent peace overtures to the Upper Creeks as early as the ratification 
of the Treaty of New York in 1790.6 It was not until April 1793, however, that the Upper 
Creeks responded favorably. On the 8th of that month, Mad Dog dispatched a talk to 
Seagrove that promised peace with the Americans as well as his and the Upper Creeks 
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Occupation of the Floridas,” in Pre-Removal Choctaw History: Exploring New Paths, ed. Greg O’Brien 
(1999; repr., Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008),103-122, and O’Brien, Choctaws in a 
Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), Chapter 3 and 84-85. 
6 On the 22 of March, 1793 Timothy Barnard reported that Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee and White 
Lieutenant of Okfuskee “assured” him that all Upper Creek towns were “for peace” and the Lower towns 
were “not inclined for mischief except for Coweta,” but it was not until April that documentation is 
provided that demonstrates these two headmen to indeed be inclined towards peace. See, Timothy Barnard 
to James Seagrove, 3/26/1793, Flint River, American State Papers. Documents, Legislative and Executive, 
of the Congress of the United States, from the First Session of the First to the Third Session of the 
Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1789, and Ending March 3, 1815, ed. Walter 
Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832), Vol. 1, 381-382. 
(hereafter cited as ASPIA, volume number, page number). 
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best efforts to control the restlessness of young warriors against frontier settlers. Mad 
Dog proclaimed: 
 
We wish to have a wide path down to you, that our women and children may 
travel down to you; it is the wish of the Upper Towns that it should be so. The 
Tuckabatchee town and the rest of the head-men, have taken your talks, and mean 
to live by them, as long as you and the brothers of the United States exist. 
 
Mad Dog’s talk was accompanied by belts, which Mad Dog clarified to serve as a symbol 
of “everlasting peace and friendship.” The belts had “one stripe for General Washington, 
one for Mr. Seagrove, and the others for the brothers of the United States.”7 
 Mad Dog’s diplomacy to protect American trade was not limited to the Upper 
Creeks. A resolution was agreed upon by the leading town headmen located along the 
Chattahoochee, Tallapoosa, and Coosa Rivers a few days after the talk at Tuckabatchee 
that confirmed that even the Lower Towns agreed to join Mad Dog in Creek-American 
peace negotiations. Bird King and Cussita King of the Lower town of Cussita town 
dispatched a talk on April 13th that confirmed this agreement: “The three rivers have 
talked, and wished for peace, and have to have things settled to the satisfaction of both 
sides.”8 The satisfaction the headmen referred to was in regards to the frequent murders 
of both Creeks and Whites, which all Creeks agreed must be stopped in order for peace to 
prevail and trade be preserved.  
                                                 
7 Talk of Mad Dog, 4/8/1793, Tuckabatchee. ASPIA, Vol. 1, 385-385. The White Lieutenant of Okfuskee 
was noted to be present at the time of Mad Dog’s talks which were translated by Alexander Cornell. 
8 Bird King and Cussetah (Cussita) King to Major Henry Gaither, 4/13/1793, Cussita, ASPIA, Vol.1, 420. 
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 In July of 1793 it was reported that a “talk from the heads of the Upper and Lower 
Creeks” was to be given out “by order of Mad Dog of Tuckabatchee” in Cussita’s town 
square and subsequently forwarded to President George Washington. The purpose of the 
talk was to inform Washington that all Creeks had consented to refrain from frontier 
violence and provide retribution for any murders committed by Creeks. The following 
quote from this talk makes this point evident: 
 
We, the heads of the Upper and lower Creeks wish to inform the president of the 
United States that we have give out talks to put a total stop to all our young 
people going out to commit any hostilities against Cumberland or Kentucky . . . 
so that his [the President] and the red people, should be at peace.9 
 
Thus, by July of 1793 it was quite clear that the majority of Creek towns agreed to protect 
trade by making peace with the Americans and curtailing frontier violence, and that Mad 
Dog of Tuckabatchee was the architect of these particular plans.  
 As the Creek-Chickasaw war raged on, the Upper and Lower Creeks continued to 
deflect frontier violence away from Americans and met with James Seagrove in 
November of that year to negotiate a final peace between the Creeks and the Americans. 
The meeting took place in the Tuckabatchee town square and a “full representation of the 
Creek nations” was reported to be in attendance. Even the Hallowing King of Coweta, the 
town most reluctant to make peace with the Americans, was present and joined the ranks 
of the rest of the Upper and Lower towns during peace overtures. Satisfaction for the 
                                                 
9 A talk from the heads of the Upper and Lower Creeks, by order of Mad Dog of the Tuckabatchees, given 
out at Cussetah (Cussita) square, at a meeting of a number of Lower Creeks, 7/3/1793, Cussita, ASPIA, 
Vol.1, 424. 
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murders of several whites along the St. Mary’s river was promised by the Creeks “by 
capitally punishing two or more of the principals in that affair,” which signified that the 
Creeks were committed to peace with the Americans. Just as Emistisiguo called the 
Creeks to Little Tallassee in 1774 to put aside clan retribution practices in order to 
preserve Anglo-Creek trade, so did the Creeks under the direction of Mad Dog in the 
town square of Tuckabatchee in 1793.10 
 It is not surprising that Tuckabatchee replaced Little Tallassee as the center of 
diplomacy and leading town of the Upper Creeks by 1793. Tuckabatchee possessed all 
the key components of what constituted an official Creek town. The town’s headman, 
Mad Dog, was a warrior-diplomat who obtained power and respect in multiple areas held 
sacred to Creek people: war, diplomacy, and trade. Just as Emistisiguo transcended his 
position from warrior to lead headman and diplomatic liaison through obtaining military 
prowess during the Creek-Choctaw War, and the American Revolution, so did Mad Dog. 
As a result, Mad Dog garnered respect from not only his townspeople of Tuckabatchee, 
but from the Upper and Lower Creek towns as well. 
 The power that Mad Dog and Emistisiguo held was propelled and sustained by 
the support they received from their towns and neighboring villages. More specifically, 
matters of peace and war discussed amongst headmen in the town square became actual 
diplomacy only when a consensus was reached amongst the populace. For example, Mad 
Dog was successful in pursuing peace with the Americans in 1793 because the majority 
                                                 
10 Extract from a letter from James Seagrove, Agent of Indian Affairs of the Southern Department, to the 
Secretary of War, 11/30/1793, Tuckabatchee, ASPIA, Vol. 1, 471-472. 
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of Tuckabatchee men and women supported him. Respected headmen such as Mad Dog 
and Emistisiguo used the art of oral persuasion, logic, and examples of their extensive 
accomplishments in war to launch their individual diplomacies. They did not use 
deception or coercion as McGillivray did. Most important, both ambitious headmen’s 
power stemmed from their strong relations at local level, and it was this combination that 
enabled the two individuals to lead their towns to prominence within the larger Creek 
community. 
 Historian Michael D. Green observed that “After McGillivray’s death, the center 
of Upper Creek Affairs swung to Tuckabatchee.”11 The truth of the matter is that 
Tuckabatchee replaced Little Tallassee in prominence and as a diplomatic center much 
earlier than 1793. After examining the relationships between Little Tallassee and the two 
key leaders who had dwelled there, it is quite clear that Little Tallassee lost its 
significance as a sacred space beginning with the death of Emistisiguo, not Alexander 
McGillivray. Little Tallassee’s decline was gradual. Little Tallassee was a bustling trade 
hub, home to the many Creeks that resided there, and had been the center of diplomatic 
affairs for two decades. Emistisiguo’s legacy lived on well into the early 1780s, as the 
documentary record demonstrated diplomatic assemblies still taking place in the town’s 
square after his death. 
 By the mid to late 1780s, however, diplomatic assemblies of importance in Upper 
Creek country were being conducted at Tuckabatchee, not Little Tallassee. The 
underlying factor behind this decline was Alexander McGillivray’s identity as a trader, 
                                                 
11 Michael D. Green, Politics of Indian Removal, 40. 
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not a Creek headman, as well as his personal priorities in regard to trade over Creek 
cultural traditions at Little Tallassee. As a partner in the lucrative trade firm Panton, 
Leslie, & Company, McGillivray did garner a degree of respect from the Creeks at Little 
Tallassee and surrounding Upper towns. Creeks revered Euro-Americans ability to create 
indispensable trade items such as guns, woven cloth, cooking supplies, etc., and those 
wares had become integral to Creek life by the late eighteenth century. European goods 
were therefore associated with powerful outside individuals and any Creek who had 
access to that world and the wares they supplied were looked upon highly. Access to and 
control of trade, in essence, was a “new” source of power in the Creek world, in addition 
to traditional avenues through hunting, war, diplomacy, oration and persuasion.12 
Trade alone, however, was not enough to sustain Little Tallassee as a Creek town 
and sacred space. Towns were communities where individuals gathered together and 
made collective decisions in regards to social, economic, political, and spiritual affairs. 
To that end, town squares, accompanied by sacred fire, spatially and symbolically 
represented the ties townspeople shared together despite any distance between them.13 
Thus, all decisions in regard to Creek life were discussed around the sacred fire and 
collectively decided upon. Alexander McGillivray was not only disinterested in the 
spiritual and social life of Creek society, but he had no means to draw on any traditional 
sources of power to participate in that world. He was not a headman or warrior and as a 
Beloved Man he could only advise the council around the sacred fire, not participate. 
                                                 
12 On sources of power, see O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830 (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002), Chapter 5. 
13 On towns, see Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), Introduction. 
319 
 
 Alexander McGillivray accelerated Little Tallassee’s decline. First, McGillivray 
abused his access to trade. Ruled by self-interest, McGillivray coerced Upper Creek 
towns to trade only with Panton, Leslie, & Company. Towns that did not willingly enter 
the fold, McGillivray pressured with violence through his private police force and was 
rumored to have carried out execution orders of independent traders. Since Spain had 
granted McGillivray the power to distribute trade goods, he threatened to withhold wares 
from towns that challenged McGillivray’s vice grip on Creek access to trade.14 Individual 
Creek towns were locally autonomous units that belonged to a loosely tied together Creek 
Confederacy. Thus, it was Creek custom and law that towns decided for themselves what 
was best for their village. McGillivray’s monopoly on Creek trade endangered individual 
town autonomy and often left headmen no choice but to defer to McGillivray on matters 
of trade. 
 Second, Alexander McGillivray’s campaign to push for a centralized Creek 
‘Nation’ and government was part of a new worldview and one that the Creeks in the 
1780s and 1790s were just not ready for. It was not until the Creek Civil War (Red Stick 
War) beginning in 1812 that the Creeks contemplated the idea seriously and divided. Yet, 
even after the civil war, the importance of local politics and individual town autonomy 
remained. Out of all the Southeastern Indian Nations, the Creeks are the only Nation to 
not allow their government to penetrate village and clan affairs. More specifically, as 
historian Duane Champagne points out, “villages remained the primary political unites of 
                                                 
14 There are no records of McGillivray ordering any Creek to be executed. Michael D. Green, The Politics 
of Indian Removal, 33-34; McGillivray to Zepedes, 11/15/1786, Little Tallassee, in Caughey, McGillivray 
of the Creeks, 139. For more information on the role of private police, see also Green, “Alexander 
McGillivray,” in American Indian Leaders, 51. 
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Creeks and Seminole societies, and political relations were mediated through village 
governments.” This was so even after Removal in the 1830s. Thus, while other Natives 
all adopted U.S. style constitutional governments by the twenty-first century, the Creeks 
ensured that “their sacred, political, and social rights” be preserved through the sacred 
and official unit of Creek life, the town.15 The present-day Creek Muskogean Nation 
continues to preserve the importance of Creek towns in government and identity. 
Alexander McGillivray’s attempt to dismantle the autonomy of Creek towns and 
his blatant disregard for local and consensus politics alienated him from the townspeople 
of Little Tallassee as well from neighboring towns. Without respect and support from the 
Creek community, McGillivray’s power was confined to trade and his abuse of that 
authority left him disgraced by Creek headman and warriors. Without a traditional 
headman to embrace Creek traditions and customs, Little Tallassee quickly reverted back 
to its original form: a trade post. Alexander McGillivray was indeed, Lachlan 
McGillivray’s son and replacement as Little Tallassee’s resident trader.  
The Creek town of Little Tallassee is a unique product of a particular colonial 
encounter. Emistisiguo’s role in shaping Little Tallassee into a sacred and diplomatic 
space is just as exceptional as his own transformation from warrior to leading headman, 
warrior-diplomat, and Upper Creek spokesperson. The rise and fall of Little Tallassee as 
a sacred space is intertwined with the events of Emistisiguo’s life, which demonstrates 
the relationship between Emistisiguo and the town of Little Tallassee as somewhat of an 
                                                 
15 Duane Champagne, Social Change and Cultural Continuity Among Native Nations (Lanham, MD: 
AltaMira Press, 2007), 100-101, 104. 
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enigma. The fact that no headman ever replaced Emistisiguo leaves many questions 
unanswered. This dissertation has explored the evolution of Little Tallassee from trade 
center to Creek town, and restored Emistisiguo’s role in and importance to Creek history. 
The twin goal of this study was to dismantle many myths that surround Alexander 
McGillivray as a Creek leader and an individual of authority within Creek Country. It is 
my hope that these chapters have done so and in turn, answer one mystery that belongs to 
the Native South and the world of Early American places and spaces.  
The research findings within this study encourage scholars to reevaluate 
significant people and places within eighteenth-century Southeastern Indian 
historiography by paying closer attention to the perspectives and motives of individual 
Native people. By doing so, historians can better understand the actions of Native 
Americans such as Emistisiguo and the physical locations they occupied and operated 
within, which up until this study were misunderstood and overshadowed. Scholars have 
cast their gaze far too long at western educated mestizos and culture brokers like 
Alexander McGillivray, and as a result have obscured the Native architects of diplomacy 
and trade that dominated the economic and social realms of both European and Indian 
societies throughout the eighteenth-century. I encourage historians of Native American 
History to keep in mind the value of town and local town studies, as well as the enduring 
power of Indian institutions and worldviews in shaping and reshaping these historical 
interactions. 
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